Ex Parte Landry et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 23, 2017

14291682 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/291,682 05/30/2014 Gregg W. Landry 09945-0129004 7627
108858 7590 10/25/2017
Fish & Richardson PC (iROBOT)
P.O. Box 1022
Minneapolis, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
PATTON, SPENCER D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3664
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/25/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patdoctc@fr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GREGG W. LANDRY, DAVID A. COHEN, DANIEL N. OZICK,
MARK J. CHIAPPETTA, and JOSEPH L. JONES
Appeal 2017-003195
Application 14/291,682
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN A. EVANS, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and
JASON M. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges.
EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of Claims 1—10 and 15—23. App. Br. 1. Claims
11 and 12 are objected to as depending from a rejected base claim and
Claims 13 and 14 are canceled. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We REVERSE.2
1 Appellants state the real party in interest is iRobot Corporation. App.
Br. 1.
2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (filed September 14, 2016, “App. Br.”); the Reply
Appeal 2017-003195
Application 14/291,682
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relates to a navigational control system for a robotic
device. See Abstract and Spec. 1 5.
INVENTION
Claims 1 and 21 are independent. An understanding of the invention
can be derived from a reading of Claim 1, which is reproduced below with
some formatting added:
1. An autonomous cleaning apparatus comprising:
a chassis;
a drive system disposed on the chassis and operable to
enable movement of the cleaning apparatus;
a controller in communication with the drive system, the
controller including a processor operable to control the drive
system to steer movement of the cleaning apparatus;
a cleaning head system disposed on the chassis having a
cleaning pathway providing pneumatic communication with a
debris bin, the cleaning head system comprising an agitating
brush that throws debris into the debris bin;
an indicator light; and
a debris sensor in communication with the controller, the
debris sensor responsive to debris to generate a signal indicative
of such passing;
wherein the controller is configured to
change an operational condition of the cleaning
apparatus in response to receiving a debris signal
generated by the debris sensor, the operational condition
Brief (filed December 12, 2016, “Reply. Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer
(mailed October 21, 2016, “Ans.”); the Final Action (mailed March 10,
2016, “Final Act.”); and the Specification (filed May 30, 2014, “Spec.”) for
their respective details.
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Appeal 2017-003195
Application 14/291,682
selected from the group consisting of a speed of the
movement of the cleaning apparatus and an amount of
power drawn by the cleaning apparatus, and to
illuminate the indicator light in response to the
debris signal generated by the debris sensor.
References and Rejections
Kobayashi, et al., US 5,109,566 May 5, 1992
“Kobayashi”
Colens US 2002/0120364 Al Aug. 29, 2002
Taylor, et al., US 2005/0010331 Al Jan. 13, 2005
“Taylor”
The claims stand rejected as follows:3
1. Claims 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, and 18 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Taylor. Final Act. 2—5.
2. Claims 3, 7, 17, and 21—23 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Taylor and Kobayashi. Final Act.
5-9.
3. Claims 5, 6, 10, 15, 16, 19, and 20 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Taylor and Colens. Final
Act. 9-13.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 1—10 and 15—23 in light of
Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred.
3 Claims 11 and 12 stand as free of the prior art and would be allowable if
re-written to include the limitations of the base and any intervening claims.
Final Act. 13.
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Appeal 2017-003195
Application 14/291,682
We consider Appellants’ arguments seriatim, as they are presented in
the Appeal Brief, pages 3—7.
Claims 1,2,4, 8,9, and 18: Obviousness over Taylor
Claim 1 recites, inter alia, “wherein the controller is configured to . . .
illuminate the indicator light in response to the debris signal generated by
the debris sensor.” Appellants contend this limitation is not taught by
Taylor. Appellants argue Taylor teaches a robot cleaner having user­
operated input buttons with indicator lights, but that Taylor fails to teach any
event that would cause illumination of the lights. Id. at 3.
The Examiner does not make a finding contrary to Appellants’
assertion that Taylor fails to disclose a controller configured to illuminate an
indicator light in response to a debris signal generated by a debris sensor.
See Ans. 3. Rather, the Examiner finds Taylor teaches a plurality of user-
controlled indicator lights. Id. at 4. The Examiner finds that it would have
been obvious to modify Taylor’s lights from user-controlled to become robot
processor-controlled. Id. at 3^4.
Appellants’ reply re-alleges their contention that Taylor fails to teach
any robot control over the lights. Reply Br. 1.
The cited prior art fails to teach each claimed limitation. “[T]he
Examiner recognizes Taylor does not explicitly disclose all of the claimed
subject matter.” Ans. 7. A claim is not obvious in light of the cited prior art
when one or more limitations of the claim necessary to prove obviousness
has not been taught. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,
576 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding of nonobviousness requires
conclusion that “some element necessary to prove obviousness had not been
demonstrated”). When a prima facie case of obviousness has not been
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Application 14/291,682
established, the rejection must be reversed. In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
Because “Taylor does not explicitly disclose all of the claimed subject
matter” (Ans. 7), the suggestion to supply the missing limitation must have
come from Appellants’ disclosure. “Care[, however,] must be taken to avoid
hindsight reconstruction by using ‘the patent in suit as a guide through the
maze of prior art references, combining the right references in the right way
so as to achieve the result of the claims in suit.’” In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d
1279, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
In view of the foregoing, we decline to sustain the rejection of Claims
1, 2, 4, 8, 9, and 18.
Claims 3,5-7,10,15-17, and 19-23: Obviousness over
Taylor and Kobayashi/Colens.
The Examiner has not cited either Kobayashi or Colens to teach the
missing limitation. See Ans. 7—8.
“[Dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from
which they depend are nonobvious.” In reFritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266
(Fed. Cir. 1992). In view of the foregoing, we decline to sustain the
rejection of Claims 3, 5—7, 10, 15—17, 19, and 20, or independent Claim 20
and its dependent Claims (22 and 23), which also require illuminating in
response to the debris signal.
DECISION
The rejection of Claims 1—10 and 15—23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
REVERSED.
REVERSED
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