Ex Parte Howell et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesJun 21, 201210346523 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 21, 2012) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ________________ Ex parte JAMES A. HOWELL, JR. and SHREE DANDEKAR ________________ Appeal 2010-003900 Application 10/346,523 Technology Center 2100 ________________ Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, THOMAS S. HAHN, and JEREMY J. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judges. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2010-003900 Application 10/346,523 2 SUMMARY Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-10, 12-15, and 17-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 1-5, 9, 10, 15, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Stedman (US 6,262,726 B1; issued July 17, 2001). Claims 6-8, 12-14, and 17-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Stedman in view of Milius (US 2003/0200201 A1; published Oct. 23, 2003; filed Apr. 23, 2002). We affirm. STATEMENT OF CASE Appellants’ invention provides a customized out of box experience for an information handling system. See generally Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below with key disputed limitations emphasized: 1. A method of providing a customized out of box experience for an information handling system comprising: configuring the information handling system with options selected according to user input, the options selected including service options, the configuring including customizing an out of box presentation based upon selected service options; and presenting a customized out of box experience when the information handling system is initially started by a user based upon selected service options. Appeal 2010-003900 Application 10/346,523 3 CONTENTIONS1 Appellants argue the following with regard to claims 1 and 20 and Stedman, column 2, lines 29-33: However nowhere within this portion of Stedman, or anywhere else in Stedman, is there a disclosure or suggestion of a customized out of box experience which includes customizing an out of box presentation based upon selected service options and presenting a customized out of box experience based upon selected service options, as required by claims 1 and 20. (Br. 4). The Examiner finds, with regard to claims 1 and 20, that Stedman teaches presenting a customized out of box experience when the information handling system is initially started by a user based upon selected service options. (Ans. 3, 6 (citing Stedman, col. 2, ll. 29-33)). The Examiner further finds that Appellants’ Specification does not define what service options are, and interprets service options as software to be installed on the specific computer. The Examiner maps the recited “service options” to Stedman’s software installed on the computers. (Ans. 9-10 (citing Stedman, col. 3, ll. 35-42; col. 5, ll. 24-35)). Appellants argue the following with regard to claims 9 and 15 and Stedman, column 2, lines 29-33: Additionally, nowhere within this portion of Stedman, or anywhere else in Stedman, is there a disclosure or suggestion of storing out of box experience files on an information handling system based upon an information part number where the information part number is based upon services ordered during 1 Rather than repeat the Examiner’s positions and Appellants’ arguments in their entirety, we refer to the following documents for their respective details: the Appeal Brief (Br.) filed August 17, 2009; and the Examiner’s Answer (Ans.) mailed November 2, 2009. Appeal 2010-003900 Application 10/346,523 4 configuration of the information handling system, as required by claims 9 and 15. (Br. 4). The Examiner finds, with regard to claims 9 and 15, that Stedman teaches out of box experience files on the information handling system based upon an information part number, the information part number being based upon services ordered during configuration of the information handling system. (Ans. 4-5 (citing Stedman, col. 7, ll. 17-20; col. 3, ll. 18-49)). The Examiner further finds that Stedman teaches that customers may request any one or more software applications be installed onto the computer system. The Examiner maps the part number to the name of the application the user wishes to install on their machine, which is based on the user’s wishes when ordering the machine. (Ans. 10-11 (citing Stedman, col. 3, ll. 29-37; col. 4, ll. 13-39)). Appellants argue the following with regard to claims 6-8 and Milius: While Milius discloses service options which include Internet service options, Milius does not disclose or suggest a customized out of box experience which includes customizing an out of box presentation based upon selected service options and presenting a customized out of box experience based upon selected service options, much less where the service options include Internet services, as required by claim 6, where whether certain providers are presented during the out of box presentation is determined based upon selected service options, as required by claim 7 or where an order of presentation of providers during the out of box presentation is determined based upon the services ordered, as required by claim 8. These deficiencies of Milius are not cured by Stedman. (Br. 6). Appeal 2010-003900 Application 10/346,523 5 The Examiner finds, with regard to claim 6, Milius teaches service options include Internet services. (Ans. 7 (citing Milius, Figs. 2-4; ¶ [0018])). The Examiner finds, with regard to claim 7, Milius teaches certain providers are presented during the out of box presentation is determined based upon the selected service options. (Ans. 7 (citing Milius, Figs. 2-4; ¶¶ [0018], [0021], [0024])). The Examiner finds, with regard to claim 8, Milius teaches an order of presentation of providers during the out of box presentation is determined based upon the services ordered. (Ans. 8 (citing Milius, Figs. 2-4; ¶¶ [0018], [0021], [0024])). ISSUES Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), has the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-5, 9, 10, 15, and 20 as anticipated by Stedman? Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), has the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 6-8, 12-14, and 17-19 as obvious over Stedman in view of Milius? PRINCIPLES OF LAW An argument that merely points out what a claim recites is unpersuasive. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”). Appeal 2010-003900 Application 10/346,523 6 One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejection is based on combinations of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). ANALYSIS We agree with the Examiner’s position, with regard to claims 1 and 20, that Stedman teaches the argued claim limitations. The Examiner has made factual findings, as detailed supra, with respect to the argued claims. The Examiner maps the recited “service options” to Stedman’s software installed on the computers. (Ans. 9-10 (citing Stedman, col. 3, ll. 35-42; col. 5, ll. 24-35)). Appellants’ argument, as detailed supra, restates the claim language and alleges that the claimed elements are not disclosed in Stedman. Appellants, however, do not explain why this is the case. Appellants do not present any persuasive arguments to explain why the Examiner’s factual findings are in error. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (noting that an argument that merely points out what a claim recites is unpersuasive). Accord Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357 (“[T]he Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”). In any event, we find the Examiner’s position (Ans. 3, 6, 9-10) reasonable, for nothing in the claim precludes the Examiner’s finding that Stedman presents a customized out of box experience based upon selected service options as required by claims 1 and 20 giving the terms their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification. Appeal 2010-003900 Application 10/346,523 7 We also agree with the Examiner’s position, with regard to claims 9 and 15, that Stedman teaches the argued claim limitations. The Examiner has also made factual findings, as detailed supra, with respect to these argued claims. The Examiner maps the part number to the name of the application the user wishes to install on their machine, which is based on the user’s preferences when ordering the machine. (Ans. 10-11 (citing Stedman, col. 3, ll. 29-37; col. 4, ll. 13-39)). Appellants’ argument, as detailed supra, restates the claim language and argues that the claimed elements are not disclosed in Stedman. We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s position. See Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357. Weighing as a whole, Appellants’ arguments, which are not supported by further explanation, that certain elements are missing from Stedman, together with the Examiner’s specific and detailed findings, we conclude that Appellants have not shown error in the Examiner’s finding of anticipation based on Stedman regarding claims 1-5, 9, 10, 15, and 20. We reach a similar conclusion regarding the issue of claims 6-8, 12- 14, and 17-19 as obvious over Stedman in view of Milius. Appellants’ only arguments presented with regard to this rejection pertain to claims 6-8 and Milius. Br. 6. We agree with the Examiner’s position, with regard to claims 6-8, that these claims are obvious over Stedman in view of Milius. The Examiner has made factual findings with respect to these argued claims. Ans. 7-8. Appellants’ arguments, as detailed supra, only restate the claim language and allege that the claimed elements are not disclosed in Milius. Appeal 2010-003900 Application 10/346,523 8 We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s position. See Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357. Further, Appellants acknowledge that Milius discloses service options which include Internet service options, but argue that Milius does not disclose or suggest a customized out of box experience including the further limitations of claims 6-8. (App. Br. 6). We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s position. One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the obviousness rejection is based on the combination of references. Keller, 642 F.2d at 426. Weighing as a whole, Appellants’ arguments, which are not supported by further explanation, that certain elements are missing from Stedman and Milius, together with the Examiner’s specific and detailed findings, we conclude that Appellants have not shown error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection based on Stedman in view of Milius regarding claims 6-8, 12-14, and 17-19. CONCLUSIONS Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-5, 9, 10, 15, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 6-8, 12-14, and 17-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). DECISION The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-10, 12-15, and 17-20 is affirmed. Appeal 2010-003900 Application 10/346,523 9 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010). AFFIRMED babc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation