Ex Parte Lindskog

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jan 30, 2012

10502020 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 30, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10/502,020 04/20/2005 Kjell Lindskog PAH-104 8970
7590 01/31/2012
Mark P. Stone
Attorney at Law
400 Columbus Avenue
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
BROWN, VERNAL U
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2612
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/31/2012 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
________________

Ex parte KJELL LINDSKOG
________________

Appeal 2010-001877
Application 10/502,020
Technology Center 2600
________________

Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, MARC S. HOFF, and
BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2010-001877
Application 10/502,020

2
SUMMARY
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejections of claims 1-20.
Claims 1-5 and 8-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Kniffin (US 5,705,991; issued Jan. 6, 1998) in view of Mellen (US
6,384,709 B2; issued May 7, 2002) and Levy (US 4,884,507; issued Dec. 5,
1989).
Claims 6-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Kniffin in view of Mellen, Levy, and Giessl (US 6,538,557 B1; issued Mar.
25, 2003).
We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Independent claim 1 is representative of the claimed subject matter:1
1. A method pertaining to the transportation of an alarmed
container, particularly with respect to the transportation of
valuable objects or valuable documents, wherein the container
(1) includes a first electronic unit (2) which can function to
accept and permit deactivation and/or opening of the container,
and wherein a primary key (10) by means of which the
container can be opened includes a second electronic unit (12)
for communication with the first electronic unit (2) so as to
initiate opening of the container, said container including
means for destroying the valuable objects or documents

1 Appellant argues claims 1-20 together as a group. See App. Br. 4-5.
Accordingly, we select independent claim 1 as representative.
Appeal 2010-001877
Application 10/502,020

3
contained therein unless said container is deactivated by a
complete code-set (ABCD) when opening the container,
characterized in that a person transporting the container (1)
carries the primary key (10), the steps of said method
comprising opening and/or deactivation of the container (1) at
an intended destination with the aid of a code subset (AB) from
said person-carried primary key (10) in simultaneous co-action
with a code subset (CD) from a secondary key (20) located at
said intended destination, and providing said complete code-set
(ABCD) from said simultaneous co-action between said
primary and secondary keys for initialising
opening/deactivation of said container without destroying the
valuable objects or documents within said container.

CONTENTIONS AND ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that claims 1-20 are allowable for three main
reasons. First, Appellant argues that Kniffin’s teaching of the detection of
two or more users within a 60 second time period does not teach or suggest
the limitation of “simultaneous co-action” of a primary key and a secondary
key as required by claim 1 (App. Br. 6-7; Reply Br. 2-4). Second, Appellant
argues that Kniffin’s teaching of opening a container upon the detection of
two users does not teach or suggest the limitation of opening a container
with the co-action of first and second code subsets as required by claim 1
(App. Br. 7-8; Reply Br. 2-4). Third, Appellant argues that the combination
of Kniffin, Mellen, and Levy is improper because: (a) no suggestion or
motivation to combine the references existed (App. Br. 8-10), (b) improper
Appeal 2010-001877
Application 10/502,020

4
hindsight was used to combine the references (App. Br. 9), and (c) Kniffin
teaches against the steps of claim 1 (App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 5).
We disagree with the Appellant’s contentions. We adopt as our own
(1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from
which the appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in
the Examiner’s Answer in response to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We
concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-20 is affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv)(2010).

AFFIRMED

rwk