Ex Parte LAUR et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 30, 2018

14061852 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 30, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/061,852 10/24/2013
23373 7590 08/01/2018
SUGHRUE MION, PLLC
2100 PENNSYLVANIA A VENUE, N.W.
SUITE 800
WASHINGTON, DC 20037
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Marion LAUR
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
Q207787 6978
EXAMINER
BOWES, STEPHEN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3657
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/01/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PPROCESSING@SUGHRUE.COM
sughrue@sughrue.com
USPTO@sughrue.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED ST ATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARION LAUR, THOMAS LEPAGE, JEAN-
FREDERIC DIEBOLD, and PHILIPPE CHICO
Appeal2016-008493
Application 14/061,852
Technology Center 3600
Before: STEFAN ST AICOVICI, CHARLES N. GREENHUT, and
ERIC C. JESCHKE, Administrative Patent Judges.
GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
rejections of claims 1-3. We have jurisdiction under35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An
Oral Hearing was conducted on July 10, 2018.
We affrrm.
Appeal2016-008493
Application 14/061,852
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to an electromechanical braking method.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. An electromechanical braking method for an aircraft
having at least one electromechanical brake (2) fitted to at least
one braked wheel (1) of the aircraft, the brake (2) having friction
members (3) and a plurality of electromechanical actuators ( 4),
each actuator (4) comprising a pusher (5) suitable for being
moved by means of an electric motor ( 6) to selectively apply a
pressing force on the friction members (3), the method
compnsmg:
applying, for a given braking operation, a total braking
force against the friction members (3) of the brake, distributed in
non-uniform manner amongst the actuators ( 4) of the brake, such
that at least two actuators ( 4) apply respective non-zero different
forces, and modifying the distribution among the actuators ( 4)
after a predetermined or random number of braking operations.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1 and 2 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Devlieg (US 2011/0226569 Al, published Sept. 22, 2011)
in view of Arnold (US 2003/0010583 Al, published Jan. 16, 2003).
Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
overDevlieg, Arnold andChareire (US 5,172,960, issued Dec. 22, 1992).
Claims 1-3 arerejectedunder35 U.S.C. § 103(a)as being
unpatentable over Chareire and Arnold.
OPINION
Arguments pertaining to the rejections citing Devlieg are premised on
claim 1, with claims 2 and 3 argued only based on dependency therefrom.
App. Br. 11.
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Appeal2016-008493
Application 14/061,852
Initially we note that although Appellants' Specification discusses
modifying the distribution of the applied force amongst the activated
actuators (Spec. 5---6), claim 1 is not so narrowly drawn, only requiring
modifying distribution of "a total braking force." 1 The latter is, as the
Examiner correctly determined, satisfied by the sequence depicted in Figure
6 of Devlieg. Thus, the Examiner correctly determined that the only
difference between Devlieg and the subject matter actually claimed is that
Devlieg's actuators applying different forces are activated or deactivated, so
ones in the latter state do not apply a "non-zero" braking force as recited.
See Final Act. 2. The Examiner accounts for this difference by citing
paragraph 16 of Arnold to demonstrate that it was known in the art to apply
different non-zero forces to applied or activated pads for the purpose of
reducing vibrations and concludes that it would have been obvious to a
skilled artisan to incorporate this technique into Dev lieg' s method for that
same reason. Final Act. 3.
Appellants argue that Devlieg was not concerned with vibrations and
does not make vibration reduction possible. App. Br. 10. There is no
requirement in an obviousness analysis that a primary or base reference
expressly identify or disclose the particular problem an examiner determines
would be overcome by modifying the method of that reference in light of the
teachings of a secondary reference. Those skilled in the art will often
recognize obvious improvements to machines and methods they themselves
did not invent.
1 Our reviewing court has "cautioned against reading limitations into a claim
from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is
the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification"
In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
( citations omitted).
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Appeal2016-008493
Application 14/061,852
Appellants next point out that Arnold teaches the use of a feedback
loop in order to determine the appropriate braking force distribution so as to
reduce vibration, as opposed to the "predetermined or random" interval
recited. App. Br. 10-11. As discussed above, Devlieg, not Arnold, was
cited by the Examiner as satisfying this limitation. Pointing out that a
secondary reference lacks subject matter the primary reference was cited for
is not, without more, demonstrative of any error in an obviousness analysis.
"Non-obviousness cannot be shown by attacking references individually
when the rejection is predicated upon the teachings of a combination of
references." See In re Merck& Co. Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir.
1986) ( citation omitted). Appellants make a similar argument regarding
Chareire, pointing out that Chareire lacks the subject matter Arnold was
cited for.
Above, we have discussed all the issues raised in the Appeal Brief.
Appellants attempted to introduce additional arguments in the Reply Brief
and Oral Hearing without any showing of good cause as to why such
arguments were not presented earlier. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37( c )(1 )(iv) states that
"any arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused
consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal." 3 7 C. F. R.
§ 41.41 (b )(2) provides, "Any argument raised in the reply brief which was
not raised in the appeal brief, or is not responsive to an argument raised in
the examiner's answer. .. will not be considered by the Board for purposes of
the present appeal, unless good cause is shown." 37 C.F.R. § 41.47(e)(l)
provides, "appellant may only rely on Evidence that has been previously
entered and considered by the primary examiner and present argument that
has been relied upon in the brief or reply brief." These rules serve to ensure
the administrative record is fully developed prior to deciding an appeal
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Appeal2016-008493
Application 14/061,852
before the Board. Arguments must be presented in a timely fashion so as to
provide the examiner an opportunity to consider them and, if they are
unpersuasive, provide a complete analysis in the record or, if necessary, cite
additional evidence for our consideration. As the arguments set forth for the
frrst time in the Reply Brief or at the Oral Hearing are untimely, they will
not be considered for purposes of the present appeal. 2
DECISION
The Examiner's rejections are affrrmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
2 We note that our initial discussion regarding the claim scope demonstrates
why the argument presented at pages 5---6 of the Reply Brief is not
commensurate in scope with claim 1.
5