Ex Parte Hall

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jan 30, 2009

10847549 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 30, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
__________

Ex parte DAVID C. HALL
__________

Appeal 2008-5756
Application 10/847,549
Technology Center 3700
__________

Decided:1 January 30, 2009
__________

Before ERIC GRIMES, RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, and STEPHEN
WALSH, Administrative Patent Judges.

WALSH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 involving claims to an
apparatus for drying the backside of a semiconductor wafer. The Examiner

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 CFR § 1.304, begins to run from the decided date
shown on this page of the decision. The time period does not run from the
Mail Date (paper delivery) or Notification Date (electronic delivery).

Appeal 2008-5756
Application 10/847,549

rejected certain claims as anticipated and the remainder of the claims as
obvious. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention is an apparatus for drying semiconductor wafers in
connection with a spin coating process. (Spec. 1.) The apparatus uses a
stream of pressurized gas to dry solvent from the back of a wafer being
coated. (Id.)
Claims 9-29, which are all the pending claims, are on appeal.
The Examiner rejected the claims as follows:
• claims 9-12, 17, and 20-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Tietz;2 and
• claims 13-16, 18, 19, and 24-29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Tietz.
Claims 9 and 13 are illustrative and read as follows:
9. Apparatus for drying the backside of a semiconductor wafer
comprising:

a spin mechanism for spin coating a semiconductor wafer, the
spin mechanism having a wafer chuck for securing the wafer; and

one or more gas ports adapted to deliver one or more
pressurized gas jets to the backside of a semiconductor wafer secured
to the spin chuck for evaporatively drying the backside of the
semiconductor wafer.

13. Apparatus according to claim 9 further comprising two gas ports.

2 U.S. Patent No. 5,884,412, issued to Tietz et al., Mar. 23, 1999.
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Appeal 2008-5756
Application 10/847,549

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND ANTICIPATION
The Issue
All the claims require that the apparatus include a “spin mechanism
having a wafer chuck.” The Examiner found that Tietz described a
semiconductor wafer processing apparatus that dried the back of wafers in a
deposition process, and that Tietz’s apparatus included a spin mechanism
having a wafer chuck. (Ans. 3.) The Examiner rejected claim 9 and others
as anticipated, and rejected the remainder of the claims reciting multiple gas
ports as obvious.
Appellant contends that Tietz described an apparatus with an “edge
ring but not a wafer chuck,” and therefore did not anticipate Appellant’s
claims. (App. Br. 14.) If Appellant is correct, none of the rejections can be
affirmed because the obviousness rejections are also premised on the finding
that Tietz disclosed a wafer chuck.
The dispositive issue is whether Tietz’s apparatus included a “spin
mechanism having a wafer chuck.”

Findings of Fact
1. Appellant’s specification states: “[t]he spin mechanism requires a
holder for the wafer, generally, a vacuum chuck, a motor and a
controller for spinning at a predetermined spin rate and time and a
spin cup to catch excess fluids.” (Spec. 1.)
2. Tietz described an apparatus for purging the back of a disk substrate
using a “support mechanism structured and arranged to support the
substrate and spin the substrate about its central axis, and a conduit
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Appeal 2008-5756
Application 10/847,549

coupled to a source of purge gas, the conduit being structured and
arranged to direct a flow of the purge gas toward the backside of the
substrate.” (Col. 2, ll. 17-24.)
3. Tietz’s “support mechanism includes an edge ring supporting the
wafer around its peripheral edge.” (Col. 2, ll. 28-30.)
4. Tietz teaches that “[t]he wafer 110 is held inside the chamber on a
rotatable substrate support structure 112.” (Col. 4, ll. 29-32.)
5. Tietz does not expressly mention a “chuck.”
6. Appellant does not identify a definition for “chuck” in the
Specification, but indicates the purpose of the chuck is “for securing
the wafer” (Spec. 3), and describes an apparatus in terms of a “wafer
secured to the spin chuck” (Spec. 6).
7. The word chuck has several ordinary meanings:3
–noun
1. the cut of beef between the neck and the shoulder blade.
2. a block or log used as a chock.
3. Machinery.
a. a device for centering and clamping work in a
lathe or other machine tool.
b. a device for holding a drill bit.
–verb (used with object)
4. Machinery. to hold or secure with a chuck.

Principles of Law
“To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every
limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.

3 From dictionary.com, accessed Jan. 23, 2009, at
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=chuck
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Anticipation is an issue of fact, and the question whether a claim limitation
is inherent in a prior art reference is a factual issue.” In re Schreiber, 128
F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
To serve as an anticipation when the reference is silent
about the asserted inherent characteristic, such gap in the
reference may be filled with recourse to extrinsic evidence.
Such evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive
matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the
reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of
ordinary skill.

Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
“[T]o properly compare [the prior art reference] with the claims at
issue, we must construe the [disputed term] to ascertain its scope and
meaning.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
[T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the
broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary
usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in
the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of
definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written
description contained in the applicant’s specification.

In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Analysis
The disputed term is “wafer chuck.” To decide whether Tietz
disclosed a wafer chuck, we must construe the term. Paulsen, 30 F.3d at
1479. That is, we must apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
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term as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. Morris,
127 F.3d at 1054.
The Specification provides an example, a “vacuum chuck,” but does
not define the term wafer chuck. (FF1.) We do not construe the
Specification’s statement that the “spin mechanism requires a holder for the
wafer, generally, a vacuum chuck” to be a limiting definition for “holder” or
for “chuck.” Nor do we interpret the statement to mean that any “holder” is
a “chuck.” We understand the Specification as meaning simply that a
vacuum chuck is one kind of holder, and that a vacuum chuck would
generally be used.
Neither Appellant nor the Examiner provides a definition for the term
chuck. (FF6.) We find that a dictionary provides a meaning for chuck in the
context of machine parts. (FF7.) Dictionary definitions 3.a. and 4 are most
pertinent to Appellant’s claims. Chuck as a noun means “a device for
centering and clamping work in a lathe or other machine tool.” (Id.) Used
as a verb, chuck means “to hold or secure with a chuck.” (Id.) We find that
the ordinary dictionary meaning of “chuck” is a device that not only centers
but also clamps or secures a work piece. Consistent with the dictionary
meaning, the Specification describes an apparatus with a wafer “secured to”
the spin chuck during the spinning operation. (FF6.)
Tietz disclosed a device for supporting a wafer on an edge ring.
(FF3.) We find that Tietz’s device performs the centering function of a
chuck. However, Tietz did not disclose that the device clamps or secures the
wafer in place. Tietz does say the wafer is “held” on the support structure.
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(FF4.) We find no evidence in the text or drawings that Tietz used “held” to
mean “clamp” or “secure.”
The Examiner argues that because Tietz’s “edge ring contacts the
wafer around the outer perimeter,” the chuck limitation is disclosed. (Ans.
5.) This is not persuasive because (1) “chuck” must be interpreted in light of
the specification which describes the chuck as securing the wafer, and
because (2) the ordinary meaning of “chuck” requires more than contact.
Reading out the clamping/securing function is contrary to both canons of
interpretation. If there were evidence that those in this art consider
contacting to mean clamping or securing, the outcome might be different.
See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1056 (“Absent an express definition in their
specification, the fact that appellants can point to definitions or usages that
conform to their interpretation does not make the PTO's definition
unreasonable when the PTO can point to other sources that support its
interpretation.”). We find that the Examiner has not shown that Tietz
expressly disclosed the “wafer chuck” limitation.
Tietz would anticipate Appellant’s claims if Tietz inherently disclosed
a wafer chuck. For inherent anticipation, there must be some evidence that
something performing both the centering and clamping functions of a
“chuck” was “necessarily present in the thing described in the reference.”
Continental Can Co., 948 F.2d at 1268. The Examiner did not provide
evidence that Tietz’s device had a component that performed both
“centering and clamping” as required by the ordinary definition. In the
absence of evidence on this point, we find that the Examiner has not shown
that Tietz inherently disclosed a wafer chuck on the spin mechanism.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Examiner has not adequately shown that Tietz expressly or
inherently described a “spin mechanism having a wafer chuck,” and
therefore did not show that Tietz anticipated Appellant’s claims by
disclosing every limitation of the claims.

SUMMARY
We reverse the rejection of claims 9-12, 17, and 20-23 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Tietz; and
We reverse the rejection of claims 13-16, 18, 19, and 24-29 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tietz.

REVERSED

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