Ex Parte GUO et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 6, 201613350910 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 6, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 13/350,910 01/16/2012 LIANG GUO 52021 7590 10/11/2016 Cuenot, Forsythe & Kim, LLC 20283 State Road 7 Ste. 300 Boca Raton, FL 33498 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. CN920100128US1_8150-0137 9423 EXAMINER KRAFT, SHIH-WEI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2194 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/11/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): ibmptomail@iplawpro.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte LIANG GUO and XU QIN ZHAO Appeal2015-003429 Application 13/350,910 Technology Center 2100 Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, WSTIN BUSCH, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING Appellants filed a Request for Rehearing ("Request") under 37 C.F.R. § 41.52 for our Decision mailed July 26, 2016, in which we affirmed the Examiner's rejection of claim 2 as obvious. Appellants assert the Decision was in error because the Board "either misapprehended and/or overlooked certain arguments presented" in the Appeal Brief and Reply Brief. Request 1. We have reconsidered our original Decision in light of Appellants' Request but are not persuaded of any errors. We therefore decline to change the Decision. Appellants' Request is DENIED. 1 Appeal2015-003429 Application 13/350,910 Disputed Claim Appellants seek rehearing only on claim 2. Request 2. Claim 2 depends from claim 1, and both are reproduced below. 1. A method for collaborative work of applications, comprising: reading a rule for defining a data transmission among collaborative working applications; initiating applications related to the rule using a processor; acquiring progress identifiers of the applications; and registering the progress identifiers of the applications. 2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the rule of the data transmission includes an event for triggering the data transmission. ANALYSIS The Decision affirmed the Examiner's finding that Young (US 2005/0160361 Al; July 21, 2005) teaches or suggests "the rule of the data transmission includes an event for triggering the data transmission," as recited in claim 2. Decision 8-9; Final Act. 2. Issue #1: Whether use of Young f 55 is a new ground of rejection One sentence of the Decision quotes paragraph 55 of Young as disclosing "the mapping rule object [i.e., MRO] created at 830 can accept data from an information provider." Decision 8. The Request concedes "the Examiner's rejection ... refers to paragraph [0055]" but contends "the Examiner's analysis does not rely upon the particular teachings in paragraph [0055] cited by the Board" and therefore "it represents an undesignated new grounds of rejection." Request 3. We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument. "It is well- established that the Board is free to affirm an examiner's rejection so long as 2 Appeal2015-003429 Application 13/350,910 appellants have had a fair opportunity to react to the thrust of the rejection." In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). Here, the Examiner's Final Rejection cites the same paragraph 55 of Young, amongst others, in finding "Young teaches the mapping rule object (MRO) includes source logic that identifies a source from which the first data will be received." Final Act. 17. Appellants have not persuaded us that the Decision's quotation of Young (i.e., an MRO accepts data from a source such as an information provider) in any way changes the thrust of the Examiner's finding in the Final Rejection (i.e., an MRO receives data from a source), particularly given that both cite the same paragraph of Young. Accordingly, we find Appellants' contention of an undesignated new ground of rejection is without merit. Issue #2: Whether the MRO "includes" an event Claim 2 recites "the rule ... includes an event." The Decision affirmed the Examiner's finding that "Young teaches the events are part of the MRO" (i.e., Young's mapping rule object). Decision 8; Ans. 20. As discussed above, the Decision relied in part on Young stating "the mapping rule object created at 830 can accept data from an information provider." Young i-f 55; Decision 8. Appellants contend "the MRO is already created at the time it accepts the data" and therefore "the MRO does not include the data - instead, the MRO operates on the data." Request 4 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 7. We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument. First, Appellants' argument merely expresses a disagreement with our result rather than any "points ... misapprehended or overlooked by the Board," as required by 37 3 Appeal2015-003429 Application 13/350,910 C.F.R. § 41.52. Second, Appellant's argument is not commensurate with the claim's scope as currently written. Appellants have not directed us to anything in claim 2 specifying how, when, or how long an event must be "included" in the rule. For example, claim 2 does not require the event be included when the rule is first created, nor that the same event be permanently included. An MRO that "accepts" data that includes an event teaches or suggests the MRO "includes" the data (e.g., by including a link to the data). The fact that the MRO subsequently transforms the data further underscores that the MRO at least temporarily "includes" such data in order to know what to transform. The prior art need not use the same words as the patentee. Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 661 F .3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Issue #3: Whether the triggers relate to "the data transmission" Appellants contend "[t]he 'data transmission,' as characterized by the Examiner refers to the translation of data from a first format to a second format by the MRO" yet "none of the actions described in paragraph [0032] correspond to this alleged data transmission." Request 6-7. We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument. As above, Appellants may disagree with our result but they have not identified any "points ... misapprehended or overlooked by the Board," as required by 37 C.F.R. § 41.52. The only misapprehension here appears to be Appellants' mischaracterization of the Examiner's findings for "data transmission." The Examiner finds "one of ordinary skill in the art understands that sharing information demonstrates the transmission of information from a source to a destination." Ans. 20 (emphasis added). The Examiner further finds "the 4 Appeal2015-003429 Application 13/350,910 MRO of Young defines the data transmission" (e.g., by identifying "the source from which data will be received"; "the destination to which second data will be provided"; and the "formats" for the data) and the MRO "provid[es] the second data to another computer component." Id.; see also Final Act. 17 (citing, e.g., Young i-f 7). Thus, for "data transmission," the Examiner relies on the MRO providing data to another component, not just "the translation of data" as Appellants suggest. See also Decision 5. Regardless, the actions in Young do correspond to data transmission. Decision 8-9. Paragraph 32 of Young discloses that "actions can be triggered by business events." The next paragraph of Young describes examples of such events, disclosing that "[t]ypes of business events for which a business process policy object can implement logic, and thus for which data conversions may be required include, but are not limited to, reference events, change events, threshold events, task completion events, and task failure events." Young i-f 33. The next paragraph explains that MROs are what perform this data conversion: "this application describes using mapping rule objects (MR Os) to facilitate converting business process policy data between various formats." Id. i-f 34. After the data conversion, such events "can provide information" to other components. Id. i-f 33; see also id. i-f 31 ("One example business event can be a message between an information source and an intended target."). Young explains it is the MRO that does this providing: "an MRO ... can ... then provide the second data to another component." Id. i-f 10; Ans. 18. Thus, contrary to Appellants' assertion, the actions described in Young do correspond to the data transmission relied upon by the Examiner. That is true regardless of whether 5 Appeal2015-003429 Application 13/350,910 the data transmission is the "translation of data" (as Appellants suggest) or "providing the second data to another computer component" (as the Examiner finds). Issue #4: Whether the events relate to a BPPO rather than a MRO Claim 2 of the present application recites "the rule ... includes an event," and as discussed above, the Examiner relies upon the MRO for the claimed rule. Young states that "[a] business process policy object can facilitate automatically performing actions .... These and similar actions can be triggered by business events." Young i-f 32 (emphasis added). Appellants contend that "the 'business process policy object' (BPPO) is not an MRO." Request 7. However, as discussed above, the very next paragraphs of Young explain that such business events may require data transmissions performed by MROs. Young i-fi-1 33-34. Thus, we are not persuaded of any error in the Decision. DECISION Based on the record before us now and in the original appeal, we grant Appellants' Request to the extent that we have reconsidered our Decision, but we deny Appellants' Request to make any changes in our Decision. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(b). REHEARING DENIED 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation