Ex Parte Hundemer

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 28, 2018

14626598 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14-1676 9824
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, LUU-PHUONG T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2177
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
14/626,598 02/19/2015 Hank J. HUNDEMER
146701 7590 02/28/2018
McDonnellBoehnenHulbert&Berghoff LLP/Tribune Media
300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3100
Chicago, IL 60606
02/28/2018 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HANK J. HUNDEMER
Appeal 2018-000408
Application 14/626,5981
Technology Center 2100
Before: LARRY J. HUME, JUSTIN BUSCH, and JOHN D. HAMANN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant files this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We heard oral arguments on February 6, 2018. A
transcript of the hearing will be added to the record in due course.
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Tribune Broadcasting
Company, LLC. App. Br. 4.
Appeal 2018-000408
Application 14/626,598
THE CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention relates to correcting misspellings in
closed-captioning text by (i) identifying a candidate misspelled term,
(ii) identifying a candidate replacement-term for the candidate misspelled
term, and (iii) prompting whether to replace the candidate misspelled term
with the candidate replacement-term. Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative of
subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below.
1. A method comprising:
a computing device selecting a media program;
the computing device accessing first data representing
closed-captioning text that corresponds to the media program;
the computing device accessing second data representing
a program schedule of the selected media-program, wherein the
program schedule comprises first text, and wherein the program
schedule was used to facilitate production of the media
program;
the computing device selecting second text from among
the first text, wherein the selected second text is different from
the closed-captioning text;
the computing device using the selected second-text to (i)
identify a candidate misspelled-term within the closed-
captioning text, and (ii) identify a candidate replacement-term
for the candidate misspelled-term; and
the computing device outputting, via a user interface, a
prompt requesting a command to modify the closed-captioning
text by replacing the identified candidate misspelled-term with
the identified candidate replacement-term.
REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
(1) The Examiner rejected claims 1, 5—9, 13—15, 19, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Polumbus
(US 2008/0252780 Al; published Oct. 16, 2008), Fonseca (US
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Application 14/626,598
2016/0173814 Al; published June 16, 2016), and Labsky (US
2012/0304057 Al; published Nov. 29, 2012).
(2) The Examiner rejected claims 2, 3, 10, 11, 16, and 17 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Polumbus,
Fonseca, Labsky, and Basso (US 2011/0072466 Al; published Mar. 24,
2011).
(3) The Examiner rejected claims 4, 12, and 18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Polumbus, Fonseca,
Labsky, Basso, and Shastri (US 2001/0003214 Al; published June 7, 2001).
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
contentions that the Examiner erred. In reaching our decision, we consider
ah evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellant. We disagree
with Appellant’s arguments and we incorporate herein and adopt as our own
the findings, conclusions, and reasons set forth by the Examiner in (1) the
January 9, 2017 Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) 2—14, (2) the March 24,
2017 Advisory Action (“Adv. Act.”) 2, and (3) the August 16, 2017
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) 2—23. We highlight and address, however,
specific findings and arguments below for emphasis.
(1) Accessing second data representing a program schedule
Appellant argues2 that the combination of Polumbus, Fonseca, and
Labsky fails to teach or suggest “accessing second data representing a
2 As to the specific arguments we address below in this section, Appellant
argues the rejected claims for the first rejection as a group. Thus, we decide
the issues for this rejection on the basis of representative claim 1. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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Application 14/626,598
program schedule of the selected media-program, [] wherein the program
schedule was used to facilitate production of the media program,” as recited
in claim 1. App. Br. 7—10; Reply Br. 4—5. More specifically, Appellant
argues Polumbus’ teaching of using a transcript of a media program to check
for misspelled words does not teach or suggest a “program schedule,” which
is “used to facilitate production of the media program.” App. Br. 7 (citing
Polumbus 128); see also id. (citing Spec. 119 (arguing the Specification
defines program schedule as being used to facilitate production)).
Furthermore, Appellant argues “a ‘program schedule’ is a known term to a
person of ordinary skill in the art[, who] would understand that a program
schedule includes an outline of a sequence of events to be carried out during
generation of a media program.” App. Br. 8 (citing Spec. Tflf 19, 53).
As to Fonseca, Appellant argues Fonseca teaches accessing external
sources (e.g., “various other news sources that are separate from the media
program, such as RSS news feeds, magazine articles, newspaper articles, and
various audio or video sources”), none of which are “a program schedule,
because these other news sources are not used to facilitate production of the
media program, as recited by claim 1.” App. Br. 8 (citing Fonseca Tflf 14,
23—25, 59—61, and 63). Appellant also argues the Examiner does not
sufficiently explain how in Fonseca a newspaper article (e.g., an external
source) related to a newscast can implicitly define a list of timing tasks or a
schedule used to generate production of video content (i.e., used to facilitate
production of a program). Reply Br. 4—5 (citing Ans. 19-20).
The Examiner finds the combination of Polumbus, Fonseca, and
Labsky teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Ans. 19-20; Final
Act. 3—5; and Adv. Act. 2. For example, the Examiner finds that Polumbus
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Application 14/626,598
teaches comparing a transcript of a program with the program’s closed
captioning text. See, e.g., Final Act. 3 (citing Polumbus H 2, 6, 15, 23,
and 28—32). The Examiner finds Fonseca teaches or suggests accessing an
external source relating to an extracted segment of closed-captioned text of
video content (i.e., “second data representing a program schedule”) where
the program schedule was used to generate the video content. See Final
Act. 4 (citing Fonseca H 14, 15, 18, 19, 22—26, 60-63, and 67). The
Examiner finds an example of such an external source taught or suggested
by Fonseca includes a newspaper article related to a previously aired
newscast. Ans. 19 (citing FonsecaH 1, 33, and 60-61). The Examiner
finds this newspaper article can implicitly define a list of timing tasks or a
schedule that was used to facilitate production of the newscast. Ans. 19-20.
We agree with the Examiner’s findings and adopt them as our own.
As to the gravamen of Appellant’s argument, we agree with the Examiner
that the combination teaches or suggests accessing second data (e.g., a
transcript, newspaper article reporting on a newcast) representing a program
schedule that was used to facilitate production of the program. Polumbus
112, 6, 15, 23, 28-32; Fonseca H 1^15, 18-19, 22-26, 60-63, and 67.
The Specification discloses:
A program schedule of a media program is a schedule or
a summary of the media program, and is typically used to
facilitate the production of the media program, such as by
coordinating the use of various media-content items. In one
example, the program schedule may include text corresponding
to a sequence of media-program portions that make up the
media program. Further, the program schedule may include
text for an anchorperson to read aloud as the media program
progresses.
Spec. 119.
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In accordance with the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
disputed limitation in light of the Specification, a transcript of a program, for
example, represents the program schedule used to produce the program
because the transcript necessarily includes the substance of the program
schedule (e.g., “a sequence of media-program portions,” “text for an
anchorperson to read aloud as the media program progresses”). Spec. 119;
see e.g., Polumbus 128. In other words, the transcript (i.e., the source of the
second data) implicitly defines (i.e., represents) a program schedule — the
claim language does not require that the transcript is a program schedule.
In addition, we note the Examiner finds the claim language “does not
specifically indicate a ‘program schedule’ has to be internal, not external,
and does not explain why the ‘program schedule’ is used instead of any
other sources such as a dictionary or an external source.” Adv. Act. 2; e.g.,
Fonseca Tflf 1, 33, and 60-61 (teaching various external sources). Such a
finding supports a conclusion that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
found it obvious to choose a program schedule as the source of the second
data. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (“When there is a
design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite
number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has
good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.
If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of
innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact
that a combination was obvious to try might show that is was obvious under
§ 103.”).
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(2) Character-generator template
Appellant argues that the combination of Polumbus, Fonseca, Labsky,
and Basso fails to teach or suggest “wherein the second text comprises text
included as part of a character-generator template,” as recited in claims 2,
10, and 16. App. Br. 10-12; Reply Br. 5—6. More specifically, Appellant
argues the claim language (in the context of claim 1 from which claim 2
depends) “recite[s] selecting text that is included as part of a character-
generator template included in the program schedule.” App. Br. 11.
Appellant argues the combination, and Basso in particular, instead “teaches
a computing device synchronizing captions to a media program and
displaying the media program to a user according to a user interface
template.” App. Br. 10-11 (citing Basso Tflf 30-33). Appellant contends
“the user interface template of Basso does not amount to a character-
generator template included in a program schedule.”
We are not persuaded by this argument that the Examiner erred. The
Specification discloses that character-generator template text “may be
spoken by an anchorperson during a broadcast of the media program.” Spec.
120. As such, and in accordance with our above reasoning, Polumbus’
transcript would include character-generator template text included in
second data representing a program schedule from which the second text
could be selected. E.g., Polumbus 128; Spec. 19-20; see also Fonseca
111, 33, and 60-61 (teaching various external sources that if reporting on
the program also could contain second text, as would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art); Ans. 23 (citing Fonseca 22, 60-61
(finding Fonseca teaches or suggests selecting external sources from a set of
external sources for determining misspelled terms in closed-captioned text)).
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We also are not persuaded of Examiner error by Appellant’s argument
that Basso fails to teach “wherein the selected second text is different from
the closed-captioning text” because Basso’s blocks of text are “merely
segments of the closed-captioning text,” and thus, would not teach or
suggest text that is different from the closed-captioning text. App. Br. 12
(citing Basso 132). The combined teachings of Polumbus, Fonseca,
Labsky, and Basso teach or suggest selecting text from an external source
(e.g., a transcript) to use for fixing misspellings, and that “extracted terms
not present in the segment of closed-caption text may be more relevant to the
segment of CC text.” Polumbus 128 (transcript as program schedule);
Fonseca 60-61; Ans. 23 (citing Fonseca 22, 60-61); Final Act. 3—6.
CONCFUSIONS
Based on our findings and reasoning above, we sustain the
Examiner’s (i) rejection of claim 1, as well as claims 5—9, 13—15, 19, and 20
grouped therewith; (ii) rejection of claims 2, 10, and 16, as well as claims 3,
11, and 17, as they are not separately argued; and (iii) rejection of claims 4,
12, and 18, as they are not separately argued.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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