Ex Parte Kapur et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 25, 2017

14179319 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 25, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
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Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
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APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/179,319 02/12/2014 Navneet Kapur 3080.260US1 5676
45839 7590 09/27/2017
smwfPtMan t t tndrf.ro & wofssnf.r/ t tnkfdtn EXAMINER
PO BOX 2938 PHAM, KHANH B
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2166
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/27/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LINKEDIN CORPORATION1
Appeal 2017-005043
Application 14/179,319
Technology Center 2100
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, DENISE M. POTHIER, and
JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—27. App. Br. I.2 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.
1 The bibliographic data sheet lists Navneet Kapur and Gloria Lau as
inventors.
2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Action (Final Act.)
mailed March 17, 2016, (2) the Appeal Brief (App. Br.) filed October 27,
2016, (3) the Examiner’s Answer (Ans.) mailed December 1, 2016, and
(4) the Reply Brief (Reply Br.) filed January 31, 2017.
Appeal 2017-005043
Application 14/179,319
Invention
Appellant’s invention relates to “methods, systems, and machine
readable mediums which automatically convert an unstandardized attribute
value of a member profile of a social networking service to one of a plurality
of standardized values for that attribute.” See Spec., Abstract.
Claim 1 is reproduced below with emphasis:
1. A method, comprising:
receiving an unstandardized attribute value describing
an attribute of a social networking service user's member
profile;
receiving a plurality of predetermined standardized
attribute values;
comparing the unstandardized attribute value to each of
the plurality of predetermined standardized attribute values;
determining that the unstandardized attribute value does
not exactly match any of the plurality of predetermined
standardized attribute values;
determining a set of candidate attribute values from the
plurality of predetermined standardized attribute values based
upon data describing social relations corresponding to the
user;
scoring the candidate attribute values based upon how
closely they match the unstandardized attribute value; and
selecting one of the candidate attribute values based upon
the candidate attribute value scores.
The Examiner relies on the following as evidence of unpatentability:
Ganti
Lamp
US 2011/0282856 A1 Nov. 17, 2011
US 2014/0172681 A1 June 19, 2014
(filed Nov. 14, 2013)
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Application 14/179,319
The Rejections
Claims 1,3,4, 6—10, 12, 13, 15—19, 21, 22, and 24—27 are rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Lamp. Final Act. 2—5.
Claims 2, 5, 11, 14, 20, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Lamp and Ganti. Final Act. 6—7.
THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION OVER LAMP
Regarding representative claim l,3 the Examiner finds Lamp discloses
its limitations. Final Act. 2-4.
Appellant argues Lamp fails to teach all the limitations in claim 1.
App. Br. 10, 13. More specifically, Appellant asserts the discussed
attributes in Lamp (e.g., name, address, phone number) “are unrelated to a
social network” or a social network user’s profile. Id. at 11; Reply Br. 2.
Additionally, Appellant contends Lamp standardizes attribute values on its
own rather than receiving “predetermined standardized attribute values” as
claimed. App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 2. Appellant even further asserts Lamp
does not discuss the recited “candidate attribute values” or “data describing
social relations corresponding to the user” in claim 1. App. Br. 12.
ISSUES
Under § 102, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by finding
that Lamp discloses:
3 Appellant argues independent claims 1,10, and 19 as a group. App. Br.
9—13. We select independent claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Application 14/179,319
(I) receiving an unstandardized attribute value describing an
attribute of a social networking service user's member profile;
(II) receiving predetermined standardized attribute values; and
(III) determining a set of candidate attribute values from the
plurality of predetermined standardized attribute values based upon
data describing social relations corresponding to the user?
ANALYSIS
I.
We begin by construing a key, disputed limitation of claim 1 which
recites “unstandardized attribute value describing an attribute of a social
networking service user’s member profile.” App. Br. 18 (Claims App’x).
Notably, claim 1 does not recite a method of using a social networking
service or even that the recited “unstandardized attribute value” comes from
a user entering data from a social networking service. Id. Rather, claim 1
merely recites an attribute value describing an attribute of a social
networking service user’s memberprofde. Thus, to extent Appellant is
asserting that Lamp must disclose a social networking service4 and that the
Better Business Bureau website discussed in Lamp is not social networking
services (see id. at 11; Reply Br. 2), we are not persuaded. Regardless,
Appellants has not rebutted the Examiner’s finding that Yelp, Foursquare,
and Google Places disclosed in Lamp (Lamp 116) are social networking
services, which is a position we find reasonable.
4 In the Reply Brief, Appellant implies a social networking service requires
logging into a website. See Reply Br. 2. The disclosure does not describe a
“social networking service” as a service that requires logging into the
website and we decline to import that construction here. Spec. H 3, 14.
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Application 14/179,319
During examination of a patent application, a claim is given its
broadest reasonable construction “in light of the specification as it would be
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The
Specification describes non-limited examples of member profile attributes,
including where a member went to school, where a member lives, and
employment. Spec. 118. Although this informs our construction of the
recited phrase, we decline to import such examples into claim 1.
The Examiner determines Lamp discloses receiving identifying
information, including an address and geographic coordinates. Final Act. 3
(citing Lamp 115); Ans. 2. An address or geographic coordinates indicate
where a user lives or, alternatively, where a user works (e.g., employment).
See Lamp 115. Thus, Lamp describes user member profile, attribute values
similar to the disclosure. Additionally, Lamp discloses receiving a user’s
name and “many other types of information.” Id. We fail to see how a
user’s name would not also be considered sufficient to describe an attribute
of a social networking service’s user member profile.
Accordingly, we disagree with Appellant that Lamp does not disclose
“receiving an unstandardized attribute value describing an attribute of a
social networking service user's member profile” as recited in claim 1.
II.
Another key, disputed limitation in claim 1 is “predetermined
standardized attribute values” within the recited step “receiving a plurality of
predetermined standardized attribute values.” App. Br. 18 (Claim App’x).
Appellant contends Lamp standardizes attribute values on its own rather
than receiving “predetermined standardized attribute values” as recited in
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Application 14/179,319
claim 1. App. Br. 11. Appellant asserts the attributes discussed in Lamp’s
Paragraph 18 are not predetermined but instead involve removing
punctuation, converting to lowercase, and standardizing abbreviations.
Reply Br. 2. We are not persuaded.
The Specification discusses standardized values can be derived from
or converted from unstandardized values. Spec. H 21—22, 65. The
disclosure further states such attributes may be an attribute for which a
member is restricted to select from, such as a drop down box containing a
list of predetermined, standardized values. Id. 123. However, the
disclosure does not limit standardized attribute values to such an example.
See id.
The Examiner maps the “[p]ublicly available data” (Lamp 116)
discussed in Lamp to the standardized attribute values. Pinal Act. 3 (citing
Lamp 1116—17). The Examiner explains in the Answer Lamp’s Paragraph
18 discloses standardizing the publicly available data prior to comparing any
attribute values (e.g., identifying information). Ans. 3 (citing Lamp 118).
We agree with the Examiner.
As noted by Appellant (App. Br. 11, Reply Br. 2), Lamp discloses
standardizing the publicly available data. Lamp 118. Lamp discloses an
example of standardizing, involving “removing punctuation, converting the
letters to all lowercase, and standardizing common abbreviations, such as
those found in a street address (Rd—road, Dr—drive, 1st—first, North—N,
etc.)” Id. As such, Lamp’s publicly available data converts to “standardized
attribute values” as recited. See also Reply Br. 2 (stating “the standardizing
of Lamp might co[n]vert the address [of 600 Dulany St., Alexandria,
Virginia, 22314] to ‘600 dulany street Alexandria va 22314’”) (emphasis
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Application 14/179,319
added). The Examiner’s findings in this regard are also consistent with the
disclosure, which states standardized values can be derived from
unstandardized values as previously discussed. See Spec. 21—22.
Appellant further contends Lamp does not disclose the attribute values
are “predetermined” as recited because Lamp performs its own
standardization. App. Br. 11, Reply Br. 2. The disclosure does not ascribe
any special meaning to the term “predetermined.” See generally Spec.
Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary defines “predetermine” as “to
determine beforehand.”5 As such, an ordinary meaning of “predetermined”
is determined or known in advance or beforehand. Consistent with the
Specification as it would be interpreted by an ordinarily skilled artisan, the
phrase “predetermined standardized attribute values” includes attribute
values that are (1) standardized, but derived from unstandardized values, and
(2) known in the advance.
Lamp’s standardization involves applying rules that are known in
advance or beforehand (e.g., no punctuation, lowercase). See Lamp 118,
cited in Ans. 3. Additionally, common abbreviations are converted to
predetermined terms or letters (e.g., “road,” “street,” “first,” and “N”)
known in advance. See Lamp 118. As such, the standardized data are
“predetermined standardized” values as broadly as recited.
Lor the above reasons, Lamp discloses “receiving a plurality of
predetermined standardized attribute values” as recited.
5 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/predetermined (def. lb).
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III.
Appellant further asserts Lamp does not discuss the recited “candidate
attribute values” and “data describing social relations corresponding to the
user” within the recited “determining a set of candidate attribute values from
the plurality of predetermined standardized attribute values based upon data
describing social relations corresponding to the user” of claim 1. App. Br.
12.
The Examiner determines Lamp has a set of fields based upon data
received from the publicly available data. Final Act. 3 (citing Lamp || 19—
20); Ans. 4. The cited portions of Lamp relied upon by the Examiner
discloses comparing identifying information associated with publicly
available data that has been standardized with other information in order to
generate comparison metrics for the various fields (e.g., name, address,
phone number). Lamp || 18—19. Such metrics can involve determining a
longest common substring, the Levenshtein distance, and/or actual distance
between two strings and capturing different match types. Id. ]f 19. Lamp
further explains the comparison metrics are used to score the comparisons
(e.g., between 0.0 and 1.0) and are evaluated to select candidates as a match
(e.g., selecting highest comparison score). Id. Tffl 20-21, cited in Ans. 4; see
also id., Fig. 1. As such, Lamp discloses “determining a set of candidate
attribute values from the plurality of predetermined standardized attribute
values” as recited.
Appellant also contends the determined candidate attribute values are
not “based upon data describing social relations corresponding to the user”
as recited. App. Br. 12. According to the disclosure, “data describing social
relations corresponding to the user includes one or more: a user’s email
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domain, information in a member profile of a connection of the user’s, a
following relationship of the user, and a connection invitation reasons.”
Spec. 1 85. However, these are non-limited examples. As noted by the
Examiner (Ans. 4), the disclosure further describes other “social relations,”
including group affiliations, locations (e.g., where members live or work
presently), group membership, and employment history. See id. 1 67.
Accordingly, consistent with the disclosure, Lamp’s disclosed address and
geographic location information (e.g., locations, such as where a user lives
or works) are “data describing social relationship corresponding to the user.”
The Examiner provides a similar explanation (Ans. 4), which is undisputed
on the record. See generally Reply Br.
Based on the record, we therefore, determine Lamp discloses
“determining a set of candidate attribute values from the plurality of
predetermined standardized attribute values based upon data describing
social relations corresponding to the user” in claim 1.
Appellant additionally argues the remaining limitations in claim 1 are
not disclosed in Lamp. App. Br. 11—13. The arguments for claim l’s
remaining recitations repeat the contentions addressed previously, such as
Lamp purportedly fails to receive predetermined standardized values and to
use a candidate attribute value set. Id. at 11—12. We are not persuaded and
refer to our previous discussion for more details. We also adopt the
Examiner’s findings as our own. final Act. 3^4; Ans. 3—5.
As for dependent claims 3, 4, 6—9, 12, 13, 15—18, 21, 22, and 24—27,
Appellant argues Lamp fails to teach their limitations due to their
dependency on claims 1,10, and 19. See id. at 13. We are not persuaded for
the above reasons. Also, Appellant contends that the dependent claims “are
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Application 14/179,319
also independently allowable because they add significant elements to
distinguish them further from the art.” Id. at 14. This argument is
unavailing because Appellant fails to point out any particular element—
significant or otherwise—in the claims distinguishable over Lamp. Id.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 6—10, 12, 13, 15—19, 21, 22, and 24—27.6
THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER LAMP AND GANTI
For the obviousness rejection, Appellant argues “Ganti does not
motivate one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the system of Lamp to
include all seven recitations” in claims 1,10, and 19 and thus, fails to cure
Lamp’s purported deficiencies. App. Br. 15.
Notably, the formulated rejection cites to Ganti to teach recitations in
claims 2, 5, 11, 14, 20, and 23—not claims 1, 10, and 19. Final Act. 6—7.
Also, as addressed above, Lamp discloses the disputed limitations in claims
1,10, and 19. Ganti, therefore, need not teach or suggest modifying Lamp
to arrive at claims 1,10, and 19’s limitations. For the foregoing reasons,
Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection of claims 2, 5, 11,
14, 20, and 23.
6 Claim 1 recites “[a] method” with various steps of receiving, comparing,
determining, and selecting data. If prosecution continues, the Examiner may
evaluate the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in light of Alice Corp. v. CLS
Banklnt’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014), and subsequent Office guidance related to
patent-eligible subject matter. See 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014), July 2015 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility, 80 Fed. Reg. 45529 (July 30, 2015), and May
2016 Subject Matter Eligibility Update, 81 Fed. Reg. 27381 (May 6, 2016);
see also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2106(I)(iv), 9th ed. (Rev.
07.2015, Nov. 2015).
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Application 14/179,319
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—27 under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102 or 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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