Ex Parte Leong-Fern et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 20, 2013

11478995 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 20, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/478,995 06/30/2006 Andrew Leong-Fern 13006/3 7846
757 7590 09/20/2013
BRINKS HOFER GILSON & LIONE
P.O. BOX 10395
CHICAGO, IL 60610
EXAMINER
UTAMA, ROBERT J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3715
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/20/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte ANDREW LEONG-FERN, PETER GORMAN,
and PAUL LASIUK
____________________

Appeal 2011-009755
Application 11/478,995
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before GAY ANN SPAHN, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
ADAM V. FLOYD, Administrative Patent Judges.

OSINSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-37. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 This case is related to Appeal 2011-008802 based on Application
11/479,543, for which a Decision was issued on August 29, 2013. See Br. 2.
2 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Healthy Interactions, Inc.
Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 9, 17, and 21 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim
1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the appealed subject matter.
1. A method for delivering health information about type 2
diabetes to a user wherein a facilitator elicits conversation from
a user, the method comprising:
providing a series of hiking related scenes on a map;
utilizing the map to introduce a user to topics related to a
health condition represented on the map as the series of hiking
related scenes; and
stimulating conversation on the type 2 diabetes related
health topics represented on the map using conversation cards
that comprise open-ended questions to elicit discussion about
the user's personal experience with the type 2 diabetes health
related topics and vary based on circumstances, needs, or
experiences of the user, and using exercises.

REJECTIONS
Appellants seek review of the following rejections:
(1) the provisional rejection of claims 1-20 on the ground of non-
statutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 11-23 of copending
Application No. 11/479,5433 (Ans. 5);
(2) the rejection of claims 1-84 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to non-statutory subject matter (Ans. 5);
(3) the rejection of claims 17-37 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Hunsberger (US 6,279,908 B1, iss. Aug. 28, 2001) (Ans. 6-
9);5

3 The Examiner’s reference to 11/478,543 is a typographical error and has
been corrected herein.
4 The Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 17-20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Ans. 14.
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(4) the rejection of claims 1, 3-5, and 9-13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Hunsberger and ADA (What You Need to Know about
Type 2 Diabetes in Children: A review of the ADA Consensus on “Type 2
Diabetes in Children and Adolescents,” , internet archive date:
May 10, 2000)6 (Ans. 9-11);
(5) the rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Hunsberger, ADA, and Strecher (US 5,207,580, iss. May 4, 1993)
(Ans. 11);
(6) the rejection of claims 6 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hunsberger, ADA, and Bandieri (US 6,454,263 B1, iss.
Sep. 24, 2002) (Ans. 11-12);
(7) the rejection of claims 7 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hunsberger, ADA, and Findlay (US 2006/0105825 A1,
pub. May 18, 2006) (Ans. 12); and
(8) the rejection of claims 8 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hunsberger, ADA, and Kuch (US 5,454,721, iss. Oct. 3,
1995) (Ans. 12-13).

5 The Examiner appears to have relied on Merck (Merck Manual Home
Edition, Diabetes Mellitus, previously available at
http://www.merckmanuals.com/home/sec13/ch165/ch165a.html (last visited:
Dec. 3, 2010) as an evidence reference that the term “diabetes mellitus” as
used in Hunsberger refers to both type 1 and type 2 diabetes. Ans. 15.
6 The “Evidence Relied Upon” section of the Examiner’s Answer appears
to be incomplete as the Examiner did not list the ADA reference. See Non-
Patent Literature document enclosed with and cited on Notice of References
Cited (Form-PTO-892) attached to the non-final Office Action mailed
January 21, 2010 in the electronic file wrapper of the underlying application.
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ANALYSIS
Rejection (1)
Appellants do not contest this rejection, but merely request abeyance
until copending Application No. 11/479,543 issues, or allowable subject
matter is indicated in the present application. Br. 18. In light of this Board’s
decision in Ex parte Moncla, 95 USPQ2d 1884 (BPAI 2010) (precedential),
we do not reach the merits of the Examiner’s provisional double patenting
rejection at this time, because it would be premature to do so.

Rejection (2)
Appellants argue claims 1-8 as a group. Br. 5-6. We select claim 1 as
the representative claim, and claims 2-8 fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2011). The Examiner found that claims 1-8 were not
directed to statutory matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Ans. 5, 13-14. The
Examiner found that a claimed method could be considered statutory subject
matter if the method claim “is tied to a particular machine or apparatus” or
“transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.” Id. at 5 (citing
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). The Examiner further indicated
that even when the method is tied to a particular machine or apparatus or
transforms an article, “the use of the particular machine or transformation of
the particular article must impose a meaningful limit on the claim’s scope”
and “the use of the particular machine or the transformation of the particular
article must involve more than insignificant ‘extra-solution’ activity.’” Id.
The Examiner found that the claims do not satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test because they are not tied to a particular machine. Id.
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Appellants contend that claims 1-8 satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test. Br. 6. More particularly, Appellants contend that the
claims are “tied to a physical map and conversation cards” and that “a map
and conversation cards are concrete things.” Id. Appellants further
particularly contend that “these features impose meaningful limits on the
claims’ scope . . . because the map . . . is utilized to introduce a user to
topics, and the conversation cards . . . are used for stimulating conversation
on type 2 diabetes.” Id. Appellants do not present evidence or reasoning to
support that the claimed process transforms an article in any way.
The Examiner responded that the claimed map and conversation cards
are not machines because they do “not contain any parts and d[o] not contain
any devices.” Ans. 13. Despite the relatively broad definition of “machine”
annunciated in In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A]
machine is a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and
combination of devices. This includes every mechanical device or
combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function
and produce a certain effect or result.”) (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d
1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)), we agree
with the Examiner that the claimed map and conversation cards are not
machines. Appellants have not persuasively explained how a map and cards
consist of parts or are otherwise a mechanical device. Thus, we agree with
the Examiner that the recitation of a “map” and “conversation cards” does
not tie the claimed method to a particular apparatus or machine.
Appellants also point out that “the machine-or-transformation test . . .
‘is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible
‘process.’’” Br. 6. The Examiner responds that “[i]n view of the new
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[O]ffice policy with regards to subject matter eligibility and Supreme Court
decision, the [E]xaminer would like to point out that the[re] are other factors
that would weigh against the finding of eligible subject matter.” Ans. 13.
For example, the Examiner determined that “[t]he step of ‘stimulating
conversation on the type 2 diabetes related topics . . . ’ can be considered to
be subjective and can be imperceptible.” Id. at 14. This Examiner-identified
factor affects the determination of whether a method claim is directed to an
abstract idea. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP)
§ 2106(II)(B)(1)(d) (“The presence of . . . a general concept can be a clue
that the claim is drawn to an abstract idea. Where a general concept is
present, the following factors are relevant: . . . (e) The mechanism(s) by
which the steps are implemented; e.g., whether the performance of the
process is observable and verifiable rather than subjective or
imperceptible.”). Appellants do not persuasively explain how the claimed
method step of “stimulating” must be observable and verifiable contrary to
the Examiner’s determination, and, therefore, weigh in favor of eligibility.
Considering whether claim 1 is patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101
by satisfying the criteria of the machine-or-transformation test or providing
evidence that an abstract idea has been practically applied, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in asserting that claims 1-8 fail to recite
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
statutory subject matter.

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Rejection (3)
Claims 17-20
Appellants argue claims 17-20 as a group. Br. 7-8. We select
independent claim 17 as the representative claim, and claims 18-20 fall with
independent claim 17. The Examiner found that Hunsberger discloses
“conversation cards comprising an open-ended conversation question about
a user’s personal experience.” Ans. 6 (citing Hunsberger, fig. 7).
Appellants contend that Hunsberger’s “cards with static right-or-wrong
questions . . . fail to teach or suggest conversation cards including open-
ended conversation questions about a user’s personal experiences” as recited
in claim 17. Br. 8. Appellants additionally contend that Hunsberger’s cards
“do not vary based on experiences of the user” as recited in claim 17. Id.
The Examiner responded that the ordinary and customary meaning of
“open-ended” is “something that permit[s] or [is] designed to permit
spontaneous and unguided response.” Ans. 15 (citing Merriam-Webster
Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed.). The Specification does not assign or
suggest a particular definition of the claim term “open-ended” and we find
nothing in the Specification inconsistent with the ordinary and customary
meaning described above. See In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (the words of the claim must be given their plain meaning unless the
plain meaning is inconsistent with the specification). Appellants do not
dispute the Examiner’s proposed claim construction of the phrase “open-
ended.”
The Examiner explained that questions on Hunsberger’s cards, such as
“‘what is polyuria,’” “can be answered by the subject’s own knowledge as
opposed to closed ended question[s] with a simple yes or no [answer] or by
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selecting an answer from a list of possible answer[s].” Ans. 15. As such,
the Examiner found Hunsberger’s questions to be “open-ended conversation
questions about a user’s personal experiences” as called for in claim 17. Id.;
see Br., Claims App’x. The Examiner also found that a “user is free to form
an answer based on his or her own knowledge” such that topics vary based
on the experiences of the user. Ans. 15. Appellants do not persuasively
explain how Hunsberger fails to disclose open-ended conversation questions
about a user’s personal experiences with the type 2 diabetes health related
topics which vary based on experiences of the users in light of the
Examiner’s claim construction and findings.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants fail to show error by the
Examiner in concluding that Hunsberger discloses all of the limitations of
claim 17, and we sustain the rejection of claim 17, and claims 18-20 which
fall therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Hunsberger.
Claims 21 and 23
Appellants argue claims 21 and 23 as a group. Br. 8-10. We select
independent claim 21 as the representative claim, and claims 22-37 fall with
independent claim 21. The Examiner found that Hunsberger discloses all of
the limitations of independent claim 21. Ans. 6-7. Appellants contend that
“[t]he board with colored squares in Hunsberger is not a map.” Br. 8. The
Examiner responded that the ordinary and customary meaning of “map” is
“a representation usually on a flat surface of the whole or part of an area.”
Ans. 16 (citing Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed.). The
Specification does not assign or suggest a particular definition of the claim
term “map,” and we find nothing in the Specification inconsistent with the
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ordinary and customary meaning set forth above. Appellants do not dispute
the Examiner’s proposed claim construction of the term “map.”
The Examiner explained that Hunsberger discloses “a relatively flat
game board (see col. 2:60-62) with a start area (see FIG. 1[,] item 11 labeled
‘START’) and an end area (see FIG. 1[,] item 12 labeled ‘FINISH’).”
Ans. 16. As such, the Examiner found Hunsberger to disclose a
representation of an area on a flat surface. Id. Appellants do not
persuasively explain how Hunsberger fails to disclose a map in light of the
Examiner’s claim construction and findings.
Appellants additionally contend that “the board and color[-]coded
spaces taught in Hunsberger do not teach or suggest a plurality of locations
on a map which are representations of various issues related to type 2
diabetes.” Br. 8. The Examiner explained that “each of the locations of
Hunsberger’s map are coded with issues about ‘medication,’ ‘side effect[s,]’
and ‘nutrition’ [related to] diabetes.” Ans. 16. In particular, the Examiner
found that Hunsberger discloses “that each of the location[s] represent
question[s] to be asked about side effect[s], medication[,] and nutritional
question [related to] diabetes mellitus” such that Hunsberger’s board
locations are representations of various issues (e.g., side effects, medication,
nutrition) related to diabetes. Id. Appellants do not persuasively explain
how Hunsberger fails to disclose a plurality of locations representing issues
related to diabetes in light of the Examiner’s claim construction and
findings.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants fail to show error by the
Examiner in concluding that Hunsberger discloses all of the limitations of
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claim 21, and we sustain the rejection of claim 21, and claim 23 which falls
therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Hunsberger.
Claims 22 and 24-37
Appellants argue claims 22 and 24-37 as a group. Br. 9-10. We
select claim 24 as the representative claim, and claims 22 and 25-37 fall with
claim 24. The Examiner found that while Hunsberger fails to disclose the
specific content printed on the map, “the difference between prior art and the
claimed subject matter can be considered to be non-functional printed-matter
. . . . [that] will not distinguish the claimed product from the prior art.”
Ans. 7 (citing In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
With respect to claim 24, Appellants set forth the same arguments
regarding the limitations relating to a map and plurality of locations thereon
as discussed supra with respect to claim 21, and these arguments are
unpersuasive for the same reasons as discussed supra. Appellants
additionally contend that “here, a functional relationship exists between the
printed matter and the substrate, [such that] the claims should not be rejected
merely because the prior art discloses a printed matter.” Br. 9. More
particularly, Appellants contend that the printed matter “‘may create an
interesting and engaging focal point for communicating health information,’
and ‘may further help the users 14 to recall the information that they learn.’”
Id. (quoting Spec. 4, ll. 3-16, paras. [0024]-[0025]).
Claim 24 requires the representation of an issue related to type 2
diabetes to be in the form of a cabin with “writings on the cabin relating to
the timing and reasons for testing blood glucose.” Br., Claims App’x.
Where the only difference between the claimed subject matter and the prior
art resides in printed matter and the printed matter recited in the claim is not
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functionally related to the substrate on which it is printed, then the printed
matter will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of
patentability. See Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1339 (holding that an inventor could not
patent known kits simply by attaching a new set of instructions to the
product); In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that
digits placed on a band patentability distinguish the band from the prior art
because the claims require a particular sequence of digits to be displayed on
the outside surface of a band and the digits exploit the endless nature of the
band).
In the present case, the Examiner found that the only difference
between the applied prior art and the subject matter of claim 24 was the
specific content of the printed representation of an issue related to type 2
diabetes on the map. The printed representation (i.e., the cabin with
“writings on the cabin relating to the timing and reasons for testing blood
glucose”) does not depend on the map, nor does the map depend on the
specific content of a cabin and writings on cabin. In this respect, the present
case is distinguishable from Gulack where the court found the claimed
invention “require[d] a particular sequence of digits to be displayed on the
outside surface of a band,” and that “[t]hese digits are related to the band in
two ways: (1) the band supports the digits; and (2) there is an endless
sequence of digits—each digit residing in a unique position with respect to
every other digit in an endless loop. Thus, the digits exploit the endless
nature of the band.” Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1386-87.
Appellants have not pointed to, nor can we find, any passage in the
Specification that suggests that the particular representation of an issue
related to type 2 diabetes (e.g., a cabin and writings on cabin) is any way
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dependent on the map on which it appears in order to establish a functional
relationship between the printed matter and its substrate. As described
supra, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the applied prior
art fails to disclose a representation of an issue related to type 2 diabetes.
Specific differences in the content of the representation will not render the
claimed invention nonobvious. As such, Appellants do not convince us of
error in the Examiner’s rejection and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 24, and claims 22 and 25-37 which fall therewith, as anticipated by
Hunsberger.

Rejection (4)
Claims 1 and 3-5
Appellants argue claims 1 and 3-5 as a group. Br. 9-10. We select
independent claim 1 as the representative claim, and claims 3-5 fall with
independent claim 1. The Examiner found that while Hunsberger fails to
disclose a “map contain[ing] a series of hiking related scene[s,]” and
concludes that “[i]t would have been an obvious matter of design choice to
use one type of graphic design (hiking related scene) with another graphic
design.” Ans. 10. The Examiner found different types of graphic designs
would “perform the same function of providing aesthetic[s].” Id. In other
words, both Hunsberger’s graphic design of a path advancing from a start
area to an end area, and the claimed graphic design of a series of hiking
related scenes, would perform the same function of improved aesthetics in
connection with delivering health information to a user. The Examiner
noted that “Appellant[s’] own disclosure shows that the hiking related
scenes are not essential to the topic of delivering health information.” Id. at
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17. The Examiner pointed to disclosure in the Specification supporting that
the type of scene is interchangeable. Id. at 18 (citing Spec. 8, paras. [0040]
and Spec. 26, para. [0096]); see, e.g., Spec. 8, para. [0040] (“The map 100
may include a path of travel 102 which may be a road. The path may
alternatively be a hiking path, a river, a stream, a bridge, a ladder, or any
other thing.”).
Appellants contend that Hunsberger’s game board “is merely used as
a placeholder identifying the position of a token” and accordingly, it would
not be a mere matter of design choice to have Hunsberger’s game board
“operate in a different manner and provide different functionality than that
of a token placeholder.” Br. 11. However, both Hunsberger’s game board
and Appellants’ claimed apparatus perform the same function of delivering
health information to a user in an aesthetically pleasing manner. Without
any persuasive argument showing that the claimed hiking related scenes
(e.g., a hiking path) are critical or achieve any unexpected result as
compared to other depicted paths (e.g., Hunsberger’s path from a start area
to end area), Appellants have failed to show error by the Examiner in
concluding that the claimed limitation would have been an obvious design
choice.
The Examiner also found that Hunsberger discloses “utilizing the map
to introduce a user to topics related to [a] health condition and stimulating
conversation on related health topics on the map.” Ans. 9 (citing
Hunsberger, col. 3, ll. 55-65). Appellants contend that Hunsberger’s “cards
with static right-or-wrong questions and answers” fail to disclose
“stimulating conversation on the type 2 diabetes related health topics
represented on the map using conversation cards that include open-ended
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questions to elicit discussion about the user’s personal experience with the
type 2 diabetes health related topics and vary based on circumstances, needs,
or experiences of the user.” Br. 11.
As an initial matter, to the extent Appellants’ arguments are the same
as those discussed above with respect to claim 17 concerning the open-ended
nature or variability of the questions, such arguments are unpersuasive for
the same reasons discussed supra in connection with claim 17. To the extent
Appellants are contesting that Hunsberger “stimulates” conversation, the
Examiner responded that the ordinary and customary meaning of “stimulate”
is “an action that excite[s] to activity or growth or to greater activity.”
Ans. 18-19 (citing Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed.). The
Specification does not assign or suggest a particular definition of the claim
term “stimulating” and we find nothing in the Specification inconsistent with
the ordinary and customary meaning described above. Appellants do not
dispute the Examiner’s proposed claim construction of the term
“stimulating.”
The Examiner explained that “[s]ince . . . the act of asking a question
by one user . . . invites an answer from another user[,] the [E]xaminer
interprets the act of asking a question as a teaching of stimulating
conversation between one user to another.” Br. 19. In other words, the
Examiner found that “any action that invites another person into an oral
exchange” constitutes “stimulating conversation.” Id. Appellants do not
persuasively explain how Hunsberger fails to disclose stimulating
conversation in light of the Examiner’s claim construction and findings.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants fail to show error by the
Examiner in concluding that the combination of Hunsberger and ADA
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disclose all of the limitations of claim 1, and we sustain the rejection of
claim 1, and claims 3-5 which fall therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hunsberger and ADA.
Claims 9-13
Appellants argue claims 9-13 as a group. Br. 11-12. We select
independent claim 9 as the representative claim, and claims 10-13 fall with
independent claim 9. Appellants contend that Hunsberger’s cards with
“static right-or-wrong questions and answers” fail to disclose “providing a
page comprising questions that are open-ended to elicit discussion about the
user’s personal experience with the type 2 diabetes health information and
topics, and utilizing the open-ended questions to stimulate conversation.”
Br. 12.
As an initial matter, to the extent Appellants’ arguments are the same
as those discussed above with respect to claim 17 concerning the open-ended
nature or variability of the questions, such arguments are unpersuasive for
the same reasons discussed supra in connection with claim 17. To the extent
Appellants are contesting that Hunsberger discloses a “page,” the Examiner
responded that the ordinary and customary meaning of “page” is “one of the
leaves of a publication or manuscript” or “a written . . . record.” Ans. 20
(citing Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed.). The Specification
does not assign or suggest a particular definition of the claim term “page”
and we find nothing in the Specification inconsistent with the ordinary and
customary meaning described above. Appellants do not dispute the
Examiner’s proposed claim construction of the term “page.” Thus, the
Examiner found Hunsberger’s conversation card is a “page,” and Appellants
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do not persuasively explain how Hunsberger fails to disclose a page in light
of the Examiner’s claim construction and findings.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants fail to show error by the
Examiner in concluding that the combination of Hunsberger and ADA
disclose all of the limitations of claim 9, and we sustain the rejection of
claim 9, and claims 10-13 which fall therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hunsberger and ADA.

Rejections (5)-(6)
Claims 2, 6, 7, and 8 depend, either directly or indirectly, from
independent claim 1; and claims 14-16 depend, either directly or indirectly,
from independent claim 9. Appellants’ arguments in support of the
patentability of claims 2, 6, 7, 8, and 14-16 solely relate to the perceived
deficiencies of Hunsberger and ADA in connection with either claim 1 or
claim 9. Br. 12-17. Since we have found no such deficiencies in connection
with independent claims 1 and 9, we also sustain the rejections, under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a), of: claim 2 as unpatentable over Hunsberger, ADA, and
Strecher; claims 6 and 14 as unpatentable over Hunsberger, ADA, and
Bandieri; claims 7 and 15 as unpatentable over Hunsberger, ADA, and
Findlay; and claims 8 and 16 as unpatentable over Hunsberger, ADA, and
Kuch.

DECISION
We do not reach the merits of the Examiner’s provisional rejection of
claims 1-20 on the grounds of non-statutory obviousness-type double
patenting.
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The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
AFFIRMED.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 17-37 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is
AFFIRMED.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1-16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
are AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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