Ex Parte Homer et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Oct 26, 2009

11051215 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 26, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte STEVEN S. HOMER, RONALD E. DELUGA,
EARL W. MOORE, and KENNETH D. REDDIX
____________

Appeal 2009-004485
Application 11/051,215
Technology Center 2800
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Decided: October 26, 2009
____________

Before EDWARD C. KIMLIN, CHUNG K. PAK, and
CHARLES F. WARREN, Administrative Patent Judges.

KIMLIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal from the final rejection of claims 1-27. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Claim 1 is illustrative:

Appeal 2009-004485
Application 11/051,215

1. A system, comprising:

a first structure;

a second structure; and

at least one plastic-over-metal latch configured to interlock the first
structure to the second structure.

The Examiner relies upon the following references in the rejection of
the appealed claims (Ans. 2):
Den Hartog 4,987,177 Jan. 22, 1991
McCrink 5,956,816 Sep. 28, 1999
Hood, III (“Hood”) 6,172,869 B1 Jan. 09, 2001
Yoshida 6,366,458 B1 Apr. 02, 2002

Appellants’ claimed invention is directed to a system comprising a
first structure, such as the display screen of a computer, and a second
structure, such as a keyboard. The system also comprises a plastic-over-
metal latch that is configured to interlock the first and second structures.
Appealed claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 13, 15-17, 25 and 26 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Hood(claim 26 is discussed
in the body of the rejection). The appealed claims stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as follows:
(a) claims 3, 6, 8-10, 20 and 27 over Hood in view of McCrink,
(b) claims 7, 14, 16, 22, and 23 over Yoshida in view of Hood,
and
(c) claims 12, 18, and 19 over Hood in view of Den Hartog, and
(d) claim 24 over Yoshida in view of Hood and McCrink.
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Application 11/051,215

We note that claim 21 is not cited in any of the statements of rejection in
both the Final Rejection and the Examiner’s Answer. This appears to be an
oversight since the Examiner agrees with Appellants’ statement that claims
1-27 are under final rejection and are the subject of this appeal.
We have thoroughly reviewed each of Appellants’ arguments for
patentability. However, we are in complete agreement with the Examiner’s
reasoned analysis and application of the prior art and legal conclusions
regarding the unpatentability of the appealed claims. Accordingly, we will
sustain the Examiner’s rejections for essentially those reasons expressed in
the Answer, and we add the following primarily for emphasis.
We consider first the Examiner’s § 102 rejection over Hood. There is
no dispute that Hood, like Appellants, describes a system comprising a first
structure, a second structure, and a plastic latch configured to interlock the
first structure to the second structure. The principal argument advanced by
Appellants is that latch 38 of Hood is not a plastic-over-metal latch, as
presently claimed. However, as correctly pointed out by the Examiner,
Hood expressly teaches that spring member 60, formed of steel, is molded
into the plastic portion of the latch 38 (see col. 3, l. 61-col. 4, l. 10).
Accordingly, we find no merit in Appellants’ argument that the metal spring
is not part of the latch described by Hood. In our view, one of ordinary skill
in the art would reasonably find a description of a plastic-over-metal latch in
the patent to Hood.
Appellants contend that Hood discloses a plastic latch and “not a
metal latch with a plastic over it” (App. Br. 8, third para.). However,
Appellants do not claim a metal latch with a plastic over it.
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Application 11/051,215

We are also not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that “the spring
member 60 does not function as a latch, but rather it serves only as a spring”
(id.). Notwithstanding the function of Hood’s spring, it remains an integral
part of the latch 38 depicted in Figure 6.
In addition, “Appellants also stress that the thickness of the spring
member 60 is quite insubstantial as compared to the plastic latch 38” (id.).
However, the appealed claims fail to define any relative thickness for the
metal portion of the latch.
We next consider the § 103 rejection of claims 3, 6, 8-10, 20 and 27
over Hood in view of McCrink. Hood does not teach that the plastic portion
of the latch may be translucent or transparent such that the metal core, or
spring, is visible through the plastic exterior, as required by claim 3.
However, we fully concur with the Examiner that it would have been an
obvious matter of design choice to select a translucent or transparent plastic
for the latch of Hood for aesthetic purposes. Hood expressly teaches that
aesthetics play a part in the design of an electronic device, such as a portable
computer, by disclosing that “tabs 86 snap into engagement with fastener
access openings 72 and completely cover or fill in the openings 72, in an
aesthetically pleasing manner” (col. 5, ll. 3-6). We agree with the Examiner
that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to select a
translucent plastic for the latch of Hood’s device in order to lend to it a
modernistic, artistic appearance. As noted by the Examiner, Appellants’
Specification attaches no criticality to the translucent nature of the plastic
latch. Although we find McCrink hardly necessary for establishing the
obviousness of claims 3, 6, 8-10, 20 and 27, McCrink does provide further
evidence of the obviousness of providing a translucent plastic for fasteners.
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Appeal 2009-004485
Application 11/051,215

Appellants do not present additional, substantive arguments against
the § 103 rejections over Yoshida in view of Hood, and Hood in view of
Den Hartog. Appellants repeat the assertion that Hood does not describe the
claimed plastic-over-metal latch. As set forth above, we find this argument
unavailing.
As a final point, we note that Appellants base no argument upon
objective evidence of non-obviousness, such as unexpected results.
In conclusion, based on the foregoing and the reasons well stated by
the Examiner, the Examiner’s decision rejecting the appealed claims is
affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (2008).

AFFIRMED

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