Ex Parte JensenDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 11, 201612691571 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 12/691,571 0112112010 20350 7590 08/15/2016 KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309 Lee Samuel Jensen UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 84304-777455 (003600US) 1020 EXAMINER PARK, GRACE A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2157 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/15/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com j lhice@kilpatrick.foundationip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte LEE SAMUEL JENSEN Appeal2014-009521 Application 12/691,571 Technology Center 2100 Before HUNG BUI, JEFFREY S. SMITH, and JOHN F. HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judges. BUI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner's final rejections of claims 1-8, 14, and 22-32. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.2 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Ancestry.com Operations Inc. App. Br. 3. 2 Our Decision refers to Appellant's Appeal Brief filed June 03, 2014 ("App. Br."); Reply Brief filed August 29, 2014 ("Reply Br."); Examiner's Answer mailed July 03, 2014 ("Ans."); Final Office Action mailed January 3, 2014 ("Final Act."); and original Specification filed January 21, 2010 ("Spec."). Appeal2014-009521 Application 12/691,571 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant's Invention Appellant's invention is directed to a method of identifying and correcting duplicate, incomplete, and inconsistent records in a database. Spec i-f 6. In one embodiment, duplicate records having two persons might contain the same name and the same city but different birth dates. If the records refer to the same individual, a determination is made as to what information is more likely to be correct. Id. i-f 19. Claims 1 and 14 are independent. Claim 1 is representative of the invention, as reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized: 1. A method for correcting pedigree information, the method comprising: providing a computer system, wherein the computer system comprises a computer-readable storage device; receiving, at the computer system, a new pedigree of a first person; determining, at the computer system, a stored pedigree of a second person stored in a database at the computer system is likely to represent the first person at a confidence level at or above a threshold confidence level, wherein the stored pedigree of the second person is selected from a first plurality of stored pedigrees; evaluating a completeness level of the new pedigree of the first person and the stored pedigree of the second person by calculating an amount of information that is present in each of the new pedigree of the first person and the stored pedigree of the second person about each of the first person and the second person, wherein the one of the new pedigree and the stored pedigree with more information about its respective person has a higher completeness level; comparing, at the computer system, data elements of the new pedigree of the first person with data elements of the stored pedigree of the second person; 2 Appeal2014-009521 Application 12/691,571 identifying, at the computer system, a first data element of the new pedigree and a second data element of the stored pedigree that are not equivalent; analyzing, at the computer system, whether the first data element of the new pedigree or the second data element of the stored pedigree is more likely to be correct, wherein the analysis includes statistical analysis which evaluates a number of records which corroborate either the first data element or the second data element; based on the statistical analysis, the corroboration of the second data element by the number of records, and the completeness level of the stored pedigree being higher than the completeness level of the new pedigree, determining, at the computer system, the second data element of the stored pedigree is more likely to be correct; replacing, at the computer system, the first data element of the new pedigree with the second data element of the stored pedigree, thereby creating a modified new pedigree; and storing, at the computer system, the modified new pedigree. Cookson Ibuki Bayliss Evidence Considered US 2005/0147947 Al US 7,181,471 Bl US 2010/0005078 Al Examiner's Rejection July 7, 2005 Feb.20,2007 Jan. 7,2010 Claims 1-8, 14, and 22-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Cookson, Ibuki, and Bayliss. Final Act. 5-11. ISSUE Based on Appellant's arguments, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether Bayliss discloses or suggests the disputed limitation: 3 Appeal2014-009521 Application 12/691,571 [E]valuating a completeness level of the new pedigree of the first person and the stored pedigree of the second person by calculating an amount of information that is present in each of the new pedigree of the first person and the stored pedigree of the second person about each of the first person and the second person, wherein the one of the new pedigree and the stored pedigree with more information about its respective person has a higher completeness level, as recited in independent claims 1 and 14. App. Br. 7-10. ANALYSIS The Examiner relies on Bayliss as teaching the disputed limitation in the context of evaluating a completeness level of a data record, i.e., [W]hen a plurality of records potentially match a search query, each field of a record is assigned a weight, and the weights are summed to compute a match score; fields without values have zero weight; by assigning zero weight to non- populated fields, completeness of the record is taken into consideration \'l1hen computing its match score and "using the weight ... indicative of the correctness of that data record." Final Act. 8-9 (citing Bayliss i-fi-161, 142, Table II.6). Appellant does not dispute the Examiner's factual findings regarding Cookson and Ibuki. Nor does Appellant dispute the Examiner's reasons to combine Cookson, Ibuki, and Bayliss. Instead, Appellant only disputes the Examiner's factual findings regarding Bayliss. In particular, Appellant acknowledges Bayliss teaches ( 1) each data record is provided with multiple fields with each field having a weight assigned, (2) weights assigned to different fields of each data record are summed, and (3) scores of data records are compared and subsequently "used to determine a confidence 4 Appeal2014-009521 Application 12/691,571 level as to whether a given data record is in fact the correct record for the individual being identified." App. Br. 7 (citing Bayliss i-fi-146, 48, 61, 142, Tables I. I and I.2). Appellant also acknowledges Bayliss teaches assigning weights based on an evaluation of (1) whether certain data fields match, and (2) whether certain fields are populated. Reply Br. 2. However, Appellant argues Bayliss does not teach evaluation of completeness of a data record. App. Br. 7-8; Reply Br. 2. According to Appellant, Bayliss' disclosure relates "to the overall completeness of information stored in a database and to methodologies for accessing information, and [does] not relate to evaluating data completeness" (App. Br. 7-8 citing Bayliss i-fi-139, 56). Appellant also argues Bayliss' scores are not based on the completeness of a data record or an amount of information in the data record, and do not reflect whether data fields are populated. App. Br. 7-10; Reply Br. 2-3. According to Appellant, Bayliss' determination of whether individual data fields in a data record are populated is not the same as Appellant's claimed "determining the completeness level of the entire data record." App. Br. 9; Reply Br. 2 (emphasis in orignal). We do not find Appellant's arguments persuasive. Instead, we find the Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to Appellant's arguments supported by a preponderance of evidence. Ans. 2--4; Final Act. 5-11. As such, we adopt the Examiner's findings and explanations provided therein. Id. For example, as recognized by the Examiner, "Bayliss teaches the claimed evaluation of completeness of a data record" because (1) the term "completeness" of a data record as recited in Appellant's claims 1 and 14 refers to an amount of information present in the data record, and (2) Bayliss' determination of whether each field of a data record is populated 5 Appeal2014-009521 Application 12/691,571 can be considered as determining the amount of information present in the data record, i.e., Appellant's claimed "completeness" of a data record. Ans. 2-3. In its reply, Appellant further argues that "determining whether individual data fields in a data record are populated [as disclosed by Bayliss] is not the same as [Appellant's claimed] determining the completeness level of the entire data record as a whole." Reply Br. 2. According to Appellant, "[w]eights are assigned based on an evaluation of (I) whether certain data fields match and (2) whether certain fields are populated," "[b Jut this evaluation is not a measure of the completeness of the entire data record in which the individual fields appear." Id. We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Examiner, Bayliss' evaluation of data fields within each data record can be considered as Appellant's claimed evaluation of "a completeness level" of a data record. Ans. 2-3. We further highlight Appellant's contention that Bayliss teaches assigning weights based on evaluating both whether data fields match and whether certain fields are populated is inconsistent with paragraph 115 of Bayliss, which teaches counting a field toward a match score if the field is populated and a match or non-match occurs. Appellant's contention that the term "non-match" in paragraph 115 is likely a typographical error (App. Br. 11) is attorney argument that does not take the place of evidence. In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). We also note that Appellant has not provided persuasive evidence to show calculating an amount of information in a record that is present was "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art" who can count a field based on whether the field is populated as taught by Bayliss. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. 6 Appeal2014-009521 Application 12/691,571 Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007)). For the reasons set forth above, Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection3 of independent claims 1 and 14 and their respective dependent claims 2-8 and 22-32, which Appellant does not argue separately. CONCLUSION On the record before us, we conclude Appellant has not demonstrated the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-8, 14, and 22-32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 3 In the event of any further prosecution of this application, the Examiner may wish to consider: (1) whether claims 1-8, 14, and 22-32 should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter, i.e., an abstract idea in light of the two-steps framework set out in the Supreme Court decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank lnt'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014); and (2) whether claims 14 and 24--32 should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter, i.e., carrier waves (see i-fi-158-61 of Appellant's Specification) in light of the Board precedential decision in Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857 (PT AB 2013) (precedential) (expanded panel). For example, the Examiner should consider whether the steps of Appellant's process claim 1, including: ( 1) "determining ... a stored pedigree of a second person ... likely to represent the first person," (2) "evaluating a completeness level ... " (3) "comparing .. . data elements ... " (4) "determining ... the second data element of the stored pedigree is more likely to be correct", ( 5) "replacing ... the first data element of the new pedigree with the second data element of the stored pedigree, thereby creating a modified new pedigree" recites anything more than a mathematical algorithm, which is an unpatentable abstract idea. See Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1973). 7 Appeal2014-009521 Application 12/691,571 DECISION As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner's final rejection of claims 1-8, 14, and 22-32. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation