Ex Parte LI et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 14, 2017

13829391 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/829,391 03/14/2013 YONGHUA LI 83228186 3416
28395 7590 11/16/2017
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET
EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER ROBBINS, JERRY D
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/16/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YONGHUA LI and XU WANG
Appeal 2017-001160
Application 13/829,391
Technology Center 2800
Before DONNA M. PRAISS, CHRISTOPHER C. KENNEDY, and
DEBRA L. DENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final decision to reject claims 1—20 as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
1 In this decision, we refer to the Specification filed Mar. 14, 2013 (“Spec.”),
the Final Office Action dated Nov. 6, 2015 (“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief
filed Apr. 4, 2016 (“App. Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer dated Aug. 26, 2016
(“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief filed Oct. 25, 2016 (“Reply Br.”).
2 Ford Global Technologies, LLC is the applicant and also identified as the
real party in interest. App. Br. 4.
Appeal 2017-001160
Application 13/829,391
over Takahashi3 and Barsoukov4 alone and together with other cited
references. App. Br. 6; Final Act. 2—23.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
The subject matter on appeal relates to “a vehicle system for
selectively updating battery parameter estimations.” Spec. 11. According
to the Specification, vehicle controls in a hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) or
plug-in HEV, or battery electric vehicle, evaluate a level of charge in the
battery referred to as the state of charge (SOC). Id. 12. SOC and power
capability may be calculated based on an equivalent circuit model (ECM)
representing the battery characteristics. Id. Claims 1 and 15, copied below
from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal Brief, are illustrative (disputed
matter italicized):
1. A vehicle comprising:
an electric machine configured to provide drive torque;
a battery for supplying power to the electric machine; and
a controller configured to:
estimate battery parameters based on input
indicative of the power supplied by the battery; and
generate output indicative of battery power
capability based on the input and previously determined
battery parameters in response to a rate of change of a
component of the power being less than a lower-rate-of-
change boundary while the electric machine provides
drive torque for vehicle propulsion.
3 Takahashi et al., US 2012/0109443 Al, pub. May 3, 2012 (“Takahashi”).
4 Barsoukov et al., US 8,049,465 B2, iss. Nov. 1, 2011 (“Barsoukov”).
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Application 13/829,391
15. A method for controlling a hybrid vehicle comprising:
receiving a first input indicative of first power;
receiving a second input indicative of second power; and
calculating a battery power capability based on the
second input and an estimate of first battery ECM parameters
based on the first input, in response to a rate of change of a
component of the second input being less than a lower-rate-of-
change boundary while an electric machine provides drive
torque.
OPINION
The Examiner finds that claims 1—20 would have been obvious to one
of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention for the reasons stated
on pages 2—23 of the Final Action.
In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv), we address below the
claims separately argued by Appellants.
Claim 1
Appellants argue the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 15, and 18 as a
group and discuss claim 1 as representative. App. Br. 6—8. Accordingly,
claims 2, 4, 7, 15, and 18 will stand or fall together with claim 1.
Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
because Barsoukov does not disclose the “while the electric machine
provides drive torque” limitation. Id. at 7. Appellants assert that Barsoukov
teaches increased accuracy is achieved when the battery is fully relaxed as
opposed to partially relaxed for measuring open circuit battery voltage
(OCV) and does not disclose measuring an OCV to determine a depth of
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Application 13/829,391
discharge (DOD)5 while a load, such as an electric machine, is being driven.
Id. at 8.
The Examiner responds that Barsoukov teaches calculating the SOC
regardless of whether the battery is under load as shown in the flow chart of
Figure 5. Ans. 3. The Examiner identifies step 545 in Figure 5 for the
calculation of SOC and the earlier step 510 in Figure 5 as indicating that the
calculation is performed whether the battery is under load or relaxed. Id.
(citing Barsoukov 11:28—31 as clarifying the typo in Figure 5, step 510
where the options should be yes and no rather than no and no).
In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue that Barsoukov discloses
equations to compare the rate of change of voltage when relaxed and not
during vehicle propulsion. Reply Br. 4 (citing Barsoukov 4:45—50).
Appellants argue that the entire limitation as a whole is therefore not
disclosed or suggested by the combination of Takahashi and Barsoukov, i.e.,
“generate output... in response to a rate of change of a component of the
power being less than a lower-rate-of-change boundary while the electric
machine provides drive torque for vehicle propulsion.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner
reversibly erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the reasons
provided by the Examiner. We add the following primarily for emphasis.
Appellants do not dispute that Barsoukov discloses a lower-rate-of-
change boundary (Final Act. 3) nor do Appellants dispute the Examiner’s
finding that Barsoukov’s rate of change threshold would benefit Takahashi’s
vehicle by determining abnormal conditions within the battery (id.).
5 DOD is related to SOC by the equation DOD=l-SOC for computing the
remaining runtime of a device powered by a battery. Barsoukov 5:37-40.
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Appellants’ assertion that Barsoukov’s teachings are limited to generating
output from its rate of change of voltage calculations during a relaxed period
(Reply Br. 4) is not persuasive of error because Barsoukov prefaces the
quoted sentence with “[s]ome embodiments of the present invention”
(Barsoukov 4:45). In a determination of obviousness, a reference may be
relied upon for all that it would have reasonably suggested to one having
ordinary skill in the art. Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., 874 F.2d 804, 807
(Fed. Cir. 1989). Moreover, “a reference is not limited to the disclosure of
specific working examples.” In re Mills, 470 F.2d 649, 651 (CCPA 1972)
(citation omitted). In addition, Appellants do not adequately explain why
one skilled in the art would expect Barsoukov’s teachings to be limited to
calculating a rate of change while the battery is relaxed. In re Preda, 401
F.2d 825, 826—27 (CCPA 1968) (“[I]n considering the disclosure of a
reference, it is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the
reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would
reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.”); KSR Int 7 Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[AJnalysis [of whether the subject matter of a
claim would have been obvious under § 103] need not seek out precise
teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for
a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.”) Accordingly, based on the cited
record on appeal, Appellants do not sufficiently rebut the Examiner’s finding
(Ans. 3) that a skilled artisan would have understood from Barsoukov to
calculate SOC regardless of whether the battery is under load or relaxed.
Appellants’ arguments also are not persuasive of error because claim
1 is directed to an apparatus, not a method. Specifically, the vehicle of claim
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1 comprises an electric machine, a battery, and a controller. Appellants do
not dispute that the cited prior art combination discloses the claimed
structure. “[AJpparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device
does.'1'’ Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). Appellants’ arguments instead are
directed to whether Barsoukov discloses computing the rate of change of
voltage during vehicle propulsion, not whether Barsoukov’s controller is
capable of computing the rate of change of voltage required by the claim.
In sum, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as well as
claims 2, 4, 7, 15, and 18 as obvious over the combination of Takahashi and
Barsoukov.
Claim 15
Appellants additionally argue the rejection of claims 15 and 18 as a
group. App. Br. 8—10. Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 15 because the recited “ECM parameters” limitation is
limited to an ECM based on a general circuit model as disclosed in the
Specification and does not encompass the electrochemical model disclosed
in Takahashi. Id. (citing Spec. Fig. 3, Tflf 34, 55). According to Appellants,
Takahashi’s model uses parameters based on physical characteristics of ion
movement and concentration whereas the model disclosed in the
Specification uses standard electronic components. Id. at 9-10.
In response, the Examiner acknowledges that Takahashi obtains the
equivalent circuitry values differently, but finds that “Takahashi uses the
information gathered to provide a battery equivalent model using digital
values that can be fed into the processor(s) to allow the same type of
calculations as in the claimed invention.” Ans. 5. The Examiner also points
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out that the claims do not recite the specifics for obtaining the values to be
used in the ECM. Id. Therefore, the Examiner determines that the broadest
reasonable interpretation of ECM parameters recited in claim 15
encompasses Takahashi’s model to provide battery estimations.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner
reversibly erred in rejecting claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the
reasons provided by the Examiner. We add the following primarily for
emphasis.
As construed by the Examiner, ECM parameters means an equivalent
circuit model to provide battery estimations (Ans. 5). The Examiner’s
interpretation of this claim limitation is reasonable and consistent with the
Specification, which discloses that “[a] battery may be represented by an
equivalent circuit model (ECM) having battery ECM parameters” and
parenthetically discloses the “circuit elements.” Spec. 12. The disclosure
of a particular ECM in the Specification does not limit the definition of the
broader term ECM. Our reviewing court “has repeatedly ‘cautioned against
limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific
examples in the specification.’” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d
1339, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, Appellants do not dispute the
Examiner’s finding (Ans. 5) that the digital values provided by Takahashi’s
battery equivalent model can be fed into a processor to allow the same type
of calculations as used in the model disclosed by Appellants. Because we
decline to read into the claim limitation a particular model disclosed in
Appellants’ Specification, we find Appellants’ argument unpersuasive of
error.
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In sum, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 15 as well as
claim 18 as obvious over the combination of Takahashi and Barsoukov.
Claims 3, 5, 6, 8—14, 16, 17, 19, and 20
Appellants contend that the Examiner’s rejections of claims 3, 5, 6, 8—
14, 16, 17, 19, and 20 over the combination of Takahashi and Barsoukov
together with one or more secondary references is in error because none of
the secondary references cures the deficiencies of Takahashi and Barsoukov
discussed above in connection with claim 1, namely, the limitation “being
less than a lower-rate-of-charge boundary while the electric machine
provides drive torque” recited in each of independent claims 1, 7, and 15.
App. Br. 10-12.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument for the same reasons
discussed above in connection with claim 1. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejections of claims 3, 5, 6, 8—14, 16, 17, 19, and 20.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—20 as obvious under
35U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision is affirmed.
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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).
AFFIRMED
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