Ex Parte Kraus et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 20, 2013

11640076 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte BERNHARD KRAUS, STEFAN REHBEIN, and
UWE SCHOBER
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Appeal 2012-001168
Application 11/640,076
Technology Center 3700
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Before MEREDITH C. PETRAVICK, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judges.

OSINSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-7, 9, 10, 15, and 20-28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Kraus (WO 2004/028760 A1, pub. Apr. 8, 2004) and Eichhorn (US
6,357,117 B1, iss. Mar. 19, 2002). Ans. 4-5. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1 and 23 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is
reproduced below and is illustrative of the appealed subject matter:
1. An electric shaving apparatus comprising
a hand-holdable housing; and
a shaving head coupled to the housing via at least one
first elastic element and comprising:
a first shaving cutter;
a second shaving cutter; and
an electric motor that generates a first oscillatory
motion of the shaving head and a second oscillatory
motion of the second shaving cutter, said electric motor
comprising:
a first drive component with at least one
electric coil that generates a magnetic field; and
a second drive component that is movable
relative to the first drive component and that
cooperates with the first drive component to
generate a motive force;
wherein the first drive component of the electric motor is
rigidly connected to one of the shaving head and the housing;
wherein the first drive component and the second drive
component are coupled via at least one second elastic element.

1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Braun GmbH. Br. 1.
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ANALYSIS
Only issues and findings of fact contested by Appellants in the Brief
will be addressed. See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075-76 (BPAI
2010) (precedential). Appellants argue claims 1-7, 9, 10, 15, and 20-28 as a
group. Br. 3-4. We select claim 1 as the representative claim and claims
2-7, 9, 10, 15, and 20-28 fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2011).
The Examiner found that Kraus teaches substantially all of the
limitations of claim 1, except for “one first elastic element and a first
oscillatory motion of the shaving head.” Ans. 4-5. The Examiner found that
Eichhorn “teaches the use of at least one first elastic element/leaf spring 21-
24” and concluded that:
[i]t would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the
art . . . to have modified the device of Kraus . . . by providing at
least one first elastic element/leaf spring and the first oscillatory
motion of the shaving head as taught by Eichhorn . . . in order
to obtain a device that shorte[ns] the length of displacement of a
hair that has penetrated the hair entrance opening during the
cutting operation.
Id. at 5 (citing Eichhorn, col. 3, ll. 41-54; col. 7, ll. 36-53).
Appellants contend that Kraus’ joints 21-24 are not elastic elements
“since they are rigid in their entire range of motion and do not ‘yield
resiliently perpendicular’ to a rigid plane.” Br. 4; see also Spec. 5, ll. 2-3
(“The characteristic of the leaf springs 4 is that they act like rigid bodies
within the plane defined by them while yielding resiliently perpendicularly
to that plane.”).
The Specification does not assign or suggest a particular definition to
the claim term “elastic element,” and therefore, it is appropriate to consult a
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general dictionary definition of the words for guidance in determining the
ordinary and customary meaning of the claim phrase as viewed by a person
of ordinary skill in the art. See Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d
1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The ordinary and customary meaning of the
claim term “elastic” is “capable of recovering size and shape after
deformation.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged,
Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, Copyright 1993, accessed at
http://lionreference.chadwyck.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). Thus, one
of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim 1 to call for an element
that couples the shaving head and the housing and that is capable of
recovering size and shape after deformation. We find nothing in the
Specification inconsistent with the ordinary and customary meaning
described above. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (the words
of the claim must be given their plain meaning unless the plain meaning is
inconsistent with the specification). Appellants’ Specification describes that
“the shaving head 2 can be moved to the left and right relative to the housing
1 by overcoming the restoring force produced by [the first elastic element,
i.e.,] the leaf springs 4.” Spec. 5, ll. 4-6.
The Examiner explained that the rejection does not rely on the joints
illustrated in connection with the embodiment of Figures 1-4 (that are
described as including bearing trunnions and bearing bores which are
disposed in support elements 16, 17) (Eichhorn, col. 7, ll. 13-15), but rather
relies on the embodiment illustrated in Figure 6. Ans. 5. The Examiner
found that “[i]t is clear by inspection of Fig. 6 that the elements 21-24 are
shaped like bars that behave like a common spring which is well known in
the art.” Id.
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The burden of proof with respect to the Examiner’s rejection is by a
preponderance of the evidence. In order to satisfy this standard, the
evidence must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the alleged fact
is the case. See Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 541-42 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(the preponderance of the evidence standard requires the finder of fact to
believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence).
Although not described as an “elastic element,” the joints 21-24 as shown in
Figure 6 of Eichhorn support that at least a portion of at least one joint 21-24
deforms to accommodate oscillation of shaving head 6 in the directions of
movement A and B. In connection with the description of Figure 6,
Eichhorn discloses: “The shaving head 6 is mounted on the support elements
16, 17 for oscillation in the directions of movement A and B through a
supporting frame 40 and through supports arms 14, 15 having joints 21, 22,
23, 24.” Eichhorn, col. 9, ll. 19-22. Thus, Figure 6 and column 9, lines 19-
22 of Eichhorn demonstrate that it is more likely than not that joints 21-24 of
Figure 6 of Eichhorn are elastic elements as found by the Examiner.
To the extent Appellants may be arguing that joints 21-24 do not have
the particular characteristics of leaf springs by acting like rigid bodies within
the plane defined by them while yielding perpendicularly to that plane (Br.
4), the language of claim 1 is broader than the particular example of a leaf
spring as an elastic element, and we decline to import the specific
characteristics of leaf springs as a limitation of claim 1. See Superguide
Corp. v. DirecTV Enterps., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the
explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to
import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim. For example,
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a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be
read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the
embodiment.”).
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants have not shown that the
Examiner erred in concluding that the subject matter of independent claim 1
would have been obvious over Kraus and Eichhorn, and we sustain the
rejection of independent claim 1, and claims 2-7, 9, 10, 15, and 20-28 that
fall therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kraus and
Eichhorn.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-7, 9, 10, 15, and 20-28 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kraus and Eichhorn is AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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