Ex Parte Kirenko et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 13, 2019

13996641 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/996,641 06/21/2013 Ihor Olehovych Kirenko
24737 7590 03/15/2019
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus A venue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2011P00022WOUS 5651
EXAMINER
ABDOU TCHOUSSOU, BOUBACAR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2489
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/15/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patti. demichele@Philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte IHOR OLEHOVYCH KIRENKO, GERARD De HAAN, and
ADRIAAN JOHAN Van LEEST
Appeal2018-006330
Application 13/996,641 1
Technology Center 2400
Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, HUNG H. BUI, and JON M. JURGOV AN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-15, which are all the claims pending
in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
WeAFFIRM. 2
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Koninklijke Philips
Electronics N.V. App. Br. 3.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.") filed
December 12, 2017; Reply Brief ("Reply Br.") filed June 4, 2018;
Examiner's Answer ("Ans.") mailed April 5, 2018; Final Office Action
("Final Act.") mailed July 13, 2017; and original Specification ("Spec.")
filed June 21, 2013.
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Application 13/996,641
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' invention relates to "a video encoding device and a
corresponding video encoding method for encoding video data, by which
PPG [ (photo plethysmographic imaging)] relevant information is preserved
without requiring a large amount of additional data." Spec. 3:8-10;
Abstract.
Claims 1-15 are pending on appeal. Claims 1, 10, 11, and 13 are
independent. Claim 1 is illustrative, as reproduced below with disputed
limitations in italics.
1. A video encoding device for encoding input video data,
the video encoding device comprising:
photoplethysmograph (PPG) signal-based selector
circuitry which, when operating, selects in the input video data
one or more regions of interest that provide a PPG signal,
a first video encoder, which, when operating, encodes said
one or more regions of interest of said input video data according
to a predetermined encoding scheme with a first setting of the
encoding to preserve PPG-relevant information in the encoded
one or more regions of interest,
a second video encoder, which, when operating, encodes
remaining parts of said input video data according to said
predetermined encoding scheme with a second setting of the
encoding, and
a video combiner, which, when operating, combines the
encoded one or more regions of interest and the encoded
remaining parts of said input video data into an encoder output
video stream.
App. Br. 46 (Claims App.).
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EXAMINER'S REJECTIONS & REFERENCES
(1) Claims 1-9, 11, 12, and 14 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the written description
requirement. Final Act. 8-9.
(2) Claims 1-9, 11, 12, and 14 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite. Final Act. 10-12.
(3) Claims 1--4, 7, 10, 14, and 15 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § I02(a)(2) as being anticipated by Noguchi et al. (US
2010/0119156 Al; published May 13, 2010; "Noguchi"). Final Act. 13-17.
(4) Claims 5, 6, and 11-13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a)
as being unpatentable over Noguchi and Ming-Zher Poh et al. (Non-Contact,
Automated Cardiac Pulse Measurements Using Video Imaging and Blind
Source Separation, 18 OPTICS EXPRESS, 10762-74 (May 10, 2010); "Poh").
Final Act. 17-20.
(5) Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Noguchi and Cetin et al. (US 2006/0062478 Al;
published Mar. 23, 2006; "Cetin"). Final Act. 20-21.
ANALYSIS
35 U.S. C. § l l 2(a): Claims 1-9, 11, 12, and 14
In support of the§ 112(a) rejection of claims 1-9, 11, 12, and 14, the
Examiner finds Figures 1-7 of Appellants' disclosure only show boxes that
represent several hardware components, such as: (1) photoplethysmograph
(PPG) signal-based selector circuitry 20, shown in Figures 1, 3, and 7, and
recited in claim 1; (2) area selector circuitry 21 and block selector circuitry
24, shown in Figure 3, and recited in claim 2; (4) detector circuitry 24 and
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analyzer circuitry 23, shown in Figure 3, and recited in claim 3; and (6) PPG
extractor circuitry 80, shown in Figure 2, and recited in claim 6, without a
proper "written description" showing where these claim limitations are
described in the Specification. Final Act. 8-9. According to the Examiner,
"there is no disclosure of circuitries wherein each circuitry performs one of
these functions." Id. at 9.
Appellants argue ( 1) "it is not necessary to provide details in the
specification of items that are well known to those of ordinary skill in the
art"; (2) "computer carrying out, i.e., executing or running, software is a
form of circuitry" and, as such, (3) "one of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that Appellant ... sufficiently disclosed photoplethysmograph
(PPG) signal-based selector circuitry, area selector circuitry, block selector
circuitry, detector circuitry, analyzer circuitry and PPG extractor circuitry
to a level that would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art." App.
Br. 10-12 (emphasis in original); Reply Br. 2--4.
In response, the Examiner takes the position that ( 1) these circuit
limitations do not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(±) and are not limited to the
structure, materials, or acts in the specification and "equivalents thereof' for
performing the claimed functions and, as such, "Appellant is not entitled to
ALL photoplethysmograph (PPG) signal-based selector circuitry, area
selector circuitry, block selector circuitry, detector circuitry, analyzer
circuitry and PPG extractor circuitry available in the art"; and (2) "Figs. 1-7
show only boxes and the description fails to describe to which circuitry each
of the recited circuitries corresponds individually or to what part of the
computer circuitries each of the circuitry corresponds individually or
whether each circuitry correspond to a processor." Ans. 3--4.
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We do not agree with the Examiner. At the outset, we note that 3 5
U.S.C. § 112(±) is separate and distinct from 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The
"written description" requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) is a question of
fact. Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). The Federal Circuit has recognized that determining whether a
patent complies with the "written description" requirement will necessarily
vary depending on the context. Capon v. Eshhar, 418, F.3d 1349, 1357-58
(Fed. Cir. 2005). Specifically, the level of detail required to satisfy the
written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of
the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant
technology. Id. For generic claims to satisfy the "written description"
requirement, the court has set forth a number of factors for evaluating the
adequacy of the disclosure, including "the existing knowledge in the
particular field, the extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the
science or technology, [and] the predictability of the aspect at issue." Id. at
1359.
Because the circuit limitations recited in claims 1 and 11 are well
known in the art and need not be described in detail, we do not sustain the
Examiner's§ 112(a) rejection of claims 1-9, 11, 12, and 14.
35 U.S. C. § l l 2(b): Claims 1-9, 11, 12, and 14
In support of the§ 112(b) rejection of claims 1-9, 11, 12, and 14, the
Examine finds ( 1) the term "video combiner" is a generic placeholder which
invokes the application of 35 U.S.C. § 112(±) and, as such, is indefinite
because Appellants' Specification does not disclose an "algorithm for
performing the claimed function"; (2) the term "when operating" recited in
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connection with "a video combiner" is vague because it is unclear which
part of the claimed invention is not operating; and (3) the phrase "the
extracted PPG signals" lacks sufficient antecedent basis. Final Act. 11-12;
Ans. 4--5.
Appellants argue the term "'video combiner' has a sufficiently
definite meaning [in the art] as the name for the structure that performs
the function when read in light of the specification" and, as such, does "not
invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112([) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph."
App. Br. 16-17.
We agree with Appellants. Whether a claim is indefinite is an issue of
law. Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The second
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, requires that a patent's claims, viewed in light
of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art
about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty. See Nautilus,
Inc. v. Biosig, Insts., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129-30 (2014). Indefiniteness
is to be evaluated from the perspective of a person with ordinary skill in the
relevant art at the time of the invention-when the patent application was
filed. Id. at 2128. In other words, "a patent must be precise enough to
afford clear notice of what is claimed, thereby apprising the public of what is
still open to them." Id. at 2129 (internal citation, quotation marks, and
brackets omitted). .
35 U.S.C. § 112([) is invoked to interpret a claim when there is a
"means-plus-function" limitation recited therein. Under 35 U.S.C. § 112([),
the "means-plus-function" limitation must be "construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof." Personalized Media Comm 'ns, LLC v. Int'! Trade
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Comm 'n, 161 F.3d 696, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1998). If the "means-plus-function"
limitation recited in the claim does not have an adequate supporting
disclosure, then the claim fails to particularly point out and distinctly claim
the invention as required under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. See In
re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[I]f one employs
means-plus-function language in a claim, one must set forth in the
specification an adequate disclosure showing what is meant .... If an
applicant fails to set forth an adequate disclosure, the applicant has in effect
failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as required
by the second paragraph of section 112.")
In the context of software, the disclosed structure is a general purpose
computer programmed to perform a disclosed algorithm. WMS Gaming,
Inc. v. Int'! Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("In a
means-plus-function claim in which the disclosed structure is a computer, or
microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm, the disclosed
structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose
computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm."). A general
purpose computer alone is insufficient if the specification fails to disclose an
algorithm for performing the claimed function. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v.
VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Instead, the
specification must sufficiently disclose an algorithm to transform the general
purpose computer or processor to a special purpose processor programmed
to perform the disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v.
Int'! Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Generic terms such as "mechanism," "element," "device," and other
nonce words used in a claim can be considered as a substitute for the
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"means-plus-function" limitation and, as such, may invoke the application of
35 U.S.C. § 112([) because these generic terms or nonce words "typically do
not connote sufficiently definite structure." Williamson v. Citrix Online,
LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en bane) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the term "video combiner" recited in Appellants' claim 1
is not a generic term as alleged by the Examiner; instead, "video combiner,"
like "video encoder," has a definitive structure well known in the art and, as
such, does not invoke the application of 35 U.S.C. § 112([), as Appellants
argue. App. Br. 16-17. Separately, we find the term "when operating"
recited in Appellants' claim 1 is clear and refers to "a video combiner" to
combine "the encoded one or more regions of interest and the encoded
remaining parts of said input video data into an encoder output video
stream."
Lastly, the mere fact that a term or phrase used in the claim has no
antecedent basis does not mean, necessarily, that the term or phrase is
indefinite. Contrary to the Examiner's assertion, the failure to provide
explicit antecedent basis for terms does not always render a claim indefinite
if the scope of a claim is reasonably ascertainable by those skilled in the art.
See Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int'! Trade Comm 'n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that "anode gel" provided by implication the
antecedent basis for "zinc anode"). As such, the phrase "the extracted PPG
signal[ s ]" recited in claim 5 does not render that claim indefinite in the
context of Appellants' claim 5 because this phrase refers to "a PPG signal"
extracted from "said detected potentially usable areas."
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For these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner's§ 112(b) rejection
of claims 1-9, 11, 12, and 14.
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2): Claims 1-4, 7, 10, 14, and 15
In support of the anticipation rejection of claim 1 and, similarly, claim
10, the Examiner finds Noguchi discloses Appellants' claimed "video
encoding device for encoding input video data," shown in Figure 11,
including: ( 1) photoplethysmograph (PPG) signal-based selector circuitry;
(2) a first video encoder; (3) a second video encoder; and ( 4) a video
combiner. Final Act. 13-14 (citing Noguchi ,r,r 81, 148-149, 153, 185, Fig.
11).
Noguchi's Figure 11 is reproduced below:
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,·201
COMPRESS ED MOV f Isl(,
J MAGE OBTAINING
r·202
COMPRESSED MOVlNG
IMAGE EXPANDING
-700
CHARACTERISTIC !------i COMPRESS I ON
REGION OETEGTING CONfROL UNIT
IMAGE QUALtTY
CONTf~OL
IMAGE QUALITY
REDUCING
r282d
'
l NTER···GRADE
0 I FFERENGE 1---f-•-i
COMPRESSING
·-.~ 281
r2.82c
INTER-GRADE
0 I FFERENCE 1----+---1-i
COMPRESSING
~--······ r2s2b
INTER-GRADE
.__ ____ ..__,,.-! DI FFFREl'JCE ---··--······ -
COMPRESSING
-282s
INTER~GRAnE
~--------t Dlr'rtHENGE
COMPRESSlNG
-··206
ASSOCIATING OUTPUT
Noguchi's Figure 11 shows video encoding device 120 including
selector circuitry 203, first video encoder 282d, second video encoder 282a,
and video combiner 206-207.
Appellants contend Noguchi does not disclose "a PPG signal" and, as
such, Appellants' "recited photoplethysmograph [(PPG)] signal-based
selector circuitry which, when operating, selects in the input video data one
or more regions of interest that provide a PPG signal." App. Br. 19-22.
According to Appellants, "the selection of [characteristic] regions by
Noguchi is not intended to select regions of interest that provides a PPG
signal but a region containing a prescribed shape[, i.e., a person's head, a
portion of a person's body, and particular tissues]." Id. at 21.
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As explained in Appellant's specification, the expression
"PPG signal" means any signal that can be obtained through
photoplethysmography analysis, such as temporal biometrical
signals, e.g. the heartbeat, cardiac cycle, Sp02, respiratory rate,
depth of anesthesia, or hypo- and hypervolemia. Clearly, these
are not things that are being looked for by Noguchi's particular
characteristic region detecting section 203, as explained
generally and in particular in consideration of the above-cited
sections. As such, Noguchi does not teach or suggest Appellant's
recited photoplethysmograph signal-based selector circuitry
which, when operating, selects in the input video data one or
more regions of interest that provide a PPG signal.
Id. ( emphasis added).
Appellants also argue:
[g]iven that Noguchi does not teach or suggest Appellant's
recited photoplethysmograph [(PPG)] signal-based selector
circuitry which, when operating, selects in the input video data
one or more regions of interest that provide a PPG signal, it
cannot teach Appellant's claim element of, "a first video
encoder, which, when operating, encodes said one or more
regions of interest of said input video data according to a
predetermined encoding scheme with a first setting of the
encoding to preserve PPG-relevant information in the encoded
one or more regions of interest" because "said regions of
interest" refer back to those regions selected by the PPG signal-
based selector circuitry, which Noguchi does not have.
Id. at 23. According to Appellants, "there is no teaching by Noguchi that the
coding will preserve PPG-relevant information in the encoded one or
more regions of interest." Id. at 25.
Appellants' arguments are not persuasive. Rather, we find the
Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to Appellants' arguments
supported by a preponderance of evidence. Ans. 6-10. Therefore, we adopt
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the Examiner's findings and explanations provided therein. Id. At the
outset, we note there is no requirement that the prior art must use the same
words to describe a claim element in order to be deemed as teaching or
disclosing that claim element. "[T]he reference need not satisfy an
ipsissimis verb is test," i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re
Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Moreover, claim terms,
during prosecution, are given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d
1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation,
claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire
disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
The term "PPG [(photo-plethysmography)] signal" is not explicitly
defined in Appellants' Specification; instead, "PPG signal" is generally
described as "biometrical signals (e.g.[,] heart rate, respiratory rate, blood
pressure, skin oxygenation, etc[.])." Spec. 1:20-21. For example, PPG may
refer to "skin color variations" or "variations in light absorptions by the
skin" and such "variations can be registered by a video camera that takes
images of a skin areas, e.g.[,] the face, while processing calculates the pixel
average over a ... selected region." Spec. 1:27, 2:2--4 (emphasis added).
According to Appellants' Specification, the term "PPG signal" in this
context "generally means any signal that can be obtained through
PhotoPlethysmoGraphy [(PPG)] analysis, such as temporal biometrical
signals, e.g.[,] the heartbeat, cardiac cycle, Sp02, respiratory rate, depth of
anesthesia or hypo- and hypervolemia." Spec. 4:34--5:3. Similarly, the term
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"PPG-relevant information" is described by Appellants' Specification as
"information that is relevant for obtaining a PPG signal" and may include
"information contained in original video data that is not recognized for the
human eye, for instance slight color changes of the skin of a person." Spec.
4:32-34.
Separately, the phrase "to preserve PPG-relevant information" in the
context of Appellants' claimed "first video encoder, which, when operating,
encodes said one or more regions of interest of said input video data
according to a predetermined encoding scheme with a first setting of the
encoding" is described by Appellants' Specification as the situation where a
selected region of interest which provides a PPG signal is encoded
differently (i.e., a high bit rate) than other areas of the video data which
provide no PPG signal (at a low bit rate). Spec. 2:18-19, 32-33, 4:11-21;
8: 19-25.
Based on Appellants' Specification, we agree with the Examiner that
the phrase "one or more regions of interest [in the video data] that provide a
PPG signal" recited in Appellants' claims 1 and 10 can be broadly, but
reasonably interpreted to encompass Noguchi's "region that shows a portion
of a person's head ... in addition to the person's face." Ans. 6-7 (citing
Noguchi ,r,r 78-81, Fig. 11); see also Noguchi Fig. 5, face region layer 450;
Fig. 6, face region layer 640. Similarly, we agree with the Examiner that the
phrase "photoplethysmograph (PPG) signal-based selector circuitry which,
when operating, selects in the input video data one or more regions of
interest that provide a PPG signal" recited in Appellants' claim 1 can be
broadly, but reasonably interpreted to encompass "any selector that selects
skin areas as regions of interest [(ROI)], since skin areas provide PPG
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signals" (Ans. 6) including Noguchi's characteristic region detecting section
203, shown in Figure 11, used to select skin areas as regions of interest
(ROI) that provide PPG signals. Ans. 7 (citing Noguchi ,r,r 78-81, Fig. 11).
Likewise, we also agree with the Examiner that the limitation: "first
video encoder, which, when operating, encodes said one or more regions of
interest of said input video data according to a predetermined encoding
scheme with a first setting of the encoding to preserve PPG-relevant
information in the encoded one or more regions of interest" recited in
Appellants' claim 1 (with emphasis added) can be broadly, but reasonably
interpreted to encompass Noguchi's "inter-grade difference compression
section 282d" and "image processing system 10 ... configured to detect a
region containing a person's face as a ROI and set the image quality of the
detected ROI higher than the image quality of the non-ROI region and select
the inter-grade difference compressing section 282d which processes the
person's face to output a high image quality of the person's face." Ans. 9
(citing Noguchi ,r,r 43, 48, 54, 107, 113-114, 144, 185, 197, Figs. 4--5,
region face 450, Fig. 11 ).
For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of
independent claims 1 and 10, and their respective dependent claims 2--4, 7,
14, and 15, which Appellants do not argue separately. App. Br. 27. "[T]he
fact that [ A ]ppellants can point to definitions or usages that conform to their
interpretation does not make the PTO' s definition unreasonable when the
PTO can point to other sources that support its interpretation." In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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§ 103(a) Rejection of Claims 5, 6, and 11-13
Claims 5 and 6 depend ultimately from claim 1, and further recite a
"PPG extractor that extracts a PPG signal from said detected potentially
usable areas and selects one or more areas as one or more regions of interest
based on the quality or content of the extracted PPG signal." Similarly,
independent claim 11 further recites "PPG extractor circuitry, which, when
operating, extracts a PPG signal from said one or more decoded regions of
interest." Likewise, independent claim 13 recites a similar limitation.
The Examiner acknowledges Noguchi teaches a "characteristic region
detecting section 203" shown in Figure 11, used to detect regions of interest
(ROis) that show a person's face or skin areas and perform extracting
operations of candidate regions. Final Act. 17 (citing Noguchi ,r,r 78-93)
(emphasis omitted). Nevertheless, the Examiner relies on Poh for teaching
the use of "a PPG extractor that extracts a PPG signal from regions of
interest" in the context of using an "Independent Component Analysis (ICA)
to measure heart rate by extracting PPG signal from video images of a face"
to support the conclusion of obviousness. Final Act. 17-18 (citing Poh
Abstract, Fig. 2, § 3) ( emphasis omitted).
Appellants dispute the Examiner's factual findings regarding Poh. In
particular, Appellants argue Poh does not teach or suggest the claimed "PPG
extractor that extracts a PPG signal from said detected potentially usable
areas and selects one or more areas as one or more regions of interest based
on the quality or content of the extracted PPG signal" recited in claims 5 and
6, and similarly recited in claims 11 and 13. App. Br. 37--43.
Appellants' argument is not persuasive and is predicated upon
individual attacks of Noguchi and Poh separately, when the rejection is
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based on a combination of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,425
(CCP A 1981 ). As correctly recognized by the Examiner, "a person's face
[in Poh] is a ROI because it provides PPG signal and in Noguchi, a person's
face is selected as a ROI and is encoded to provide high image quality of the
person's face." Ans. 15 (citing Noguchi ,r,r 81, 149; Poh Fig. 2, § 3). As
such, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Noguchi and Poh
teaches or suggests the disputed limitation of claims 5, 6, and 11-13.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 5, 6,
and 11-13, and for the same reasons discussed, we also sustain the
Examiner's rejection of claims 8 and 9, which Appellants do not argue
separately. App. Br. 44.
CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellants have demonstrated
the Examiner erred in rejecting: (1) claims 1-9, 11, 12, and 14 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the written description
requirement; and (2) claims 1-9, 11, 12, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
being indefinite. However, we conclude Appellants have not demonstrated
the Examiner erred in rejecting: (3) claims 1--4, 7, 10, 14, and 15 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Noguchi; (4) claims 5, 6, and
11-13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Noguchi and
Poh; and (5) claims 8 and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Noguchi and Cetin.
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DECISION
We REVERSE the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-9, 11, 12, and
14 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) and§ 112(b). However, we AFFIRM the
Examiner's rejections of claims 1-15 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) and
§ 103(a).
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner's decision is affirmed. See 37
C.F.R. § 4I.50(a)(l).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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