Ex Parte Kidd

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 17, 2014

11828519 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/828,519 07/26/2007 Deanna R. Kidd PD-207034 9466
20991 7590 03/19/2014
THE DIRECTV GROUP, INC.
PATENT DOCKET ADMINISTRATION
CA / LA1 / A109
2230 E. IMPERIAL HIGHWAY
EL SEGUNDO, CA 90245
EXAMINER
NEWLIN, TIMOTHY R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2424
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/19/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte DEANNA R. KIDD
____________________

Appeal 2011-009206
Application 11/828,519
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.

BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2011-009206
Application 11/828,519
2
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–36. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.
Illustrative Claim
Appellant’s disclosure relates to a content processing and delivery
system for coordinating content, content data and forming programming
guide and menu structures in response thereto. Spec. ¶ 1.
Claim 1, reproduced below with the disputed limitations italicized, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
receiving content at a content processing system from a
content provider having an asset identifier;
assigning a material identification different than the
asset identifier to the content in a content management system
of the content processing system;
receiving metadata for the content at the content
processing system;
associating the metadata with the material identification
at the content management system;
communicating the metadata and material identification
to a user device;
forming a menu from the content information and
material identification;
generating a menu selection from the menu at the user
device; communicating the material identification associated
with the menu selection to a content processing system; and
communicating the content corresponding to the menu
selection to the user device.

Appeal 2011-009206
Application 11/828,519
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References
Barker
Sull
Syed
US 2002/0143976 A1
US 2005/0193425 A1
US 2006/0101496 A1
Oct. 3, 2002
Sept. 1, 2005
May 11, 2006

Rejections
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1–13, 15, 17–31, 33, 35, and 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Barker and Syed. Ans. 4–9.
Claims 14, 16, 32, and 34 under 35 U.S.C § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Barker, Syed, and Sull. Ans. 9.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments in the Appeal Brief (“App. Br.” filed Nov. 23, 2010) and the
Reply Brief (“Reply Br.” filed May 13, 2011). We refer to the Briefs and
the Answer (“Ans.” mailed Mar. 14, 2011) for the respective positions of
Appellant and the Examiner.
35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection of Claim 1 Over Barker and Syed
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 because the
combination of Barker and Syed does not teach or suggest “assigning a
material identification different than the asset identifier to the content in a
content management system of the content processing system; [and]
associating the metadata with the material identification at the content
management system,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 5–6.
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In mapping these elements of claim 1, the Examiner cites Barker,
paragraphs 37 and 71, and Syed, paragraph 16. Ans. 4–6. Barker describes
an asset manager, storing in a metadata cache, metadata describing an asset
and an asset identifier identifying the asset. Barker ¶ 37. The Examiner
finds that, “[a]lthough the asset ID is sent from the provider, it is associated
locally (i.e., “assigned” to) the content at the headend.” Ans. 4 (emphasis
omitted). The Examiner finds “Barker is silent on assigning an identifier
different than the asset ID,” but finds “Syed teaches the assignment of an
identifier which is not the same as asset ID, but includes the asset ID and a
provider ID.” Id. at 5 (referring to Syed ¶ 16, ll. 6–7). The Examiner
concludes “it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill that a new
identifier, different than (but possibly including) the asset ID, could be
assigned at the processing system.” Id.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because in Barker, “the
distribution end point merely receives an asset identifier and does not assign
any identifier regardless of type” (App. Br. 5) and “there is no teaching for
‘associating the metadata with the material identification at the content
management system’” (id. at 6). Appellant also argues that in Syed, “there
is no teaching or suggestion for [assigning a material identification different
than the asset identifier] in a content management system.” Id.; see also,
Reply Br. 2–3.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error. The Examiner
finds “[a]lthough the asset ID is received by the distribution endpoint, the
distribution endpoint then performs additional steps [including unbundling]
the asset bundle into its components, [and storing] the asset and asset ID []
in the local storage device.” Ans. 10. The Examiner further finds storing
Appeal 2011-009206
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the separated asset ID in local storage “has the effect of creating an
association at the distribution endpoint between the asset and asset ID . . . .”
Id. The Examiner finds, and we agree, this “meets a reasonably broad
construction of ‘assigning’ in the context of a data processing system such as
Barker.” Id. We are unpersuaded of error due to Syed’s teachings not
taking place in a content management system because the Examiner relies on
Barker for assigning and associating in a content management system.
Appellant attacks the references individually.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 and of
claims 2–12, 15–30, and 32–36, which fall therewith. See App. Br. 6–7.

35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection of Claim 13 Over Barker and Syed
Claim 13 depends from claim 1 and recites “communicating the
metadata comprises communicating the metadata through a satellite and
wherein communicating the content comprises communicating the content
through a terrestrial system.” Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 13 is in error because “two different ways for communicating the asset
and the asset bundle are not taught or suggested.” App. Br. 6. The
Examiner finds “[a] major function of Barker is to update metadata, during
which process the content is not re-sent, only the metadata.” Ans. 11. This
separate, updated metadata may be sent via any medium, including satellite,
while the content may be sent earlier via terrestrial system.” Ans. 11 (citing
Barker ¶¶ 6, 64–65, 71). Appellant responds “[n]one of the paragraphs cited
by the Examiner in the Barker reference teach[es] different paths for
communicating metadata and content to a user device. Claim 13 is specific
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to communicating the metadata through a satellite and the content through a
terrestrial system.” Reply Br. 3.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive of error. To the extent
Appellant’s argument is premised on claim 13 requiring contemporaneous
communication of metadata and content, we are unpersuaded because the
claim does not require contemporaneous communication. To the extent
Appellant argues the rejection of claim 13 does not address communicating
“to a user device,” we are unpersuaded of error because communicating to a
user device is addressed in the rejection of claim 1 (see Ans. 5 (citing Barker
¶¶ 43, 72)), which element Appellant does not dispute. Appellant’s
arguments do not otherwise persuade us of error in the Examiner’s finding
that the combination of Barker and Syed teaches or suggests
“communicating the metadata comprises communicating the metadata
through a satellite and wherein communicating the content comprises
communicating the content through a terrestrial system.”
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13 and of
claim 31, which falls therewith. See App. Br. 7

CONCLUSIONS
On the record before us, we conclude the Examiner has not erred in
rejecting claims 1–13, 15, 17–31, 33, 35, and 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Barker and Syed and claims 14, 16, 32, and 34 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Barker, Syed, and Sull.

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Application 11/828,519
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DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–36 is
affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

ELD