Ex Parte Harjula et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 26, 2017

14034010 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 26, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/034,010 09/23/2013 Tero Petted Harjula 3731.008US1 1382
21186 7590 09/28/2017
SCHWEGMAN LUNDBERG & WOESSNER, P.A.
P.O. BOX 2938
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402
EXAMINER
GETACHEW, ABIY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2434
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/28/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspto@slwip.com
SLW @blackhillsip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TERO PETTERI HARJULA, BREON MALACHY
MCCARTNEY, and ASKO JUHA SAURA
Appeal 2017-004690
Application 14/034,0101
Technology Center 2400
Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, HUNG H. BUI, and JON M. JURGOVAN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final
Rejection of claims 1—20, which are all the claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.2
1 Appellants identify Venafi, Inc. as the real party in interest. (App. Br. 2.)
2 Our Decision refers to the Specification filed Sept. 23, 2013 (“Spec.”), the
Final Office Action mailed Nov. 20, 2015 (“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief
filed Apr. 22, 2016 (“App. Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer mailed Nov. 18,
2016 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief filed Jan. 18, 2017 (“Reply Br.”).
Appeal 2017-004690
Application 14/034,010
CLAIMED INVENTION
The claims are directed to centralized discovery and management of
cryptographic keys and trust relationships in environments employing secure
protocols. (Spec. 11, Title; Abstract.) The invention’s centralized key
discovery and management employs search criteria—including a tag to
identify a type of information that is located, and a state to indicate at least
one action that may be taken with regard to located keys—to search for key
information. (Spec. 199; Abstract.)
Claims 1,9, 14, and 17 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below,
is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method performed by a centralized key management
system comprising:
creating, using a processor of the centralized key
management system, search criteria used to identify and gather
key file information from at least one managed system, the
search criteria comprising:
at least one condition derived from a key file to be
located;
a tag identifying at least the type of information
located by the at least one condition, the tag to be
assigned to any key files located using the at least one
condition; and
a state to be assigned to any key files located using
the at least one condition, the state indicating further
action to be taken with respect to any key files located;
and
initiating, using the processor of the computing system, a
search on the at least one managed system using the search
criteria.
(App. Br. 41 (Claims App.).)
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REJECTIONS3 & REFERENCES
(1) Claims 1—13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Thomas (US 8,116,456 B2, Feb. 14, 2012), Wilkins (US
2012/0204032 Al, Aug. 9, 2012), and Bishop (US 2013/0054613 Al, Feb.
28,2013). (Final Act. 5-22.)
(2) Claims 14—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wilkins and Bishop. (Final Act. 22—31 .)4
ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 9, and 14
Appellants acknowledge independent claim 1 recites
search criteria that has three parts: “(1) at least one condition
derived from a key file to be located; (2) a tag identifying at
least the type of information located by the at least one
condition, the tag to be assigned to any key files located using
the at least one condition; and (3) a state to be assigned to any
key files located using the at least one condition, the state
indicating further action to be taken with respect to any key
files located.”
3 Claims 14—16 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as directed to non-
statutory subject matter. (Final Act. 2—3.) However, this rejection was
withdrawn in the Notice of Panel Decision from Pre-Appeal Brief Review
(mailed March 2, 2016), and is no longer pending on appeal.
4 The listing of the rejection of claims 14—20 in the Final Office Action
contains a typographical error where Thomas was erroneously listed instead
of Bishop (see Final Act. 22 (the listing of the rejection referring to “Thomas
. . . in view of Wilkins et al.”)). The body of the rejection (see Final Act.
22—31) refers only to Wilkins and Bishop, not Thomas, and the Examiner’s
Answer further clarifies that claims 14—20 are rejected based on “Wilkins et
al. (hereinafter referred as Wilkins) (US Publication No. 2012/0204032 Al)
in view of Bishop (US Publication No. 2013/0054613 Al)” (see Ans. 20).
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(App. Br. 24.)
The Examiner relies on both Wilkins and Bishop for teaching
Appellants’ claimed tri-part search criteria comprising a condition, a tag, and
a state. In particular, the Examiner relies on Wilkins for teaching
Appellants’ claimed “search criteria comprising: at least one condition
derived from a key file to be located; . . . and a state to be assigned to any
key files located using the at least one condition, the state indicating further
action to be taken with respect to any key files located.” (Final Act. 6—8
(citing Wilkins 39, 192); Ans. 32, 34 (citing Wilkins 1135).) And the
Examiner finds Bishop teaches Appellants’ claimed “search criteria
[comprising:] ... a tag identifying at least the type of information located by
... at least one condition, the tag to be assigned to any . . . files located
using the at least one condition.” (Final Act. 8 (citing Bishop 1132); Ans.
32—33 (citing Bishop ^fl[ 7—8).) Based on those teachings, the Examiner
concludes it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to assign Bishop’s tag to a key file located by Wilkins’ search. (Ans.
30-32; Final Act. 8—9.)
Appellants contend “the records that are searched for and returned in
Wilkins do not store encryption keys,” in contrast to the claimed key file in
which “one or more keys (i.e., public keys, private keys, KSI, etc., perhaps
along with other information) are stored.” (App Br. 16—18 (citing Wilkins
139, Figs. 6a—6b; Spec. ^fl[ 27, 44—45) (emphases added).) Thus, Appellants
assert, Wilkins’ “search is for a particular record (i.e., an individual serial
number that is associated with an encryption key record), not a key file to be
located.” (App. Br. 17; see also Reply Br. 3—4.) We disagree.
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Application 14/034,010
Wilkins teaches that its searchable encryption key (EK) records may
include public keys. (See Wilkins 1178 (“The public key is transferred from
the network device via the network using a secure connection to the KES
[(Key Exchange Server)] . . . where it is stored in the user’s EK record”
(emphasis added)); 1180 {“the EK record data fields contain the encryption
key and its corresponding key ID” (emphasis added)); 1182 (“retrieve a key
from an EK record 406 (e.g., a public key)”); 1185; Ans. 30, 32.) Thus,
Wilkins’ EK records teach the claimed key files. (Ans. 34.)
We, therefore, agree with the Examiner’s finding that the “search for
the EK record by keywords” in Wilkins’ Key Exchange Server (KES)
teaches search criteria created using a centralized key management system
(KES), the search criteria comprising at least one condition derived from a
key file to be located, as required by claim 1. {See Wilkins 139; Ans. 32
(citing Wilkins 1 39).) Wilkins’ keywords—including “a person’s name and
phone number, email address, location (e.g., city, state and/or zip code)” and
a “serial number that includes ‘keyword’ entries” {see Wilkins 139)—are
commensurate with the broad description of “condition derived from a key
file” in Appellants’ Specification.5
Appellants also argue Bishop does not teach search criteria including
a tag identifying “at least the type of information located”; rather, Bishop’s
tag “is applied to files having content that matches the tag. . . . [T]he tag of
5 Appellants’ Specification describes “[conditions derived from the key or
key files may be any combination of information that would help locate the
desired information,” such as “text to match in the key file, a file name of
the key file, a file hash of the key file, a byte stream to match in the key file,
. . . metadata assigned to the key file,. . . and/or combinations thereof.”
(Spec. 199.)
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Bishop identifies content while the [claimed] tag . . . identifies type.” (App.
Br. 21 (citing Bishop 1132).) We are not persuaded because Appellants’
Specification does not provide an explicit and exclusive definition of the
claimed term “type of information.” The Specification merely provides that
“[t]ags may help the system 300 to identify the type of information that is
located” and “may also help in later processing such as when the
information may be sent to a parser without having to recheck what sort of
information it is prior to sending it to the parser.” (See Spec. ]ff[ 99, 118.)
As the Specification does not define the “type of information” identified by
the tag, we agree with the Examiner’s reasonable findings that Bishop’s
tags—including “tag words, tag phrases, or tag objects) respectively
associated with a file folder . . . [such as] folders associated with the same
client or same subject matter[,] to determine or identify whether any
words, phrases, or other information match any of the known tags”—
teach the claimed tag identifying a type of located information. (Final Act.
8.)
Bishop further teaches “associating] [the] tag(s) with the electronic
document” whose “words, phrases, or other information” matches the tag,
thereby teaching the claimed tag to be assigned to any files located using a
search condition. (See Bishop ^fl[ 7—8, 132; Ans. 32—33 (citing Bishop ^fl[ 7—
8); Final Act. 8 (citing Bishop 1132).) That is, Bishop’s tag is to be
assigned to any files located using a condition (a search by “key-content,”
see Bishop 1132). Thus, we are unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument that
Bishop does not teach a tag to be assigned to any files located using a
condition. (See App. Br. 20.)
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Appellants further argue neither Wilkins nor Bishop teaches the
claimed “state to be assigned to any key files located using the at least one
condition, the state indicating further action to be taken with respect to any
key files located.” (App. Br. 22; Reply Br. 2, 6.) We do not agree.
Appellants’ arguments do not address the Examiner’s specific findings that
Wilkins’s identification of EK records for deletion teaches a state assigned
to key files (EK records) to indicate a further action to be taken with respect
to the key files, as required by claim 1. (Ans. 34 (citing Wilkins 1135).)
We agree with the Examiner’s findings. Moreover, Wilkins discloses the
“delete requests” mark EK records that are to be deleted at the next
synchronization between the Key Exchange Server and the user’s network
device. {See Wilkins H 132, 13^K135, 201, 203-204, 206-207.)
Appellants’ Specification similarly describes a state indicating a deletion
action with respect to a key file. (See Spec. 99-100, 118, 122.)
We are also not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that (1) Bishop
is non-analogous art, and that (2) the Examiner’s combination of references
lacks articulated reasoning. (Reply Br. 6—7; App. Br. 19-20, 23.) The test
for non-analogous art is whether the art is within the field of the inventor’s
endeavor and, if not, whether it is reasonably pertinent to the problem with
which the inventor was involved. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA
1979). A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a
different field of endeavor, it logically would have commended itself to an
inventor’s attention in considering his problem because of the matter with
which it deals. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Here,
Appellants’ argument has only addressed whether Bishop is in the field of
“security key” management (App. Br. 19-20; Reply Br. 6), and not whether
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it is reasonably pertinent to problem. The Examiner has found that Bishop,
although not directed to management of security keys, is reasonably
pertinent as it discloses information management by searching and
identifying information based on content. (Ans. 32—33 (citing Bishop 7—
8); Final Act. 9 (citing Bishop 1110).) We concur with the Examiner that
Bishop is reasonably pertinent to the problem contemplated by the inventor.
Additionally, the Examiner has articulated sufficient reasoning for
incorporating Bishop’s tags into Wilkins’ keyword-based search for EK
records. (Ans. 31; Final Act. 9 (citing Bishop 1110).) We agree with the
Examiner that tagging Wilkins’ identified key files (EK records) with
corresponding tags based on the record’s content (as taught by Bishop)
would have been obvious to those skilled in the art as a use of a known
technique to improve retrieval of data (keys) from a data storage. (Final Act.
9; see also Wilkins ^fl[ 2, 78.) See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 416 (2007) (“[A] combination of familiar elements according to known
methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
results.”). Thus, the combination of Wilkins and Bishop teaches the claimed
tri-part search criteria comprising a condition, a tag, and a state for searching
key files.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1, and the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 9 on the same
basis as claim 1 (see App. Br. 15, 20, 22), for the reasons stated above.
With regard to independent claim 14 rejected based on a combination
of Wilkins and Bishop, Appellants provide substantially the same arguments
as for claim 1 (App. Br. 33). Thus, for the same reasons as claim 1, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14.
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Claim 2
Claim 2 recites “wherein initiating the search comprises sending the
search criteria to an agent located on the at least one managed system.”
Appellants argue the claimed agent “reside[s] on another system,''’ and
Bishop and Wilkins do not teach “sending the tri-part search criteria of claim
1 to an agent located on a managed machine (that is not executing the
method)” as required by claim 2. (App. Br. 24—25 (emphases added).) We
do not agree.
Rather, we agree with the Examiner Bishop’s enhanced information
management component (EIMC) teaches the claimed agent located on a
managed system and receiving search criteria including “key-content” and
“tags.” (Ans. 35—36 (citing Bishop 17).)
We further note Appellants’ argument (see App. Br. 24—25) is not
commensurate with the scope of claim 2 because claim 2, and its base claim
1, does not require the “agent” and the “at least one managed system” to be
distinct from the “centralized key management system.”
Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in the rejection of claim
2. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2.
Claim 3
Claim 3 recites “wherein initiating the search comprises initiating file
operations on the at least one managed system.” Appellants argue Wilkins’
“associating the sender of a communication with a user of the K[E]S is not a
file operation” as described in Appellants’ Specification. (App. Br. 25—26
(citing Wilkins 1192; Spec. 1125).) We do not agree.
Appellants’ Specification does not provide an explicit and exclusive
definition of the claimed term “file operation,” and merely provides a list of
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non-exhaustive examples of “file operations.” (See Spec. 1125.) We agree
with the Examiner that Wilkins’ associating a unique identifier (e.g., a serial
number) of an encrypted signed communication with a user’s identity
initiates a file operation (on the file represented by the encrypted
communication), as required by claim 3. (Final Act. 9—10 (citing Wilkins
1192).) Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in the rejection of
claim 3. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3.
Claims 4 and 10
With respect to dependent claim 4, Appellants argue “it is evident that
the Examiner has not cited art that teaches using the elements of claim 4 as
search criteria for a key file.” (App. Br. 27.) We do not agree. Appellants’
arguments do not address the Examiner’s specific findings that Wilkins’
“search criteria such as a person’s name” and Wilkins’ “search for [a user’s]
EK record by name, company name, telephone number, email or other
criteria” teach a “condition derived from a key file [that] comprises at lest
[sic] one of: ... a byte stream to match in the key file.” (See Wilkins ^fl[ 39,
95 (emphases added); Ans. 36—37 (citing Wilkins 195); Final Act. 6 (citing
Wilkins 1 39) (rejecting base claim 1).)
Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in the rejection of claim
4, and we, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4. We also
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10, for which Appellants provide
the same arguments as for claim 4 (see App. Br. 15).
Claims 5 and 16
With respect to dependent claim 5, Appellants argue Wilkins does not
teach the claimed state of claim 1 “which indicates a further action to be
performed on a file located by the condition derived from the key file.”
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(App. Br. 28.) However, as discussed supra with respect to claim 1, we
agree with the Examiner that Wilkins teaches “a state to be assigned to any
key files located using the at least one condition, the state indicating further
action to be taken with respect to any key files located.” (Ans. 34 (citing
Wilkins | 135).) Additionally, Wilkins’ deletion instruction with respect to
encryption key information (see Wilson 1135) indicates “a file management
operation” as recited in claim 5.
Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in the rejection of claim
5. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5 and claim 16,
for which Appellants provide the same arguments (see App. Br. 33).
Claims 6 and 13
With respect to dependent claim 6, Appellants argue Wilkins does not
teach “sending ‘second key file information and a second state to be
assigned to the second key file information, the second state indicating at
least one action that should be taken by the agent with respect to the second
key file information'.” (App. Br. 29.) However, as discussed supra with
respect to claim 1, we agree with the Examiner that Wilkins teaches key
files, and states assigned to key files to indicate further actions (e.g.,
deletions) to be taken with respect to the key files. (Ans. 34 (citing Wilkins
1135).) Wilkins’ paragraph 135 further discloses a remote synchronization
process—between the Key Exchange Server and remote network devices—
transmits deletion instructions and identifies remote key records as deleted,
thereby teaching sending key file information and a state indicating an action
(a deletion), as required by claim 6.
Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in the rejection of claim
6, and we, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6. We also
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sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13, for which Appellants provide
the same arguments as for claim 6 (see App. Br. 15).
Claim 7
With respect to dependent claim 7, Appellants argue Wilkins does not
teach receiving a key file, but merely discloses “a record from a database
(possibly records not even containing an encryption key).” (App. Br. 29-
30.) However, as discussed supra with respect to claim 1, we agree with the
Examiner that Wilkins teaches key files comprising encryption keys.
Appellants further argue Wilkins does not disclose “associating a
policy with a key file” or that “the policy comprises properties to manage the
key file.” (App. Br. 30.) Appellants’ argument is not persuasive because
Wilkins’ “utilization restriction and policy . . . associated to a public key”
associates a policy with key file information (e.g., with key file information
regarding Wilkins’ public key), as required by claim 7. (See Wilkins 190;
Final Act. 12—13 (citing Wilkins 190).) Wilkins’ policy also comprises
properties to manage the key file information as required by claim 7, as
Wilkins discloses “[t]he utilization restriction and policy provides data fields
indicating whether the public key may be used to send an encrypted
communication to the at least one communication address,” “whether the
key may be used to verify a signed communication sent from another
communication address,” “the type of communication application associated
to a communication address and . . . suitable protocols . . . and encryption
algorithms and methodologies associated to the key.” (See Wilkins 1 90
(emphases added).) Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in the
rejection of claim 7 and, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim
7.
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Claims 8, 11, and 15
With respect to dependent claim 8, Appellants argue Wilkins does not
teach the receiving, storing, and associating steps.
The Examiner finds Wilkins’ paragraph 5 teaches the claimed key set
representing a plurality of four key objects—including PKI (Public Key
Infrastructure) asymmetric keys—to be managed as a group for bi­
directional encryption and decryption between two entities. (Final Act. 13—
14 (citing Wilkins 1 5).) We agree with the Examiner, Wilkins’ paragraph 5
teaches these limitations of claim 8.
Further, as discussed supra with respect to claim 7, we agree with the
Examiner that Wilkins teaches associating a policy with a key, the policy
comprising properties to manage the key. (See Wilkins 190.) Additionally,
Wilkins’ paragraph 196 discloses a policy may be associated with a key set
of multiple keys, to manage the set. (See Wilkins 1196 (describing “a key
rotation policy” to “generate PKI key pairs” for “encryption keys [that] may
expire and need to be regenerated and redistributed securely on a regular
basis”).)
As Appellants have failed to clearly distinguish the claimed invention
over the prior art relied on by the Examiner, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 8. We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 11
and 15, for which Appellants provide the same arguments as for claim 8 (see
App. Br. 15, 33).
Claim 12
Appellants argue Wilson does not teach the elements of claim 12. We
do not agree. Claim 12 requires the policy to comprise “at least one” feature
from a list of features including “a property indicating whether key rotation
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is allowed.” We agree with the Examiner that Wilkins teaches such a policy
comprising a property indicating whether key rotation is allowed. (Final
Act. 21 (citing Wilkins 131 (describing the need for key rotation)); see also
Wilkins 1196 (describing “a key rotation policy” is allowed when
encryption keys “expire and need to be regenerated and redistributed
securely on a regular basis”).) Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs
in the rejection of claim 12, and we, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 12.
Claim 17
Appellants contend Wilkins and Bishop do not teach a schedule
received from a centralized key management system and designating time
that an action is to be taken, as required by independent claim 17. (App. Br.
34.) Rather, the cited portion of Wilkins “discusses decrypting an encrypted
message rather than receiving a schedule from a centralized key
management system.” (App. Br. 34 (citing Wilkins 124).) However,
Wilkins’ paragraph 24 discloses an email encryption system that “requires
the recipient of an encrypted communication to sign up with ... a
centralized registry” and “sends an email notifying the user that an attached
and encrypted sensitive message is pending decryption.” (See Wilkins 124.)
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Wilkins teaches the claimed
receiving, from a centralized key management system (Wilkins’ centralized
registry), a schedule designating time (a time when the user receives the
encrypted message) that an action is to be taken (the actions of “login to
retrieve a decryption key for each message,” “download the decryption key
to decrypt the message each time they receive an encrypted message,” and
“archiv[e] messages for regulatory compliance (e.g., Sarbanes Oxley,
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Graham Leach Bliley, HIPAA, etc.) since the message itself will not reside
in an ‘inbox’ in unencrypted form”). (See Wilkins 124; Final Act. 26 (citing
Wilkins 124).) The claimed “schedule designating time that an action is to
be taken” is broad, and does not exclude Wilkins’ real-time notification that
an encrypted message is pending decryption. (See Wilkins 124.)
Appellants further argue “neither Wilkins [n]or Bishop, singularly or
combined, teach receiving the tri-part search criteria from a centralized key
management system.” (App. Br. 35.) However, as discussed supra with
respect to claim 1, we agree with the Examiner the combination of Wilkins
and Bishop teaches a centralized key management system’s tri-part search
criteria comprising a condition, a tag, and a state.
Appellants also argue Wilkins does not teach an information packet
comprising “a state associated with the received key file information, the
state indicating further action to be taken with respect to the received key
file information” recited in claim 17. (App. Br. 35—36.) We are not
persuaded. As discussed supra with respect to claim 1, we agree with the
Examiner that Wilkins teaches a state assigned to key files to indicate a
further action (e.g., a deletion) to be taken with respect to those key files.
Appellants contend Wilkins and Bishop do not teach the steps of
claim 17 describing “what happens when the search criteria is received.”
(App. Br. 36.) We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument which merely
recites the language of claim 17 and asserts the recited limitations are not
found in the prior art, without presenting persuasive evidence or reasoning.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (The arguments shall explain why the Examiner
erred as to each ground of rejection contested by Appellants.) Additionally,
as discussed supra with respect to claim 1, we agree with the Examiner that
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Wilkins in combination with Bishop teaches: the claimed tri-part search
criteria, and updating a state associated with a located key file information
to, e.g., designate a key file (EK record) to be deleted; and transferring
located key file information to a centralized key management system during
a synchronization between the centralized key management system
(Wilkins’ Key Exchange Server) and the user’s network device. (See
Wilkins 132, 134—135, 201, 203—204, 206-207.) Wilkins also discloses
the hash operations recited in claim 17. (Final Act. 28—29 (citing Wilkins
19); see also Wilkins 1167.)
We are also not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the
Examiner’s combination of Wilkins and Bishop lacks articulated reasoning.
(App. Br. 37.) As discussed supra with respect to claim 1, we agree with the
Examiner that tagging Wilkins’ identified key files (EK records) with
corresponding tags based on the record’s content (as taught by Bishop)
would have been obvious to those skilled in the art.
Accordingly, Appellants’ arguments have not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 17. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 17.
Claims 18 and 19
Dependent claim 18, separately argued (App. Br. 37), recites
“evaluating the state associated with the received key file information” and
“perform at least one action designated by the state with respect to the
information packet.” As discussed supra with respect to claims 1, 5, and 6,
we agree with the Examiner that Wilkins teaches a state assigned to key files
to indicate a further action (e.g., a deletion) to be taken with respect to those
key files. As Appellants have failed to clearly distinguish the claimed
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invention over the prior art relied on by the Examiner, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 18.
Dependent claim 19, also separately argued (App. Br. 38), recites that
“the at least one action designated by the state with respect to the
information packet comprises a file management operation, a registry
operation, or both a file management operation and a registry operation.”
Thus, claim 19 requires an action comprising one of (i) a file management
operation, (ii) a registry operation, or (iii) both a file management operation
and a registry operation. As discussed supra with respect to claims 1 and 5,
we agree with the Examiner that Wilkins teaches a state indicating a further
action to be taken with respect to a key file, the action comprising a file
management operation (e.g., a deletion instruction with respect to
encryption key information, see Wilkins 1135), as required by claim 19. As
Appellants have failed to clearly distinguish the claimed invention over the
prior art relied on by the Examiner, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 19.
Claim 20
With respect to dependent claim 20, we agree with the Examiner that
Wilkins teaches multiple schedules comprising: (i) the claimed “schedule
for retrieving configuration information” taught by Wilkins’ paragraph 11
that describes a schedule, set by a client application and automatically
accepted by a server, for bi-directionally retrieving configuration
information regarding encryption keys and certificates; and (ii) the claimed
“schedule for uploading logged information to the centralized key
management system” taught by Wilkins’ paragraph 22. Paragraph 22
describes a schedule for uploading a user’s logged information to a
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Appeal 2017-004690
Application 14/034,010
centralized key management system of a trusted site (e.g., an online banking
site holding the user’s account, or a medical site storing the user’s medical
information), where the user’s legitimate upload may be subject to phishing
attacks. (See Wilkins Ull, 22; Final Act. 30 (citing Wilkins Hll, 22).)
Appellants’ arguments have not addressed these findings by the
Examiner, and merely state that the cited portion of Wilkins’ “is not the
same as” the claimed features, without persuasive evidence or reasoning as
to why this would be the case. (App. Br. 39.) Thus, we are not persuaded
the Examiner errs in the rejection of claim 20 and, therefore, sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 20.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—20 under
35U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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