Ex Parte Lin et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jun 4, 2012

11261730 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 4, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte RICHARD S. LIN, MONJI G. JABORI, and
DALLAS M. BARLOW
____________

Appeal 2009-010285
Application 11/261,730
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES R. HUGHES, and
ANDREW J. DILLON, Administrative Patent Judges.

DILLON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-36. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention is directed to a computer protection system
which includes a module for detecting movement of the computer and means
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for automatically placing a drive device of the computer in a suspend state in
response to that movement. See Spec. 17, Abstract of the Disclosure.
Claim 1 is illustrative, with key disputed limitations emphasized:
1. A computer protection system, comprising:

a mobile detection module adapted to detect at least one event
indicating a likelihood of movement of a computer and, in response to
detecting the at least one event, automatically place a drive device of
the computer in a powered suspend state.

The Examiner relies on the following as evidence of unpatentability:
Jung US 6,243,819 B1 June 5, 2001
Clark US 5,748,972 May 5, 1998
Evans US 2002/0171546 A1 Nov. 21, 2002
Kwok US 7,053,883 B1 May 30, 2006
(filed Oct. 24, 2000)

THE REJECTIONS
1. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 8-11, 13, 15-20, 24, 25, 27-31,
33, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Jung.
Ans. 4-8.1
2. The Examiner rejected claims 3, 6, 7, 21, 26, and 35 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Jung and Clark. Ans. 8-9.
3. The Examiner rejected claims 4, 5, 22, 23, 32, and 36 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Jung and Evans. Ans. 9-10.

1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Appeal Brief filed June 27, 2008,
the Examiner’s Answer mailed October 22, 2008, and the Reply Brief filed
November 18, 2008.
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4. The Examiner rejected claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Jung and Kwok. Ans. 10.

ISSUES
Based upon our review of the record and the arguments of the
Appellants, the following issues are dispositive of the claims on appeal:
1. Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 8-11,
13, 15-20, 24, 25, 27-31, 33, and 34 by finding that Jung would
have taught or suggested placing a drive device of a computer “in a
powered suspend state” in response to detecting an event
indicating a likelihood of movement of the computer?
2. Does the Examiner’s proposed modification of Jung render Jung
unsatisfactory for its intended purpose?

FINDINGS OF FACT
We find that the following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are
supported by at least a preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v.
Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general
evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Office).
1. Jung discloses a power management system for detecting the
closed and open state of the flat panel display of a portable
computer. Jung, col. 7, ll. 59-63.
2. Jung discloses that upon detection of the closure of the display lid,
the computer system enters a suspend state. Jung, col. 5, ll. 56-66.
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ANALYSIS
The § 103 Rejection of Claims 1, 2, 8-11, 13, 15-20,
24, 25, 27-31, 33, and 34
Appellants argue that claims 1, 13, 19, 29, and 34, the independent
claims on appeal, each recites, inter alia, a “powered suspend state.”
Appellants note that the Examiner has acknowledged that Jung is silent on
whether the “suspend state” taught therein is a “powered suspend state.”
App. Br. 5.
The Examiner finds that the “stand-by” mode of Jung, where the hard
drive is powered, would have been obvious to utilize in place of the
“suspend” mode where the hard drive is not powered. Ans. 5.
Appellants also argue that as the stated intention of Jung is to
“maximize battery life” the provision of battery power to a “powered
suspend state” would render Jung unsuitable for its stated purpose. App. Br.
5.
The Examiner finds that Jung also teaches that it is a goal of the
system described therein to permit a user to immediately resume operations
without requiring the system to reinitialized. Ans. 14.
Appellants also argue that although Jung describes both a suspend
mode and a standby mode there is no teaching within Jung that the standby
mode is entered in response to the closing of the display lid, as described for
initializing the suspend mode. Reply Br. 3.
We begin our analysis by construing Appellants’ claim. We give
claim limitations the “broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
[S]pecification” in accordance with our mandate that “claim language should
be read in light of the [S]pecification as it would be interpreted by one of
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ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Initially we note that Appellants’ have not identified a specific
definition within their Specification as to what constitutes a “powered
suspend state.” Consequently, we find that any state in which the power
applied to the computer systems which is less than the full operating power
is a reasonable interpretation of a “powered suspend state.”
We find that Jung teaches the detection of the movement of the flat
panel display (FF1) and the placement of the computer system into a
“suspend state” in response to that detection (FF2).
In light of the foregoing, we find the Examiner’s argument persuasive
that Jung teaches or suggests the placing of a computer system into a state of
less than full power in response to detection of movement (the movement of
the flat panel display). The express teaching of Jung of both a “suspend”
and “standby” mode further buttresses our finding.
Further, we find the utilization of either a “suspend” or “standby”
mode will enhance the battery life of the Jung system. We therefore find
that the proposed modification of Jung by the Examiner does not render
Jung unsuitable for its intended purpose, nor does it support the Appellants’
position that Jung teaches away from the proposed modification, since either
mode will enhance battery life within the Jung system.
It is well settled that “[t]he prior art’s mere disclosure of more than
one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these
alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or
otherwise discourage the solution claimed . . . .” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d
1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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We are therefore not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
representative claim 1 and claims 2, 8-11, 13, 15-20, 24, 25, 27-31, 33, and -
34, which were not separately argued with particularity.
Appellants have not separately argued the rejections of claims 3-7, 12,
14, 21-23, 26, 32, 35, and 36 as unpatentable under §103 over Jung in
various combinations with Clark, Evans, or Kwok.
Consequently, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the
Examiner’s rejection of those claims as unpatentable under §103 over Jung
in combination with Clark, Evans, or Kwok.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-36 under §103.

ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-36 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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