Ex Parte Hewitt et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Nov 17, 2010

10651560 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 17, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
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Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10/651,560 08/29/2003 Lee Hewitt ARC.063A 9628
7590 11/18/2010
GAZDZINSKI & ASSOCIATES
Suite 375
11440 West Bernardo Court
San Diego, CA 92127
EXAMINER
DINH, PAUL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2825
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/18/2010 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte LEE HEWITT, MARK FARR,
CHAO DONG, and SIMON BROADLEY
____________

Appeal 2009-004377
Application 10/651,560
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, KARL D. EASTHOM, and
BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judges.

RUGGIERO, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing,
as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE”
(paper delivery mode) or the “NOTIFICATION DATE” (electronic delivery
mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Final Rejection of
claims 1-3 and 42-102, which are all of the pending claims. Claims 4-41
have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the Examiner,
we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed January 14, 2008) and the Answer
(mailed March 28, 2008) for the respective details. We have considered in
this decision only those arguments Appellants actually raised in the Brief.
Any other arguments which Appellants could have made but chose not to
make in the Brief are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(vii).

Appellants’ Invention
Appellants’ invention relates to a computerized processor extension
tool which allows the addition of user-defined processor extensions across
multiple heterogeneous target architectures. (See generally Spec. 13:4-5,
15:28–16:5).
Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed invention and reads as follows:
1. A computerized processor extension tool, comprising:
a computer readable storage device, said storage device comprising a
medium, said medium having a plurality of instructions comprising a
computer program stored therein, said computer program, when executed on
a digital processor, enables via one or more routines of said program the
addition of user-defined processor extensions across multiple heterogeneous
target architectures.

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The Examiner’s Rejections
The Examiner’s Answer relies on the following prior art references:
Kant US 2002/0010667 A1 Jan. 24, 2002
Arimilli US 2002/0087828 A1 Jul. 4, 2002
Cook US 2003/0229482 A1 Dec. 11, 2003
(filed Apr. 25, 2003)
Churchill US 7,089,278 B1 Aug. 8, 2006
(filed Sep. 7, 1999)
Claims 1-3, 42-61, 63-73, 75-85, and 87-102 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Cook.2
Claims 1, 68, 80, 92, 93, and 102 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) as being anticipated by Arimilli.
Claims 62, 74, and 86 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Cook in view of “one or more” of Kant and
Churchill.

ANALYSIS
I. THE 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) REJECTION BASED ON COOK
Claims 1-3, 42-61, 63-73, 75-85, and 87-92
With respect to the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent
claims 1, 68, 80, and 92 based on Cook, Appellants’ arguments initially
focus on the contention that, in contrast to the claimed invention, Cook does
not disclose the addition of user-defined processor extensions “across
multiple heterogeneous target architectures” as claimed. According to
Appellants (App. Br. 5-6), while Cook suggests that the disclosed method

2 The Examiner has withdrawn (Ans. 3) the 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, rejection of claims 1-3 and 42-102, as well as the prior art
rejection based on Killian (communication of April 9, 2008).
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and architecture could be adapted for use with different target architectures,
Cook, at best, discloses only the addition of extensions to a given one target
architecture and not “across multiple heterogeneous target architectures.”
(Cook, ¶ [0143]).
We do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive of any error in the
Examiner’s reliance (Ans. 13) on several paragraphs from the disclosure of
Cook in support of the position that user-defined extensions are added across
multiple heterogeneous target architectures in Cook. For example,
paragraph [0106] of Cook discloses an integrated circuit design that includes
multiple processor cores with “heterogeneous extension instruction/feature
sets.” Further, paragraph [0205] of Cook discloses that the multiple cores,
which perform different tasks, are separate components, are developed by
separate teams, and have instruction sets that are defined by the separate
teams. Appellants have demonstrated no error in the Examiner’s conclusion
that Cook’s “heterogeneous extension instruction/feature sets” are
heterogeneous “architectures” as claimed.
In view of the above discussion, we find that the Examiner did not err
in concluding that all of the limitations of independent claims 1, 68, 80, and
92 are present in the disclosure of Cook. Accordingly, the Examiner’s
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) rejection of independent claims 1, 68, 80, and 92, as well
as dependent claims 2, 3, 42-61, 63-67, 69-73, 75-79, 81-85, and 87-91 not
separately argued by Appellants, is sustained.

Claims 93-101
Independent claim 93 differs from previously discussed independent
claims 1, 68, 80, and 92 only in that the word “different” is substituted for
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the word “heterogeneous” in the phrase “across multiple different target
processor architectures.” As Appellants recognize by their statements at
page 4 of the Brief, “heterogeneous” and “different” have essentially the
same meaning. Accordingly, the Examiner’s anticipation rejection, based on
Cook, of independent claim 93, as well as dependent claims 94-101 not
separately argued by Appellants, is sustained for the same reasons as
previously discussed with respect to independent claims 1, 68, 80, and 92.

Claim 102
We also sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection, based on Cook,
of independent claim 102. Independent claim 102 differs slightly from the
previously discussed independent claims 1, 68, 80, 92, and 93 in that it
includes a limitation directed to the applying of designed instructions,
registers, and condition codes “to a plurality of different processors.”
Despite this slightly different wording, Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 7)
are identical to those made with respect to claims 1, 68, 80, 92, and 93 and
are equally unpersuasive for all of the previously discussed reasons. Further,
as pointed out by the Examiner (Ans. 15), the processor “cores” discussed in
the previously relied upon paragraphs [0106] and [0205] in Cook are
included in Cook’s definition of “processor” as indicated at paragraph
[0089] of Cook.

II. THE 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) REJECTION BASED ON ARIMILLI
We also sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of all of the
appealed independent claims 1, 68, 80, 92, 93, and 102 based on Arimilli.
Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 8), while recognizing that Arimilli
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discloses (Figs. 3, 6; ¶¶ [0009], [0044]) adding heterogeneous processors to
a processing system, contend, without more, that a processor is not a
processor “extension” as claimed.
We agree with the Examiner (Ans. 17), however, that the
heterogeneous “processors” added to the processing system in Arimilli fall
within the broad definition of “extension” appearing at page 12, line 26,
through page 13, line 3, of Appellants’ Specification. In particular,
Appellants’ Specification states that “extensions” can include “features or
components such as multiplier/arithmetic units, functional units, memory,
scoreboards, and any number of other features over which a designer may
desire to exert design control.” (Spec. 13:1-3). Further, we agree with the
Examiner (Ans. 16) that paragraph [0025] of Arimilli, which indicates that
the simultaneous operation of added heterogeneous processors requires
“additional software and hardware logic,” can be reasonably interpreted as
requiring software and hardware “extensions.”
We further find unpersuasive Appellants’ argument (Ans. 8) that the
Examiner has not indicated how Arimilli’s disclosure anticipates the specific
language of independent claim 102 which requires the enabling of a user to
“design processor instructions, registers and condition codes” as claimed.
We find, contrary to Appellants’ contention, that the Examiner has pointed
to specific instances in the disclosure of Arimilli which satisfy the claimed
limitations. Specifically, the Examiner (Ans. 10-11) relies upon paragraphs
[0006], [0020], [0021], [0025], and [0029] as having a disclosure which
corresponds to the claimed features. We find no error, and Appellants have
demonstrated no error, in the Examiner’s stated position.
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Lastly, we find to be without merit Appellants’ argument (App. Br. 8)
that, since Arimilli’s processor additions occur without significant processor
system reconfiguration (¶ [0009) while Appellants’ extensions require
system reconfiguration, Arimilli therefore “teaches away” from Appellants’
invention. Aside from the fact that a “teaches away” argument is not
appropriate with respect to an anticipation rejection, there is nothing in the
claim language, as pointed out by the Examiner (Ans. 18-19), which requires
system reconfiguration or, conversely, precludes a system such as Arimilli
which requires no reconfiguration.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) REJECTION
The Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claims 62, 74,
and 86, based on the combination of Cook and “one or more” of Kant and
Churchill, is sustained as well. Appellants have made no arguments in the
Brief contesting the merits of this rejection.

CONCLUSION
Based on the analysis above, we conclude that Appellants have not
shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-3, 42-61, 63-73, 75-85,
and 87-102 for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, nor in rejecting claims
62, 74, and 86 for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-3, 42-61, 63-73, 75-85,
and 87-102 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and claims 62, 74, and 86 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(v) (2009).

AFFIRMED

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