Ex Parte Hoshall

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 2, 2018

12770432 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 2, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/770,432 04/29/2010 Tom Hoshall 3516.025 9714
30589 7590 02/06/2018
DUNLAP CODDING, P.C.
PO BOX 16370
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73113
EXAMINER
HOSSAIN, FARZANA E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2482
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/06/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@dunlapcodding.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TOM HOSHALL
Appeal 2017-003741
Application 12/770,432
Technology Center 2600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, ADAM J. PYONIN,
and JOHN R. KENNY, Administrative Patent Judges.
MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2017-003741
Application 12/770,432
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1—4 and 6—9. Final Act. 1. Claim 5 has been cancelled. App. Br. 23.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Representative Claims
Representative claims 1 and 3 under appeal read as follows (emphasis,
formatting, and bracketed material added):
1. A content broadcast system comprising:
a non-transitory computer readable medium storing at least one web
page having a web page address, the at least one web page in
communication with a host system to permit a plurality of users
and a plurality of content providers to access the host system;
[A.] wherein the host system is programmed to permit at least
one content provider to register at least one channel and
associate the channel with the content provider,
[i.] wherein the channel is associated with a channel
page identification number;
[B.] wherein the host system is further programmed to permit
the at least one content provider associated with the
channel to selectively upload to the host system at least
one content file and associate the at least one content file
with the channel,
[i.] wherein the at least one content file is further
associated with a media identification number and
the channel page identification number,
[ii.] wherein the at least one content file is accessible
by a user through a combination of the channel
page identification number and the media
identification number;
1 The real party in interest is Apple Partners, LP, an Oklahoma limited
partnership. (App. Br. 1).
2
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Application 12/770,432
[C.] wherein the host system is further programmed to permit
the at least one content provider to associate a link source
address with the channel,
[i.] wherein the link source address is different from
the web page address of the at least one web page,
and
[ii.] wherein the user accessing the link source address
is redirected to the web page address;
[D.] wherein the host system is further programmed to permit
the at least one content provider to determine which of
the channels registered with the host system are
accessible by the user based at least in part on the user’s
method of accessing the host system from the link
source address rather than accessing the host system by
the web page address; and
[E.] wherein the host system is adapted to determine if a user
is accessing the host system by the web page address or
by the link source address, and, in response to the user
accessing the host system by the link source address,
provide the user access to the channels as determined
by the content provider for such a user that accesses the
host system by the link source address rather than by
accessing the host system by the web page address.
3. A web-based content broadcast system, comprising:
[A.] a non-transitory computer readable medium storing at least one
web page hosted by a plurality of servers;
[i.] wherein the servers are programmed to
[a.] permit at least one content provider to register at
least one channel and
[b.] associate the channel with a channel page
identification number;
[ii.] wherein the servers are further programmed to permit the
at least one content provider associated with the channel
to
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Appeal 2017-003741
Application 12/770,432
[a.] selectively upload at least one content file and
[b.] assign a media identification number and an
address to the at least one content file; and
[B.] a user device accessing the at least one web page and providing
to the web page the media identification number,
[i.] wherein the at least one web page passes the media
identification number to the servers, the servers being
programmed to
[a.] correlate the media identification number to the
address, and
[b.] use the address to present the at least one content
file to the user device.
Rejections
1. The Examiner rejected claims 1 and 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over the combination of Goldman et al (US
2010/0023397 Al; published Jan. 28, 2010), How do I set up domain
forwarding?2 (downloaded on May 29, 2012; hereinafter “DomFwd”),
Lilleness et al (US 2007/0136693 Al; published June 14, 2007) and
Vermeire et al (US 6,874,152 B2; issued Mar. 29, 2005).3
2. The Examiner rejected claims 3,8, and 9 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Goldman and
Vermeire.4
2http://web.archive.org/web/20071030175641/http://help.yahoo.com/l/us/ya
hoo/smallbusiness/domains/domainfeatures/forwarding/forwarding-01 .html
3 Claim 2 is not argued separately. Except for our ultimate decision, claim 2
is not discussed further herein.
4 Claims 8 and 9 are not argued separately. Except for our ultimate decision,
claims 8 and 9 are not discussed further herein.
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Application 12/770,432
3. The Examiner rejected claims 4, 6, and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Goldman and Vermeire in various combinations
with other references.5
Issues on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being obvious?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 3 as being obvious?
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
Appeal Brief arguments that the Examiner has erred.
Claim 1
A
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
Vermeire discloses a “genre code” that is not a channel page
identification number, but rather, is a series of letters, for
example ‘SF’ for ‘Science Fiction’ genre.” See, for example,
Vermeire Col. 4, lines 1-5. Therefore, Vermeire does not disclose
a channel associated with a channel page identification number
and at least one content file associated with a media identification
number and the channel page identification number.
App. Br. 10.
As to Appellant’s above contention, we disagree. Appellant’s
argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claim language.
5 Claims 4, 6, and 7 are not argued separately. Therefore, our decisions as to
these rejections turn on our decision as to claim 3. Except for our ultimate
decision, claims 4, 6, and 7 are not discussed further herein.
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Claim 1 is not explicitly limited to a “channel page identification number”
containing no other information than numeric characters, and Appellant does
not explain how claim 1 would be inherently so limited. We agree with the
Examiner that Vermeire discloses a channel page identification number in
the form of an “alphanumeric channel code” (col. 4,11. 36—37). That
Vermeire’s alphanumeric channel code includes both a number (e.g., 0005
through 0010) and a genre code (e.g., “SF”) is not precluded by the argued
limitation of claim 1.
B
Appellant also contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
[E]ven if Vermeire teaches “wherein the at least one content file
is accessible by a user through a combination of the channel page
identification number and the media identification number”, the
combination of Vermeire and Goldman would impermissibly
change the principles of operation of Goldman. See In re Ratti,
270 F.2d . . .
Goldman claims to have solved problems associated with
promoting specific video subject matter, for example, “dog
training,” rather than finding a specific file. The purpose of
Goldman is to enhance the promotion of videos by associating
subject matter keywords with the video and then providing a
video search server 112 to locate the video based on the
keywords and a search query. In Goldman, the focus is on
searching for video content. If a user is searching by a code, such
as the codes of Vermeire, the user is not searching by keywords
descriptive of the video, thereby destroying the principle of
operation of Goldman. Therefore, the modification of Goldman
with Vermeire is not sufficient to render the claims prima facie
obvious.
App. Br. 12—13 (emphasis added and omitted).
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Further, there is no evidence in the record that it was
common knowledge to one of ordinary skill in the art “to use
identifiers to locate videos” at the time of the filing of
Appellant’s application.
App. Br. 14.
As to these contentions, we are unpersuaded by this argument.
Appellant bases the above argument on “not searching by keywords . . .
destroying the operation of Goldman” and “no evidence in the record ... to
use identifiers to locate videos.” However, both arguments are contrary to
the teachings of Goldman. At claims 1 and 14 of Goldman, claim 1 is not
limited to keyword searching as this limitation is not included until
dependent claim 14. At paragraphs 49-50, Goldman is explicit that filters
(e.g., “metadata”) other than keywords can be used to filter search results.
C
Appellant also contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
[T]he Final Office Action states that DomFwd discloses
“wherein the host system is adapted to determine if a user is
accessing the host system by the web page address or by the link
source address” of claim 1. Final Office Action page 13. And,
“the purpose of DomFwd is for redirecting from one address to
another address based on a user trying to access a web page via
one address and be redirected to the other address for whatever
reason the creator of the web page requires a new address.” Final
Office Action page 6.
Appellant respectfully submits that simply forwarding a
user from one address to another is not determining if a user is
accessing the host system by the web page address or by the link
source address. As this claim limitation is not disclosed or made
obvious by DomFwd, the Final Office Action fails to present a
prima facie case of obviousness of claim 1.
App. Br. 14—15 (emphasis added).
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Application 12/770,432
As to Appellant’s above contention, we agree. We conclude,
consistent with Appellant’s argument, there is insufficient articulated
reasoning to support the Examiner’s findings. Therefore, we conclude that
there is insufficient articulated reasoning to support the Examiner’s final
conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art at the time of Appellant’s invention.
D
Appellant also contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
Lilleness does not disclose the above [sections D. and E.] of
claim 1. Rather, Lilleness discloses a programmable universal
remote with a display. 1 [0009]. The universal remote can control
an appliance (such as a TV) and retrieve information from a
website based on a single keystroke (such as selecting an icon)
by a user on the display. 1 [0022], Lilleness allows a user to
assign a website to be accessed when the icon is activated, or the
icon to be preprogrammed to access a website. 1 [0021],
Lilleness is simply linking an icon to a website. Lilleness
does not disclose or suggest permitting at least one content
provider to determine which of the channels registered with the
host system are accessible by a user based at least in part on the
user’s method of accessing the host system from the link source
address rather than accessing the host system by the web page
address. Lilleness also does not disclose, in response to the user
accessing the host system by the link source address, providing
the user access to the channels as determined by the content
provider for such a user that accesses the host system by the link
source address rather than by accessing the host system by the
web page address.
App. Br. 15—16.
As to Appellant’s above contention, we agree. Again, we conclude,
consistent with Appellant’s argument, there is insufficient articulated
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reasoning to support the Examiner’s findings. Therefore, we conclude that
there is insufficient articulated reasoning to support the Examiner’s final
conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art at the time of Appellant’s invention.
Claim 3
A
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 3 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
In the Office Action, the Examiner fails to address the
underlined portion of the following limitation of claim 3:
“wherein the servers are further programmed to permit the at
least one content provider associated with the channel to
selectively upload at least one content file and assign a media
identification number and an address to the at least one content
file.”
In this case, since the Examiner did not provide a reference
or a reason that all of the limitations of claim 3 were obvious, no
prime facie case of obviousness was established by the
Examiner.
Further, even if the Examiner had addressed this
limitation, neither Goldman nor Vermeire disclose or suggest a
content provider assigning an address to at least one content
file. Therefore, claim 3 is not obvious over Goldman in view of
Vermeire.
App. Br. 16—17.
The Examiner responds:
Vermeire . . . discloses wherein the servers are further
programmed to permit the at least one content provider
associated with the channel to selectively upload at least one
content file and assign a media identification number and an
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address to the at least one content file (Column 4, lines 34-50),
wherein the at least one web page passes the media identification
number to correlate the media identification number to the
address and use the address to present the at least one content file
to the user device (Column 4, lines 34-50).
Ans. 18.
As to Appellant’s above contention, we disagree. We agree with the
Examiner that Vermeire discloses (or renders obvious) the argued limitation
of a content provider assigning an address to a content file.
The part of the system which allows webcaster content
providers to input channel information (such as the IP address
of the content files 205 for “the Sci-Fi Chronicles” and a content
description) into the database 195 .. .
Vermeire, col. 4,11. 17—20 (emphasis).
B
Appellant also contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 3
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
The arguments presented above in relation to claim 1
regarding the claim construction of the term “number,” the
Vermeire reference, and the Goldman reference, apply equally to
claim 3, and are incorporated herein.
App. Br. 18.
As to this contention, we are unpersuaded by this argument for the
reasons discussed above as to claim 1.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Appellant has established that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1 and 2 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
(2) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 3, 4, and 6—9 as
being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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(3) Claims 1 and 2 have not been shown to be unpatentable.
(4) Claims 3, 4, and 6—9 are not patentable.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 3, 4, and 6—9 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 2 as being unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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