Ex Parte Liebermann

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 28, 2013

10718023 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10/718,023 11/19/2003 Raanan Liebermann 03-125 8805
34704 7590 03/29/2013
BACHMAN & LAPOINTE, P.C.
900 CHAPEL STREET
SUITE 1201
NEW HAVEN, CT 06510
EXAMINER
ELISCA, PIERRE E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3718
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/29/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte RAANAN LIEBERMANN
____________________

Appeal 2010-009038
Application 10/718,023
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before: MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, ANTON W. FETTING,
and JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-36, 39-44, and 46-72. We affirm-in-
part.

THE CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant claims a touch language which can be used by deaf, blind
and deafblind persons for sensory reception of visual images displayed on a
device such as a television and for communicating with others.
(Specification 1:4-6). Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for communicating visual images to a
handicapped person, said method comprising the
steps of:
providing at least one device for physically
transmitting information to said handicapped
person;
providing information about said visual
images to said handicapped person using said at
least one device; and
said information providing step comprising
delivering a physical signal representative of a key
word describing a portion of a visual image to a
first part of a body of said handicapped person
using said at least one device and further
comprising transmitting at least one physical input
describing a dynamic element associated with said
key word to a second part of the body of said
handicapped person.

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Hagle
Lynt
Butnaru
US 3,831,296
US 5,636,038
US 6,240,392 B1
Aug. 27, 1974
Jun. 3, 1997
May 29, 2001
Nissen US 2004/0098256 A1 May 20, 2004

REJECTIONS
The following rejections are before us for review.
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3-9, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22-27, 42, 43, 46-
49, 53-58, 71, and 72 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Lynt, or,
alternatively, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Lynt.
The Examiner rejected claims 2, 13, 16-18, 21, 28-32, 35, 36, 44, 52,
59-64, and 67-70 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Lynt and
Hagle.
The Examiner rejected claims 10-12, 39-41, 50, and 51 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Lynt and Butnaru.
The Examiner rejected claims 33, 34, 65, and 66 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Lynt and Nissen.

FINDINGS OF FACT
We find the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
1. The Specification does not define or describe the term key word.
2. The ordinary and customary definition of the term key word, as defined
by Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.), is: “a: a word
exemplifying the meaning or value of a letter or symbol.”
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3. Lynt discloses communicating information about an image in the form
of a key word, stating, “image identification along with a synthesized
voice output could be used. For example, if the device could recognize a
familiar object or person, the voice synthesizer could issue a spoken alert
such as ‘mailbox’ or ‘Mr. Bill’ to the user.” (Col. 6, ll. 10-14).
4. The Specification does not define or describe the term dynamic element.
5. The Specification describes by example that “[d]ynamic elements are
provided by attributing action to body parts, such as the palm throughout
strength of impact, vibration, or perceived (virtual) movement of
elements, whether in linear, curvature, rotational or other motion. Thus,
dynamic elements provide for direction, size and speed, to name a few
situations.” (Spec. 16, ll. 4-7).
6. Lynt discloses transmitting at least one physical input describing a
dynamic element, in that “a tactile image is formed by the movement of
the rods against the body (skin) of the person.” (Col. 5, ll. 32-33).
7. Lynt discloses transmitting at least one physical input describing a
dynamic element, by “indicating the color of the object, through a
particular mechanical vibration for a particular color, for example.”
(Col. 5, ll. 35-38).
8. Lynt discloses storing a database of key words, stating, a “data base of
common object patterns could be stored and accessed during this
processing to identify ubiquitous objects, such as traffic lights, mail
boxes, police cars, tanks, etc.” (Col. 4, ll. 29-32).
9. Lynt discloses transmitting audio information using Braille characters,
stating, “[i]f the processing includes speech analysis, for example, the
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tactile display could be caused to form alphabetical or braille type
characters.” (Col. 5, ll. 50-53).
10. Lynt discloses a hand-held display that transmits information to the
palm, stating, “the display could be made spherical and about the size of
a tennis ball, for instance. When held in the hand, and provided with 3-
D information about an apple, for example, the sphere would take the
three-dimensional form of the apple.” (Col. 5, ll. 22-26).
11. Lynt discloses a display in contact with the hand, in that the display is
“formed as a two dimensional grid (X-Y dimensions) on which the
individual would place their hand, for example.” (Col. 4, ll. 61-64).
12. Lynt discloses identifying motion, stating the “processing means in
essence identifies objects, their relative size, their spatial location
relative to the device, their movement, if any, etc.” (Col. 3, ll. 41-43).
13. Lynt discloses displaying the processed images, stating the “tactile
display means converts the processed electrical signals from the
processing means into so-called ‘tactile images.” (Col. 3, ll. 57-59).
14. The Specification describes “a continuation signal” as follows:
When the mechanical object reaches the North of the
PalmScreen, it reverts to it[s] initial South position on the Palm
Screen to continue, which practically means repeat its
movement toward the North. An indicator is needed for the
deafblind person, so that the repeated movement will be
considered a continuation. Such an indicator is a dynamic
parameter providing the needed signal at the point when the
mechanical object reverts to its initial position to create the
"illusion" of continuance. There are various possibilities for
such a signal. It could be a vibration at the end of the motion
before it is repeated.
(Spec. 17, ll. 9-15).
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15. The Specification does not define or describe the term musical
background.
16. The Specification describes musical background by example that:
It is common in watching a suspense movie on TV, to have no
words, dialogue or written material, where all that is presented
to the viewer is some screen activity with a background sound
or music. The music is composed and utilized for the creation
of a sense of suspense in the viewer. Since the deafblind cannot
hear the music, a functionally equivalent signal that can achieve
a similar effect for the deafblind needs to be found.
(Spec. 19, ll. 16-20).
17. Lynt discloses the object of “provid[ing] a visually impaired person with
a tactile representation of the field of view of a sighted person, e.g., the
objects in front of the individual and their respective spatial locations.”
(Col. 1, ll. 30-33).
18. Hagle discloses “on the thumb 38 there is one [stimulator] ....” (Col. 3,
ll. 34-38).
19. Hagle discloses the “stimulator on each thumb 38 corresponds to the
shift key.” (Col. 3, ll. 47-48).
20. Hagle discloses at column 3 lines 15-29 that each stimulator mounted in
the backs of fingers of the glove “presses the end of a plunger against the
back of the hand ....” (Col. 3, ll. 15-29).
21. Butnaru discloses a system for hearing-impaired individuals that
receives and processes audio information and displays a symbolic
representation of the audio speech data. (Col. 2, ll. 30-44).
22. The Specification does not define or describe the term cradle.
23. The ordinary and customary definition of the term cradle, as defined by
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.), is: “a framework
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or support suggestive of a baby's cradle: as (1): a framework of bars and
rods.”
ANALYSIS
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Lynt
Rejection of Claims 1, 22, and 27
We find Lynt explicitly discloses the disputed limitations of claims 1,
22 and 27, and thus we affirm the rejections of these claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) and § 103(a). Anticipation is the epitome of obviousness. Jones v.
Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See also In re Fracalossi, 681
F.2d 792, 794 (CCPA 1982); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402 (CCPA
1974).
Appellant argues Lynt does not disclose communicating information
about an image in the form of a key word, because Lynt “may be modified
to output Braille characters, or another representation, corresponding to
detected speech” but not a key word which describes a portion of a visual
image. App. Br. 17-18, 21, Rep. Br. 2.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument. First, we find the
Specification does not define the term “key word.” (FF 1). We rely on the
ordinary and customary meaning of “a word exemplifying the meaning of a
value of a letter or symbol.” (FF 2). We find Lynt discloses communicating
information about an image in the form of a key word, because Lynt
discloses identifying symbols in the form of an image, and speaking a word
such as “mailbox” to the user (FF 3), thus meeting the claim language
because “mailbox” exemplifies the meaning of the image/symbol of a
mailbox.
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Appellant argues, as to transmitting an input describing a dynamic
element, “‘dynamic element’ is not even used in Lynt et al.” App. Br. 18.
We find the Specification does not define the term “input describing a
dynamic element” (FF 4) but describes it as providing action to body parts,
such as vibration or movement (FF 5). This is not an ipsissimis verbis test,
i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832
(Fed. Cir. 1990). We find Lynt discloses transmitting at least one physical
input describing a dynamic element using both movement (FF 6) and
vibration (FF 7), thus meeting the claim language.
Appellant also argues Lynt does not disclose that “images would be
felt by different parts of the body.” App. Br. 18. This argument is restated,
that Lynt “does not disclose” transmitting a keyword to a first part of the
body and transmitting a dynamic element to a second part of the body. Rep.
Br. 2-3, 5. Claim 1 requires “delivering a physical signal representative of a
key word describing a portion of a visual image to a first part of a body ...
and ... transmitting at least one physical input describing a dynamic element
associated with said key word to a second part of the body....” Lynt
discloses transmitting signals to a hand through a three-dimensional display
(FF 10) and through a grid on which the hand is placed (FF 11), each of
which would transmit information to both the palm and fingers, thus meeting
the claim limitation. Lynt also discloses transmitting an audio message of a
keyword (FF 3), which further meets the claim by “delivering a physical
signal ... to a first part of the body” in the form of audio to the ear, in
addition to the tactile transmission to the hand.
As to the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection only, Appellant also argues the
rejection depends on hindsight, because nothing in Lynt discloses a reason
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for a modification of Lynt, or both a key word and a dynamic element. Rep.
Br. 5.
We are not persuaded by this argument because Lynt explicitly
discloses this feature. That is, because Lynt discloses identifying symbols in
the form of an image, and speaking a key word such as “mailbox” to the user
(FF 3), it meets the claim language because “mailbox” exemplifies the
meaning of the image/symbol of a mailbox. In addition, we find Lynt
discloses transmitting a dynamic element, as set forth above.
Rejection of claim 42
Independent claim 42 recites, in pertinent part, “means for delivering
a physical signal representative of a key word associated with said visual
images to a first part of a body of said handicapped person,” and “means for
delivering at least one physical input describing a dynamic element
associated with said key word to a palm of said handicapped person.”
Appellant argues there is “no disclosure of any dynamic element
being transmitted to the palm of the handicapped person.” App. Br. 22. We
are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because we find Lynt discloses
transmitting at least one physical input describing a dynamic element using
both movement (FF 6) and vibration (FF 7), thus meeting the claim
language. Therefore, we affirm the rejection of claim 42 under both 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of claim 3
Dependent claim 3 recites, in pertinent part, “delivering said key word
signal in Braille form to said first body part of said handicapped person..”
Appellant argues Lynt does not disclose transmitting a key word using
Braille. App. Br. 23-24, Rep. Br. 7.
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We agree with Appellants with respect to the anticipation rejection
only, but we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument to the 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) rejection because Lynt discloses transmitting an audio key word (FF
3), maintaining a database of key words (FF 8), and transmitting Braille
characters (FF 9). We find that one of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that transmitting an audio key word to someone who has impaired
hearing could instead be done using the disclosed method of transmitting
Braille characters, thus meeting the claim requirements. “[A] person of
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”
KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
Therefore, we affirm the rejection of claim 3 only under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a).
Rejection of claims 4 and 43
Dependent claim 4 recites, in pertinent part, “transmitting said at least
one physical input describing a said dynamic element associated with said
visual image to a palm of said handicapped person.” Claim 43 is argued as a
group with claim 4 (App. Br. 25) and falls with claim 4. See, 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Appellant argues Lynt “does not disclose transmitting an input which
describes a dynamic element associated with a visual image.” App. Br. 24-
25. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because Lynt discloses
transmitting a vibration associated with a color (FF 7), which meets the
claim language of “transmitting said at least one physical input describing a
said dynamic element associated with a visual image.” Although this
portion of Lynt does not explicitly state that this vibration is transmitted “to
a palm of said handicapped person,” Lynt does disclose a spherical display
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that is “held in the hand” (FF 10). A vibration to the hand would also
transmit to the palm, because the palm is part of the hand.
Appellant argues “the word ‘palm’ is nowhere to be found in Lynt et
al.” App. Br. 25. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because
Lynt discloses communication means “held in the hand” (FF 10), or upon
which the user would “place their hand” (FF 11), and the palm is part of the
hand.
Appellant finally argues, “the Examiner errs because it is not
recognized that there is no disclosure in this portion of Lynt et al. of
transmitting a dynamic element associated with a key word to the palm of a
user.” Rep. Br. 7. This argument fails because claim 4 does not require that
the dynamic element be associated with a key word, but only that it is
associated with “said visual image,” which we addressed above.
Therefore, we affirm the rejection of claim 4 under both 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of claim 5
Dependent claim 5 recites, in pertinent part, “transmitting a plurality
of successive elements describing a motion to said palm of said handicapped
person.”
Appellant argues “there is no mention in Lynt et al. of transmitting
any motion signal to the palm of a user.” App. Br. 25, Rep. Br. 7-8. We are
not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because Lynt discloses transmitting
vibration, which we interpret as a plurality of successive elements describing
a motion because it involves repeated movements, thus meeting the claim
language. In addition, we find Lynt discloses the processing means
identifies movement of objects (FF 12), and display means that displays
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tactile images of the processing means (FF 13). Therefore, we interpret Lynt
to mean that it transmits information about the movement of an object. We
thus affirm the rejection of claim 5 under both 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of claims 6, 7, 46, and 47
Dependent claims 6 and 46 each recite, in pertinent part, “transmitting
a continuance signal to said palm of said handicapped person to indicate
continuance of said motion.” Dependent claims 7 and 47 each recite, in
pertinent part, “transmitting said signal in the form of at least one vibration
or impact on a body part.”
Appellant argues there is “no mention in Lynt et al. of transmitting
any continuance signal to the palm of a user.” App. Br. 25. We construe
“continuance signal” to be a particular piece of information about movement
that indicates movement information must change but that it is merely a
continuation of the prior movement rather than a new movement (FF 14).
This signal does not further affect the function of the claims, which transmit
information. Although the signal may have significance to the receiver, as a
code, the signal within the claim is merely non-functional content. Our
courts direct us not to give content such as this patentable weight. See In re
Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Lynt discloses transmitting
motion information (FF 6, 7, 12, 13), which therefore meets the claim
language of all these claims. We thus affirm the rejection of these claims
under both 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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Rejection of claims 8 and 48
Dependent claims 8 and 48 each recite, in pertinent part, “delivering
information about a musical background associated with said visual image to
said handicapped person.”
Appellant argues “there is nothing in Lynt et al. which discloses
transmitting a musical background associated with a visual image ....” App.
Br. 26, Rep. Br. 8. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because
we find the undefined term “musical background” (FF 15) is construed to
mean a particular type of content, in this case, music (FF 16). We therefore
construe “musical background” to be content, to which we give no
patentable weight, similar to printed matter. Patentable weight need not be
given to descriptive material absent a new and unobvious functional
relationship between the descriptive material and the substrate. See In re
Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Although content may have
meaning to the receiving individual, it does not affect the methods or
functions claimed. Therefore, we affirm the rejection of claims 8 and 48
under both 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), because Lynt
discloses delivering information to a person (FF 6), thus meeting the claim
language.
Rejection of claims 9 and 49
Dependent claims 9 and 49 each recite, in pertinent part, “transmitting
at least one of long and short physical impacts to a body part of said
handicapped person.”
Appellant argues, “Lynt et al. forms a tactile display. It is not inherent
that long or short physical impacts are transmitted to the user ....” App. Br.
26-27. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because Lynt
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discloses both short impacts in the form of vibrations (FF 7) and long
impacts in the form of motion (FF 12, 13), thus meeting the claim language.
We therefore affirm the rejection of these claims under both 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of claims 14, 15, 53, and 54
Dependent claims 14 and 53 each recite, in pertinent part,
“transmitting information about said visual images to the back of at least one
finger of said handicapped person.” Dependent claims 15 and 54 each
recite, in pertinent part, “transmitting information about the character of a
person displayed in said visual images ....”
Appellant argues there is no disclosure, either explicitly or inherently,
of the transmission of visual images to the back of a finger. App. Br. 27,
Rep. Br. 8-9. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because Lynt
discloses transmitting information to a person’s hand (FF 11), and since the
hand is placed on the display, the back of the hand would either receive the
information directly or through the finger, depending upon whether the hand
is placed palm-down or palm-up.
Appellant argues as to claims 15 and 54, that there is no disclosure of
transmitting the “descriptive information” about the character of a person
displayed. Rep. Br. 9. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument,
because the content transmitted does not affect the function of the claim,
which requires transmitting information. That information, then, is mere
content, undeserving of patentable weight. Id.
We therefore affirm the rejection of these claims under both 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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Rejection of claims 19 and 55
Dependent claims 19 and 55 each recite, in pertinent part,
“transmitting information about said visual images to a front portion of at
least one finger.”
Appellant argues Lynt does not disclose the claim limitation because
“Lynt at al. is not specific as to the portions of the body part to which what
information is to be transmitted.” Rep. Br. 27-28. We are not persuaded by
Appellant’s argument, because Lynt discloses transmitting to a person’s
hand (FF 11), which would transmit to the front portion of a finger because
the hand is placed on the display, thus meeting the claim language, in that
fingers are part of a hand. We therefore affirm the rejection of these claims
under both 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of claim 20
Dependent claim 20 recites, in pertinent part, “said transmitting step
comprises transmitting information about a particular group.” Claim 20
depends from claim 19, which depends from claim 1, but neither of those
claims includes the term “group.”
Appellant argues Lynt does not disclose “transmitting information
about a particular group to a front portion of the at least one finger.” App.
Br. 28. Appellant also argues, the information “has to be transmitted to a
front portion of at least one finger.” Rep. Br. 9. The argument fails because
claim 20 requires transmitting information, without reference to a finger
portion, but because it uses the “comprises” term, it does not necessarily
require that that information be transmitted according to claim 19, to a front
portion of a finger. In addition, we construe the term “group” in claim 20 to
refer to any unit with several parts, and construe this to be mere content,
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undeserving of patentable weight. We find Lynt discloses transmitting
information about a group of objects in view of a person (FF 17), thus
meeting the broadly construed claim language. We therefore affirm the
rejection of claim 20 under both 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of claims 23-25
Dependent claims 23-25 each recite transmitting different information
“to said front portion of said at least one finger.” Claim 23 recites that the
content is “about scenery,” claim 24 recites that the content is “about a
place,” and claim 25 recites that the content is “about an activity.”
Appellant argues Lynt does not “say what portion of the body any
information is transmitted to.” App. Br. 28. We are not persuaded by
Appellant’s argument, because we find Lynt discloses a tactile display
would permit the transmission of information to fingers, because fingers are
part of a hand. (FF 11).
Appellant also argues the specific information content claimed as
being transmitted is not disclosed in Lynt. App. Br. 28. This content,
however, does not deserve patentable weight, since it represents non-
functional descriptive material, similar to printed matter. Id.
We therefore affirm the rejection of these claims under both 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of claims 26 and 57
Dependent claim 26 recites, in pertinent part, “transmitting
information about a dialogue associated with said visual image being spoken
to said handicapped person.” Dependent claim 57 recites a substantially
similar limitation.
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Appellant argues Lynt does not disclose content that is “about a
dialogue.” App. Br. 29. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument,
because the content transmitted does not affect the function of the claim,
which requires transmitting information. That information, then, is mere
content, undeserving of patentable weight. Id. Lynt discloses transmitting
information, and thus meets the claim limitation. (FF 3, 6, 7, 9, 13, 17). We
therefore affirm the rejection of these claims under both 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of claim 71
Dependent claim 71 recites, in pertinent part, “transmitting said at
least one physical input describing said dynamic element to a second part of
the body which is different from said first part of the body.”
Appellant argues Lynt does not disclose the claim limitation because
“Lynt et al. has no specificity of the body parts to which various signals are
transmitted.” App. Br. 29. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument,
because we find Lynt discloses a tactile display upon which the person
places their hand (FF 11), which would transmit movement to at least two
parts of the body, even if only adjoining regions of the palm or fingers. We
construe the claim as permitting simultaneous transmission to different body
parts, and construe “different” body parts broadly to permit small
distinctions of location, such as different parts of a single finger. We
therefore affirm the rejection of claim 71 under both 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of claim 72
Dependent claim 72 recites, in pertinent part, “delivering means
delivers said physical signal to at least one of fingertips of a hand that does
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not include said palm and fingers that are part of the hand which has said
palm.” We construe the claim to require delivery means to both hands of a
person.
Appellant argues Lynt “does not disclose transmitting signals to more
than one hand and the Examiner offers no articulated reason why one of
ordinary skill in the art having Lynt et al. before them would want to
transmit signals to two hands.” App. Br. 30, Rep. Br. 10-11. We agree with
Appellants with respect to the anticipation, but we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s argument to the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection, because we find
one of ordinary skill in the art would use both hands for communicating if
the amount of encoded information is large, so that more receiving areas are
available.
Appellant argues Lynt does not disclose delivering “the physical
signal to the fingertips of the hand and the dynamic element signal to the
palm of the same hand.” App. Br. 30, Rep. Br. 10-11. The argument fails
because claim 42, from which claim 72 depends, does not require sending a
physical signal to the fingertips, because instead it requires sending it “to a
first part of a body.”
We therefore affirm the rejection of claim 72 under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a).
Rejection of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Lynt and Hagle
Rejection of claims 2 and 44
Dependent claims 2 and 44 each recite, in pertinent part, “delivering
said key word signal in Morse code form to said handicapped person via a
said first body part.”
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Appellant argues “there is no articulated reason why the subject
matter of claim 2 would be rendered obvious by” Hagle’s teaching that
Morse code may be used to communicate unwritten communication. App.
Br. 30-31. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because the
Examiner found that using Morse code is “well known.” Ans. 11-12. We
find that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Morse code is a
well-known way of communicating that would be obvious to employ with
someone with impaired sight, to enhance the other communication methods
of Lynt, such as using Braille symbols.
Appellant further argues there is no reason to combine Lynt and Hagle
because Lynt “does not use a keyboard to communicate with a user.” Rep.
Br. 12. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because the
Examiner set forth a rationale to combine in order “to come up with a
communication system that provide[s] the deaf and blind person total control
thus he or she can truly experience and interact with the environment.” Ans.
10. We find this motivation to be reasonable.
Rejection of claims 13 and 52
Dependent claims 13 and 52 each recite, in pertinent part, “providing
said handicapped person with information about a state of reception of a
system on which said visual images are displayed.”
Appellant argues the citations provided by the Examiner do not
disclose the claim limitation of claims 13 or 52. App. Br. 31-32. We are not
persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because the content transmitted does
not affect the function of the claim, which requires transmitting information.
That information, then, is mere content, undeserving of patentable weight.
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Id. Lynt discloses transmitting information, and thus meets the claim
limitation. (FF 3, 6, 7, 9, 13, 17).
Rejection of claims 16 and 17
Dependent claim 16 recites, in pertinent part:
... dividing said fingers of a hand of said handicapped person
into a first group consisting of a pointer finger and a middle
finger and into a second group consisting of a ring finger and a
pinky and said transmitting step comprises transmitting
information about a bad character to one of said fingers of said
first group and transmitting information about a good character
to one of said fingers of said second group.

Appellant argues that neither Lynt nor Hagle disclose dividing fingers
into groups. Rep. Br. 12. The Examiner cites to Figure 3 and column 3
lines 34-41 as disclosing this limitation. Ans. 10. We find nothing in either
the figure or the sentence cited in column 3 that discloses dividing fingers
into a first and second group, as required. Therefore, we reverse the
rejection of claim 16, and claim 17 that depends from claim 16.
Rejection of claim 18
Dependent claim 18 recites, in pertinent part, “transmitting
information about an age of a character and a personality of said character to
said back of said at least one finger.”
Appellant argues “Hagle is incapable of transmitting information
about age of a character and a personality of the character to the back of at
least one finger.” App. Br. 33. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s
argument, because the content transmitted does not affect the function of the
claim, which requires transmitting information. That information, then, is
mere content, undeserving of patentable weight. Id. Lynt discloses
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transmitting information, and thus meets the claim limitation. (FF 3, 6, 7, 9,
13, 17).
Rejection of claim 21
Dependent claim 21 recites, in pertinent part, “transmitting
information about a profession of a character to said front portion of said at
least one finger.”
Appellant argues “Hagle is incapable of transmitting information
about a profession of a character to the front portion of the at least one finger
since there are a limited number of keys on each finger and the stimulators
are only on the back of the glove.” App. Br. 33. We are not persuaded by
Appellant’s argument, because the content transmitted does not affect the
function of the claim, which requires transmitting information. That
information, then, is mere content, undeserving of patentable weight. Id.
Lynt discloses transmitting information, and thus meets the claim limitation.
(FF 3, 6, 7, 9, 13, 17).
Rejection of claims 28-30
Dependent claim 28 recites, in pertinent part, “using a thumb of said
handicapped person to perform control functions.” Claim 58, 59, and 61 are
argued as a group with claims 28-30 (App. Br. 34) and fall with claim 28.
See, 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Appellant argues “Hagle is incapable” of performing the methods of
claims 28-30. App. Br. 33-34. The Examiner directs us to Hagle, Figures 2
and 3, column 1, line 28 to column 2, line 12, and column 3 lines 30-64.
Within these sections, we find that a stimulator is attached to a thumb in a
glove (FF 18), and that the stimulator on the thumb corresponds to the shift
key (FF 19). We do not find the thumb performing control functions, as
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claimed. Therefore, we reverse the rejection of claim 28, as well as claims
29 and 30 that depend from claim 28.
Rejection of claims 31 and 62
Dependent claims 31 and 62 each recite, in pertinent part,
“transmitting information about at least one of female representation and
cross relationships to a front portion of a pinky of said handicapped person.”
Appellant argues “since the stimulators are on the back of the glove, it
is not possible to use them to transmit information to a front portion of the
pinky.” App. Br. 34. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument,
because we find the content of information is content undeserving of
patentable weight, and find Lynt discloses transmitting to a person’s hand
(FF 11), which would transmit to the front portion of a finger because the
hand is placed on the display, thus meeting the claim language. Id. We find
one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that placing the hand on a
tactile display would permit the transmission of information to fingers,
because fingers are part of a hand.
Rejection of claims 32 and 64
Dependent claim 32 recites, in pertinent part, “using said pinky to
select a particular channel.” Dependent claim 64 recites a substantially
similar limitation.
Appellant argues the Examiner has not cited any portion of Hagle for
this claim. App. Br. 34, Rep. Br. 12. We agree, because we do not find a
citation for this claim in the Answer, except a reference to Figures 1-4 and
column 3 lines 15-29 for a “pinky cradle, i.e. glove.” Ans. 10, 35. This
portion of column 3 discloses that the backs of fingers can be stimulated to
communicate to the person wearing the special gloves. (FF 20). This does
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not provide control of the pinky to select a channel, as required. Therefore,
we find the Examiner has not set forth a prima facie case of obviousness for
claim 32.
Rejection of claim 35
Dependent claim 35 recites, in pertinent part, “transmitting
information about an emotional state to at least one finger of at least one
hand of said handicapped person.”
Appellant argues that while Hagle may be capable of transmitting this
information, the Examiner has not presented a reason to do this. App. Br.
34-35. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because we find the
content of information is content undeserving of patentable weight, and find
Lynt discloses transmitting to a person’s hand (FF 11), which would
transmit to a finger because the hand is placed on the display, thus meeting
the claim language. Id. We find one of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that placing the hand on a tactile display would permit the
transmission of information to fingers, because fingers are part of a hand.
Rejection of claim 36
Dependent claim 36 recites, in pertinent part, “wherein said
information about said emotional state is transmitted to a finger of a hand.”
Appellant argues Hagle is incapable of performing this because the
typewriter arrangement in Hagle “only contains certain letters ....” App. Br.
35. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because we find Lynt
discloses transmitting to a person’s hand (FF 11), which would transmit to a
finger because the hand is placed on the display, thus meeting the claim
language. Id.
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Rejection of claims 60 and 63
Dependent claim 60 recites, in pertinent part, “a thumb cradle.”
Dependent claim 63 recites, in pertinent part, “a pinky cradle.”
Appellant argues there is no disclosure in Lynt or Hagle of a thumb
cradle or pinky cradle. App. Br. 34. The Examiner equates each cradle to a
glove, and directs us to Hagle, column 3. Ans. 10. The term “cradle” is not
defined (FF 22), so we use the ordinary and customary definition of “a
framework or support suggestive of a baby's cradle: as (1) : a framework of
bars and rods.” FF 23. We do not find that a glove includes a framework or
support suggestive of a baby’s cradle, since a glove is typically a cloth
garment. Therefore, we reverse the rejection of claims 60 and 63.
Rejection of claim 67
Dependent claim 67 recites, in pertinent part, “means for transmitting
information about an aggression group, a neutral group, and a pleasant group
to at least one finger of at least one hand of said handicapped person.”
Appellant argues there is no disclosure of transmitting the particular
content by Hagle. App. Br. 35. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s
argument, because the content transmitted does not affect the function of the
claim, which requires transmitting information. That information, then, is
mere content, undeserving of patentable weight. Id.
Rejection of claims 68-70
Dependent claim 68 recites, in pertinent part, “wherein said
information about said aggression group is transmitted to a first finger of a
hand.” Dependent claim 69 recites, in pertinent part, “wherein said
information about said neutral group is transmitted to a middle finger of a
hand.” Dependent claim 70 recites, in pertinent part, “wherein said
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information about said pleasant group is transmitted to a fourth finger of a
hand.” We construe each claim as requiring transmission of information to a
particular finger, but not requiring the exclusion of other fingers.
Appellant argues Lynt is “incapable” of transmissions as claimed
because in Lynt and Hagle “each finger only contains certain letters which
do not necessarily form words.” App. Br. 35. We are not persuaded by
Appellant’s argument, because the content transmitted does not affect the
function of the claim, which requires transmitting information. That
information, then, is mere content, undeserving of patentable weight. We
also are not persuaded by Appellants' argument, because Lynt discloses
transmitting to a person’s hand (FF 11), which would transmit to the front
portion of a finger because the hand is placed on the display, thus meeting
the claim language. Id. We find one of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that placing the hand on a tactile display would permit the
transmission of information to fingers, because fingers are part of a hand.
Rejection of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Lynt and Butnaru
Rejection of claims 10, 11, 39, 50, and 51
Dependent claim 10 recites, in pertinent part, “transmitting
information about a start of and an end of a commercial advertisement to
said handicapped person.” Dependent claim 11 recites, in pertinent part,
“transmitting information about a start of and an end of a test to said
handicapped person.” Claims 50 and 51 are argued as a group along with
claims 10 and 11 (App. Br. 37), and fall with claims 10 and 11. See, 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Appellant argues nothing teaches the transmitting steps of claims 10
or 11. App. Br. 36, Rep. Br. 12-13. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s
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argument, because the content transmitted does not affect the function of the
claim, which requires transmitting information. That information, then, is
mere content, undeserving of patentable weight. Id. Lynt discloses
transmitting information, and thus meets the claim limitation. (FF 3, 6, 7, 9,
13, 17). Therefore, we affirm the rejection of claims 10 and 11, as well as
claim 39 that is not separately argued. App. Br. 37.
Rejection of claim 12
Dependent claim 12 recites, in pertinent part, “storing information
from a written indicia scrolling across a screen containing said visual images
for play at another time.”
Appellant argues the Examiner’s citation to Butnaru and reasoning
have “nothing to do” with the claim. App. Br. 36-37, Rep. Br. 13-14. The
Specification describes that “deafblind are not able to utilize the hearing
sense to listen to what happens on the upper side of the [television news
program] screen while utilizing their seeing sense to read the information
strip at the bottom of the screen.” (Spec. 19, ll. 2-4). The Specification
further describes that since the running news strips at the bottom of the
screen are repeated and not broadcast during commercials, and not tied to
the rest of the screen, they can be stored for later communication. (Spec. 19,
ll. 7-12). The Examiner cites to column 2 lines 41-44 as disclosing the
limitation. This section discloses a communication system for hearing-
impaired individuals that interprets audio information and provides a
“display means” for the interpreted audio information. (FF 21).
This section does not store information from a written indicia
scrolling across a screen, because instead it displays audio information in
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visual form. Therefore, we find the Examiner has not set forth a prima facie
case of obviousness of claim 12, so we reverse the rejection as to this claim.
Rejection of claim 40
Dependent claim 40 recites, in pertinent part, “information about said
dialogue is transmitted by a keypad contacting fingertips of said deafblind
person and said key word is delivered to said deafblind person through a
plurality of impacts on a palm of a hand of said deafblind person.” We
construe this claim as not requiring the transmission to both the fingertips
and palm to be simultaneous.
Appellant argues there is no keypad in Lynt. App. Br. 37. We are not
persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because Lynt discloses transmitting
information using Braille to the fingertips and information about a keyword
to the palm. (FF 9, 10).
Appellant also argues there is “no articulated reason” to combine Lynt
and Butnaru. App. Br. 37. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument,
because the Examiner provided a reason to combine Lynt with Butnaru as
being “in order for the user to enjoy the television show by allowing the user
to distinguish between the actual show and the commercials.” Ans. 12.
Rejection of claim 41
Dependent claim 41 recites, in pertinent part, “transmitting
information about motion of said visual images to said deafblind person
through a plurality of impacts on said palm.”
Appellant argues Lynt does not disclose transmitting “information
about motion of the visual images and/or delivering the information through
a plurality of impacts on the palm.” App. Br. 37-38. We are not persuaded
by Appellant’s argument, because the content transmitted does not affect the
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function of the claim, which requires transmitting information. Id. That
information, then, is mere content, undeserving of patentable weight. Lynt
discloses transmitting information using motion, and thus meets the claim
limitation. (FF 7).
Rejection of claims 33, 34, 65, and 66 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Lynt
and Nissen
Dependent claims 33 and 65 each recite, in pertinent part,
“transmitting information about grammatical tense to at least one finger of at
least one hand.” Dependent claims 34 and 66 each recite, in pertinent part,
“transmitting grammatical tense information to a back of a pinky of said at
least one hand.”
Appellant argues no reference discloses transmitting this particular
information about tense, and is “incapable” of doing so to the pinky finger.
App. Br. 38-39. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because the
content transmitted does not affect the function of the claim, which requires
transmitting information. That information, then, is mere content,
undeserving of patentable weight. Id. We find Lynt discloses transmitting
to a person’s hand (FF 11), which would transmit to a pinky finger because
the hand is placed on the display, thus meeting the claim language.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4-11, 13-15, 18-27,
31, 33-36, 39-44, 46-59, 61, 62, and 64-71 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 3 and 72 under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b).
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The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-11, 13-15, 18-27, 31,
33-36, 39-44, 46-59, 61, 62, and 64-72 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
The Examiner erred err in rejecting claims 12, 16, 17, 28-30, 32, 60,
63 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-11, 13-15,
18-27, 31, 33-36, 39-44, 46-59, 61, 62, and 64-72 is AFFIRMED and the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 12, 16, 17, 28-30, 32, 60, 63 is REVERSED.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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