Ex Parte Imes et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 30, 201714508152 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 30, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/508,152 10/07/2014 Kevin R. Imes 2552.1013 8556 21171 7590 12/04/2017 STA AS fr HAT SFY T T P EXAMINER SUITE 700 LAUGHLIN, NATHAN L 1201 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, DC 20005 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2126 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/04/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ptomail @ s-n-h.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KEVIN R. IMES and JAMES HOLLISTER Appeal 2017-007939 Application 14/508,152 Technology Center 2100 Before JOHN A. EVANS, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s Final Rejection of Claims 1—14. Br. 3. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE.2 1 The Appeal Brief identifies Allure Energy, Inc., as the real party in interest. App. Br. 3. 2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed May 4, 2016, “App. Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed September 22, 2016, “Ans.”), the Final Action (mailed May 4, 2015, “Final Act.”), and the Specification (filed October 7, 2014, “Spec.”) for their respective details. Appeal 2017-007939 Application 14/508,152 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The claims relate to an on-site controller that alters an on-site operating condition in response to detecting a mobile device has established or lost an 802.11-based connection. See Abstract. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary Claim 1, the sole independent claim, which is reproduced below with some formatting and emphasis added: 1. A system comprising: a controller disposed at a site and including a communication device capable of initiating an 802.11 based network to communicate with a mobile device; and said controller configured to: detect the mobile device establishing or losing a 802.11 based connection to the 802.11 based network; alter an operating condition at the site in response to detecting the mobile device establishing the 802.11 based connection; alter an operating condition at the site in response to detecting the mobile device losing the 802.11 based connection; and receive a control setting from one of the mobile device or a server disposed remotely from the site to alter the operating condition. 2 Appeal 2017-007939 Application 14/508,152 References and Rejections The Examiner relies upon the prior art as follows: Trundle, et al, US 2010/0289643 A1 Nov. 18, 2010 Petricoin, Jr. , et al., US 2010/0198367 Al Aug. 5, 2010 Lu, et al, US 2011/0270452 Al Nov. 3, 2011 The claims stand rejected as follows: 1. Claims 1 and 3—14 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Trundle and Petricoin. Final Act. 3—9. 2. Claim 2 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Trundle, Petricoin, and Lu. Final Act. 9—10. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 1—14 in light of Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred. We consider Appellants’ arguments seriatim, as they are presented in the Appeal Brief, pages 5—10. Claims 1-14: Obviousness over Trundle, Petricoin, and Lu Appellants argue all claims as a group in view of the limitations of Claim 1. Br. 10. Thus, we decide this appeal on the basis of representative Claim 1, and refer to the rejected claims collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Claim 1 recites, inter alia, a “controller configured to: detect the mobile device establishing or losing a 802.11 based connection to the 802.11 based network; [and] alter an operating condition at the site in response to 3 Appeal 2017-007939 Application 14/508,152 detecting the mobile device establishing [or losing] the 802.11 based connection.” Appellants contend the “802.11 based networks in Trundle and Petricoin are simply used to communicate information between a mobile device and a controller, not as a proxy for altering operating conditions at a site based on whether the 802.11 based connection is established or lost.” Br. 6. Appellants argue Trundle teaches mobile devices that connect via wifi protocols and communicate with and receive monitoring system data from a system control unit. Id., at 7 (citing Trundle, 1 55). Appellants argue Petricoin teaches a mobile device may communicate its location via a wifi protocol. Id. (citing Petricoin, 117). But, Appellants argue, mere communication of a mobile device location does not teach altering operations at a site based on whether a wifi (802.11) connection is gained or lost. Id., at 6. The Examiner finds Trundle teaches a site-located controller. Ans. 4. The Examiner further finds the claim term “an operating condition at the site” is broad enough to read on the type of connection formed by the mobile device. Id., at 5. Thus, the Examiner finds that when the mobile device establishes a wi-fi (802.11) connection to the on-site controller, the controller alters its “operating conditions” to communicate by 802.11 link, but when such 802.11 link is lost, the controller alters its “operating conditions” to communicate by an alternative protocol. Id. The issue is whether the communications protocol reads on the claimed “operating conditions.” We agree with the Examiner that Appellants do not provide claim construction guidance “in explicit definitional format.” However, the Federal Circuit has “held that ‘[e]ven 4 Appeal 2017-007939 Application 14/508,152 when guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format, the specification may define claim terms by implication such that the meaning may be found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.” In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Irdeto Access, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed.Cir.2004)). Appellants disclose Claim 1 relates to an energy management system including a controller 216 located at a site 202. Br. 2; Spec., 1 56. The controller is capable of initiating an 802.11-based network to communicate with a mobile device 210. Id. The controller is configured to detect the mobile device establishing or losing an 802.11-based connection to the network and altering an operating condition at the site in response to detecting a change in connection status. Id. (citing Spec., H 81, 84, 100, 109). The energy management system can include a server, a controller capable of connecting to a wireless thermostat, a mobile device, one or more smart appliances, and a distributed energy generating asset to establish a wireless energy network 242. Spec., 142. The Specification discloses that upon gain or loss of connection, the user of the mobile device may access an energy management system application to alter “an operating condition at site 202.” Spec., 1 85. The claims recite a “controller configured to . . . alter an operating condition at the site.” By implication, “alter an operating condition at the site” relates to the operation of the energy management system. Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., at 1150 (“the specification may define claim terms by implication”). As found by the Examiner, the prior art teaches that altering an operating condition means altering “how and what network (either Wi-Fi 5 Appeal 2017-007939 Application 14/508,152 or network 205) that is being used.” Ans. 4—5. R. 14. The Examiner does not find that the prior art teaches altering the operation condition of an energy management system, as claimed. Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, as well as claims 2—14. DECISION The rejection of Claims 1—14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is REVERSED. REVERSED 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation