Ex Parte Lee et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 17, 2010

10612954 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 17, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10/612,954 07/07/2003 Christine Lee 95-535 6609
20736 7590 09/20/2010
MANELLI DENISON & SELTER
2000 M STREET NW SUITE 700
WASHINGTON, DC 20036-3307
EXAMINER
LE, LANA N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2614
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/20/2010 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte CHRISTINE LEE, CHIEN-MEEN HWANG, and YONG LI
____________

Appeal 2010-000360
Application 10/612,954
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before JOHN C. MARTIN, JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, and
MARC S. HOFF, Administrative Patent Judges.

RUGGIERO, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing,
as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE”
(paper delivery mode) or the “NOTIFICATION DATE” (electronic delivery
mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision.

Appeal 2010-000360
Application 10/612,954

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Final Rejection of
claims 1-7, which are all of the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the Examiner,
we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed September 25, 2006), the Answer
(corrected, mailed June 15, 2007), and the Reply Brief (filed January 3,
2007) for the respective details. We have considered in this decision only
those arguments Appellants actually raised in the Briefs. Any other
arguments which Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the
Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

Appellants’ Invention
Appellants’ invention relates to a wireless transceiver that uses a
digital automatic gain control (AGC) module. The AGC is configured to set
a gain to an initial gain value for mapping a received wireless signal to a first
power value for an input circuit having a prescribed input range. Upon a
determination by the AGC module that the first power value of the received
wireless signal does not exceed the prescribed input range, the digital AGC
module calculates an optimum gain for the received wireless signal relative
to the initial gain value and the first power value. If the first power value is
determined to exceed the prescribed input range, the AGC module
determines the optimum gain based on setting the gain to a minimum value.
(See generally Spec. 2:9-33).
Appeal 2010-000360
Application 10/612,954

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Claim 1 further illustrates the invention and reads as follows:
1. A method in a wireless transceiver, the method including:
setting a gain to an initial gain value for mapping a received wireless
signal to a first power value for supply of the received wireless signal to an
input circuit having a prescribed input range;
amplifying the received wireless signal by the initial gain value to the
first power value;
if the first power value of the received wireless signal does not exceed
the prescribed input range, determining an optimum gain for the received
wireless signal relative to the initial gain value and the first power value;
if the first power value of the received wireless signal exceeds the
prescribed input range, determining the optimum gain for the received
wireless signal based on setting the gain to a minimum gain value; and
outputting the received wireless signal at the optimum gain.

The Examiner’s Rejections

The Examiner’s Answer cites the following prior art references:
Wheatley, III (Wheatley) US 5,732,341 Mar. 24, 1998
Kopmeiners US 5,917,865 June 29, 1999

Claims 1 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Kopmeiners.
Claims 2, 3, and 5-7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kopmeiners in view of Wheatley.

Appeal 2010-000360
Application 10/612,954

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ISSUE
Based on Appellants’ contentions, as well as the findings and
conclusions of the Examiner, the pivotal dispositive issue before us is
whether the Examiner erred in finding that Kopmeiners discloses the setting
of the gain value of a received signal to a minimum value if a first power
value to which the received signal is amplified exceeds a threshold value.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) Rejection
Appellants’ arguments contend that, in contrast to the requirements of
each of the rejected independent claims 1 and 4, Kopmeiners has no
disclosure of determining optimum gain of a received signal based on setting
the gain to a minimum gain value if a first power value to which the received
signal is amplified exceeds a threshold value. According to Appellants
(App. Br. 16-17; Reply Br. 9), the portion of Kopmeiners (col. 2, ll. 57-65)
relied upon by the Examiner merely discloses that the gain value can be
decremented in incremental steps by a value that approximates the dynamic
range of the digital circuit, i.e., 20 dB, in Kopmeiners’ example. In
Appellants’ view, the cited portion of Kopmeiners at best discloses the
decrementing of the gain value in 20 dB increments toward a minimum
value, but does not disclose setting the gain to a minimum value as claimed.
We agree with Appellants. We find nothing in the cited portion of
Kopmeiners which could reasonably be construed as disclosing setting the
gain of the received signal to a minimum value. While Kopmeiners does
indeed describe a search algorithm in which the gain of the received signal is
adjusted in minimum 20 dB increments, the actual gain of the received
Appeal 2010-000360
Application 10/612,954

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signal is not set to a minimum value as claimed. In the search algorithm
disclosed by Kopmeiners, the successive 20 dB increments by which the
gain of the received signal is decremented will end when the received signal
value falls within the dynamic range of the ADC 120 (col. 5, l. 64-col. 6, l.
9). The amount of the signal gain, however, required to arrive at a signal
value which falls within the dynamic range of the ADC 120 is not set, let
alone set to a minimum value, as claimed.
In view of the above discussion, since all of the claim limitations are
not present in the disclosure of Kopmeiners, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) rejection of appealed independent claims 1
and 4.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) REJECTION
We also do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
dependent claims 2, 3, and 5-7 based on the combination of Kopmeiners
and Wheatley. The Examiner has applied the Wheatley reference to
Kopmeiners to address the signal to noise ratio gain setting condition feature
of the rejected claims. We find nothing in the disclosure of Wheatley,
however, which overcomes the innate deficiencies of Kopmeiners discussed
supra.
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Application 10/612,954

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CONCLUSION
Based on the findings of facts and analysis above, we conclude that
the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 and 4 for anticipation under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and in rejecting claims 2, 3, and 5-7 for obviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1 and 4 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) and claims 2, 3, and 5-7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.

REVERSED

KIS

MANELLI DENISON & SELTER
2000 M STREET NW SUITE 700
WASHINGTON, DC 20036-3307