Ex Parte Keinrath et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 26, 2016

13206409 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 26, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO.
13/206,409
89955 7590
HONEYWELL/IPL
Patent Services
115 Tabor Road
P.O.Box 377
FILING DATE
08/09/2011
07/28/2016
MORRIS PLAINS, NJ 07950
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Claudia Keinrath
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
H0028472 (002.2595) 3778
EXAMINER
LAU, KEVIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/28/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
patentservices-us@honeywell.com
DL-ACS-SM-IP@Honeywell.com
docketing@ifllaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CLAUDIA KEINRA TH,
MICHAEL CHRISTIAN DORNEICH,
STEPHEN WHITLOW, BRETISLA VP AS SINGER,
JIRI VASEK, and PETR KRUP ANSKY1
Appeal2015-003519
Application 13/206,409
Technology Center 2600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JUSTIN BUSCH, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-5, 7-10, and 12-20, which are all of the claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Honeywell
International, Inc. App. Br. 2.
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Application 13/206,409
Technology
The application relates to "intelligently managing the avionics
display, information, and controls to more evenly distribute pilot task loads
and/or automatically configure/reconfigure displays during flights."
Abstract.
Representative Claims
Claims 1 and 12 are representative and reproduced below with the key
limitations emphasized:
1. A method for selectively and adaptively reconfiguring one or
more of a plurality of flight deck displays in an aircraft,
comprising the steps of:
processing pilot preference data, the pilot preference data
including information representative of pilot preferences,
behaviors, habits, biases, idiosyncrasies, and tendencies
associated with at least flight deck display settings and
configurations;
processmg sensor data representative of a current
workload state of a pilot;
processing aircraft avionics data representative of a
current state of the aircraft;
determining, based on at least one of the processed sensor
data and the processed aircraft avionics data, whether one or
more events have occurred; and
selectively commanding reconfiguration of one or more of
the plurality of flight deck displays based on (i) the determination
of whether the one or more events have occurred, and (ii) the
pilot preference data.
12. A method for dynamically managing aircraft flight crew
tasks, comprising:
m a processor:
processing sensor data representative of a current
workload state of a pilot;
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processing aircraft avionics data representative of a
current state of the aircraft;
processing aircraft mission data representative of a
current mission state of the aircraft;
determining, based on the processed sensor data,
the processed aircraft avionics data, and the processed
aircraft mission data, a current and future task load of the
pilot; and
based on the current and future task load of the pilot,
selectively generating a recommendation that the pilot
complete one or more tasks.
Rejections
Claims 1-5 and 7-10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Vial (US 2010/0204855 Al; Aug. 12,
2010), Geisler et al. (US 2004/0088205 Al; May 6, 2004), and
Kratchounova et al. (US 2008/0001847 Al; Jan. 3, 2008). Final Act. 2.
Claims 12-14, 17, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Guilley et al. (US 2010/0161157 Al; June
24, 2010) and Domeich et al. (US 2006/0029198 Al; Feb. 9, 2006). Final
Act. 10.
Claims 15, 16, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Guilley, Domeich, and Leslie (US
2007/0050225 Al; Mar. 1, 2007). Final Act. 14.
ISSUES
1. Did the Examiner err in finding Vial teaches or suggests
"determining ... whether one or more events have occurred," as recited in
claim 1, and commensurately recited in claim 7?
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2. Did the Examiner err in finding Kratchounova teaches or
suggests "selectively commanding reconfiguration of one or more of the
plurality of flight deck displays based on ... the pilot preference data" and
"the pilot preference data including information representative of pilot
preferences, behaviors, habits, biases, idiosyncrasies, and tendencies," as
recited in claim 1, and commensurately recited in claim 7?
3. Did the Examiner err in finding Domeich teaches or suggests
"processing sensor data representative of a current workload state of a pilot,"
as recited in claim 12, and commensurately recited in claim 17?
4. Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Guilley and
Domeich teaches or suggests "determining, based on the processed sensor
data, the processed aircraft avionics data, and the processed aircraft mission
data, a current and future task load of the pilot," as recited in claim 12, and
commensurately recited in claim 1 7?
ANALYSIS
Claims 1-5 and 7-10
Vial teaches that the display in an aircraft cockpit can change
depending upon the state of the aircraft. Vial i-fi-f 13-15; App. Br. 10. The
aircraft's state can be based on, for example, "the phase of flight (taxiing on
the ground, takeoff, climbing, cruising, descent, landing)"; "detection of a
breakdown or fault"; and "a selection by the pilot." Vial i139; Ans. 3.
Appellants contend Vial fails to teach or suggest "determining ...
whether one or more events have occurred," as recited in claim 1, because
even though Vial teaches determining an aircraft's state, "the 'state of an
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aircraft' refers to one or more of its altitude, speed, pitch, roll, etc." which
"are not events in any sense." Reply Br. 4; App. Br. 13.
However, Appellants do not fully respond to the Examiner's rejection.
The Examiner finds that under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the
"transition of the state of the aircraft can be considered an event." Ans. 2-3
(emphasis added). We agree. Vial teaches "the state of the aircraft is
determined automatically" and "[ o Jn the basis of this state, the accessible
functions and parameters are determined and presented to the pilot." Vial
i-f 57. Thus, Vial teaches or suggests that if the state of the aircraft changes
(e.g., if the aircraft begins its descent or a fault is detected), then different
functions and parameters are presented to the pilot. Moreover, the state is
based at least in part on the aircraft avionics data, such as the altitude or a
sensor detecting a fault. See id.; Ans. 3; see also Spec. i-f 18 (listing "non-
limiting examples of avionics systems"). Given this, Appellants have not
persuaded us of any error in the Examiner finding Vial teaches or suggests
determining based on the processed aircraft avionics data whether one or
more events have occurred. 2
Appellants also contend Kratchounova fails to teach or suggest
"selectively commanding reconfiguration of one or more of the plurality of
flight deck displays based on ... the pilot preference data" and "the pilot
preference data including information representative of pilot preferences,
behaviors, habits, biases, idiosyncrasies, and tendencies." App. Br. 14.
2 Though not necessary for our decision, we note that other portions of Vial
not cited by the Examiner also expressly say the display can be changed "[i]f
an event is detected." Vial i-f 93; see also i-fi-189, 92, 95, 68, 69.
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First, Appellants concede Kratchounova "teaches that certain views of
various displays may be configured according to pilot/co-pilot preferences"
but argue this "does not provide any teaching that is even remotely related to
'selectively commanding the reconfiguration of one or more displays' based
on the pilot preferences." App. Br. 14; Reply Br. 4--5. However, Appellants
have not adequately explained that argument. Kratchounova teaches an
aircraft display with multiple views (i-f 39, FIGs. 3-5) and expressly says
these views "may be configured as operational displays for aircraft system
menus, display of aircraft flight data, or otherwise configurable according to
the preferences of the pilot or copilot" (i-f 40). Thus, if the aircraft changed
pilots and the new pilot had different preferences, the display would be
configured according to the new pilot's preferences. Appellants therefore
have not sufficiently persuaded us against Kratchounova teaching or
suggesting "selectively commanding reconfiguration of one or more of the
plurality of flight deck displays based on ... the pilot preference data."
Second, claim 1 recites "the pilot preference data including
information representative of pilot preferences, behaviors, habits, biases,
idiosyncrasies, and tendencies associated with at least flight deck display
settings and configurations." The Examiner says that under the broadest
reasonable interpretation, Kratchounova's pilot "preferences" are
"representative of' a pilot's "behaviors, habits, biases, idiosyncrasies, and
tendencies" (Ans. 3), but Appellants disagree because according to
Appellants "in most instances, habits, biases, idiosyncrasies, and tendencies
may be diametrically opposed to personal preference." App. Br. 14. The
Examiner provides dictionary definitions for each of these terms, yet
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Appellants do not provide their own dictionary definitions, nor identify any
substantive error with the Examiner's definitions. Ans. 3--4. Instead,
Appellants merely assert in a conclusory fashion that "[t]he difference is
apparent on its face" without sufficiently explaining what that difference is.
Reply Br. 6. We also agree with the Examiner that Appellants' single
counter example ("a person may prefer to be a non-smoker, but by habit is a
smoker") is both incomplete (i.e., because "the smoker has ... a preference
for feeling the effects of nicotine") and not relevant to the preferences a pilot
has for "flight deck display settings and configurations" as recited by claim
1. Ans. 5; App. Br. 14 n.9.
Claim 1 expressly recites that information representative of all of
these categories is collectively labeled "pilot preference data." See also
Spec. i-f 19 ("The pilot preference data source ... includes data
representative of ... preferences, behaviors, habits, and tendencies")
(emphasis added). The rest of the Specification provides little guidance
because it only uses the terms "habits" and "tendencies" once and never
further defines them. Spec. i-f 19. Moreover, the Specification never uses
the terms "bias" or "idiosyncrasy," so to the extent Appellants are saying
"preferences, behaviors, habits, and tendencies" are not representative of
"biases" or "idiosyncrasies," the claims would be unpatentable for lack of
written description. Given the limited record before us, including limited
discussion in the Specification and no definitions from Appellants, we are
not persuaded of any error in the Examiner's finding that Kratchounova's
"preferences" are "representative of' behaviors, habits, biases,
idiosyncrasies, and tendencies.
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 1, and
claims 2-5 and 7-10, which Appellants argue are patentable for similar
reasons. See App. Br. 19, 10-15; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Claims 12-20
Domeich teaches monitoring the cognitive state of a user using
electroencephalogram (EEG) to assess the user's present task engagement,
cognitive workload, and stress level. Domeich i-f 35. An "aircraft" and
specifically "cockpits" are identified as fields that might benefit from
Domeich's invention. Id. i-fi-13--4.
Claim 12 recites "processing sensor data representative of a current
workload state of a pilot." Appellants argue Domeich does not teach this
limitation: "Rather, Domeich processes EEG data to determine, among other
things, a workload state." App. Br. 18. We are not persuaded of any error.
EEG data is sensor data, and we agree with the Examiner that "the cognitive
state[] of the pilot is representative of the workload of the pilot." Ans. 6. In
fact, the present application expressly states that "examples of suitable
physiological sensors 107 include an electroencephalogram (EEG) sensor,"
explaining that "the EEG sensors may be used to measure the cognitive state
of the pilot." Spec. i-fi-125-26. That is exactly what the Examiner relies upon
Domeich for here.
Guilley teaches a system for managing alerts and tasks for a crew of
an aircraft. Guilley Abstract. For example, alerts may relate to a
mechanical breakdown of one of the aircraft's systems. Id. i-f 28. The
system then advises the crew of the "steps or actions to be accomplished so
as to solve the problem that generated the alert." Id. i-f 32.
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Appellants contend the combination of Guilley and Domeich fails to
teach or suggest "determining, based on the processed sensor data, the
processed aircraft avionics data, and the processed aircraft mission data, a
current and future task load of the pilot," as recited in independent claim 12.
App. Br. 17-18. We, however, are not persuaded of any error.
First, we find Guilley teaches or suggests "determining ... a current
and future task load of the pilot." For example, Guilley states:
The display of the state of processing of an alert, of a task and of
a procedure allows the crew to have an overall view of the
ongoing tasks and of the tasks to be carried out. This overall
view allows the crew to be aware of the current and forthcoming
workload. The crew can thus bring forward certain tasks when
their workload is lighter.
Guilley i-f 103 (emphasis added); Ans. 6. Thus, Guilley teaches notifying the
crew of the current and forthcoming workload, and even rearranging tasks.
Second, we find Guilley teaches or suggests the task load is
determined based on "the processed aircraft avionics data." Specifically, \Ve
agree with the Examiner that Guilley' s alerts pertain to the aircraft state,
which comes from avionics data. Ans. 5; Guilley i-fi-1 11-17 (listing sample
alerts based on altitude, terrain, communications, stalls, or system failures);
see also Spec. i-f 18 (listing "non-limiting examples of avionics systems").
And as discussed above, the system advises the "steps or actions to be
accomplished so as to solve the problem that generated the alert." Guilley
i-f 32. Therefore, the task load is determined based on the alerts, which are
based on the avionics data.
Third, we find Guilley teaches or suggests the task load is determined
based on "the processed aircraft mission data." Appellants have not
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sufficiently persuaded us against the Examiner's finding that under the
broadest reasonable interpretation, the current workload would be "mission
data," nor have they offered any intrinsic or extrinsic evidence to otherwise
define that term. Ans. 6. We also agree with the Examiner that Guilley
teaches alerts can be filtered, such as reordering alerts based on their
seriousness or deferring new alerts if there is currently a heavy workload.
Guilley i-f 79; Ans. 6. Therefore, both the current and future task load (e.g., a
deferred alert) are determined based on Guilley's current workload.
Fourth, we find Domeich teaches or suggests the "processed sensor
data," as discussed above. Moreover, Appellants have not sufficiently
persuaded us against a combination of Domeich and Guilley. For example,
Guilley teaches that alerts can be filtered during times of heavy workload
(i-f 79), and Domeich teaches using EEG to determine the user's workload
(i-f 3 5). See also Final Act. 11.
Fifth, we agree with the Examiner that even if Guilley taught a
manual process, 3 it is well settled that there is no invention in providing an
automatic means to replace a manual activity with the same result. In re
Venner, 262 F .2d 91, 95 (CCP A 1958). Here, Appellants have not identified
anything novel or non-obvious from automating Guilley's process, nor cited
any case law supporting their position. See App. Br. 17; Reply Br. 8.
Finally, Appellants have not adequately supported their assertion that
Guilley's process "all occurs before the system, crew, or any other entity
3 Though not necessary for our opinion, we are not convinced Guilley only
teaches a "manual" process. For example, Guilley's "filtering function"
discussed above may be performed automatically. See Guilley i-f 79.
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knows anything about the crew task load, let alone the current and future
task load." App. Br. 17. To the contrary, Guilley teaches alerts happen
during the course of a flight, such as an alert "to avoid collisions with the
terrain" (i-f 11) or to notify the crew of a "mechanical breakdown" (i-f 28).
Similarly, Guilley' s "filtering function" reorders alerts when a new alert is
"generated" and defers alerts if there is currently "heavy workload, such as
during takeoff for example." Guilley i1 79.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 12, and
claims 13-20, which Appellants argue are patentable for similar reasons.
See App. Br. 19, 16; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
DECISION
For the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting
claims 1-5, 7-10, and 12-20.
TIME TO RESPOND
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED
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