Ex Parte Kasahara

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 30, 2016

13445431 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2016)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/445,431 04/12/2012 Shunichi KASAHARA 1946-0382 3882
60803 7590 08/30/2016
Paratus Law Group, PLLC
620 Herndon Parkway
Suite 320
Herndon, VA 20170
EXAMINER
ELBINGER, STEVEN Z
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2613
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/30/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SHUNICHI KASAHARA
____________

Appeal 2015-005286
Application 13/445,431
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before TERRENCE W. McMILLIN, NORMAN H. BEAMER, and
SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–7 and 9–14, which constitute all claims pending
in the application. Claim 8 has been canceled. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellant identifies Sony Corporation as the real party in interest. App.
Br. 3.
Appeal 2015-005286
Application 13/445,431

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claimed invention relates to “augmented reality” (AR) image
processing, which involves superimposing a “virtual” image onto a real
world image in a video display. Spec. ¶¶ 2–5. Claims 1, 13, and 14 are
independent. Claim 1, which is illustrative of the invention, reads as
follows:
1. An image processing apparatus comprising:

an image acquisition unit for acquiring an input image;
a detection unit for detecting a parameter regarding a motion of
an object shown in the input image;

a selection unit for selecting a recognition method of the
object shown in the input image from a plurality of recognition
methods;

a recognition unit for recognising the object shown in the
input image using the recognition method selected by the
selection unit; and

a display control unit for superimposing a virtual object
that is associated with the object recognised by the recognition
unit onto the input image and displaying the virtual object,

wherein the display control unit changes display of the
virtual object according to the recognition method selected by
the selection unit, and

wherein, in a case the parameter detected by the detection
unit indicates that the object is moving at a level exceeding a
predetermined level is shown in the input image, the selection
unit selects a recognition method with a lower processing cost
instead of a recognition method with a higher processing cost.

Br. 23 (emphasis added).

Appeal 2015-005286
Application 13/445,431

3
THE REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
Claims 1, 11, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hobgood et al. (US 7,042,421 B2; May 9, 2006)
(“Hobgood”), Shikano et al. (US 7,340,078 B2; Mar. 4, 2008) (“Shikano”)
and Rosser et al. (US 5,264,933; Nov. 23, 1993) (“Rosser”). Final Act. 3–7.
Claims 2–7, 9, 10, and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hobgood, Shikano, Rosser, and Baheti et al. (US
2012/0011119 A1; pub. Jan. 12, 2012) (“Baheti”). Final Act. 7–15.
Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Hobgood, Shikano, Rosser, and Kanetaka et al. (US 6,646,642 B1;
Nov. 11, 2003) (“Kanetaka”). Final Act. 15–17.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments presented in this appeal. Any other arguments which Appellant
could have made but did not make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). On this record, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth in
the rejections from which this appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s Answer,
and highlight the following for emphasis.
Rejection of Claims 1, 11, and 13 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Appellant argues claims 1, 11, and 13 as a group, with claim 1
representative of the group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv). Appellant
contends the Examiner erred in finding the prior art teaches “[when] the
object is moving at a level exceeding a predetermined level . . . shown in the
Appeal 2015-005286
Application 13/445,431

4
input image, the selection unit selects a recognition method with a lower
processing cost.” App. Br. 12–19; Reply Br. 4–16.
The Examiner finds the disputed limitation in the combination of
Hobgood, Shikano, and Rosser. We agree with the Examiner’s finding.
First, as the Examiner finds, Hobgood teaches the first portion of the
disputed limitation, detecting an object’s motion and blurring display of the
object if motion exceeds a “predetermined level” (which may be zero),
Hobgood col. 2, ll. 16–19, col. 4, ll. 20–28; Ans. 3. Second, as the Examiner
finds, Shikano also teaches identifying motion in a video exceeding a
threshold value and further teaches the second portion of the disputed
limitation, i.e., selection of a “recognition method,” including possibly
changing that method in response to motion. Shikano col. 7, ll. 49–59, col.
9, ll. 53–61; Ans. 3–4. And third, as the Examiner finds, Rosser teaches the
third and final portion of the disputed limitation, i.e., recognition methods
having successively lower processing costs, namely, through use of a “Burt
pyramid” algorithm that successively reduces frequency and sample density
of images, and can be “slowed down . . . depending on whether or not one
wishes a simultaneous [video] transmission of the actual event or a delayed
version.” Rosser col. 8, ll. 12–37; Ans. 4.
Appellant argues that none of the foregoing three references discloses
all elements of the disputed limitation. App. Br. 12–19. Appellant asserts,
for example, the combination of Hobgood and Shikano lacks the teaching of
a lower-cost recognition method. 13–14. Appellant asserts Rosser lacks
detection of motion exceeding a predetermined level. App. Br. 18.
Appellant asserts Hobgood lacks selection of a recognition method with
lower processing cost. App. Br. 14. At no point, however, does Appellant
Appeal 2015-005286
Application 13/445,431

5
identify any element in the disputed limitation not taught by the combination
of all three references relied upon by the Examiner. Because “one cannot
show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the
rejections are based on combinations of references,” Appellant’s arguments
do not persuade us of error. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981).
Appellant further argues the Examiner erred in finding Rosser teaches
“lower processing cost” as recited in the claim. App. Br. 19. As noted
above, however, Rosser teaches successively reducing frequency and sample
density of images in video processing depending upon motion, and that the
processing can be “slowed down . . . depending on whether or not one
wishes a simultaneous [video] transmission of the actual event or a delayed
version.” Rosser col. 8, ll. 12–37; Ans. 7. The Examiner finds one of
ordinary skill would understand using an image “with reduced density and
resolution will allow a software method to run more quickly,” lowering
processing cost. Ans. 7. Appellant does not identify error in this finding.
To the extent Appellant’s argument is intended to imply “cost” refers to a
specific monetary unit (e.g., dollars), that requirement is not in the claim.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 11,
and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hobgood, Shikano,
and Rosser.
Remaining Rejections
Independent claim 14 and dependent claims 2–7, 9, and 10 stand
rejected as obvious over Hobgood, Shikano, Rosser, and Baheti. Appellant
argues claim 14 is patentable because it includes limitations commensurate
in scope to claim 1, and Baheti does not cure the deficiencies of Hobgood,
Shikano, and Rosser. App. Br. 20. Appellant further argues the dependent
Appeal 2015-005286
Application 13/445,431

6
claims are patentable for the same reasons as independent claims 1, 13, and
14. For the reasons set forth above, these arguments do not demonstrate
error. We sustain the rejections of claims 2–7, 9, 10, and 14.
Dependent claim 12 stands rejected as obvious over Hobgood,
Shikano, Rosser, and Kanetaka. Appellant argues Kanetaka does not cure
the deficiencies of Hobgood, Shikano, and Rosser with respect to claim 1,
from which claim 12 depends. App. Br. 21. For the reasons set forth above,
these arguments do not demonstrate error. We sustain the rejection of claim
12.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–7 and 9–14 are AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED