Ex Parte Jaax et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 28, 201513050836 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 28, 2015) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/050,836 03/17/2011 50638 7590 12/28/2015 Boston Scientific Neuromodulation Corp. c/o Lowe Graham Jones 701 Fifth Avenue Suite 4800 Seattle, WA 98104 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Kristen N. Jaax UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. BSNC-1-425.2 3364 EXAMINER FAIRCHILD, MALLIKA DIPAYAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3762 MAILDATE DELIVERY MODE 12/28/2015 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KRISTEN N. JAAX, TODD K. WHITEHURST, and RAFAELCARBUNARU 1 Appeal2014-000098 Application 13/050,836 Technology Center 3700 Before JAMES P. CAL VE, GEORGE R. HOSKINS, and AMANDA F. WIEKER, Administrative Patent Judges. WIEKER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Kristen N. Jaax et al. ("Appellants") appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's decision finally rejecting claims 23-34. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellants, the Real Party in Interest is Boston Scientific Neuromodulation Corporation. App. Br. 2. Appeal2014-000098 Application 13/050,836 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The invention concerns a method for treating a medical condition by applying a stimulus to the motor cortex of a patient's brain. Spec., Abstract. Claim 23, the only pending independent claim, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal, and recites: 23. A method of treating a patient with a medical condition, comprising: implanting a microstimulator within an opening extending completely through a skull of said patient, wherein the microstimulator resides within the opening; generating a stimulus in accordance with one or more stimulation parameters using said microstimulator; and applying said stimulus to a portion of a motor cortex of said patient adjacent said opening, thereby treating said medical condition. App. Br. 9 (emphasis added). REJECTIONS The claims stand rejected as follows: I. Claims 23-34 on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting, as unpatentable over claims 1-11 of U.S. Patent No. 7,962,219. Final Act. 2, 5; Ans. 3. II. Claims 23-34 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Whitehurst (US 7,013,177 Bl, iss. Mar. 14, 2006). Final Act. 6-9; Ans. 3. 2 Appeal2014-000098 Application 13/050,836 OPINION I. Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Appellants do not argue against the Examiner's rejection of claims 23-34 on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting, as unpatentable over claims 1-11 of U.S. Patent No. 7,962,219. See generally App. Br.; Reply Br.; see also Final Act. 2, 4--5 (noting Appellants' request to hold double patenting rejection in abeyance until no other rejections are pending when Appellants will submit a Terminal Disclaimer, and maintaining the double patenting rejection); Response After Final, Jan. 23, 2013, 2. In the absence of allegations of Examiner error by Appellants, we sustain the Examiner's rejection. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072 (BP AI 2010) (precedential)) (panel reviews rejection for error based on the issues identified by appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1205.02 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015). II. Anticipation by Whitehurst Regarding sole independent claim 23, the Examiner finds that Whitehurst discloses implanting a microstimulator within an opening in a patient's skull such that the microstimulator resides within the opening. Final Act. 6. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the microstimulator (SCU 130) "may be implanted under the scalp in a shallow depression or opening created in the skull." See id. (citing Whitehurst, 8:26-48). The Examiner also finds that Whitehurst discloses applying a stimulus to a portion of the motor cortex that is adjacent the opening. Id. at 6-7 (citing 3 Appeal2014-000098 Application 13/050,836 Whitehurst, 18: 17-19). Specifically, the Examiner finds that when the micro stimulator is implanted in the parietal, temporal, or frontal bone of the skull, as taught by Whitehurst, "the electrodes 152 on the lead 150 ... are used to stimulate the portion of the motor cortex adjacent the opening in which the [microstimulator] is implanted." Ans. 4--5. Furthermore, the Examiner finds that, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the claim language requiring stimulation of a portion of the motor cortex "adjacent" the opening includes stimulation at "any part of the motor cortex," whether "directly below or next to the opening or in the motor cortex in the opposite hemisphere of the brain." Final Act. 3. Appellants contend that Whitehurst "is silent as to the location of the stimulation site relative to the opening in which the microstimulator (SCU 130) resides." App. Br. 4. Specifically, Appellants argue that the Examiner's interpretation of "adjacent" to include any part of the motor cortex is overly broad and "renders this term meaningless." Id. at 5 (citing Spec., Figs. 6-7). Furthermore, Appellants argue that even ifWhitehurst's microstimulator is placed in an opening in the skull, "this does not mean that for any particular location of the skull that is selected ... the portion of the motor cortex to which the stimulus is applied will be adjacent this particular skull location." Id. at 6; see also Reply Br. 2. We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. During examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. Therefore, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Trans logic Tech., 4 Appeal2014-000098 Application 13/050,836 Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Here, Appellants have not directed our attention to any special definition for the term "adjacent." Id.; see App. Br. 5 (citing Spec., Figs. 6- 7). Rather, the cited portion of the Specification describing Appellants' Figure 6 states only that "SCU (140) [is] implanted in the skull (160) adjacent to the motor cortex (104) .... [A] lead (141) may be coupled to the SCU (140) with the distal end of the lead (141) being routed to a particular location within the motor cortex (104)." Spec. i-fi-f 103-104. With respect to cited Figures 7 A-7C, the Specification states that a stimulating electrode "may be coupled to the outer surface of the motor cortex (104)." Id. i-fi-f 106- 108. Neither description places any restriction on the meaning of the term "adjacent" or provides any guidance for determining how close a stimulus must be to be considered "adjacent" to an opening in the skull. Rather, Appellants' arguments and Appellants' Figure 6 merely establish that a stimulus provided by lead 141, which lead 141 extends into motor cortex 160 and includes one or more electrodes 142, is "adjacent" to opening 161. App. Br. 5. 2 Therefore, Appellants have not demonstrated that the Examiner 2 Furthermore, Appellant's claim 29 depends from claim 23 and recites that the microstimulator "comprises a capsule." The doctrine of claim differentiation, therefore, presumes that independent claim 23 encompasses more than a capsule, including, for example, Appellants' Figure 2, in which SCU 140 includes lead 141 and catheter 143 extending into the brain to stimulate an internal portion. See Kraft Foods Inc. v. Int 'l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This is consistent with Appellant's citation to Figure 6. See App. Br. 5. 5 Appeal2014-000098 Application 13/050,836 erred in interpreting "adjacent" to include a stimulation applied to portions of the motor cortex underlying the opening. See Final Act. 3, 6-7; Ans. 4--5. Given this understanding, Appellants have not demonstrated that the Examiner erred in finding that Whitehurst discloses stimulating a portion of the motor cortex that is "adjacent" the opening in the skull in which the microstimulator resides. Specifically, the Examiner finds that Whitehurst discloses implanting a microstimulator within an opening in a patient's skull, such that the microstimulator resides within the opening. Final Act. 6-7 (citing Whitehurst, 8:26-48). This is supported by Whitehurst's disclosure that the system control unit (SCU 130) of Figure 5 may be implanted in an "opening in the skull of [the] patient 200, for instance, in parietal bone 141, temporal bone 142, or frontal bone 143." Whitehurst, 8:26-31. The Examiner also finds that Whitehurst discloses applying a stimulus to a portion of a motor cortex adjacent said opening, noting that when Whitehurst's SCU is implanted in the parietal, temporal, or frontal bones, "the electrodes 152 on the lead 150 . . . are used to stimulate the portion of the motor cortex adjacent the opening in which the SCU 130 is implanted." Ans. 5; Final Act. 6-7 (citing Whitehurst, 18:17-19). This finding is also supported by the Examiner's citations to the record. Indeed, Whitehurst explicitly states that "stimulation may also/instead be applied to ... the motor cortex 116." Whitehurst, 18:17-19. Furthermore, as identified by the Examiner, Whitehurst's leads 150 extending from the SCU appear substantially similar to the leads extending from Appellants' SCU 140, as shown in Appellants' Figures 2 and 6. See Whitehurst Figs. 5---6. Therefore, Appellants have not articulated persuasively how, when Whitehurst's SCU 6 Appeal2014-000098 Application 13/050,836 130 is implanted in an opening of the skull that overlies the motor cortex (as taught by Whitehurst, 8 :26-31 ), the stimulus provided by lead 150 is not "adjacent said opening," as claimed. This is especially so in light of Appellants' admission that similar structure depicted in Appellants' Figure 6 satisfies the claim language. See App. Br. 5 ("[T]he specification clearly illustrates and describes examples of stimulation sites that are adjacent to the opening in which the microstimulator is implanted. For example, Fig. 6 illustrates the stimulation site as being in the motor cortex just below the opening (161) in which the SCU (140) is implanted, while Figs. 7A-7C illustrate the stimulation site as being on the outer surface of the motor cortex just below the opening (161) in which the SCU (140) is implanted."); cf Reply Br. 2. Appellants' Figure 6 illustrates SCU 140 implanted in skull 160 adjacent to motor cortex 104. Spec. i-fi-f l 02-103. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 23, and we affirm the Examiner's rejection of that claim. Furthermore, Appellants do not provide specific argument regarding the rejection of dependent claims 24--31 or 34. App. Br. 6. Accordingly, we also affirm the rejection as to those claims. Regarding dependent claims 32 and 33, Appellants argue that the portions of Whitehurst cited by the Examiner, including Figures 7 A-7 C, do not disclose a capsule having external stimulation and indifferent electrodes, and which is implanted and resides within an opening of the skull, as claimed. App. Br. 6-7; Reply Br. 3--4; see also Final Act. 3--4, 8 (citing Figs. 7 A-7C, 8:26--48; 9:50-54; 966-10:4); Ans. 6-8. 7 Appeal2014-000098 Application 13/050,836 We agree with Appellants. The Examiner has not identified any single embodiment in Whitehurst that includes a microstimulator that resides within an opening of the skull, and which includes the claimed capsule with external stimulation and indifferent electrodes. See In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587-88 (CCPA 1972) (noting that the reference "must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference" and stating that although "[ s ]uch picking and choosing may be entirely proper in the making of a [35 U.S.C. §] 103, obviousness rejection ... it has no place in the making of a [35 U.S.C. §] 102, anticipation rejection"). DECISION We AFFIRM the Examiner's rejection of claims 23-34 on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting, as unpatentable over claims 1-11 of U.S. Patent No. 7,962,219; we AFFIRM the Examiner's rejection of claims 23-31 and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Whitehurst; and we REVERSE the Examiner's rejection of claims 32-33 under 35 U.S.C. § 102( e) as anticipated by Whitehurst. AFFIRMED JNS 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation