Ex Parte Kim et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

May 29, 2012

11320775 (B.P.A.I. May. 29, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/320,775 12/30/2005 Jong Seok Kim 9988.052.20 9892
7590 05/30/2012
MCKENNA LONG & ALDRIDGE LLP
Song K. Jung
1900 K. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
EXAMINER
RIGGLEMAN, JASON PAUL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1711
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/30/2012 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte JONG SEOK KIM, YANG HWAN NO, HAN KI CHO,
YEON SU JUNG, JUNG HOON KANG, MYUNG SIK PARK, and
YOUNG HOON HA
____________

Appeal 2010-010578
Application 11/320,775
Technology Center 1700
____________

Before CHUNG K. PAK, ROMULO H. DELMENDO, and
BEVERLY A. FRANKLIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

DELMENDO, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
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Appeal 2010-010578
Application 11/320,775

3
Figures 3A–3C above depict front, side, and perspective views, respectively,
of a hinge assembly in accordance with the invention, wherein the assembly
includes, inter alia, hinge arms 120 and 140, first members 121, 141
rotatably connected to bracket 110, a second member having a first hinge
shaft 122f, and another second member having a second hinge shaft 142f.
Spec. 5, l. 24 to 6, l. 1; 8, l. 24 to 11, l. 15; 16, l. 10 to 17, l. 2.
Claims 51 and 56 are reproduced below (with disputed limitations in
shown in italics):
51. A hinge assembly for a door in a washing machine or
a dryer comprising:
a bracket attached to a housing of the washing machine
or the dryer; and
at least one pair of hinge arms including first and second
hinge arms, wherein each of the first and second hinge arms has
a first member rotatably coupled to the bracket and a second
member extending from the first member and rotatably coupled
to the door, and wherein the second member of the first hinge
arm has a first hinge shaft, the second member of the second
hinge arm has a second hinge shaft, and the first hinge shaft of
the second member of the first hinge arm and the second hinge
shaft of the second member of the second hinge arm are
separate from each other.

56. The hinge assembly according to claim 51, wherein
each of the second members of the first and second hinge arms
has ribs extending therefrom, and the ribs of the first and the
second hinge arms have widths different from each other.
App. Br. 22-23, Claims App’x.
The Examiner rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
follows:
Appeal 2010-010578
Application 11/320,775

4
I. Claims 51, 52, 55, 58, and 79-81 as unpatentable over
Fumagalli;3 and
II. Claims 56, 57, 82, and 83 as unpatentable over the
combined teachings of Fumagalli and Hua.4,5

ISSUES
I.
In Rejection I, the Examiner found that Fumagalli describes every
limitation of claim 51 except “the first hinge shaft of the second member of
the first hinge arm and the second hinge shaft of the second member of the
second hinge arm are separate from each other.” Ans. 4-5. That is, the
Examiner found that Fumagalli teaches a single shaft for both hinge arms
rather than separate shafts as required by claim 51. Nevertheless, the
Examiner concluded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
found it obvious to use two shafts in lieu of a single shaft given the limited
number of design choices and the expectation that two separate shafts would
also work. Id. at 5, 8-9. In support, the Examiner relied on Fumagalli’s
teaching regarding another shaft that a single pin may be replaced with two
half pins of minor length. Id. at 5, 9.
The Appellants contend that the Examiner’s rejection is in error
because Fumagalli “fails to teach or suggest the [disputed] limitation” and

3 European Patent Application EP 0 859 079 A1 published on August 19,
1998 (copy attached).
4 U.S. Patent Application Publication 2002/0078525 A1 published on June
27, 2002.
5 The Examiner expressly withdrew the final rejection of claim 51 under 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. Ans. 3.
Appeal 2010-010578
Application 11/320,775

5
“teaches away from the concept of using two separate hinge shafts by
disclosing only a single hinge shaft 27 that ‘extends for the entire height of
the hinge 15’ and is located in a single bracket 28 and vertical seating 25.”
App. Br. 15-16. The Appellants further assert that “[w]here the hinge arms
are connected by the single shaft, as in Fumagalli, under such a composite
condition of the door motion, the motions of the hinge arms are restricted by
the hinge shaft” and “[s]uch hinge arms and shaft hardly allow the twisting
of the door.” Id. at 16.
Thus, the dispositive issues arising from these contentions are:
(1) Did the Examiner articulate sufficient reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the conclusion that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would have been prompted to replace Fumagalli’s single shaft
with two separate shafts of minor length?
(2) If so, did the Appellants come forward with persuasive rebuttal
argument or evidence to successfully rebut the Examiner’s rejection?

II.
In Rejection II, the Examiner acknowledged that Fumagalli does not
disclose ribs having different widths extending from each of the second
members of the first and second hinge arms, as required by claim 56. Ans.
7. The Examiner found, however, that Hua teaches a reinforcement ring that
stiffens a hinge body, thus requiring less resin in the hinge body to achieve
the desired amount of strength and stiffness. Id. The Examiner further
found that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that
the symmetry or asymmetry of the widths of Hua’s reinforcement ribs to be
a matter of aesthetic design and therefore would have found it obvious to
Appeal 2010-010578
Application 11/320,775

6
implement ribs having different widths in order to provide an aesthetically
pleasing hinge arm and door assembly. Id.
The Appellants argue that: (i) Hua does not disclose separate hinge
shafts; (ii) Hua teaches away from the use of separate shafts; (iii) Hua’s
disclosure relates to cabinet doors, not washers or dryers; (iv) Hua discloses
the use of only a single rib element, which extends perpendicularly from the
surface of the hinge arms and not in the same general plane as the high arms;
and (v) Hua does not disclose two ribs having different widths. App. Br. 19-
20.
Thus, the dispositive issue is:
(3) Did the Appellants show that the Examiner’s obviousness
analysis lacks sufficient reasoning with some rational underpinning, thus
requiring reversal?

DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, we observe that the Appellants rely upon
new arguments and/or evidence (e.g., unexpected results) for the first time in
the Reply Brief filed July 16, 2010. Because the Appellants failed to offer a
showing of good cause, we decline to consider such new arguments and/or
evidence. Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473 (BPAI 2010) (informative
opinion).
For each of the two rejections, the Appellants have argued the claims
together. App. Br. 12-20. Accordingly, we select claims 51 and 56 as
representative of the claims subject to Rejections I and II, respectively, and
confine our discussion to these two selected claims. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Appeal 2010-010578
Application 11/320,775

7

I.
We find ourselves in agreement with the Examiner’s factual findings
and succinct but cogent reasoning in support of Rejection I. Ans. 4-5, 8-9.
Therefore, we adopt them as our own and add the following comments for
emphasis.
“[W]hen a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that
is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the
field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.” KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). See also In re Fout, 675
F.2d 297, 301 (CCPA 1982) (“Express suggestion to substitute one
equivalent for another need not be present to render such substitution
obvious.”); In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Because
the applicants merely substituted one element known in the art for a known
equivalent, this court affirms [the rejection for obviousness].”).
“When the PTO shows prima facie obviousness, the burden then shifts
to the applicant to rebut.” Mayne, 104 F.3d at 1342. “Such rebuttal or
argument can consist of a comparison of test data showing that the claimed
compositions possess unexpectedly improved properties or properties that
the prior art does not have . . . .” In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692-93 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Fumagalli describes a hinge for an electric appliance door, such as a
washing machine or dryer door. Col. 1, ll. 3-7. Fumagalli’s Figures 3 and 4
are reproduced below.
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Appeal 2010-010578
Application 11/320,775

9
vertical pin 27 can be replaced with two shorter pins of minor length, we
conclude that it would have been notoriously well known to a person of
ordinary skill in the art that separate pins could be used in lieu of a single
longer pin to affix rotatable hinge components that are designed to act in
concert. That finding is supported by Fumagalli’s explicit teaching that
vertical pin 22 can be replaced with two half pins of minor length. Col. 3, ll.
8-19. A person of ordinary skill in the art, who is presumed to have some
common sense, would have drawn a reasonable inference from this explicit
teaching that the simple mechanical concept of interchangeability of a single
pin with two shorter pins would also be applicable for vertical pin 27.
We find no merit in the Appellants’ argument that Fumagalli teaches
away from using two shorter pins in lieu of pin 27. App. Br. 15-16. The
mere disclosure in the prior art reference of a different option from the one
recited in the claim does not constitute a teaching away. Also, while
Fumagalli teaches that vertical pin 27 is positioned inside a seating, col. 3, ll.
43-53, the Appellants have not shown that a person of ordinary skill in the
art could or would not have modified the seating (e.g., use two separate
seatings of shorter length) to accommodate the use of two shorter pins.
Thus, the Appellants have not directed us to any teaching in Fumagalli that
would have discouraged or otherwise would have led a person of ordinary
skill in the art to diverge from the use of two shorter pins. In re Gurley, 27
F.3d 551, 552-53 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Regarding the Appellants’ contention that Fumagalli’s single pin
restricts the motion of the hinge arms and “hardly allow[s] the twisting of
the door,” App. Br. 16, such an assertion is mere unsubstantiated attorney
argument. The Appellants have failed to direct us to any credible evidence
Appeal 2010-010578
Application 11/320,775

10
(e.g., comparative test results) that would support the argument. Therefore,
the Examiner was correct in finding the Appellants’ unsupported assertion to
be unpersuasive. Ans. 8. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (mere lawyer’s arguments and conclusory statements, which are
unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little probative value).
Because the Appellants have failed to adequately rebut the
Examiner’s reasoning in support of obviousness, we sustain Rejection I.

II.
Again, we agree with the Examiner’s factual findings and reasoning in
support of Rejection II. Ans. 6-7, 9-10. Therefore, we adopt them as our
own and add the following comments for emphasis. To the extent that the
same arguments against Rejection I are repeated in the arguments against
Rejection II, we find them unpersuasive for the same reasons given above.
As noted above, the Appellants argue that Hua’s disclosure relates to
cabinet doors, not washer or dryer doors. App. Br. 18. According to the
Appellants, Hua’s assembly could not be used in a washer or dryer. Id. at
19. On this point, we are in complete agreement with the Examiner’s
response, Ans. 10, which we incorporate by reference herein. “The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981).
The Appellants’ argument that Hua is directed to a cabinet door rather
than a washer or dryer door is misplaced and ignores binding precedent.
Appeal 2010-010578
Application 11/320,775

11
The Supreme Court of the United States explained that “[w]hen a work is
available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces
can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one.” KSR,
550 U.S. at 417.
Lastly, the Appellants argue that Hua “discloses the use of only a
single rib element, which extends perpendicularly from the surface of the
hinge arms and not in the same general plane as the hinge arms.” App. Br.
20. The Appellants, however, have not adequately explained why a person
of ordinary skill in the art would not have used multiple ribs to provide
additional strength and stiffness. As to the argument regarding the
perpendicular orientation of the rib element relative to the hinge arms, the
Appellants have not identified any language in claim 56 that serves as a
basis for such an argument.
For these reasons, we also affirm Rejection II.

ORDER
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 51, 52, 55-58, and 79-83 is
affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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