Ex Parte KangDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 28, 201713347520 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/347,520 01/10/2012 Taehyen Kang 252361-1 (GEIS:0002) 9767 82438 7590 02/28/2017 (TR Power Rr Water EXAMINER Fletcher Yoder PC COOK, BRIAN S P.O. Box 692289 Houston, TX 77269-2289 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2123 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/28/2017 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte TAEHYEN KANG Appeal 2016-002499 Application 13/347,5201 Technology Center 2100 Before ERIC S. FRAHM, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—20, which constitute all claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as General Electric Company. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2016-002499 Application 13/347,520 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Claimed Invention The claimed invention relates to modeling electric vehicles in an electrical network and, specifically, optimizing the charging and discharging schedules for such vehicles. Spec. Tflf 1, 13. Claims 1, 12, and 18 are independent. Claims 1 and 18 are illustrative of the invention and the subject matter of the appeal, and read as follows (with the disputed limitations emphasized): 1. A device, comprising: a processor configured to execute one or more instructions stored in a memory to: receive an electrical vehicle (EV) location profile comprising information regarding movement of an EV between a first and a second charging location of an electrical network; and apply an EV mobility model to the EV location profile to concurrently determine a first optimized schedule for the EV to charge or discharge a storage cell of the EV at the first charging location during a scheduling period and a second optimized schedule for the EV to charge or discharge a storage cell of the EV at the second charging location during the scheduling period, wherein the EV mobility model comprises constraints that describe interactions of the EV with the electrical network, wherein the processor is disposed external to the EV. 18. A charging station device at a location, comprising: a charging interface configured to physically couple an electrical vehicle (EV) to an electrical grid via the charging station device to allow power to pass between the electrical vehicle and the electrical grid via the charging station device, wherein the charging station device is co-located with the EV at the location and is external to the EV; 2 Appeal 2016-002499 Application 13/347,520 a network interface configured to receive a schedule for the electrical grid to supply power to or receive power from a storage cell of the EV when it is coupled to the charging interface, wherein the schedule is generated by applying an EV mobility model to an EV location profile, and wherein the schedule minimizes power costs, power transmission losses, or both, in the electrical grid; and a processor configured to use the schedule to instruct the charging interface when to supply power to or receive power from the storage cell of the EV during a power transfer between the storage cell of the EV and the electrical grid. App. Br. 18 (Claims App.). The Rejections on Appeal Claims 18—20 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated Kempton (US 2011/0202217 Al; publ. Aug. 18, 2011). Final Act. 12-23. Claims 1—3, 7—14, and 17 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kempton, Abdolreza Karbassi & Matthew Barth, Vehicle Route Prediction and Time of Arrival Estimation Techniques for Improved Transportation System Management, IEEE, 511—16 (2003) (“Karbassi”), and Agassi et al. (US 2011/0071932 Al; publ. Mar. 24, 2011) (“Agassi”). Final Act. 2U-61. Claims 4—6, 15, and 16 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kempton, Karbassi, Agassi, and Willett Kempton & Jasna Tomic, Vehicle-to-Grid power fundamentals: Calculating capacity and net revenue, 144 Journal of Power Sources, 268—79 (Apr. 11, 2005) (“V2G”). Final Act. 61-69. 3 Appeal 2016-002499 Application 13/347,520 ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments presented in this appeal. Arguments which Appellant could have made but did not make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41,37(c)(l)(iv). On the record before us, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth in the rejections from which the appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s Answer, and provide the following for highlighting and emphasis. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Appellant first argues the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 18 as anticipated by Kempton, because Kempton does not disclose a “charging [station] device that is co-located with the EV.” App. Br. 6—8 (emphasis omitted); Reply Br. 2-4. We disagree. As the Examiner finds, Kempton discloses “electric vehicle station equipment (EVSE)” for “interfacing an electric vehicle with the grid;” i.e., a charging station device. Final Act. 3 (citing Kempton 17). Kempton further discloses the EVSE may be deployed “at a garage, public parking space, curb, or other location for automobile parking.” Kempton | 50 (emphasis added); Ans. 7. Moreover, as the Examiner finds, Kempton discloses the EVSE and EV must be co-located “in order for [their respective] interfaces ... to be connected together.” Ans. 7; see also Kempton Figs. 2, 3 (block diagrams of electric vehicle equipment (EVE) 102 and EVSE 104, respectively). Accordingly, Appellant’s argument does not persuade us of error.2 * 4 2 Appellant’s attempt to distinguish a charging “device” from a charging “system,” App. Br. 8, also does not demonstrate error, because as the 4 Appeal 2016-002499 Application 13/347,520 Appellant further argues the Examiner erred in finding Kempton discloses an interface configured to “physically couple an electrical vehicle (EV) to an electrical grid via the charging station device,” as recited in claim 18. App. Br. 7. As the Examiner finds, however, the figures and accompanying descriptions in Kempton disclose physical coupling, via the power grid. Ans. 7. Figure 1, for example, is reproduced below. ---- 100 108 106 v 112b V/} Aggregation Server ELECTRIC POWER TRANSFER SYSTEM Electric Vehicle Equipment (EVE) ^ 102 110a 112cj f GRID 110b Electric Vehicle j Station Equipment j {EVSE} | 104 1 FIG. 1 Figure 1 depicts an “electric power transfer system” including an electric vehicle (EVE 102), electric vehicle station equipment (EVSE) 104, an aggregation server 106, and the electric grid 108. Kempton || 25—27. As shown in Figure 1, “[tjhick connection lines” 110a and 110b “represent electric power flow” from the grid through the EVSE to the electric vehicle. Id. at 127; see also Ans. 7 (citing Kempton Figs. 2 and 3, which further Examiner finds, Ans. 5—7, the charging system in Kempton includes a charging “device.” 5 Appeal 2016-002499 Application 13/347,520 describe the manner of coupling to the electrical grid). Accordingly, we discern no error in the Examiner’s finding. Finally, Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding Kempton discloses an interface configured to receive a “schedule to instruct [power supply/receive] during a power transfer between the storage cell of the EV and the electrical grid,” wherein the “schedule minimizes power costs, power transmission losses, or both, in the electrical grid.” App. Br. 7, 9 (emphasis added). We disagree. As the Examiner finds, Final Act. 15, Kempton discloses a “predictive schedule” utilized to “determine the amount of charge needed” between trips, and “when to reach that” amount. Kempton H 84—85. The “scheduling software” may be hosted in any of a variety of devices, and “can use the next trips predictions to plan the amount of electrical capacity to be offered for grid services, at what times, and at what location on the grid.” Id. 1 82; see also Ans. 7—8.3 For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 18. Appellant does not argue dependent claims 19 and 20 separately. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 18—20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Kempton. 3 Appellant’s argument that a “schedule” is different than “instructions” for charging, App. Br. 9, is unpersuasive, because Kempton discloses a “schedule” for charging. See supra. Moreover, Appellant’s Specification equates a “schedule” with instructions for when to charge the vehicle. Spec. 115 (charging station may receive “instructions for charging and discharging connected EVs 28 at particular times (e.g., a schedule for charging and discharging the EVs 28 coupled to the charging station 26)” (emphasis added)). 6 Appeal 2016-002499 Application 13/347,520 Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Appellant argues claims 1—3, 7—14, and 17 as a group, App. Br. 10- 13, and we choose claim 1 as representative of the group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellant contends the Examiner erred in finding Agassi teaches “concurrent generation (or concurrent determination) of a[n] optimized schedule for an EV to charge or discharge a storage cell at both a first and a second charging location during a common scheduling period.” App. Br. 11 (emphasis omitted). We are not persuaded. “[0]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where ... the rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Here, the Examiner relies not on Agassi, but on the combination of Agassi with Kempton and Karbassi as teaching the disputed limitation. Ans. 16—18. Specifically, as discussed above, Kempton discloses (and teaches) optimal scheduling for charging and discharging based on projected travel schedule and power distribution needs of the electrical grid. See id. at 17; Kempton 11 82—85. As the Examiner finds, Agassi teaches determining available power stations in a geographic radius and making a “reservation” at a next charging station. Ans. 16 (citing Agassi Figs. 3, 21,1151). We discern no error in the Examiner’s finding that one of ordinary skill would understand the cited combination as teaching “concurrent” determination of scheduling at a first and second charging station during a particular “scheduling period,” i.e., a period before which the battery is depleted. Ans. 17. Moreover, Appellant does not argue or dispute the Examiner’s rationale for combining the references, and we discern no error therein. See Final Act. 30, 37—38. 7 Appeal 2016-002499 Application 13/347,520 Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1—3, 7—14, and 17 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kempton, Karbassi, and Agassi. Regarding the separate rejection of dependent claims 4—6, 15, and 16, Appellant argues the claims are allowable based “upon their respective dependencies from allowable independent claims 1 and 12.” App. Br. 13. Because we find no error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 to 12, see supra, Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive of error.4 Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 4—6, 15, and 16 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kempton, Karbassi, Agassi, and V2G. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—20. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED 4 Appellant also asserts that claims 4—6, 15, and 16 include additional distinguishing “elements individually recited therein,” id., but does not explain how the Examiner allegedly erred regarding such additional elements. See In reLovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Rule 41.37 [requires] more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art”). 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation