Ex Parte Hannes et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardFeb 25, 201914000576 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 14/000,576 10/28/2013 62836 7590 02/27/2019 Brooks Kushman P.C. / BERLINER & ASSOCIATES 1000 Town Center, 22nd Floor 22nd Floor Southfield, MI 48075 Ralf Hannes UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. PHEN0103PUSA 4044 EXAMINER DUKERT, BRIAN AINSLEY ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3774 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/27/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@brookskushman.com nwhitlock@brookskushman.com lwerk@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RALF HANNES and HERMANN MONSTADT Appeal2018-006040 1 Application 14/000,5762 Technology Center 3700 Before HUBERT C. LORIN, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and BRADLEY B. BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judges. BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1---6 and 8-1 7, which are the only claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We REVERSE. 1 Our Decision references Appellants' Appeal Brief ("Br.," filed November 15, 2017), the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed February 7, 2018), and Non-Final Office Action ("Non-Final Act.," mailed November 16, 2016). 2 Appellants identify "Phenox GMBH" as the real party in interest. Br. 3. Appeal2018-006040 Application 14/000,576 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Claimed Invention The present "invention relates to a membrane implant for the treatment of vascular malformations, said implant consisting of an expandable stent and a membrane connected to said stent, wherein the membrane covers meshes of the stent at least in a central area." Spec. 1, 11. 5-8. Claim 1, the sole independent claim, reproduced below with added emphasis and formatting, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. Membrane implant for the treatment of vascular malformations, said implant being implantable by endovascular methods into the vessel to be treated, wherein the membrane implant comprising an expandable stent (4) and a membrane (2, 3, 5, 11) connected with the stent (4), with said membrane (2, 3, 5, 11) covering the meshes of the stent at least in a central region, characterized in that the membrane (2, 3, 5, 11) is provided in the form of a non woven fabric comprising plastic fibrils, wherein the membrane (2, 3, 5, 11) forming a bond with the stent (4) and, at least partially, being of porous design, and wherein the membrane comprises an outer layer facing the wall of the vessel, said outer layer comprising a sponge-like structure that becomes compressed when the stent is expanded in the vessel such that a medical substance in the outer layer is pressed out of the outer layer when the outer layer becomes compressed. Br. 9 (Claims Appendix.). 2 Appeal2018-006040 Application 14/000,576 Rejections I. Claim 13 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, fourth paragraph, as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the claim upon which it depends. II. Claims 1-6, 8, 9, and 11-16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I02(b) as anticipated by Shalev et al. (US 2009/0088828 Al, pub. Apr. 2, 2009) ("Shalev"), or alternatively under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being unpatentable over Shalev. III. Claims 10 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being unpatentable over Shalev and Seiler, Jr. et al. (US 4,550,447, iss. Nov. 5, 1985) ("Seiler"). ANALYSIS Rejection I The Examiner finds that claim 13 does not further limit claim 1 because "[ c ]laim 13 repeats the same limitations set forth in amended claim 1." (Non-Final Act. 4). According to the Examiner, "[m]erely claiming that the membrane 'accommodates' a medical substance is not the same as saying that the device further comprises a medical substance." (Ans. 2). Appellants disagree and argue that "claim 1 recites how a medical substance behaves when the stent is expanded in a vessel, while claim 13 recites that the membrane actually contains ('accommodates') a medical substance." (Br. 4). We are persuaded by Appellants' arguments. Claim 1 refers to "a medical substance" only in the context of the functional limitation regarding the behavior of the outer layer when the stent is expanded. Claim 13 further 3 Appeal2018-006040 Application 14/000,576 limits claim 1 by placing a structural limitation on the outer layer of the membrane. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 13 as failing to further limit the subject matter of the claim upon which it depends. Rejection II Anticipation by Shalev In rejecting claim 1 as anticipated by Shalev, the Examiner finds that "Shalev contains all the claimed limitations of the membrane implant ( e.g. the material, structure, deployment means) but is silent [as] to the membrane being 'compressed when the stent is expanded in the vessel."' (Non-Final Act. 6). The Examiner maintains that the functional limitation of claim 1 is inherent in Shalev. According to the Examiner: Since the membrane/device as disclosed above [in Shalev] is substantially identical to the claim, claimed properties or functions are presumed inherent. In the instant case, the amendment is considered entirely functional and attempts to claim the device for how it performs and not what it is. However, not disregarding the newly amended functional language, it is the [E]xaminer's position that the device of Shalev is entirely capable of performing said function. One of ordinary skill in the art would conclude that, absent any special features or disclosure, the newly amended limitation was a function of the membrane [ 's] material, structure, design, and means of deployment. As Shalev teaches the same material as recited in claims 1 & 2 (i.e., non-woven plastic fibrils; polycarbonate urethane), the same fabrication method recited in claim 4 (i.e., electrospinning), the same porous design as recited in claim 1, and the same deployment/expansion means recited in claim 1 (i.e., a stent); it is the [E]xaminer's position that the newly amended limitation is inherent. 4 Appeal2018-006040 Application 14/000,576 [] Further, due to the radial force applied by the underlying stent and the membrane's porous structure, the membrane would compress to some extent (however small) following endoluminal expansion against the inner wall of the vessel. Furthermore, due to Shalev's elastomeric fibers being electrospun with defined porous evacuations within, the radial expansion of the underlying stent would also result in some level/extent of compression. One of ordinary skill would recognize that a sleeve/membrane fabricated of electrospun polymeric fibers would compress in a radial thickness dimension, due to at least the polymeric fibrils further aligning/stretching, as the stent expanded the membrane to a larger overall outer/inner diameter and/or circumference. [] Additionally, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that as the membrane material comprises fibrils (22, 24, 26) with a pharmaceutical agent dispersed amongst the fibrils (30), as the elastic membrane is stretched, some amount of pharmaceutical will be pressed out as the outer layer is compressed (i.e., device is expanded). (Id. at 6-7; see also, Ans. 4--5). Appellants argue that "Shalev does not teach the release of the pharmaceutical by compression of a sponge-like structure." (Br. 6). We are persuaded by Appellants' argument. Even if we agree with the Examiner's finding that Shalev's disclosure of elastomeric polymer fibers stretching as the stent is expanded amounts to "a sponge-like structure that becomes compressed when the stent is expanded in the vessel," we find that the Examiner has not adequately shown that Shalev inherently discloses that "a medical substance in the outer layer is pressed out of the outer layer when the outer layer becomes compressed" as required by claim 1. To establish anticipation, the claimed subject matter must be met by the prior art disclosure of a single embodiment, not by a combination of different embodiments, and must be arranged in the same way as recited in 5 Appeal2018-006040 Application 14/000,576 the claims. See Net MoneyIN, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[U]nless a reference discloses within the four comers of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 3 5 U.S.C. § 102."). The Examiner has not adequately shown that a pharmaceutical agent incorporated in Shalev's structure 12 necessarily will be "pressed out" when the nonwoven polymer fibers are compressed. The Examiner's finding of inherency focuses exclusively on the similarity of Shalev's nonwoven polymer fibers to the claimed nonwoven fabric. (See Non-Final Act. 6 ("same material," "same fabrication method," "same porous design," "same deployment/expansion means.")). But Shalev teaches that the release of pharmaceutical agent from nonwoven polymer fibers depends on additional factors that the Examiner has not addressed. Specifically, Shalev discloses that release of a specific pharmaceutical agent depends on variables in addition to the type of polymer, including "the method in which the pharmaceutical agent is introduced into the polymer fibers, the sequence of layers forming the tubular structure, the matrix morphological peculiarities of each layer and the concentration of the pharmaceutical agent." Shalev ,r 103. In relevant part, with regard to the release of pharmaceutical agent from non-woven polymer fibers, Shalev discloses that "[t]he preferred mechanism of pharmaceutical agent release from the fibers is by diffusion, regardless of the technique employed to embed the pharmaceutical agent therein." Id. ,r 98. 6 Appeal2018-006040 Application 14/000,576 Shalev discloses various methods for incorporating a pharmaceutical agent in the fibers. In a preferred embodiment, the stent comprises a number of sub-layers, and "pharmaceutical agent release during the first hours and days following implantation may be achieved by incorporating a solid solution, 3 containing a medicament such as anticoagulants and antithrombogenic agents, in a sub-layer of readily soluble biodegradable polymer fibers." Id. ,r 99. "[T]he pharmaceutical agent may be constituted by particles 28 embedded in the electrospun polymer fibers forming a sub- layer of tubular structure 12." Id. ,r 100. Shalev further discloses "an alternative method for incorporating the pharmaceutical agent in the tubular structure, ensuring pharmaceutical agent release during the first post-operative days and weeks" wherein "the pharmaceutical agent is constituted by compact objects 30 distributed between the electrospun polymer fibers of the tubular structure." Id. ,r 101. "Compact objects 30 maybe in any known form, such as, but not limited to, moderately stable biodegradable polymer capsules." Id. The Examiner's finding that "as the elastic membrane is stretched, some amount of pharmaceutical will be pressed out as the outer layer is compressed" (Non-Final Act. 7; Ans. 5) is unsupported by any explicit disclosure in Shalev. Shalev contains no disclosure that any of the disclosed methods of incorporating a pharmaceutical agent ( e.g., particles 28 and compact objects 30) will result in a pharmaceutical agent being "pressed out 3 A solid solution is "[a] homogeneous solid mixture whose constituent particle concentrations may vary over specified ranges." Academic Press Dictionary of Science and Technology, https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/apdst/solid_solution/ (accessed February 18, 2019). 7 Appeal2018-006040 Application 14/000,576 of the outer layer when the outer layer becomes compressed" as required by claim 1. And the Examiner does not provide adequate evidence or technical reasoning that makes "clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill." Continental Can Co. USA, v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Although it is possible, for example, that Shalev's particles 28 or compact objects 30 may be "pressed out" of structure 12 when the stent is expanded, that is not sufficient to show inherency. "Inherency ... may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient." Id. at 1269 ( quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578,581 (CCPA 1981)). Because the Examiner has not shown that every limitation of claim 1 is disclosed or inherent in a single embodiment of Shalev, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Shalev, including dependent claims 2---6, 8, 9, and 11- 16. Obviousness over Shalev The Examiner indicates that claims 1---6, 8, 9, and 11-16 are rejected "in the alternative" as obvious over Shalev. (Non-Final Act. 4). We are persuaded by Appellants' argument (Br. 7) because the Examiner has not explained or shown how the contested limitations are disclosed by Shalev or why they would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. In particular, the Examiner acknowledges that Shalev does not explicitly disclose the contested limitation discussed above (Non-Final 8 Appeal2018-006040 Application 14/000,576 Act. 6), yet the Examiner has not explained how the Examiner proposes to modify any particular embodiment of Shalev in order to meet that limitation. "[R ]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343--46 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355-59 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). "To facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit." KSR Int'! v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007) (citing Kahn, 441 F .3d at 988). Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same reasons, we also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2---6, 8, 9, and 11-16. Cf In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[D]ependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious") ( citations omitted). Re} ection III Dependent claims 10 and 17 Rejection III relies on the same deficient finding in Shalev discussed above, and the Examiner's reliance on the disclosure of Seiler does not remedy that deficiency. See Non-Final Act. 9-10. For the same reasons discussed above with respect to independent claim 1, we do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 10 and 17. 9 Appeal2018-006040 Application 14/000,576 DECISION The Examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is reversed. The Examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is reversed. The Examiner's rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are reversed. REVERSED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation