Ex Parte Lee et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJul 11, 201412060944 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 11, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/060,944 04/02/2008 Sean S. Lee PD-208020 7627 20991 7590 07/11/2014 THE DIRECTV GROUP, INC. PATENT DOCKET ADMINISTRATION CA / LA1 / A109 2230 E. IMPERIAL HIGHWAY EL SEGUNDO, CA 90245 EXAMINER KURIEN, CHRISTEN A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2427 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/11/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte SEAN S. LEE and SCOTT D. CASAVANT ____________________ Appeal 2012-008200 Application 12/060,944 1 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before MARC S. HOFF, DENISE M. POTHIER, and JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, Administrative Patent Judges. HOFF, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a Final Rejection of claims 1-27. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. Appellants’ invention is a method and system for arbitrating and assigning program recording requests among a plurality of receiving units, and streaming recorded programming from one receiving unit to one or more other receiving units. 1 The real party in interest is The DIRECTV Group, Inc. Appeal 2012-008200 Application 12/060,944 2 Claim 1 is exemplary of the claims on appeal: 1. A method comprising: forming a network having a plurality of receiving units including a first receiving unit and a second receiving unit; generating a plurality of recording requests from a first group of the plurality of receiving units; communicating the recording requests through the network; determining whether the recording requests are redundant; when recording requests are redundant, selecting a first receiving unit of the first group to record content corresponding to the request; storing the content in a first memory of the first receiving unit; communicating a do-not-record signal to the first group except the first receiving unit; forming a selection for the content at the second receiving unit; communicating the selection from the second receiving unit to the first receiving unit; streaming the content to the second receiving unit through the network; and displaying the content on a display associated with the second receiving unit. The Examiner relies upon the following prior art in rejecting the claims on appeal: Arnold US 2005/0108769 A1 May 19, 2003 Verhaegh US 2009/0210533 A1 Aug. 20, 2009 Claims 1-27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Arnold in view of Verhaegh. Throughout this decision, we make reference to the Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed June 1, 2011), the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Jan. 4, 2012), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Sept. 2, 2011) for their respective details. Appeal 2012-008200 Application 12/060,944 3 ISSUE Appellants argue, inter alia, that neither Arnold nor Verhaegh disclose or suggest communicating a do-not-record signal to the first group except the first receiving unit (App. Br. 7-8). The Examiner finds that the assignment list of Verhaegh, which contains information about which receiver is to record which program, constitutes a “do-not-record signal” to the receivers not selected to record a particular program (Ans. 16-17). Appellants’ contentions present us with the following issue: Does Verhaegh disclose or suggest communicating a do-not-record signal to the first group except the first receiving unit as recited in claims 1and 16? PRINCIPLES OF LAW Section 103(a) forbids issuance of a patent when “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). See also KSR, 550 U.S. at 407, (“While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the [Graham] factors continue to define the inquiry that controls.”) Appeal 2012-008200 Application 12/060,944 4 The claim terms should be given their broadest reasonable meaning in their ordinary usage as such claim terms would be understood by one skilled in the art by way of definitions and the written description. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The claims, of course, do not stand alone. Rather, they are part of a “fully integrated written instrument” . . . consisting principally of a specification that concludes with the claims. For that reason, claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part” . . . . [T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’ Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005). ANALYSIS Each of independent claims 1 and 16 recites “communicating a do- not-record signal to the first group except the first receiving unit.” The Examiner finds that Verhaegh discloses this limitation (Ans. 5). The Examiner reasons that when Verhaegh’s assignment list assigns peer 1 to record a program, even though peer 2 submitted a request to record that program, Verhaegh’s coordinator “signaled” peer 2 not to record the program by communicating via the assignment list that another element on the network (e.g., peer 1) would be recording the program (Ans. 16-17). The Examiner contends that because one definition for a “signal,” in a general-purpose dictionary, is an “indication,” Verhaegh may be read such that the assignment list includes an indication not to record because someone else (e.g., a peer) is doing the recording (Ans. 17). Appeal 2012-008200 Application 12/060,944 5 We find error in the Examiner’s finding. Appellants disclose that “a ‘do-not-record’ signal may be generated and communicated to the other devices. In this manner, the other devices may become unselected devices” (Spec. ¶ 72). Consistent with the disclosure, we do not agree that the Examiner’s broad construction of “signal,” as described in the Answer, is reasonable. We agree with Appellants that Verhaegh discloses communicating assignment lists to the one or more recording units, commanding the recording units affirmatively to record program content, rather than commanding negatively as the claims require (App. Br. 7-8; Verhaegh ¶ 84). We further agree with Appellants that “[c]ommanding peer 1 to record each of the four programs, however, does not teach commanding peer 2 not to record two of the four programs” (Reply Br. 5). Because we do not sustain the rejection of independent claims 1 and 16 as proposed by the Examiner, we find that the combination of Arnold and Verhaegh fails to disclose or suggest all the elements recited in the rejected claims. We do not sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 1-27. CONCLUSION Verhaegh does not disclose or suggest communicating a do-not-record signal to the first group except the first receiving unit. ORDER The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-27 is reversed. REVERSED kis Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation