Ex Parte Lablans

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 6, 2017

12983168 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 6, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/983,168 12/31/2010 Peter Lablans PET0004-00US 9730
93697
Peter T ahlans;
7590 06/08/2017 EXAMINER
8 Harvey Court
Morris Township, NJ 07960
BECK, LERON
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2487
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/08/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket @ ternary logic .com
ipdocket @ verizon. net
lablans @ ternary logic, com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PETER LAB LANS
Appeal 2016-001199
Application 12/983,1681
Technology Center 2400
Before JEFFREY S. SMITH, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
JON M. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
1 Appellant identifies Spatial Cam LLC as the real party in interest. (App.
Br. 3.)
Appeal 2016-001199
Application 12/983,168
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 1—3, 5—7, 11, 18, 20, 21, and 25—28. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
CLAIMED INVENTION
According to Appellant, the claims are directed to a large, ultra-thin
and ultra-light connectable display that communicates with a smartphone.
(Spec., Title, Abstract, 1120.) Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
1. A display communicatively connectable to a smartphone,
comprising:
the display being a self-contained portable and mobile
display with a single housing spatially separated from the
smartphone, the single housing being not thicker than 5 mm and
the single housing containing a display screen with an area size
determined by a diagonal of at least 10 cm, the display screen
being a touch screen and the single housing also containing a
processor;
the single housing including a receiver enabled to directly
receive a display signal originating from a camera in the
smartphone which is enabled to record a video image of a scene
and the smartphone includes a processor with an operating
system which enables a user interface on a screen on the
smartphone;
the processor in the single housing is uniquely authorized
to process the display signal originating from the camera in the
smartphone;
the touch screen in the single housing is enabled to display
the video image of the scene in real-time in response to the
display signal originating from the camera in the smartphone
received by the receiver, wherein the touch screen in the single
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Application 12/983,168
housing is enabled to display the video image of the scene when
the scene takes place; and
the touch screen in the single housing of the display is
enabled to display a user interface to control a plurality of
functions of the smartphone including controlling a brightness of
the screen of the smartphone.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 27, and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
based on Sarnia (US 7,911,493 B2, issued March 22, 2011), Klosowiak (US
2008/0239170 Al, published October 2, 2008), Larocca (US 7,835,736 B2,
issued November 16, 2010), Warren (US 7,477,919 B2, issued January 13,
2009), Hayton (US 2011/0095999 Al, published April 28, 2011), and
Gonsalves (US 7,429,988 B2, issued September 30, 2008). (Final Act. 6—
11.)
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Sarma,
Klosowiak, Larocca, Warren, Hayton, Gonsalves, and Nasserbakht (US
8,311,513 Bl, issued November 13, 2012). {Id. at 11—12.)
Claims 11 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on
Sarma, Klosowiak, Larocca, Warren, Hayton, Gonsalves, Kim (US
8,180,410 B2, issued May 15, 2012), Yiu (US 7,418,275 B2, issued August
26, 2008), and Yoshie (US 5,947,359, issued September 7, 1999). {Id. at
12-14.)
Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Sarma,
Klosowiak, Larocca, Warren, Hayton, Gonsalves, Kim, Yiu, Yoshie, and
Larsen (US 2009/0086015 Al, published April 2, 2009). {Id. at 14—15.)
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Application 12/983,168
Claims 21, 25, and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based
on Sarnia, Klosowiak, Larocca, Warren, Hayton, Gonsalves, and Choi (US
7,869,117 B2, issued January 11, 2011). (Id. at 15—16.)
ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 2, 3, 5-7, 11, 18, 21, 25-28
Appellant argues that Gonsalves does not disclose the limitation “the
touch screen in the single housing of the display is enabled to display a user
interface to control a plurality of functions of the smartphone including
controlling a brightness of the screen of the smartphone,” as recited in
independent claim 1, and in a similar limitation of independent claim 27.
(App. Br. 14, 17, 33.) In particular, Appellant argues “Gon[salves] teaches
control of brightness on [a] display in [a] device from fthel device itself,
not from another device.” (Id. at 17.) We agree with Appellant’s argument.
The Examiner cites Gonsalves (2:35—55) as disclosing the claimed
limitation. (Final Act. 10.) Gonsalves states “[t]he screen 12 has a certain
default brightness level which is automatically activated whenever the user
touches the screen 12 or any key on the keypad 14.” (2:53—55.) However,
Gonsalves’ screen 12 is apart of PDA/telephone 10.2 (2:40-42, Fig. 1.) In
contrast, in the claimed invention, the display is “spatially separated” from
the smartphone and is used to control its functions, including brightness.3
2 Gonsalves refers to element 10 as both a “handheld device” and a
“PDA/telephone.”
3 The Examiner and Appellant are advised to consider whether claim 1 and
claim 27 are compliant with 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, specifically,
the “written description” and “enablement” requirements. The part of the
Specification cited as providing support for the claimed limitation states that
brightness control is applied to the display, not to a separate smartphone via
the display. (App. Br. 8, citing Spec. 1144.)
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Application 12/983,168
The Examiner’s mapping does not explain why one of ordinary skill in the
art considering Gonsalves’ teachings would have considered it obvious to
use a display to control functions, including brightness, of a “spatially
separated” smartphone when there is no such disclosure in the parts of
Gonsalves relied upon in the obviousness rejection. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 or claim 27, or of dependent
claims 2, 3, 5—7, 11, 18, 21, 25, 26, and 28, which incorporate the same
limitations due to their dependency from claim 1 or claim 27.
Claim 204
In arguing for patentability of claim 20, Appellant refers back to
earlier arguments presented in the Appeal Brief with respect to claim 11.
(App. Br. 42.) In particular, Appellant argues Kim’s actuator is not actuated
by a signal from a positional sensor in a display, as claimed. However, the
Examiner relies not on Kim, but on Yiu, to disclose this feature. (Final Act.
13—14 citing Yiu, 1:25—35, 5:15—42.) Accordingly, Appellant’s argument is
not responsive to the Examiner’s rejection, and thus is unpersuasive of
Examiner error.
Appellant argues Yiu discloses a magnetic sensor 362 located in a
main module 10 and not in the display 12, as required by the claim. (App.
Br. 40-42, citing Yiu 5:3—5.) However, the Examiner relies on Kim for the
feature of the sensor being located in a housing of the display. (Final Act.
15, citing Kim 10:10-12.) Thus, Appellant’s argument is not responsive to
the manner in which the Examiner applied the references.
4 Appellant and the Examiner are advised to consider whether claim 20 is
compliant with 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. The claimed “fixture
enabled to be removably attached to an object” has no relationship to the
remainder of the claim.
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Appellant also argues Yoshie fails to teach the required actuator or a
signal generated by a positional sensor in a display to control an actuator in a
platform. (App. Br. 41 42.) The Examiner finds that Yoshie discloses this
feature, stating that Yoshie’s actuator actuates the movement of a holding
element in response to a change, which the Examiner regards as a signal.
(Final Act. 14, citing Yoshie, Abstract, 3:5—15.) Although Appellant
disagrees with the Examiner’s finding, Appellant does not explain how or
why the finding is erroneous.5
Appellant argues Kim does not disclose the claimed positional sensor.
(App. Br. 42-44.) In particular, Appellant argues Kim is directed to a touch
input device and not “a sensor which senses a positional change of a portable
and mobile computer display with a screen.” 6 {Id. at 42-43, citing Kim
145—52.) However, the Examiner relies on Yiu, not Kim, to teach this
feature of the claim. (Final Act. 13, citing Yiu 5:15—42.)
Appellant also argues “[t]he terms as used in the cited prior art are
used in a completely different context than in the claim and would not have
pointed one of ordinary skill [in the art] to the claimed invention.” (App. Br.
5 Even if Appellant is correct that Yoshie does not disclose this feature,
Larsen, which was applied in the rejection of claim 20, discloses moving a
camera in response to movement of a helmet including a display. (Figs. 1, 2
118.)
6 We note in passing that, from the briefings, Appellant appears to regard the
claims as limited to causing the “smartphone” (claim 11) or “telephone”
(claim 20) to rotate by the actuator when the orientation of the display is
changed between portrait and landscape positions. However, the claim
language may be construed to encompass within its meaning the sensing of
the deflection of a touch screen display in response to touch, or sensing the
GPS location of the device as it is moved from one place to another, which
were well known in the art before Appellant’s invention.
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43.) However, Appellant does not explain in any detail how or why the
Examiner errs in interpreting cited prior art as disclosing the claimed
language under its broadest reasonable interpretation. In this regard, we note
that “the PTO is obligated to give claims their broadest reasonable
interpretation during examination.” In re Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech. Ctr., 367
F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Appellant further argues Kim, Yiu, Yoshie, and Farsen are not
analogous art (App. Br. 39, 41, 43), but does not offer sufficient analysis or
supporting evidence in support of the contention. Fawyer’s arguments and
conclusory statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are
entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139-140 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
A reference is analogous art to the claimed invention if: (1) the
reference is from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention (even
if it addresses a different problem); or (2) the reference is reasonably
pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor (even if it is not in the same
field of endeavor as the claimed invention). In re Icon Health and Fitness,
Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Clay, 966 F.2d
656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re
Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Manual of Patent Examining
Procedures (“MPEP”) § 2141.01(a).
Although Appellant offers a hint of an analogousness argument in
asserting Kim relates to an MP3 player (App. Br. 43), which Appellant
presumably meant to contrast with the claimed telephone, Kim’s disclosure
is actually more generally directed to “portable electronics devices”
including “mobile phones.” (1:5—26.) Thus, Kim’s disclosure is not
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restricted to an MP3 player, but rather it is directed to “portable electronics
devices” in a similar field to that of the claimed invention.
Appellant also argues that Larsen discloses manual rotation by an
operator (App. Br. 43), which Appellant argues is not pertinent to the
claimed invention. However, Larsen discloses slaving the movements of a
camera, using servo systems, to the neck movements of an operator, as
sensed by a sensor system of a helmet-mounted display. (Fig. 1,118.)
Thus, Larsen addresses a similar problem in solving how to move a display
to control the movement of a camera using a remotely controlled actuator.
Appellant further argues the Examiner fails to provide adequate
rationale to combine Kim, Yiu, Yoshie, and Larsen. (App. Br. 43 44.) The
Examiner’s rationale to combine these references is set forth in the rejection.
(Final Act. 12—15.) In particular, Appellant criticizes the Examiner’s
rationale of combining Kim with the other references, in order to “provide
an improved system that involves mobile devices for ease and convenience.”
(App. Br. 39; Final Act. 13.) However, we agree with the Examiner that the
provision of Kim’s housing with clip assembly would make it easier to
attach a camera telephone to an object. (2:30-32.) Appellant’s challenge to
the Examiner’s rationale for combining the remaining references is
conclusory. Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in relying on the
stated rationale to combine the references.
In order to sustain the rejection, “there must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.” KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)
(quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). As Appellant has
not shown reversible error in the reasoning and underpinning set forth in the
Examiner’s rejection, we sustain the obviousness rejection of claim 20.
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DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—3, 5—7, 11, 18, 21,
and 25—28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We affirm the rejection of claim 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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