Ex Parte Lee et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 30, 2018

13831462 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/831,462 03/14/2013 Adam Y. Lee
42425 7590 11/01/2018
HICKMAN PALERMO BECKER BINGHAM/ORACLE
1 Almaden Boulevard
Floor 12
SAN JOSE, CA 95113
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
50277-4061 6137
EXAMINER
WANG,EDWARD
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2139
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/01/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usdocket@h35g.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ADAM Y. LEE, J. WILLIAM LEE,
DMITRY MIKHAILOVICH POTAPOV,
NEIL MACNAUGHTON, VIPIN GOKHALE,
BHARAT CHANDRA BADDEPUDI, and
DAVID VENGEROV1
Appeal2018-001220
Application 13/831,462
Technology Center 2100
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, NABEEL U. KHAN, and
KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.
STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Oracle International
Corporation. See Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 13/831,462
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1, 3-12, and 14--22. Claims 2 and 13 are canceled. Appeal Br. 2. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm-in-part. 2
THE INVENTION
The claims are directed to caching large objects in a computer system
with mixed data warehousing and online transaction processing workload.
Spec., Title. Claims 1 and 5, reproduced below, are illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method for managing cached data objects, the method
compnsmg:
receiving a request to perform an operation that accesses a
target data object;
determining whether the operation is for a transactional
workload or a data warehousing workload;
in response to determining that the operation is for the
transactional workload, replacing, in a buffer cache,
a data object with the target data object;
in response to determining that the operation is for the data
warehousing workload, determining whether to
cache the target data object in the buffer cache based
on an access-level value associated with the target
data object;
wherein the method is performed by one or more
computing devices.
5. A method for managing cached data objects, the method
compnsmg:
receiving a request to access a target data object;
2 We refer to the Specification, filed March 14, 2013 ("Spec."); the Final
Office Action, mailed October 28, 2016 ("Final Act."); Appeal Brief, filed
Apr. 28, 2017 ("App. Br."); the Examiner's Answer, mailed Sept. 29, 2017
("Ans.") and the Reply Brief, filed Nov. 16, 2017 ("Reply Br.").
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Application 13/831,462
in response to the request to access the target data object,
increasing a first access-level value associated with the
target data object;
after increasing the first access-level value associated with the
target data object, comparing the first access-level value
associated with the target data object with a set of one or
more other access-level values associated with data
objects residing in a cache;
based on said comparing, replacing at least one data object with
the target data object;
adjusting, based on a second access-level value associated with
the at least one data object, a rate at which access-level
values are adjusted;
based on the rate at which access-level values are adjusted,
adjusting the first access-level value of the target data
object; and
wherein the method is performed by one or more computing
devices.
REFERENCES
The following prior art is relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the
claims on appeal:
Gill et al. US 7,464,246 B2 Dec. 9, 2008
Ari et al. US 8,688,904 Bl Apr. 1, 2014
Nishimoto US 2010/0235569 Al Sept. 16, 2010
Wenguang Wang, "Storage Management in RDBMS", Aug. 17,
2001, Department of Computer Science University of
Saskatchewan, pp. 1-23.
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1, 3-7, 9, 10, 12, 14--18, 20, and 21 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § I03(a) as being unpatentable over Ari, Gill and Wang. Final Act.
2---6.
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Claims 8, 11, 19, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Ari, Gill and Nishimoto. Final Act. 6-7.
ANALYSIS
Independent claims 1 and 12
Appellants' contentions in connection with independent claims 1 and
12 are unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error. In connection with claims
1, 3, 4, 12, 14, and 15 we adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final
Act. 2--4) and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner's
Answer in response to Appellants' Appeal Brief (Ans. 2--4) and concur with
the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following for
emphasis, adopting Appellants' headings for ease of reference.
Contention A. I: Ari lacks a buffer cache
Appellants argue Ari's storage devices (which include integral
primary caches) and Ari's auxiliary cache resource are remote from and fail
to provide direct access to virtualization appliance 220. Appeal Br. 6.
Therefore, according to Appellants, Ari does not disclose a buffer cache. Id.
The Examiner answers, finding "a limitation requiring [the argued] direct
access is not within the claims and the buffer cache has not been explicitly
defined to require it." Ans. 2. Appellants reply, arguing the Examiner errs
in construing a buff er cache as a cache that acts as a buffer because
Appellants disclose an embodiment in which a buffer cache must have
multiple buffers, so therefore, a cache is not a buffer. Reply Br. 4.
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Appellants' contention is unpersuasive of Examiner error. Although
we interpret claim limitations consistent with the specification, we do not
import limitations from the specification into the claims. In re Van Geuns,
988 F.2d 1181, 1184, (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In re Zietz, 893 F.2d 319,
321(Fed. Cir. 1989)). In particular, when construing claim terminology
during prosecution before the Office, claims are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, reading claim
language in light of the specification as it would have been interpreted by
one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. A cad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d
1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). "Construing claims broadly during prosecution
is not unfair to the applicant ... because the applicant has the opportunity to
amend the claims to obtain more precise claim coverage." Id. Appellants
fail to provide sufficient evidence that the claimed buffer cache would have
been understood to require the argued features distinguishing it over Ari's
caches. The single example in which a buffer cache includes several buffers
does not constitute a limiting definition. We also disagree that independent
claims 1 and 12 require that the recited buffer cache be integral to or be
directly accessible by a particular device such as the recited one or more
computing devices. Accordingly, Appellants' arguments are not
commensurate with the scope of the independent claims.
Appellants' argument is still further unpersuasive because Ari
discloses "[i]t should also be appreciated that the blocks of FIG. 1 may be
included within a single computer system." Ari, col. 2, 11. 64---65. Thus, one
skilled in the art would have understood Ari to disclose a configuration in
which Virtual Appliance 220, Auxiliary Cache Resource 250, and Storage
Devices 160 and 170, including their respective Primary Caches 162 and
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1 72, are components of a single computer system such that there is direct
access to the caches by a computing device, i.e., the single computer system.
Contention A.2: Ari caches unconditionally
The Examiner finds Ari's migration of data to auxiliary cache as
described at col. 10, 11. 50-57 discloses determining whether to cache the
target data object in a second cache. Final Act. 2. The Examiner applies
Gill's single cache with separately maintained types of data for teaching that
Ari's separate caches may be combined into a single cache. Final Act. 3.
Wang is applied for disclosing data warehousing workloads. Id. Thus, the
combination of Ari, Gill and Wang teaches or suggests the disputed
limitation of, in response to determining that the operation is for the data
warehousing workload, determining whether to cache the target data object
in the buffer cache based on an access-level value associated with the target
data object. Id.
Appellants contend, because Ari always writes to caches 162 and 172,
the reference fails to disclose determining whether to cache the target data
object in the buffer cache as required by claims 1 and 12. Appeal Br. 6. The
Examiner answers "[ e ]ven if the data may be cached in one device, the
decision to cache in another device is a determination of whether to cache."
Ans. 3. That is, a determination to cache into Ari's auxiliary cache 250
discloses the argued conditional caching limitation. The Examiner further
explains "the entire limitation is not taught by Ari alone, but the combination
of Ari and Gill." Id. In particular, the Examiner relies on Gill for caching to
a single device, i.e. conditionally caching data in the buffer cache. Final
Act. 3.
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Appellants reply arguing the Examiner's position that Ari includes
two caches ( with Gill applied for teaching a single cache) is inconsistent
with the Examiner's position later in the Answer that Ari discloses a single
cache that spans two devices. Reply Br. 4. Appellants argue the alleged
inconsistency renders the rejection's rationale ambiguous and defeats a
prima face case of obviousness. Reply Br. 5.
Appellants' contention is unpersuasive. Ari's disclosure of migrating
data to the second storage device if it is determined the number of accesses
exceeds a threshold teaches or suggests the disputed conditional caching of
data, except that the storage device is a second cache rather than the same
cache that stores other (i.e., transactional workload) data. Because Gill
teaches storing different types of data in a single cache, the combination of
Ari, Gill, and Wang teaches or suggests the entirety of the disputed
limitation. Appellants' argument that Ari always stores to a first cache
ignores the Examiner's finding that Ari selectively stores to a second cache.
Furthermore, we disagree with Appellants' contention that the Examiner's
application of Gill for disclosing combining different types of data in a
single cache is inconsistent with the Examiner's position that a reasonable
interpretation of Ari is that "auxiliary cache is treated as a part of the single
multi-level cache which includes the demand based cache also within the
underlying storage device." The fact the Examiner chose to cite to Gill for
explicitly disclosing a single cache containing multiple data types is not
inconsistent with a finding that the same is at least suggested, if not taught
by, Ari.
Still further, even if the Examiner had taken alternative, inconsistent
positions, Appellants' response to the rejection belies argument the Examiner
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has failed to put forth a prima facie case of obviousness. The Federal Circuit
has repeatedly observed that "the prima facie case is merely a procedural
device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production." Hyatt
v. Dudas, 492 F.3d. 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977
F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The USPTO carries its procedural
burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying the applicant of the reasons for
the rejection, "together with such information and references as may be
useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the]
application." See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(alteration in original). All that is required of the Office is that it sets forth
the statutory basis of the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative
manner as to meet the notice requirement of§ 132. Id.; see also Chester v.
Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("Section 132 is violated when
a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from
recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection."). Appellants
fail to persuade us the Examiner's reasons for rejection fails to satisfy the
notice requirements of§ 132.
Contention A.3: Gill changes Ari's principle of operation
Appellants contend the combination of Ari and Gill is improper,
arguing "Ari will not work with a single cache, because Ari (Background) is
intentionally designed for 'migrations between levels in a multi-level cache
environment."' Appeal Br. 8. According to Appellants, Ari is directed to "a
more intelligent use of 'a second storage device'" such that using Gill's
single cache would change the principle of operation of Ari's migration
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technique. Id. Appellants argue "Ari operates primary and auxiliary caches
very differently" and "primary cache 162 and auxiliary cache 250 are
logically, operationally, and physically very different" such that one skilled
in the art would not use a single cache as taught by Gill in place of Ari's
multiple caches. Appeal. Br. 9-10. According to Appellants using a single
cache would improperly change Ari's principle of operation from migratory
to non-migratory. Appeal Br. 10.
The Examiner answers, directing attention to Ari's multi-level cache
environment in which "migrations between levels in a single multi-level
cache would still be applicable." Ans. 3. According to the Examiner, in
interpreting the claim language,
The first issue here appears to arise from the term 'cache' or
'buffer cache' and whether it refers to a single physical device
that holds cached data, or the concept of a cache, which could be
comprised of various devices as long as it is accomplishing the
goal of caching for the underlying storage. However, the
broadest reasonable interpretation appears to support the latter.
Id. In connection with the applied art, the Examiner finds, although it is
unclear whether Ari treats the devices constituting "the auxiliary cache and
primary caches ... as a single multi-level cache or two separate caches," Ari
discloses various configurations which would suggest treating the auxiliary
cache as a part of a single multi-level cache. Ans. 3--4. The Examiner
disputes Appellants' argument using a single cache would defeat Ari's data
migration technique. Ans. 4. According to the Examiner "Ari's principle of
operation is actually the use of two separate caching policies" a result of
which takes advantage of different underlying storage devices. Id. The
Examiner finds the combination of Ari and Gill does not defeat Ari's policy
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of "supplement[ing] the functionality of the caching policy provided by the
primary caches." Id quoting Ari col. 3, 11. 53-54.
Appellants' contentions are unpersuasive of Examiner error. As set
forth above, when construing claim terminology during prosecution before
the Office, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the specification, reading claim language in light of the
specification as it would have been interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the
art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1364. As discussed by the
Examiner, an initial issue is the meaning of the recited "buff er cache" and
whether it is a single device or can be multiple devices, e.g., separate caches
working together in a multi-level or multitier cache system. Appellants'
argument "a buffer cache must have (multiple) buffers" (Reply Br. 4) is not
persuasive because, inter alia, it is based on a particular embodiment rather
than on a specified requirement as might be evidenced by a formal definition
of a buffer cache. See Spec. ,r 66. Therefore, in the absence of persuasive
evidence to the contrary, we agree with the Examiner that "a buffer cache is
simply a cache that acts as a buffer." Ans. 2.
Furthermore, method claim 1 and Beauregard-type claim 12 recite a
series of steps, none of which specify or otherwise require the buffer cache
structure includes a single device or, even if so, what is included in a single
device. Therefore, under a broad but reasonable interpretation, Ari's
separate primary and auxiliary caches teach or suggest the disputed buffer
cache. We further note combining several caching devices into a single,
unified device is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, considered to be
an obvious design choice and does not render an invention patentable. See
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In re Larson, 340 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1965); In re Dulberg, 289 F.2d 522,
523 (CCPA 1961); MPEP § 2144.04(V)(C).
We also disagree the combination of Ari and Gill would result in an
inoperative device or would defeat Ari's principle of operation. Appellants'
argument is based on a wholesale combination of Ari's and Gill's
embodiments rather than the combination suggested by the Examiner in
which separate cache devices are combined into a single device. See Final
Act. 3. We note the skilled artisan would "be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle" because the skilled artisan
is "a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton." KSR Int'! Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420-21 (2007); see also Bos. Sci. Scimed, Inc. v.
Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("Combining two
embodiments disclosed adjacent to each other in a prior art patent does not
require a leap of inventiveness."). Here, Appellants have not demonstrated
the Examiner's proffered combination in support of the conclusion of
obviousness would have been "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art." Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485
F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 419--21).
For the reasons discussed above, we are sustain the rejection of
independent claims 1 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) together with the
rejection of dependent claims 3, 4, 14, and 15 which are not argued
separately.
Independent claims 5 and 16
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants'
arguments that the Examiner has erred in rejecting independent claims 5 and
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16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We agree with Appellants' conclusions as to
this rejection of the claims.
Appellants contend Ari does not adjust future cooling (i.e.,
decrementing an access count of a data object) based on past access and
therefore "does not disclose adjusting, based on a second access-level value
associated with at least one data object, a rate at which access-level values
are adjusted, as Claim 5 recites." Appeal Br. 11-12. The Examiner answers
that claim 5 does not recite adjusting future cooling based on past access, as
Appellants argue. Ans. 4. Addressing the actual claim language, the
Examiner interprets "access-level value" to be "merely a label for a value
that is in some way related to anything on the level of an access. In other
words, any values related to the access counts, the cooling, the rate of
cooling, values used for adjusting those rates are all access-level values."
Ans. 4--5. Appellants reply, noting agreement with the Examiner's finding
that "Ari does not explicitly disclose the specific variable used to
dynamically tune the cooling period." Reply Br. 5 citing Ans. 7. However,
Appellants emphasize that Ari's "dynamic threshold is not analogous to
adjusting a cooling rate." Id.
We agree with Appellants. Ari's disclosure of adjusting a threshold
does not specify how the threshold is adjusted, much less by adjusting a rate
of change of the threshold, i.e., a cooling rate. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the rejection of independent claims 5 and 16 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) or the rejections of dependent claims 6-11 and 17-22 which stand
with their respective base claims.
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1, 3, 4, 12, 14, and
15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claims 5-11 and 16-22
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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