Ex Parte KIM

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 24, 2017

14167241 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 24, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/167,241 01/29/2014 Jin Yup KIM 0203-0613-1 6128
10/26/201768103 7590
Jefferson IP Law, LLP
1130 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 420
Washington, DC 20036
EXAMINER
LAI, DANIEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2641
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/26/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
u sdocketing @ j effersonip .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JIN YUP KIM
(Applicant: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.)
Appeal 2017-005798
Application 14/167,241
Technology Center 2600
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 21—24, 26—38, and 40, which are all of the claims pending in the
application.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Claims 1—20, 25, and 39 are cancelled. App. Br. 8, 11.
Appeal 2017-005798
Application 14/167,241
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to Appellant, the claims are directed to a computing device
that shuts off network resource usage to conserve power. The network
resources are shut off after an amount of time, which is based on whether the
device’s display is on or off. Spec. Tflf 6, 8—10. Claim 21, reproduced
below, is representative of the claimed subject matter:
21. A method comprising:
determining, by a controller of an electronic device,
whether a display unit operatively coupled to the electronic
device is in a first state or a second state;
setting, by the controller, a first period of time as a
duration for network resources to fall into dormancy, the setting
of the first period of time based at least in part on a determination
that the display unit is in the first state; and
setting, by the controller, a second period of time as the
duration for the network resources to fall into the dormancy, the
setting of the second period of time based at least in part on a
determination that the display unit is in the second state,
wherein the first period of time is longer than the second
period of time, and
wherein the first state is an on state of the display and the
second state is an off state of the display.
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
Claims 21—24, 26, 28—33, 35—38, and 40 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lenart et al. (US 2011/0319064
Al, pub. Dec. 29, 2011, hereinafter “Lenart”) and Nakajima (US
2010/0322127 Al, pub. Dec. 23, 2010). Final Act. 5-11.
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Application 14/167,241
Claims 27 and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lenart, Nakajima, and Patil et al. (US 2011/0038347 Al,
pub. Feb. 17, 2011, hereinafter “Patil”). Final Act. 11—12.
Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and
the issues raised by Appellant. Arguments not made are waived. See MPEP
§ 1205.02; 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv) and 41.39(a)(1).
ISSUE
Does the Examiner err in finding the combination of Lenart and
Nakajima teaches
setting ... a first period of time as a duration for network
resources to fall into dormancy, the setting of the first period of
time based at least in part on a determination that the display
unit is in the first state; and setting ... a second period of time
as the duration for the network resources to fall into the
dormancy, the setting of the second period of time based at
least in part on a determination that the display unit is in the
second state, wherein the first period of time is longer than the
second period of time
as recited in claim 21 and similarly recited in claims 30 and 40?
CONTENTIONS AND ANALYSIS
We disagree with Appellant’s contentions with respect to independent
claim 21, and we adopt as our own (1) the Examiner’s findings and
reasoning set forth in the Office Action from which this appeal is taken
(Final Act. 2—12) and (2) the Examiner’s reasoning set forth in the
Examiner’s Answer. Ans. 2—11. We highlight the following points for
emphasis.
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Application 14/167,241
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Lenart and Nakajima teaches
setting ... a first period of time as a duration for network
resources to fall into dormancy. . . based at least in part on a
determination that the display unit is in the [on] state; and
setting ... a second period of time as the duration for the
network resources to fall into the dormancy . . . based at least in
part on a determination that the display unit is in the second state,
wherein the first period of time is longer than the second
period of time,
as recited in claim 21 and similarly recited in claims 30 and 40. App. Br. 5—
6; see also Reply Br. 2—5. Specifically, Appellant argues Lenart “discloses
one period of time for transitioning to the idle state” for network resources
when Lenart’s display is on but does not teach a second period of time for
transitioning to the idle state when Lenart’s display is off. App. Br. 6; see
also App. Br. 5. Appellant further argues Nakajima’s “predetermined time”
does not teach a second period of time based on when a display is off
because Nakajima’s predetermined time “is a time period during which
[Nakajima’s] display is turned on.” Reply Br. 2, 4—5. According to
Appellant, Nakajima’s “delay time” does not teach a second period of time
based on the display being off because “the determined delay time will
remain the same regardless of whether [Nakajima’s] display is on or off.”
Reply Br. 3. Additionally, Appellant argues Nakajima does not teach
“shorter or longer” times. App. Br. 6.
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds (final Act. 6), and we
agree, that Lenart teaches a “dynamic dormancy module” which sets a
“dormancy timer threshold” (Lenart || 49-50, 53, and Lig. 4), and the
“dormancy timer threshold is the amount of time that the mobile device
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Application 14/167,241
waits . . . before requesting to the network for a transition to idle mode.”
Lenart | 53. The Examiner further finds (Final Act. 3, 6), and we agree, that
Lenart’s dormancy timer threshold can be set to a first period of time based
on “a display being enabled” to “avoid[] expedited transition to idle” (Lenart
149). Moreover, the Examiner (Final Act. 3, 6; see id. 4—5), and we agree,
Lenart’s dormancy timer threshold can alternatively be set based on “a
power saving mode wherein a user may want a fast transition to idle”
(Lenart || 49, 50), i.e., a second period of time that is shorter than the first
period of time.
Furthermore, we agree with the Examiner’s finding (Final Act. 7) that
Nakajima teaches when “the display screen ... is transited to the power
consumption saving mode, that is, when the display section 22 is turned off,
the [network] connection releasing section 14 may start.” Nakajima | 62.
Relying on Nakajima’s teaching that a display is off in a power saving
mode, the Examiner modifies Lenart’s dynamic dormancy module to set
Lenart’s dormancy timer threshold to a short period of time based on when
Lenart’s display is off in a power saving mode. Final Act. 4—5, 7; see also
Ans. 6.
We disagree with Appellant’s arguments that “Lenart only discloses
one period of time for transitioning to the idle state” and “therefore cannot
suggest any relationship between a first period of time and a second period
of time.” App. Br. 6; see also App. Br. 5. As discussed supra, Lenart
teaches a longer “first period of time” based on “a display being enabled”
which “avoids expedited transition to idle” (Lenart 149) and Lenart also
teaches a shorter “second period of time” based on “a power saving mode,
wherein a user may want a fast transition to idle.” Id. ^fl[ 50, 53.
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Furthermore, Appellant’s arguments that: (1) Lenart does not teach a
“second period of time for transitioning when Lenart’s display is off’ (App.
Br. 6); (2) Nakajima’s “predetermined time” is not a time period when the
display is off (Reply Br. 2, 4—5); and (3) Nakajima’s “delay time” is not
based on when the display is off {id. at 3) improperly attack Lenart and
Nakajima individually when the rejection is based on a combination of
Lenart and Nakajima. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Those
arguments do not address the Examiner’s reliance on the modification of
Lenart’s time periods in light of Nakajima’s teachings. Specifically,
Appellant’s arguments do not persuasively address the Examiner’s
combination of Lenart’s shorter second transition period during a power
saving mode and Nakajima’s power saving mode that turns off the display,
to teach Lenart’s shorter second transition period is set based on Lenart’s
display being off in the power saving mode. Final Act. 4—5, 7; see also
Ans. 6.
Additionally, Appellant’s argument that Nakajima does not teach
“shorter or longer” time periods (App. Br. 6) does not address the
Examiner’s finding that Lenart teaches shorter or longer time periods.
Specifically, Lenart’s “dormancy timer threshold may be set to a higher
[time] value” or the dormancy timer threshold may be set to a lower [time]
value” (Lenart | 53), either “avoiding] expedited transition to idle” or
providing “a fast transition to idle.” Id. at || 49-50.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that the
combination of Lenart and Nakajima teaches
setting ... a first period of time as a duration for network
resources to fall into dormancy. . . based at least in part on a
determination that the display unit is in the [on] state; and
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setting ... a second period of time as the duration for the network
resources to fall into the dormancy . . . based at least in part on a
determination that the display unit is in the second state, wherein
the first period of time is longer than the second period of time,
as recited in claim 21 and similarly recited in claims 30 and 40. We,
therefore, sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claims 21,
30, and 40, as well as dependent claims 22—24, 26—29 and 31—38, which are
not argued separately. App. Br. 6.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 21—24, 26—38,
and 40.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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