14554562 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2018)

Ex Parte Launiere

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 23, 2018

14554562 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/554,562 11/26/2014 25215 7590 10/25/2018 The Dobrusin Law Firm P.C. 29 W. Lawrence Street, Ste. 210 SUITE 210 PONTIAC, MI 48342 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Timothy Richard Launiere UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 1755-002 3976 EXAMINER JARRETT, RONALD P ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3652 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/25/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): rmasquelier@patentco.com serla@patentco.com dobrusin_PAIR@firsttofile.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte TIMOTHY RICHARD LAUNIERE Appeal 2018-000331 Application 14/554,562 Technology Center 3600 Before MICHAEL L. HOELTER, JAMES P. CAL VE, and LEE L. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judges. HOELTER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is a decision on appeal, under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a), from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-20. App. Br. 4. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b). For the reasons explained below, we find error in the Examiner's rejections. Accordingly, we REVERSE. THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The disclosed subject matter relates "to an improved work-piece transfer apparatus, and particularly a work-piece transfer apparatus that has multiple mechanical links driven by multiple servo motors that control Appeal 2018-000331 Application 14/554,562 work-piece engagement structures." Spec. ,r 2. Apparatus claims 1 and 14 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the claims on appeal and is reproduced below. 1. A work-piece transfer apparatus comprising: a. at least one generally elongated work-piece engagement structure; b. at least one first robot arm having a first end portion and a second end portion, the first end portion being pivotally connected to the at least one generally elongated work-piece engagement structure; c. a first motor coupled to the at least one first robot arm at the second end portion and being adapted for translating the at least one first robot arm fore and aft in a generally horizontal direction; d. a second motor; e. at least one second robot arm having a first end portion and a second end portion, the first end portion of the at least one second robot arm being in operating driving relationship with the second motor, and the second end portion operatively coupled with the at least one generally elongated work-piece engagement structure for raising and lowering the at least one generally elongated work-piece engagement structure; and f. a support structure for supporting, from below, the first and second motor, the at least one first robot arm, the at least one second robot arm, and the at least one generally elongated work-piece engagement structure; wherein the first and second motors are operated synchronously to raise and lower the at least one generally elongated work-piece engagement structure, and translate the at least one generally elongated work-piece engagement structure in a fore and aft direction by way of one or both of the at least one first and second robot arms. REFERENCES RELIED ON BY THE EXAMINER Sofy Sahlin us 4,895,013 us 4,921,395 2 Jan 23, 1990 May 1, 1990 Appeal 2018-000331 Application 14/554,562 Willenbrock et al. Christopher et al. Williams us 4,966,274 US 2003/0007774 Al US 8,887,595 B2 THE REJECTIONS ON APPEAL Oct. 30, 1990 Jan 9, 2003 Nov. 18, 2014 Claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10, and 12-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 102( a)( 1) as anticipated by Willenbrock. Claims 6, 8, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 as unpatentable over Willenbrock and Christopher. Claims 11 and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 as unpatentable over Willenbrock, Sahlin, and Williams. Claim 18 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 as unpatentable over Willenbrock and Sofy. ANALYSIS The rejection of claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10, and 12-17 as anticipated by Willenbrock As indicated above, there are two independent claims, i.e., claims 1 and 14. Each will be separately addressed due to the differences between them. Claim 1 Claim 1 includes the limitation, "a support structure for supporting, from below, the first and second motor." The Examiner states that this support structure is identified in an accompanying annotated drawing of Figure 1 of Willenbrock, and that this support is "understood to be a wall." 1 1 The Examiner subsequently clarifies this by stating "these lines clearly indicate a wall (or similar, vertical mounting surface)." Ans. 3. 3 Appeal 2018-000331 Application 14/554,562 Final Act. 9; see also Ans. 3. The Examiner's annotation of Willenbrock's Figure 1 is replicated below. FIG,1 The above Figure 1 of Willenbrock has been annotated by the Examiner to identify the recited "support structure." Appellant contends, "[ w ]ith respect to claim 1, the Office Action has not reasonably construed the claim language 'from below"' and that "the alleged support structure is not providing support from below to those elements." App. Br. 17. Answering this, "[t]he Examiner's position is that, in a gravitational environment, all structures are directly or indirectly supported from below." Ans. 4. The Examiner "states that the claim limitations were examined under broadest reasonable interpretation" and that "Willenbrock's wall, whether it goes directly to the floor, or if it's suspended 4 Appeal 2018-000331 Application 14/554,562 in some form, is supported from below, either directly or indirectly." Ans. 4. The Examiner is effectively reading the claim phrase "from below" so broadly as to give this language such little meaning or context that it may as well be ignored and read out of the claim limitation. We decline to follow the Examiner's lead because we are instructed, "[a]ll words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art." In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970); see also MPEP Â§ 2143.03. We are further instructed, "[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference." Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F .2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). As is readily evident from even a cursory review of Figure 1 of Willenbrock above, the Examiner's identified "Support Structure" provides support to the suspended apparatus from above, not "from below" as recited. Accordingly, and in view of the record presented, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 (or dependent claims 2-5, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 13) as being anticipated by Willenbrock. Claim 14 Claim 14 lacks both the "from below" and the "support structure" limitation. Instead, claim 14 recites "a base for supporting .... " This "base" has also been identified by the Examiner in the above annotated figure. See also Final Act. 11 ("a base (identified in Figure 1 below)"). As is evident, the Examiner identifies Willenbrock's eyelet structure that is mounted to an overhead support and from which Willenbrock's device is suspended, as the corresponding "base." See Examiner's annotated figure 5 Appeal 2018-000331 Application 14/554,562 above. At the same time, however, and when addressing dependent claim 15, the Examiner provides a "broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed limitation 'base"' stating, "[ o ]ne applicable definition of base is 'the bottom part or section of something that supports the rest of it' (MacMillan Dictionary)."2 Ans. 8. Understanding from the Examiner's verbiage that a "base" is a "bottom part," yet also understanding from the Examiner's annotated figure that Willenbrock' s corresponding "base" is an uppermost component, there is a dichotomy between these two assertions by the Examiner that cannot be readily resolved. Further, there is no indication that the structure visually labeled as a "base" ( or "support structure") above Willenbrock's device (see Examiner's annotated figure) is in any way connected to whatever it may be the Examiner has explained is "the bottom part or section of something." Ans. 8. Because the Examiner has staked out these two opposite points of view for a "base" in the same rejection, the Examiner has (perhaps inadvertently) injected confusion into the rejection. Appellant thus is placed in the unenviable position of having to argue against both "base" positions, and it would seem that in defending against the one, Appellant would be, in effect, arguing in support of the other. This is not palatable. For example, when addressing the requirements for a rejection under obviousness (which is, in some respects, less demanding 2 This "bottom" location for the "base" is consistent with the Examiner's subsequent definition of a "stanchion" as "an upright post that supports a structure." Ans. 8 (referencing "MacMillan Dictionary"). The Examiner relies on both definitions to reject dependent claim 15 which recites, "wherein the base is a stanchion." 6 Appeal 2018-000331 Application 14/554,562 than a rejection under anticipation3), our reviewing court has stated that the PTO fails to carry its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie rejection when the rejection is so "uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection." In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). We believe that is the case here in view of the confusing, and perhaps even mutually exclusive, interpretations by the Examiner of the claim term "base." Accordingly, and in view of the record presented, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 14 ( or dependent claims 15-1 7) as being anticipated by Willenbrock. The rejection of (a) claims 6, 8, and 20 as unpatentable over Willenbrock and Christopher; (b) claims 11 and 19 as unpatentable over Willenbrock, Sahlin, and Williams; and, (c) claim 18 as unpatentable over Willenbrock and Sofy The Examiner relies on the additional references to Christopher, Sahlin, Williams, and Sofy for their respective teachings regarding the additional limitations of dependent claims 6, 8, 11, and 18-20. Final Act. 13-15. None of these references are cited by the Examiner in a manner that might cure the defect above regarding Willenbrock. Accordingly, we likewise do not sustain the Examiner's rejections of claims 6, 8, 11, and 18- 20. 3 "Though it is never necessary to so hold, a disclosure that anticipates under Â§ 102 also renders the claim invalid underÂ§ 103, for 'anticipation is the epitome of obviousness."' Connell v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing In reFracalossi, 681 F.2d 792 (CCPA 1982). 7 Appeal 2018-000331 Application 14/554,562 DECISION The Examiner's rejections of claims 1-20 are reversed. REVERSED 8