Ex Parte Kim

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 30, 2017

13144909 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/144,909 07/15/2011 Jong Ho Kim 4900-0064 1186
22429 7590 11/01/2017
HAUPTMAN HAM, LLP
2318 Mill Road
Suite 1400
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314
EXAMINER
AMELUNXEN, BARBARA J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/01/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @ ipfirm. com
pair_lhhb @ firsttofile. com
EAnastasio @ IPFirm.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JONG HO KIM
Appeal 2016-0032321
Application 13/144,9092
Technology Center 3600
Before HUBERT C. LORIN, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges.
MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1—4, 6—8, 10, 13—15, and 17. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
July 9, 2015) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed February 4, 2016), and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed December 4, 2015), and Non-Final
Office Action (“Non-Final Act.,” mailed February 12, 2015).
2 Appellant identifies SK Planet Co., Ltd. as the real party in interest. App.
Br. 2.
Appeal 2016-003232
Application 13/144,909
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed “invention relates to a system and method for
identifying multiple types of electronic money, and an apparatus employing
the same” (Spec. 11).
Claims 1, 3, 6, 8, 13, and 15 are the independent claims on appeal.
Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed numerals added, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
1. A system for identifying multiple types of
electronic money, the system comprising:
[1] an electronic money card unit configured to store a
first type of electronic money; and
[2] an electronic money terminal unit configured to
[3] read application identification information
corresponding to the first type of electronic money from
the electronic money card unit,
[4] when the application identification
information indicates a preset default electronic money
application for handling the first type of electronic money,
execute the preset default electronic money application,
[5] when the application identification
information includes no indication of the preset default
electronic money application, select an electronic money
application corresponding to the application identification
information, among electronic money applications stored
in the electronic money terminal, and execute the selected
electronic money application, and
[6] process an electronic money service
including charging, payment, and transfer of the first type
of electronic money through the executed electronic
money application, and
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[7] wherein, when the electronic money terminal unit
determines that the application identification information
corresponds to two or more compatible electronic money
applications among the stored electronic money applications in
the electronic money terminal, the electronic money terminal is
further configured to
[8] determine priorities of the two or more
compatible electronic money applications,
[9] appoint, among the two or more compatible
electronic money applications, a compatible electronic
money application having a highest priority,
[10] execute the appointed compatible electronic
money application, and
[11] process the electronic money service through
the executed electronic money application.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1—4, 6—8, 10, 13—15, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 1—4, 6—8, and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Matsumoto (US 2009/0050691 Al, pub. Feb. 26, 2009),
Tushie et al. (US 2003/0050899 Al, pub. Mar. 13, 2003) (hereinafter
“Tushie”), Mennie et al. (US 2003/0118228 Al, pub. June 26, 2003)
(hereinafter “Mennie”), and Davis et al. (US 6,282,522 Bl, iss. Aug. 28,
2001) (hereinafter “Davis”).
Claims 13—15 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Matsumoto, Tushie, and Mennie.
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ANALYSIS
Non-Statutory Subject Matter
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
BankInt7, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2012), “for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp.,
134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether
the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.”
Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an
abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the
second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually
and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional
elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. We, therefore, look to whether
the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
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abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.
See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Here, in rejecting the pending claims under § 101, the Examiner finds
that the claims are directed to “identifying multiple types of electronic
money,” i.e., to a fundamental economic practice and, therefore, an abstract
idea (Non-Final Act. 6—7; see also Ans. 3—4);3 and that the additional
elements or combination of elements in the claims, other than the abstract
idea, amounts to no more than “generic computer elements [that] do not add
a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because they would be routine in
any computer implementation of an electronic money application that would
3 The Examiner cites, as examples of cases finding abstract ideas,
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (using
advertising as an exchange or currency); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593
(2010) (hedging risk); Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (mitigating settlement risk);
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(processing loan information); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance
Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (managing an
insurance policy); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x. 1005
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (managing a game of Bingo); Gametek LLC v. Zynga, Inc.,
Nos. CV 13-2546 RS, CV-13-3089-RS, CV-13-3472-RS, CV-13-3493-
RS, 2014 WL 1665090 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2014), affd. 597 F. App’x. 644
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (allowing players to purchase additional objects during a
game); Accenture Global Servs., GmbHv. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728
F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (generating rule-based tasks for processing
an insurance claim); Content Extraction & Transmission v. Wells Fargo
Bank, Nat’lAss’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (datarecognition and
storage); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Flees, for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (organizing information through mathematical
correlations); and Paragraph IIIA of the “July 2015 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility” to 2014 Interim Guidance on Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed.
Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014).
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be routinely used by those of ordinary skill in the art in order to process an
electronic money service” (Non-Final Act. 7).
Independent Claim 1
Focusing specifically on claim 1, and addressing the first step of the
Mayo!Alice framework, Appellant asserts that “the Examiner has failed to
provide a convincing rationale or evidence to prove why the claimed subject
matter is considered as an abstract idea” (App. Br. 15 (emphasis omitted)).
Appellant charges that although the Examiner “immediately discussed why
the claimed subject matter does not include ‘significantly more,’” the
Examiner provided no explanation “as to why the claimed subject matter is
considered as an abstract idea” (id.). Appellant notes that the Supreme
Court, in Alice, cited several references to establish that the claimed subject
matter was directed to a fundamental economic practice, i.e., intermediated
settlement, and, therefore, to an abstract idea (id. ). And Appellant ostensibly
maintains that the Examiner is likewise required to cite authority here in
order to meet “the first step of the Alice Corp. [test]” (id. at 15—16).
As an initial matter, we find nothing in Alice that requires the Office
to identify specific references to support a finding that a claim is directed to
an abstract idea. Nor are we aware of any other controlling authority that
requires the Office to “prove, by convincing evidence,” that a claim is
directed to an abstract idea. Instead, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly
observed that “the prima facie case is merely a procedural device that
enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production.” Hyatt v. Dudas,
492 F.3d. 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443,
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The court has, thus, held that the USPTO carries its
procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection
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satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying the applicant of
the reasons for rejection, “together with such information and references as
may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of
[the] application.” See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Thus, all that is required of the Office is that it set forth the statutory basis of
the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet
the notice requirement of § 132. Id.', see also Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d
1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Section 132 “is violated when a rejection is so
uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to
counter the grounds for rejection.”).
Appellant does not contend here that the § 101 rejection was not
understood or that the Examiner otherwise failed to comply with the notice
requirements of § 132. And for all the criticism of a lack of evidentiary
support, Appellant puts forward no rebuttal evidence to demonstrate that the
claimed subject matter is not an abstract idea.
Responding to the Examiner’s Answer, Appellant argues that, in
applying step 1 of the Alice analysis, “the Examiner ignored 96% of the
claim language, including key aspects and the tangible nature of the
invention” (Reply Br. 4). Appellant charges that “the Examiner
oversimplified the claimed subject matter as ‘a system for identifying
multiple types of electronic money,’” and that this led to the erroneous
conclusion that the claims are directed to an abstract idea {id. at 5—6). Yet,
claim 1, on its face, is directed to “[a] system for identifying multiple types
of electronic money” (App. Br. 33, Claims Appendix). The “Technical
Field” section of the Specification also explicitly describes the claimed
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invention as “a system and method for identifying multiple types of
electronic money” (Spec. 11).
Appellant notes that claim 1 recites “features of the electronic money
card unit and the electronic money terminal unit” (Reply Br. 5), i.e., physical
components. But, it is clear from the Specification, including the claim
language, that the focus of the claims is not on the improvement of
electronic money card units and/or electronic money terminal units, but
instead on implementation of the abstract idea, i.e., identifying multiple
types of electronic money. These physical components merely provide the
generic environment in which to implement this abstract idea. And, as the
Supreme Court made clear in Alice, the recitation of generic computer
limitations is not enough to transform an otherwise patent-ineligible abstract
idea into a patentable invention. See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358.
Turning to the second step of the Mayo!Alice framework, Appellant
argues that even if the claimed subject matter is directed to an abstract idea,
claim 1 is nonetheless patent-eligible because claim 1 “recites significantly
more than an abstract idea” (App. Br. 16). Quoting the language of claim 1,
and pointing specifically to limitations [7] — [11], Appellant asserts that
“these features are distinct and distinguished from the applied art of record”
(id.; see also Reply Br. 6 (arguing that limitations [4] and [9] “aren’t
sufficiently taught by the prior art in the record.”)). Yet to the extent that
Appellant maintains that claim 1 is patent-eligible because the claim is novel
and/or non-obvious, Appellant misapprehends the controlling precedent.
Although the second step in the Alice!Mayo framework is termed a search
for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or
non-obviousness, but rather, a search for “‘an element or combination of
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elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice
Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355. A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a
purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct.
at 1304.
Further responding to the Examiner’s Answer, Appellant argues that
the rejection under § 101 cannot be sustained because “the Examiner failed
to recognize the ‘inventive concept’ imparted by the specific claim
language” that goes beyond the alleged abstract idea (Reply Br. 6).
According to Appellant, the claimed steps of “when the application
identification information indicates a preset default electronic money
application for handling the first type of electronic money, execute the preset
default electronic money application” and “appoint, among the two or more
compatible electronic money applications, a compatible electronic money
application having a highest priority” include numerous inventive concepts,
which render claim 1 patent-eligible (id.). Yet rather than constituting
“significantly more,” these steps are merely part of the abstract idea itself,
and require no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer
functions.
Appellant also argues that, like the claims found patent-eligible in
DDR Holdings, LLCv. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
claim 1 includes limitations (i.e., limitations [4] and [9]) that “specify how
interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result”
(Reply Br. 7 (citing DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258)). But Appellant does
not identify the “interactions with the Internet” that the claimed invention
allegedly manipulates; nor does Appellant otherwise explain how the
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claimed invention makes other than routine and conventional use of the
Internet. Cf. Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792
F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“claims here do not address problems
unique to the Internet, so DDR has no applicability”). In fact, claim 1 does
not even recite the Internet or any computer network.
Finally, as to Appellant’s argument that the Examiner “failed to
adhere to the statutory presumption of validity” (Reply Br. 7), we direct
Appellant’s attention to In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Although patents are entitled to a presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C.
§ 282, patent applications are not entitled to the procedural advantages of
§ 282. Id. at 674.
We are not persuaded, for the reasons set forth above, that the
Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection.
Independent Claims 3, 6, 8, 13, and 15 and Dependent Claims 7, 10, 14, and
17
Appellant argues that “[independent claim 3 recites, in part, one or
more features[,] which correspond to the aforementioned features of
claim 1 [,] and are distinct and distinguished from the applied art of record.”
Therefore, according to Appellant, claim 3 recites significantly more than an
abstract idea (App. Br. 17). Appellant makes substantially the same
argument with respect to each of independent claims 6, 8, 13, and 15 (see id.
at 17-18).
We found this argument unpersuasive, with respect to claim 1, for the
reasons set forth above. And we find it equally unpersuasive with respect to
claims 3, 6, 8, 13, and 15.
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Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 3, 6, 8, 13, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We also sustain the
rejection of dependent claims 7, 10, 14, and 17, which are not argued
separately.
Dependent claims 2 and 4
Claim 2 depends from independent claim 1 and recites, inter alia, that
“the electronic money card unit is an Integrated Circuit (IC) module” (App.
Br. 34, Claims Appendix). Claim 4 depends from independent claim 3, and
includes substantially similar language.
Appellant argues that claim 2 recites significantly more than an
abstract idea, and is patent-eligible, because a person of ordinary skill in the
art would understand that an IC module is a machine; Appellant argues that
claim 4 is patent-eligible for the same reason (App. Br. 18—19). Yet there is
no indication in the Specification that the recited IC module is other than a
generic component, and no indication that the IC module is used in other
than its normal, expected manner, e.g., to store data that are then
communicated to an electronic money terminal unit. Again, as the Supreme
Court has made clear, the recitation of generic computer limitations is not
enough to transform an otherwise patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention. See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
dependent claims 2 and 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Obviousness
Independent Claims 1, 3, 6, and 8 and Dependent Claims 2, 4, 7, and 10
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claims 1, 3, 6, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because
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neither Matsumoto nor Mennie, on which the Examiner relies, discloses or
suggests that “the electronic money terminal unit determines . . . two or
more compatible electronic money applications” and “is further configured
to determine priorities of the two or more compatible electronic money
applications” and “appoint, among the two or more compatible electronic
money applications, a compatible electronic money application having a
highest priority” as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 3, 6,
and 8 (App. Br. 21—27).
Matsumoto is directed to “an electronic money terminal for
performing settlement processing on multiple types of electronic money
stored in an IC chip” (Matsumoto 11). Matsumoto discloses that “a
plurality of settlement processing programs are stored for a plurality of
services associated with electronic money, and that the settlement processing
program for the electronic money service selected by the selection means is
executed, allowing a single electronic money terminal to handle multiple
types of electronic monies” {id. 1 6).
In rejecting independent claims 1,3,6, and 8 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a), the Examiner cites paragraphs 5, 6, 52, 57, 61, 65, and 70 of
Matsumoto as disclosing the argued limitations (Non-Final Act. 14—15). In
particular, the Examiner points to the disclosure in paragraph 57 that “the
user can select only electronic money stored in the IC card 10 and the
storage unit 120” {id. at 15).
We have reviewed the cited portions of Matsumoto, and we find
nothing there that discloses or suggests determining priorities of two or more
compatible electronic money applications.
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Matsumoto discloses an input unit 132 that a user can use to select an
electronic money service (see, e.g., Matsumoto 1 52 (“user uses the ten key
on the input unit 132 to select an electronic money service to be used among
the service names of the electronic money services displayed on the display
unit 131 and presses the OK button (Step S6)”). But the user in Matsumoto
selects a money service, not a settlement processing program (i.e., an
“electronic money application,” as recited in claim 1). Matsumoto discloses
that “control unit 150 causes the settlement processing program for the
electronic money having the [user-entered] service ID to be executed, among
the settlement processing programs stored in the storage unit 120
(Step SI6)” (Matsumoto 1 62). But we find nothing in the cited portions of
Matsumoto that discloses or suggests that “two or more” settlement
processing programs may be compatible with the user-entered electronic
money service, or assigning any priorities to the settlement processing
programs.
As an alternative rationale, the Examiner cites paragraphs 2, 10, 12,
13, 21, 43, 50, 56, and 148 of Mennie as disclosing automatic selection of
operating parameters (Non-Final Act. 5, 15—17), and reasons that it would
have been obvious “to automate the selection of electronic money on a
priority basis, in the Matsumoto terminal for processing multiple types of
electronic money, as taught in the Mennie system” (id. at 16). In particular,
the Examiner cites paragraphs 50 and 56 of Mennie, and reasons that “it is
obvious that priorities can be set manually or pre-set by a user such that the
system automatically determines the priorities of a plurality of electronic
money applications” (id. at 5). The Examiner reproduces disclosure in
paragraph 56 of Mennie that “system 10 defaults to the currency type of the
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country where the system 10 is used” and reasons that “[i]t is implicit that a
computer system defaults to the highest priority setting” {id. (citing
dictionary definitions for “default”)). The Examiner further reasons that
“automating a manual activity is not sufficient to distinguish over the prior
art” {id. at 17 (citing MPEP 2144.4.Ill; In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95,
120 USPQ 193, 194 (CCPA 1958)); see also Ans. 8)).
Mennie is directed to a customizable international note counter, and
discloses that the note counter can be customized to count bills of various
currencies and various denominations (Mennie 12). Mennie also discloses
that the system “automatically determines appropriate operating parameters
corresponding to a designated type of currency system and denomination”
{id. 112).
As Appellant persuasively argues (App. Br. 22), although Mennie
discloses automated selection of some parameters, the automated
determination of “other operating parameters” occurs “after the type of
currency system and denomination of the bills to be processed have been
entered by the operator” (Mennie 1 50). In other words, after the type of
currency is designated, other parameters corresponding to the operator-
designated currency type are automatically selected by the system.
Mennie discloses that the system can be set to default settings that are
compatible with the currency of the country where the system is used (i.e.,
rather than incompatible settings) {see Mennie | 56 (“For example, if the
system 10 were used in China, the system 10 could be set up to default to
Chinese currency”)). But, we fail to see how, and the Examiner does not
explain how, setting the Mennie system to a default setting discloses or
suggests prioritizing “two or more compatible electronic money
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applications.” For example, the Examiner has not shown that Mennie
discloses that multiple settings are compatible with Chinese currency, and
that the Mennie system establishes priorities among these multiple settings
when Chinese currency is identified.
The Examiner’s reliance on In re Venner also is misplaced. In that
case, the prior art references disclosed all of the claimed elements, and the
question was whether the combination of those old elements amounted to a
patentable invention. See In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 96 (CCPA 1958) (“we
find all the elements of appellants’ combination in the prior art cited”).
Here, the Examiner has not shown that the prior art discloses predetermined
priorities assigned to different compatible electronic money applications
(manually or otherwise). Thus, the Examiner’s determination that it would
have been obvious to automate the selection of an electronic money
application “on a priority basis” (Non-Final Act. 16) is not supported by the
record.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claims 1,3,6, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same
reasons, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent
claims 2, 4, 7, and 10. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from
which they depend are nonobvious”).
Independent claims 13 and 15 and dependent claims 14 and 17
Independent claims 13 and 15 include language substantially similar
to the language of claim 1, and were rejected based on the same findings and
rationale applied with respect to claim 1 (Non-Final Act. 42—58). Therefore,
we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of
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independent claims 13 and 15, and claims 14 and 17, which depend
therefrom, for the same reasons set forth above with respect to claim 1.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—4, 6—8, 10, 13—15, and 17 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—4, 6—8, 10, 13—15, and 17
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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