Ex Parte Lewis

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Nov 5, 2010

10403690 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 5, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte CHRISTOPHER RAYMOND LEWIS
____________

Appeal 2009-006071
Application 10/403,690
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before LANCE LEONARD BARRY, HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, and
ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing,
as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE”
(paper delivery mode) or the “NOTIFICATION DATE” (electronic delivery
mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision.
Appeal 2009-006071
Application 10/403,690

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final decision rejecting claims 1-3 and 5-12. Claims 4 and 13-16 have been
cancelled. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We Affirm.

Invention
Appellant’s invention is directed to network access. More
particularly, the invention on appeal is directed to “a method and apparatus
for providing a password interface to multiple password domains.” (Spec. 1,
ll. 8-9).

Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method of securely synchronizing password
systems on a network by a Central Password Repository
(CPR), the method comprising the steps of:
identifying password infrastructures on the
network configured to accept access by an user; and
for each said identified password infrastructure,
establishing by the CPR an encrypted and
authenticated communication session between the CPR
and the password infrastructure,
enforcing a password change on the password
infrastructure by the CPR; and
performing password services by the CPR on
behalf of systems without password infrastructures.
Appeal 2009-006071
Application 10/403,690

3
The Examiner relies on the following prior art reference as evidence
of unpatentability:
Leah US 6,986,039 B1 Jan. 10, 2006

Appellant appeals the following rejection:
Claims 1-3 and 5-12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being
anticipated by Leah.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS
Appellant contends that “Leah does not teach or suggest a method of
securely synchronizing password systems on a network by a Central
Password Repository (CPR), or the CPR itself, which performs password
services on behalf of systems without password infrastructures.” (emphasis
added) (App. Br. 3).
Appellant also contends that the mere existence of the registry in Leah
causes the system to have its own password infrastructure. (Reply Br. 3).
“Since the master registry in Leah works with other registries, and hence
with other password infrastructures,” Appellant avers that “Leah does not
teach or suggest a system that performs password services on behalf of
systems without password infrastructures.” (Id.).

ISSUE
Based upon our review of the administrative record, we have
determined that the following issue is dispositive in this appeal:
Appeal 2009-006071
Application 10/403,690

4
Under § 102, did the Examiner err in finding that Leah
discloses “performing password services by the CPR on
behalf of systems without password infrastructures,”
within the meaning of representative claim 1?

GROUPING OF CLAIMS
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Brief, we decide the appeal on
the basis of representative claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

FACTUAL FINDINGS
We adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Answer and Final Office
Action, with respect to the limitation at issue, as our own. (Ans. 5).

ANALYSIS
Based upon our review of the record, we find unconvincing
Appellant’s argument that Leah does not disclose performing password
services by the CPR on behalf of systems without password infrastructures.
(App. Br. 3).
We begin our analysis with claim construction.
“In the patentability context, claims are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretations. . . . [L]imitations are not to be read into the
claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Any special meaning assigned to a term
“must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from
common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the
Appeal 2009-006071
Application 10/403,690

5
field of the invention.” Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d
1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Absent an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term,
the words take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them
by those of ordinary skill in the art. Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive
Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Here, Appellant has not established where a definition is set forth in
the Specification that provides an artisan with notice of a special or
uncommon meaning for the disputed claim term “password infrastructures.”
Based upon our review of the record, we find Appellant’s Specification fails
to set forth a definition of the claimed “password infrastructures” with
“reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” that would render the
incorporation of any such a definition into the claims appropriate (quoting In
re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
Nor has Appellant established in the record a common or plain
meaning for the claim term “password infrastructures,” for example, by
providing a dictionary definition. In addition, there is no declaration of
record to consider as evidence regarding the metes and bounds of the
claimed “password infrastructures.”
For these reasons, we conclude that the Examiner’s broader
interpretation of the claimed “password infrastructures” is reasonable. (See
Ans. 11-13). On this record, we find Appellant has not shown error in the
Examiner’s finding of anticipation regarding the disputed negative limitation
of “without password infrastructures.”
Appeal 2009-006071
Application 10/403,690

6
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of
independent claims 1 and 8, and associated dependent claims 2, 3, 5-7, and
9-12 (not argued separately), which fall therewith.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s § 102 rejection of claims 1-3 and 5-12.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

ORDER
AFFIRMED

llw

Anderson Gorecki & Manaras, LLP
Attn: John C. Gorecki
P.O. BOX 553
CARLISLE, MA 01741