Ex Parte Gruen et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 2, 2019

13016355 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/016,355 01/28/2011 Daniel M. Gruen
46321 7590 04/04/2019
Shutts & Bowen LLP
STEVEN M. GREENBERG
525 Okeechobee Blvd
# 1100
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
CAM920110003US1 (271) 4388
EXAMINER
FORTINO, ASHLEY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2143
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/04/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@crgolaw.com
sgreenberg@shutts.com
aschneider@shutts.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DANIEL M. GRUEN, PAUL B. MOODY,
and DA WEI SHEN
Appeal2018-007493
Application 13/016,355
Technology Center 2100
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, MICHAEL J. ENGLE, and
IFTIKHAR AHMED, Administrative Patent Judges.
MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1, 3-6, 8-11, and 13-15. Appellants have cancelled claims 2, 7,
1 Appellants indicate the real party in interest is International Business
Machines Corporation. App. Br. 2.
Appeal2018-007493
Application 13/016,355
and 12. App. Br. 13, 15, 18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Illustrative Claim 2
Illustrative claim 1 under appeal reads as follows ( emphases,
formatting, and bracketed material added):
1. A method of constraining individual meeting times of a task
to a specified total duration of aggregated meeting times
compnsmg:
[A.] specifying a time constraint for a single task, wherein the
time constraint is a total duration of time available for the
single task;
[B.] subsequent to specifying the time constraint, specifying a
duration of time for each event in a plurality of events
associated with the single task, wherein the sum of duration
of times is constrained during specification of the duration
of time for each event to be less than or equal to the time
constraint;
[C.] selecting an event amongst the plurality of events;
[D.] adjusting a duration of time for the selected event;
[E.] determining whether or not a sum total of all durations of
time for the events associated with the single task exceeds
the time constraint by[:]
[i.]filtering the events of the single task to include only
events scheduled to occur in the present or in the
future while excluding events already having occurred
in the past and
2 Unless otherwise noted, any Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) citations herein are to MPEP Rev. 08.2017, January 2018.
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Application 13/016,355
[ii.] determining whether or not a sum total of all durations
of time for the filtered events excluding the events
already having occurred in the past exceeds a time
constraint for the single task; and,
[F.] apportioning a compensatory adjustment of time to
remaining ones of the events associated with the single task
in response to determining the sum total of all durations of
time for the events associated with the single task to have
exceeded the time constraint for the single task.
Sankaranarayan et al.
Welsh et al.
Bollapragada et al.
References3
US 2005/0033846 Al
US 2010/0333028 Al
US 2011/0125539 Al
Rejections4
A.
Feb. 10,2005
Dec. 30, 2010
May 26, 2011
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 14 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of
Bollapragada, Welsh, and Sankaranarayan. Final Act. 2-14.
We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this rejection. See
App. Br. 7. Appellants do not argue separate patentability for claims 3, 4, 6,
8, 9, 11, 13, and 14. Except for our ultimate decision, we do not address
claims 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 14 further herein.
3 All citations herein to each of these references are by reference to the first
named inventor only.
4 All citations herein to the "Final Action" are to a Final Action mailed on
May 15, 2017.
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Appeal2018-007493
Application 13/016,355
B.
The Examiner rejects claims 5, 10, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Bollapragada, Welsh,
Sankaranarayan, and an additional reference. Final Act. 14--17.
Appellants do not present arguments for claims 5, 10, and 15. Thus,
the rejections of these claims tum on our decision as to claim 1. Except for
our ultimate decision, we do not address the § 103 rejections of claims 5, 10,
and 15 further herein.
Issue on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being obvious?
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants'
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants'
conclusions.
Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
[S]ince the "stateless resource providers" of Sankaranayaran
have no knowledge of time, it is simply not possible for those
resource providers to filter any event based upon time. Yet, so
much is required by Appellants' plain claim language.
App. Br. 10-11 ( emphasis added). Appellants further contend:
[T]he claim language as presently presented unequivocally
requires a consideration of time--that is a determination of when
events are scheduled to occur. But the language of
Sankaranayaran prohibits the stateless resources from having a
consideration of time. Specifically, paragraph [0350] of
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Appeal2018-007493
Application 13/016,355
Sankaranayaran states without reservation, "The stateless
resource providers are configured with no concept of time."
Thus, no matter what inferences Examiner may have read
into the teachings of Sankaranayaran, there is no disclaiming the
explicit language of Sankaranayaran which absolutely without
exception, prohibits the resources from having a "concept of
time". Because it is beyond argument that the stateless
resources of Sankaranayaran cannot have a concept of time, it is
logically impossible for the stateless resources of
Sankaranayaran to [perform step E supra].
Reply Br. 5 ( emphasis added).
As to Appellants' above assertions, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred. First, we find no support in Sankaranarayan for Appellants'
contention that "the language of Sankaranayaran prohibits the stateless
resources from having a consideration of time." Reply Br. 5 ( emphasis
added). Rather, Sankaranarayan at paragraph 350 merely states that "[t]he
stateless resource providers are configured with no concept of time." These
two statement are not shown by Appellants to be equivalent.
Second, the Examiner points to Sankaranarayan at paragraph 351 to
support the rejection. Final Act. 7.
The [figure 21] architecture 2100 also includes a scheduler
2104 to schedule allocation of a set of the resources at a later
time. The scheduler 2104 includes a calendar to track the time of
day and date. The scheduler 2104 is configured to run "what
if" scenarios to determine whether resources controlled by the
stateless resource providers 2102 will be available at selected
times. For example, suppose the scheduler 2104 mocks up one
or more configurations of resources that are representative of
system usage at a prime time, such as 8:00 PM. The scheduler
2104 then asks the resource providers 2102 whether they could
allocate resources to these configurations. Since the providers
have no concept of time and the state data on which they have
to base their decisions is handed to them by the resource
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Application 13/016,355
manager, they simply indicate whether they could meet such a
collection of configurations.
Sankaranarayan ,r 351 (emphasis added). Appellants' argument looks only
to the resources while overlooking the scheduler and resource manager
which determine timing and provide state data to the stateless resource
providers. Contrary to Appellants' premise, the stateless resources are not
prohibited from having a consideration of time. Rather, they have no
concept of time and the consideration of time must be provided to them by
the resource manager.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1, 3---6, 8-11, and
13-15 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
(2) Claims 1, 3---6, 8-11, and 13-15 are not patentable.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejections of claims 1, 3---6, 8-11, and 13-15 are
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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