Ex Parte Ignagni et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 30, 201712122482 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 30, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/122,482 05/16/2008 Anthony R. Ignagni 10091-708.200 8929 66854 7590 07/05/2017 SHAY TtT FNN T T P EXAMINER 2755 CAMPUS DRIVE HOEKSTRA, JEFFREY GERBEN SUITE 210 SAN MATEO, CA 94403 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3736 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/05/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): info@ shayglenn.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ANTHONY R. IGNAGNI and RAYMOND P. ONDERS Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,4821 Technology Center 3700 Before FRANCISCO C. PRATS, JEFFREY N. FREDMAN, and TIMOTHY G. MAJORS, Administrative Patent Judges. PRATS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involves claims to methods of diagnosing or tracking the progression of treatment of a neurological disorder that affects the function of the diaphragm. The Examiner entered three rejections, all for obviousness. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse one of the rejections, but affirm the other two, except as to three claims. 1 Appellants state that the “real party in interest herein is Synapse Biomedical, Inc., Assignee by virtue of an assignment executed by the inventors to Synapse Biomedical, Inc.” App. Br. 2. Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Specification discloses that the neurodegenerative disease amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) “is difficult to diagnose at an early stage, and it is difficult to discern the rate of progression of [the] disease, especially once therapy has been initiated.” Spec. 1 6. Appellants’ invention is based on “the surprising observation that the electromyographic [EMG] measurements made from the same location of the same patient’s diaphragm over time can provide a remarkably sensitive measure of the presence or progression of ALS, and the efficacy of treatment of ALS.” Id. 18. Claims 11 and 24, the independent claims on appeal, are illustrative and reads as follows (App. Br. 11, 13): 11. A method of diagnosing or tracking the progression or treatment of a neurological disorder that affects the function of a diaphragm, the method comprising: measuring a first EMG signal during a volitional breathing maneuver at an initial recording time before the start of therapy from one or more electrodes chronically implanted in a diaphragm; measuring a second EMG signal from the same one or more electrodes at a later recording time during a volitional breathing maneuver after the start of the therapy; and comparing one or more characteristics of the first EMG signal and the second EMG signal and characterizing the presence, progression or treatment of a neurological disorder based on the comparison. 24. A method of diagnosing or tracking the progression or treatment of a neurological disorder that affects the function of a patient’s diaphragm, the method comprising: 2 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 determining a first activity index from a patient’s diaphragm motor point EMG at a first time during a volitional breathing maneuver before the start of a therapy, wherein the first activity index is a first measure of a first component of the EMG that is combined with a first measure of a respiratory parameter value; determining a second activity index from the patient’s diaphragm motor point EMG at a second time during a volitional breathing maneuver after the start of the therapy, wherein the second activity index is a second measure of the first component of the EMG that is combined with a second measure of the respiratory parameter value; comparing the first activity index and the second activity index; and characterizing the presence, progression or treatment of a neurological disorder based on the comparison between the first activity index and the second activity index. The following rejections are before us for review: (1) Claims 11—21, 36, and 39, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), for obviousness over McDonald2 and Ignagni3 (Final Action 3—6 (entered April 23,2014)); (2) Claims 22—24, 27, 30, 32, 37, 38, and 40-44, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), for obviousness over McDonald and Sinderby4 (Final Action 7— 10); and (3) Claims 25, 26, and 45, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), for obviousness over McDonald, Sinderby, and Ignagni (Final Action 10). 2 US 2004/0127954 A1 (published July 1, 2004). 3 US 2005/0021102 A1 (published Jan. 27, 2005). 4 US 2008/0121231 A1 (published May 29, 2008). 3 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 OBVIOUSNESS— MCDONALD AND IGNAGNI The Examiner’s Prima Facie Case In rejecting claims 11—21, 36, and 39 over McDonald and Ignagni, the Examiner cited McDonald as disclosing methods of tracking the treatment of neurological disorders, such as ALS, using an implanted needle to measure EMG signals during voluntary movement of a subject’s diaphragm before and after treatment. Final Action 3^4. The Examiner found, and Appellants do not dispute, that “voluntary movement of diaphragm inherently involves a volitional breathing maneuver” as independent claim 11 recites. Id. at 4. The Examiner found that McDonald differs from claim 11 in that “McDonald fails to explicitly disclose the method whether the electrodes are chronically implanted or not.” Id. The Examiner noted however that McDonald does disclose making measurements at the phrenic nerve at various times (see paragraph [0124]), using electrical stimulation for breathing (see paragraphs [0055, 0057]) and that i[t] can apply to subjects with ALS (see paragraph [0053]) and Ignagni teaches a method of stimulating the diaphragm and monitoring EMG of the diaphragm in subjects with ALS (see paragraph [0004] of Ignagni) wherein the electrodes are chronically implanted adjacent to the phrenic nerve (see paragraph [0024]). Id. (brackets in original). Based on the combined teachings of McDonald and Ignagni, the Examiner reasoned that it would have been obvious to modify the method of McDonald such that the electrode, i.e. needle, was chronically implanted as taught by Ignagni in order for the needle to be stable and chronically placed such that the same needle at the same location can be used for multiple readings at different times for more accurate results (prevent 4 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 errors based on different needles or different placement of needles) and provides chronic placement of needle for providing the electrical stimulation to the diaphragm during treatment (see paragraph [0030] of Ignagni; in order to provide continuously or periodic stimulation, the electrode would inherently have to be chronically implanted). Final Action 4 (brackets in original). Analysis As stated in In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992): [T]he examiner bears the initial burden ... of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability. . . . After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response, patentability is determined on the totality of the record, by a preponderance of evidence with due consideration to persuasiveness of argument. In the present case, Appellants persuade us that a preponderance of the evidence does not support the Examiner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to chronically implant McDonald’s EMG-sensing electrodes in a subject’s diaphragm, as required by independent claim 1. As an initial matter, we agree with Appellants that claim 1 l’s requirement for the electrodes to be “chronically implanted in a diaphragm” (App. Br. 11) does not encompass repeated re-implantations as the Examiner asserts (Ans. 3), particularly when the claim is read in light of the Specification’s disclosure, noted above, that the EMG readings must be made from the same location of the same patient’s diaphragm over time (Spec. 1 8). As to the Examiner’s assertion that chronic implantation would allow more consistent readings over time, the Examiner directs us to no specific teaching in either of the cited prior art references, or elsewhere in the record, 5 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 suggesting that EMG measurements suffered from accuracy problems so substantial that it would have been desirable to maintain EMG electrodes in a patient’s diaphragm for the multiple years during which McDonald’s treatment was undertaken. See McDonald 1124 (comparing diaphragm EMG measurements in 1995 and 2001). The Examiner contends that the accuracy advantages of chronic sensor electrode implantation are “extremely well known in the art. It is well known in the medical field or simply scientific field (not restricted to only EMG measurements) that variations in sensor placements between measurement times for any kind of biological measurement can lead to variations and/or errors in the measurement readings.” Ans. 4. Again, however, absent specific support for these assertions, we are not persuaded that the Examiner has advanced an adequate evidentiary basis for finding that any alleged accuracy advantages inherent in chronic EMG sensor electrode placement would have suggested maintaining those electrodes in a patient’s diaphragm for the multiple years during which McDonald’s treatment was undertaken. The Examiner finds that Ignagni provides motivation for chronic electrode implantation. Ans. 3^4. As the Examiner notes, however (id. at 4), Ignagni’s electrodes are chronically implanted so as to stimulate the diaphragm over an extended time to build endurance in the muscle. See, e.g., Ignagni 140. Given the very different purposes, we are not persuaded that Ignagni’s teaching of chronic implantation of therapeutic stimulating electrodes would have suggested chronically implanting McDonald’s EMG sensing electrodes in a patient’s diaphragm, as Appellants’ independent claim 11 requires. 6 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 In sum, for the reasons discussed, we are not persuaded that a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s conclusion that a process having all of the steps and features of claim 11 would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan. We, therefore, reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11, and its dependent claims 12—21, 36, and 39 for obviousness over McDonald and Ignagni. OBVIOUSNESS— MCDONALD AND SINDERBY The Examiner’s Prima Facie Case In rejecting claims 22—24, 27, 30, 32, 37, 38, and 40-44 over McDonald and Sinderby, the Examiner again cited McDonald as disclosing methods of tracking the treatment of neurological disorders, such as ALS, using an implanted needle to measure EMG signals during voluntary movement of a subject’s diaphragm before and after treatment. Final Action 7—8. The Examiner again found, and Appellants do not dispute, that “voluntary movement of diaphragm inherently involves a volitional breathing maneuver” as independent claim 24 recites. Id. at 8. The Examiner found that McDonald differs from independent claim 24 in that McDonald “fails to disclose the method wherein the indices include the EMG component with a respiratory parameter value.” Id. To address that deficiency, that Examiner cited Sinderby as teaching “a method of monitoring status of a subject (see paragraph [0010] of Sinderby) based on the combination of EMG and respiratory values (see paragraphs [0014, 0025, 0034, 0035, 0036, 0041] of Sinderby).” Id. Based on the references’ combined teachings, the Examiner reasoned that it would have been obvious to modify McDonald’s methods to “measure respiratory 7 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 parameters in addition to the EMG signal obtained and combine them to provide an activity index as taught by S inderby to provide means obtaining more data for a more thorough method of tracking the status of a subject/patient. Such combination would yield predictable results.” Final Action 8. Analysis As an initial matter, we note that claims 22 and 23, both subject to this rejection, depend from claim 11, discussed above, and require the chronically implanted sensor electrodes, also discussed above. See App. Br. 13. Because Sinderby does not remedy the shortcomings, discussed above, of McDonald as to claim 11, we reverse this rejection as to claims 22 and 23. As to the remaining claims, however, Appellants do not persuade us that the Examiner’s prima facie case lacks adequate evidentiary support. McDonald discloses methods whereby patients suffering from central nervous system (CNS) damage are treated with “a therapeutically effective amount of functional electronic stimulation (FES) sufficient to evoke patterned movement in the subject’s muscles, the control of which has been affected by the CNS damage.” McDonald, Abstract. McDonald discloses that patients treatable according to its methods include ALS sufferers. Id. 1 53. McDonald includes an example of treating a patient suffering from a chronic spinal cord injury. Id. ]Hf 77—78 (Example 1). As to Appellants’ claim 24, McDonald discloses that it tracked the progression of its treatment methods in the patient by evaluating EMG signals in the diaphragm before and after the treatment. See id. 1124 (“The EMG analysis of volitional movements was completed in the winter of 2001 (Table 4), and the results were compared with those from phrenic nerve 8 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 testing performed on Jun. 21, 1995, shortly after the injury.”). McDonald notes that, at the time of the initial diaphragm evaluation, “right and left amplitudes were 0.9 mV and 0.5 mV, respectively,” whereas, “[i]n contrast, amplitudes were greater in 2001 (2—7 mV), but there was further evidence of denervation (Table 4).” Id. Thus, as required by Appellants’ claim 24, McDonald describes comparing first and second activity indices of its patient, the EMG amplitude measurements taken at different times over the course of the treatment, and includes that comparison in characterizing the progression of its treatment methods. McDonald does not appear to describe combining its EMG measurements with a respiratory parameter as an index of the patient’s activity, as recited in Appellants’ claim 24. Nonetheless, Sinderby discloses, in relation “to a method and device for determining a level of ventilatory assist to a ventilator-dependent patient” (Sinderby, Abstract), that measurements of the diaphragm’s electrical activity (i.e., EMG measurements) can be combined with respiration parameters such as tidal volume, esophageal pressure, and gastric pressure: FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of a non-limitative example of experimental set-up. On the left, an esophageal catheter-mounted multi-electrode array 5 is used to measure diaphragm’s electrical activity EAdi and balloons 8 and 9 mounted on the catheter on opposite sides of the electrode array 5 are used to measure esophageal pressure P„ and gastric pressure Pga. The catheter 6 was passed trans-nasally and positioned at the gastro-esophageal junction 10. Respiratory airflow was measured with a pneumotachograph 3 and tidal volume Vy was obtained by integrating inspiratory flow. On the right, the target transdiaphragmatic pressure Pdi and the 9 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 root-mean-square (RMS) of the diaphragm’s electrical activity EAdi are displayed on line. Sinderby 125. Sinderby, thus, teaches that when evaluating a compromised patient’s respiratory health, it is useful to combine EMG measurements of the patient’s diaphragm with respiration parameters such as tidal volume, esophageal pressure, and gastric pressure. Accordingly, contrary to Appellants’ arguments (Reply Br. 7), we agree with the Examiner that an ordinary artisan had good reason for, and a reasonable expectation of success in, using a combination of EMG diaphragm measurements and other respiration parameters as an index for evaluating the progression of McDonald’s treatments of patients with CNS disorders, particularly given that McDonald, like Sinderby, uses EMG diaphragm measurements as an indicator of the efficacy of its treatments. We, therefore, also agree with the Examiner that the method recited in Appellants’ claim 24 would have been prima facie obvious to an ordinary artisan. In addition to arguing that an ordinary artisan lacked a reason to combine the references in the manner posited by the Examiner, Appellants contend that Sinderby does not combine “the EMG and respiratory parameter measurements into an index. Moreover, neither McDonald nor Sinderby teach comparing such indexes to characterize the presence, progression or treatment of a neurological disorder. At most, Sinderby teaches using the EMG and respiratory parameters to determine diaphragm fatigue in a patient on a ventilator.” App. Br. 7. In that regard, Appellants contend that the Examiner interpreted the term “index” unreasonably broadly in concluding that the term encompasses 10 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 the EMG data values presented in Table 4 of McDonald, as evidenced by 115 of the Specification, “along with the common usage of the term index in the medical field, such as the Clinical Disease Activity Index for rheumatoid arthritis for example, makes it clear that a table of data, as described in Table 4, is not an activity index.” Reply Br. 6; see also App. Br. 8 (“An EMG index takes one or more parameters from the EMG and then processes the parameters into a form suitable for the index, which then can be compared to indices of EMG signals from later times. See paragraphs [0068]—[0069] of Applicants’ application as published.”). We are not persuaded. Claim 24 recites, as to the limitation at issue, determining a first activity index from a patient’s diaphragm motor point EMG at a first time during a volitional breathing maneuver before the start of a therapy, wherein the first activity index is a first measure of a first component of the EMG that is combined with a first measure of a respiratory parameter value. App. Br. 13 (emphasis added). As is evident, claim 24 does not require the first activity index (or the later-recited second activity index to which the first index is compared) to be the result of any specifically defined data manipulation that combines the EMG measurement with the respiratory parameter value in a particular fashion. Appellants, moreover, do not identify in their Specification, a specific definition of the term “activity index.” To the contrary, as seen in one of the paragraphs of the Specification cited by Appellants, the determined activity index may be “non-numeric (e.g., Boolean, qualitative, etc).” Spec. 115 (emphasis added). Appellants do not persuade us, therefore, that the activity indices recited in claim 24 fail to encompass a qualitative assessment or indication of a patient’s respiratory 11 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 condition which, as discussed above, Sinderby teaches may be based on a combination of EMG diaphragm measurements and other respiratory parameters, as recited in claim 24. In sum, for the reasons discussed, Appellants do not persuade us that a preponderance of the evidence fails to support the Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness as to claim 24. Because Appellants do not advance secondary evidence of nonobviousness that outweighs the evidence of prima facie obviousness, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 over McDonald and Sinderby. Because they were not argued separately, claims 27, 30, 32, and 40-44 fall with claim 24. 37 C.F.R. § 41(c)(l)(iv). Claim 37 recites, “[t]he method of claim 24, further comprising determining and presenting a score based on the comparison.” App. Br. 15. The Examiner concluded that it would have been obvious to use a score to present the progression of McDonald’s treatments, based on McDonald’s teaching of “using scores to as means for reporting levels of improvements/degrees of change (see paragraph [0119]).” Final Action 9. Appellants contend that, although McDonald discloses that various well known clinical scoring systems were used to classify injury or disease state, those systems “rely on numerous subjective evaluations from the physician on ability to move a particular body part or feel a sensation, and none rely on quantitative data from EMG and respiratory parameter measurements.” App. Br. 8. Thus, Appellants argue, “[t]here is no indication how or why the clinical scoring systems disclosed in McDonald would be modified to include EMG and respiratory parameter measurements and still provide meaningful clinical utility.” Id. 12 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 We are not persuaded. Given the undisputed evidence from McDonald that it was known in the art to use scores to track and compare physiological parameters, Appellants do not persuade us that the Examiner erred in concluding that it would have been obvious to use a scoring system to track the progression of McDonald’s treatments, when using respiratory parameters such as McDonald’s diaphragm EMG assessments as a measure of efficacy, even when combined with another respiratory parameter, as taught by Sinderby. Given that it was undisputedly known in the art to use scores to track and compare physiological parameters, Appellants do not persuade us, moreover, that an ordinary artisan lacked sufficient skill to predictably design a scoring system for use with such respiratory parameters. Because Appellants do not persuade us, for the reasons discussed, that the Examiner erred in concluding that the method recited in claim 37 would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of that claim over the cited references. Claim 38 falls with claim 37. 37C.F.R. §41(c)(l)(iv). OBVIOUSNESS— MCDONALD, SINDERBY, AND IGNAGNI The Examiner’s Prima Facie Case In rejecting claims 25, 26, and 45, which depend directly or ultimately from claim 24 discussed above, the Examiner cited McDonald as evidence that it would have been obvious to implant a diaphragm-sensing electrode at a phrenic nerve motor point, as recited in claim 26, and cited Ignagni as evidence that it would have been obvious to map a patient’s diaphragm to determine the phrenic nerve motor point, as recited in claim 25, for deployment of McDonald’s diaphragm-sensing electrodes. Final Action 10. 13 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 The Examiner noted that, as required by claim 45, Ignagni described chronically implanting electrodes in a patient’s diaphragm. Id. Appellants contend that Ignagni fails to remedy the previously argued deficiencies in the combination of McDonald and Sinderby, in relation to their alleged failure to teach or suggest an activity index based on a combination of diaphragm-sensed EMG signals and another measured respiratory parameter value, as recited in claim 24. App. Br. 8—9. Because, for the reasons discussed above, we do not find those arguments persuasive, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 25 and 26 over McDonald, Sinderby, and Ignagni. As discussed above, however, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner did not provide a sufficient evidentiary basis for concluding, based on the combination of McDonald and Ignagni, that it would have been obvious to chronically implant McDonald’s diaphragm-sensing electrodes. Because the Examiner did not identify, nor do we discern, any teaching in Sinderby that remedies that deficiency, we, reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 45 over McDonald, Sinderby, and Ignagni. SUMMARY For the reasons discussed: (1) We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 11—21, 36, and 39 for obviousness over McDonald and Ignagni; (2) We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 22 and 23 for obviousness over McDonald and Sinderby; (3) We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 24, 27, 30, 32, 37, 38, and 40-44 for obviousness over McDonald and Sinderby; 14 Appeal 2016-004244 Application 12/122,482 (4) We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 25 and 26 for obviousness over McDonald, Sinderby, and Ignagni; and (5) We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 45 for obviousness over McDonald, Sinderby, and Ignagni. TIME PERIOD No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 15 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation