Ex Parte Lejeune

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 21, 2017

13175730 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 21, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/175,730 07/01/2011 Stephane Lejeune 200902742.03 3132
36738 7590 03/23/2017
ROrTTT7 fr ASSOPTATRS
EXAMINER
750 B STREET BUI, KIEU OANH T
SUITE 3120
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2425
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/23/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Noelle@rogitz.com
eofficeaction @ appcoll.com
John@rogitz.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEPHANE LEJEUNE
Appeal 2016-004469
Application 13/175,730
Technology Center 2400
Before HUNG H. BUI, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 29-35 and 37, which are all of the pending claims.2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Sony Corporation. App.
Br. 2.
2 The Final Office Action rejected claims 21—27 and 29-37. Based on a
post-final-action amendment, claims 29-35 and 37 are the only claims now
pending. See Appellant’s Response to Notice of Defective Appeal Brief
(“Resp. Not. Def. Br.”) (Sept. 23, 2015); Advisory Action (mailed Dec. 9,
2015).
Appeal 2016-004469
Application 13/175,730
Introduction
Appellant states the invention “generally relates to the field of content
delivery.” Spec. 12. Appellant further explains that embodiments relate to:
providing selective access to both network-based content and
broadcasted programming content by (i) aggregating metadata
for network-based content that corresponds to the scheduled,
broadcasted programming content and (ii) associating the
metadata with the corresponding network-based content. This
enables the system to provide features that enhance the user’s
viewing or listening experience ....
Id.
Claim 29 is representative (bracketed matter added and disputed,
dispositive requirements in italics):
29. Device comprising:
at least one computer memory that is not a transitory
signal, the computer memory comprising instructions executable
by at least one processor for:
sending an identification of at least one broadcast video on
a display to a network server as a request for relational
information;
receiving, responsive to the request, relational information
associated with stored content that corresponds to the broadcast
video; [and]
based at least in part [on] the relational information
received in response to the request, presenting] on a display at
least one selectable icon selectable to present the stored content
on the display to replace broadcast video, the icon being
selectable to alter a source of content being presented on the
display from broadcast content to the start of corresponding
content provided over a network, the corresponding content
being the same content as the broadcast content and being
presented at a starting point of the corresponding content which
corresponds to a starting point of the broadcast content.
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Appeal 2016-004469
Application 13/175,730
Resp. Not. Def. Br. 2 (App. Br. Claims App’x).3
Examiner’s Rejections & References
(1) Claims 29, 30, 32, 33, and 37 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable in view of Shoff et al. (US 6,240,555 Bl; iss. May
29, 2001) and Maegawa (US 2008/0005505 Al; publ. Jan. 3, 2008). Final
Act. 6—8.
(2) Claim 31 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable in view of Shoff, Maegawa, and Jankins et al. (US
2008/0046922 Al; publ. Feb. 21, 2008). Final Act. 9.
(3) Claims 34 and 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable in view of Shoff, Maegawa, and Patten et al. (US 2010/
0287592 Al; publ. Nov. 11,2010). Final Act. 10-11.
ISSUE
Based on Appellant’s arguments, the dispositive issue before us is
whether the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 29. App. Br. 3—9.4
FINDINGS AND CONTENTIONS
In rejecting claim 29, the Examiner finds Shoff, in view of Maegawa,
teaches the disputed requirements of
3 As shown by the bracketed revisions, we have identified wording issues
with claim 1 that merit correction. In the event of further prosecution, the
Examiner should consider requiring appropriate correction.
4 Appellant argues claims 29, 30, 32, and 33 together as a group, based on
claim 29, which is the only independent claim. Appellant presents no
separate arguments of Examiner error for claims 31, 34, and 35. Thus, all
claims stand or fall with claim 29.
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Application 13/175,730
altering] a source of content being presented on the display from
broadcast content to the start of corresponding content provided
over a network, the corresponding content being the same
content as the broadcast content and being presented at a starting
point of the corresponding content which corresponds to a
starting point of the broadcast content.
Final Act. 7 (citing Shoff 7:35—50, 7:67—8:3, 9:41—12:24, Figs. 3, 8a—c).
Appellant contends the Examiner errs because none of the cited
passages of Shoff teach or suggest the recited requirements that
“corresponding [stored] content” must be the same content as the broadcast
content, and that the corresponding content must be presented at a starting
point that corresponds to a starting point of the broadcast content. App. Br.
3—9. Appellant contends the portions of Shoff cited by the Examiner instead
teach “supplemental content” that is different from the broadcast content.
App. Br. 3, 5.
The Examiner takes the position that, using the broadest reasonable
interpretation of “same content,” “‘the corresponding content’ and ‘the
broadcast content’ are both video (e.g., TV shows) from Shoff. Therefore,
they are the ‘same content’.” Ans. 3 (citing Dictionary.com
(www.dictionary.com) for the meaning of “content”); see also Final Act. 12.
The Examiner also finds that Shoff teaches the disputed requirements by
teaching “retrieving supplemental content” such as related TV shows or
“switching[ing] to another channel that [is] carrying the same TV show.”
Ans. 4; Final Act. 11—12. “The program guide also permits the user to
chanse channels to another channel carrvins a Star Trek show, if available.
And when viewer switches to another channel, the broadcast video is
replaced by that channel (e.g., Star Trek).'” Ans. 4; Final Act. 12.
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Application 13/175,730
Appellant replies that finding Shoff’s supplemental content to teach
the disputed limitation requires an unreasonable interpretation of “same
content,” and merely both being videos is insufficient. Reply Br. 1—5.
ANALYSIS
In construing the meaning of “same content,” we keep in mind that,
during prosecution, the claims are to be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation in light of the Specification {In re Morris, 111 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)), without importing limitations into the claims from
the Specification {In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
Here, we find the Examiner’s interpretation of “same content” {see Ans. 3—
4) to be unreasonable.
The recited device requires a computerized method to replace the
display of “broadcast video” with “stored content [data] that corresponds to
the broadcast video.” The “corresponding content” of the stored content
data must be “the same content as” the content of the broadcast video
(hereafter the “same content” limitation), and must be “presented at a
starting point. . . which corresponds to a starting point of the broadcast
content” (hereafter the “starting point” limitation).
In view of its use in the Specification and Claims, the word “same”
has its ordinary meaning of “resembling in every relevant respect,” and
“content” has its ordinary dictionary meaning of “something contained.”
See Merriam-Webster (www.merriam-webster.com (last visited Mar. 10,
2017)); see also Ans. 3 (citing similar definition of “content” from
Dictionary.com). Thus, we construe “same content” as used in claim 29 to
require what is contained in the broadcast video and what is contained in the
stored content to resemble each other in every relevant respect.
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Before addressing the Examiner’s findings and whether the “same
content” identified by the Examiner conforms to the correct construction, it
is helpful also to understand the starting point limitation. Regarding this
limitation, we first note that an ordinarily skilled artisan understands
“broadcast video” content is content distributed to multiple potential
recipients, and a recipient of broadcast video content does not control the
timing of the broadcast. See, e.g., Wikipedia.org (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Broadcasting) (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). An ordinarily skilled artisan also
understands that with “stored content,”5 which both the Examiner and
Appellant correctly interpret to mean stored video content, it is possible to
control both the timing of the access and the starting point from which stored
content is played.
Appellant’s Specification teaches that when switching from display of
a “live” broadcast to display of stored content, the switched-to display of
stored content starts from the point where the switched-from display of
broadcast video content left off. See Spec. Tflf 3, 60-61 (referring to this as
the “trick play” feature). This trick play feature, in a manner similar to well-
known adaptive bit-rate streaming techniques for switching between video
resolutions, seeks “to coordinate the start of the playback of the network-
based content to coincide with the last playback segment of the broadcasted
5 We note that broadcast video can be stored and then used as stored content,
such as by the use of well-known video recording technologies. When this
occurs, the stored broadcast video is “stored content” and not “broadcast
video” within the meaning of claim 29. “In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the
claims connotes different meanings.” CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich
Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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programming content.” Id. 1 60. The starting point limitation of claim 29 is
directed to these starting points used by the trick play feature that result in
“playback [of] the stored content. . . beginning at the position corresponding
to where the playback of the [broadcast] programming content ceased.” Id.
161.
We now turn to the Examiner’s findings. For the “same content”
limitation, the Examiner first relies on Shoff s supplemental content. See
Final Act. 7—8 (citing Shoff 7:35—50, 7:67—8:3, 9:41—12:24, Figs. 3, 8a—c).
Shoff describes the purpose of this supplemental content as being “to
enhance the television program” and “might be, for example, questions
about the program, games, trivia information, facts about the actors and
producers, information on other episodes, advertisements, a listing of
products or memorabilia about the program, and so on.” Shoff 3:28—38; see
also id. at 5:12—22 (similar disclosure). We agree with Appellant that
teaching content which supplements other content does not, by itself, teach
or suggest the “same content” limitation in the manner recited in Appellant’s
claim 29.
The Examiner also finds, however, that Shoff specifically teaches the
“same content” limitation by disclosing a user can “switch to another
channel that carries that same TV show.” Ans. 4 (citing Shoff 7:35—50,
10:7—18, 11:4—10, 11:34—38). According to the Examiner, “‘the
corresponding content’ (e.g., related TV shows, Star Trek) and ‘the
broadcast content’ (e.g., current TV) are the ‘same content’, in the sense of
both are video content or the same TV series (Star Trek).'” Id. We disagree
with this finding. For switching to another channel, Shoff teaches making
available a program guide of broadcast channels for related shows. See
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Shoff 11:34—38 (“Button 219 is associated with a program guide, which
provides a listing of current Star Trek shows for a two week period. The
program guide also permits the user to change channels to another channel
carrying a Star Trek show, if available”). Switching between two
broadcasts, e.g., of different episodes of Star Trek on different channels does
not teach the recited requirement of switching between stored content that is
the same as broadcast content, as required by the same content limitation.
Accordingly, we agree with Appellant the Examiner errs in finding Shoff
teaches or suggests the “same content” limitation.
We also disagree with Examiner’s findings for the starting point
limitation. For this limitation, the Examiner points to the following from
Shoff:
The digital data further defines timing information to
synchronize presentation of the supplemental content with the
video content program. This timing information can be
implemented in many different ways. One approach is to
coordinate the supplemental content to a particular program start
time, and then carefully measure time from that start time to
synchronize presentation of the supplemental content with the
appropriate points in the program. Another approach is to
characterize the program in terms of frames, and key the
introduction of supplemental content to the frame numbers.
Shoff 10:7—17 (cited in Final Act. 7—8, Ans. 4).
This discussion in Shoff addresses synchronized presentation of the
supplemental content alongside the broadcast video. We agree with
Appellant that Shoff does not teach or suggest presentation of corresponding
“same content” of stored content that replaces broadcast video, and that is
presented at the same starting point for display, as required by the starting
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point limitation. Thus, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner errs in
finding Shoff teaches or suggests claim 29’s “starting point” limitation.
Accordingly we do not sustain the rejection of claim 29.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we reverse the Examiner’s rejections of claims
29-35 and 37.
REVERSED
9