Ex Parte Gregorian et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 18, 2014

11260064 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 18, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/260,064 10/26/2005 Lisa Gregorian 70086-00017 7233
58688 7590 06/18/2014
NOVAK DRUCE CONNOLLY BOVE + QUIGG LLP
(LA OFFICE)
1875 EYE STREET, N.W.
SUITE 1100
WASHINGTON, DC 20006
EXAMINER
TAYLOR, JOSHUA D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2426
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/18/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte LISA GREGORIAN and CRAIG HUNEGS
____________________

Appeal 2011-008265
Application 11/260,064
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before RICHARD E. SCHAFER, JOHN G. NEW, and HUNG H. BUI,
Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-2, 4-9, 11-15, 25-29, and 31-39.2 We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.3

1 The real party in interest is Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.
2 Claims 3, 10, 16-24, and 30 have been cancelled and are not on appeal.
3 Our decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed September 9, 2010
(“App. Br.”); Reply Brief filed February 7, 2011 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s
Answer mailed December 6, 2010 (“Ans.”); Final Office Action mailed
April 9, 2010 (“Final Rej.”); and original Specification filed October 26,
2005 (“Spec.”).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ Invention
Appellants’ invention relates to a method and a distribution channel
for creating ancillary revenue streams by providing specific ancilliary or
related media content, products, and services related to media content
already viewed and/or disseminated to viewers who desire them. See Spec.
¶ 5, and Abstract. According to Appellants, the content can be selected from
a group consisting of an episode of a broadcast program (TV show or
movie), an exclusive video clip, and a teaser (trailer) etc. Id. ¶ 10.
Alternatively, the content can also be a piece of music selected from the
group consisting of an entire song and a portion of a song included in the
broadcast program. Id. ¶ 11. The distribution channel can be an Internet
website provided with a user interface to allow a user to select and purchase
the content related to a broadcast program or a piece of music. Id. ¶¶ 12-13.

Claims on Appeal
Claims 1, 11, 25, and 29 are the independent claims on appeal.
Claims 1, 11, and 25 are illustrative of Appellants’ invention and are
reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized:
1. A method, comprising:
on a computer, obtaining recorded content related to and
different from a defined broadcast program having a scheduled
earliest broadcast date; and
making the recorded content available for purchase by a
user on a computer, the recorded content being accessible by
the user via a subscription distribution channel prior to the
scheduled earliest broadcast date, to generate additional
revenue in connection with the broadcast program.

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11. A method for providing access to music contained
in a broadcast program, the method comprising:
obtaining a music recording selected from the group
consisting of an entire song and a portion of the song that is
included in an episode of a broadcast program comprised of
multiple episodes; and
providing searchable access via an online subscription
distribution channel to the music recording, to recorded
episodes of the broadcast program and a database prior to a
scheduled earliest broadcast date of the broadcast program, the
database including information related to the music recording,
the information comprising a name of the song, a name of an
artist that performs the song, a name of the episode of the
broadcast program that includes the song, and at least one
songlist for the episode.

25. A method comprising:
placing a web page associated with content in a computer
memory for an Internet website and configured to be displayed
on a network client, the web page comprising informational
content regarding a broadcast program comprised of multiple
episodes each having a scheduled earliest broadcast date, the
web page further comprising at least one link operative to
enable purchase of recorded content related to at least one
episode of the broadcast program and different from each
episode of the broadcast program; and
storing the recorded content on a computer-readable
medium so as to be accessible via the at least one link prior to
the scheduled earliest broadcast date of the at least one
episode.

Evidence Considered
Pontenzone US 2002/0152278 A1 October 17, 2002
Ellis US 2003/0188314 A1 October 2, 2003
Robinson US 2004/0109087 A1 June 10, 2004
Becker US 2004/0181531 A1 September 16, 2004
Yamamichi US 2004/0186779 A1 September 23, 2004
Kanemitsu US 6,928,262 B1 August 9, 2005
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Rogers US 2005/0229227 A1 October 13, 2005
Lowcock US 2006/0101492 A1 May 11, 2006
Geshwind US 7,080,392 B1 July 18, 2006
Dewa US 2006/0190320 A1 August 24, 2006
Sorenson US 2007/0125620 A1 June 7, 2007

Examiner’s Rejections
(1) Claims 1-4, 8, 29, 30, and 34 [sic, 1, 2, 4, 8, 29, and 34]4 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ellis and
Yamamichi. Ans. 4-6.
(2) Claims 5, 6, 25, 26, 28, 31, and 32 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ellis, Yamamichi, and
Robinson. Ans. 7-10.
(3) Claims 7 and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Ellis, Yamamichi, and Rogers. Ans. 10-11.
(4) Claims 9 and 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Ellis, Yamamichi, and Sorenson. Ans. 11-12.
(5) Claims 11-13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rogers, Robinson, Dewa, and Kanemitsu. Ans. 12-14.
(6) Claims 11 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Kanemitsu and Dewa. Ans. 14-16.
(7) Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kanemitsu, Dewa, and Robinson. Ans. 17.

4 Claims 3 and 30 have already been cancelled and are not on appeal. As
such, only claims 1, 2, 4, 8, 29, and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ellis and Yamamichi.
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(8) Claims 14 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Rogers, Robinson, Dewa, Kanemitsu, and Becker.
Ans. 17-18.
(9) Claims 14 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Kanemitsu, Dewa, Robinson, and Becker. Ans. 18-
19.
(10) Claim 27 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ellis, Yamamichi, Robinson, Pontenzone, and Rogers.
Ans. 19-20.
(11) Claim 36 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ellis, Yamamichi, and Geshwind. Ans. 21.
(12) Claim 37 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ellis, Yamamichi, Robinson, and Lowcock. Ans. 21-22.
(13) Claim 38 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ellis, Yamamichi, Robinson, and Sorenson. Ans. 22-23.
(14) Claim 39 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ellis, Yamamichi, Robinson, and Geshwind. Ans. 23.

Issues on Appeal
Based on Appellants’ arguments, the dispositive issues on appeal are:
(1) Whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-4, 8, 29, 30,
and 34 [sic, 1, 2, 4, 8, 29, and 34] under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ellis and Yamamichi. In particular, the issue turns on: (a)
whether the Examiner’s combination of Ellis and Yamamichi discloses
“making the recorded content available for purchase by a user on a computer
. . . accessible by the user via a subscription distribution channel prior to the
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scheduled earliest broadcast date,” as recited in Appellants’ independent
claims 1 and 29; and (b) whether the Examiner has articulated reasoning
with some rationale underpinning to support combining Ellis and
Yamamichi. App. Br. 8-13; Reply Br. 2-8;
(2) Whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 5, 6, 25, 26, 28,
31, and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ellis,
Yamamichi, and Robinson. In particular, the issue turns on whether the
Examiner’s combination of Ellis, Yamamichi, and Robinson discloses a web
page comprising “at least one link operative to enable purchase of recorded
content related to at least one episode of the broadcast program and different
from each episode of the broadcast program” and “storing the recorded
content on a computer-readable medium so as to be accessible via the at
least one link prior to the scheduled earliest broadcast date of the at least one
episode,” as recited in independent claim 25. App. Br. 13-17; Reply Br. 9-
12; and
(3) Whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 11-13 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Rogers, Robinson, Dewa, and
Kanemitsu. In particular, the issue turns on whether the Examiner’s
combination of Rogers, Robinson, Dewa, and Kanemitsu discloses
“providing searchable access . . . to the music recording, to recorded
episodes of the broadcast program and a database prior to a scheduled
earliest broadcast date of the broadcast program” and a database that
includes “at least one songlist for the episode,” as recited in independent
claim 11. App. Br. 18-19; Reply Br. 14-15.

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ANALYSIS
§ 103 Rejection of Claims 1-4, 8, 29, 30, and 34 [sic, 1-2, 4, 8, 29, and 34]
over Ellis and Yamamichi.

With respect to Appellants’ independent claims 1 and 29, the
Examiner finds Ellis discloses an electronic television program guide
schedule system and a corresponding method that includes “obtaining
recorded content related to a defined broadcast program having a scheduled
earliest broadcast data” and “making the recorded content available for
purchase by a user on a computer” by way of allowing a user to view and
select broadcast programs, including comprehensive information about pay-
per-view events, premium services (i.e., HBO) or other package programing,
and also purchase such broadcast programs on demand. Ans. 4-5 (emphasis
omitted) (citing Ellis ¶¶ 95, 216-221, 225; FIG. 9, FIG. 43A-E, and FIG.
44). The Examiner acknowledges Ellis does not disclose explicitly “the
recorded content is accessible by the user via a subscription distribution
channel prior to the scheduled earliest broadcast data, to generate additional
revenue in connection with the broadcast program,” but relies upon
Yamamichi for disclosing the missing feature, i.e., user access to movie-
related information (i.e., movie trailer, behind-the-scenes featurette) before
scheduled movie release. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted) (citing Yamamichi
¶¶ 929-834). Based on such factual findings, the Examiner concludes that:
it would have been obvious . . . to modify Ellis to allow for the
related content of Yamamichi, such as a behind-the-scenes
featurette, to be made available through the cable subscription
service. This would have produced predictable and desirable
results, in that the “media mix strategy” of Yamamichi could be
expanded to include television programs rather than just
movies, and television viewers would be able to quickly access
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such related content in a hassle free manner by accessing it over
the same subscription service from which they receive the
programs.

Id. at 5-6.
Appellants dispute the Examiner’s factual findings regarding Ellis and
Yamamichi and the Examiner’s rationale for combining Ellis and
Yamamichi. App. Br. 8-13; Reply Br. 2-8. In particular, Appellants
contend the Examiner’s combination of Ellis and Yamamichi does not
disclose “making the recorded content available for purchase by a user on a
computer . . . accessible by the user via a subscription distribution channel
prior to the scheduled earliest broadcast date,” as recited in Appellants’
independent claims 1 and 29. App. Br. 11-13. According to Appellants,
Ellis only discloses using a program guide programmed into a set-top box to
enable purchasing of products (recorded content), and that products are
ordered at various times using the channel guide, but are delivered by
shipping (physical shipment). Id. at 11-12 (citing Ellis ¶¶ 225-229). As
such, Appellants argue: (1) Ellis does not make any recorded content both
available for purchase by a user and accessible by the user via a subscription
distribution channel prior to the scheduled earliest broadcast date and
(2) “purchasing” as disclosed by Ellis is distinct from user accessing, as
recited in Appellants’ claims 1 and 29. Id. In addition, Appellants also
argue there is no reason to combine Ellis and Yamamichi because: (1) Ellis
and Yamamichi disclose unrelated methods that cannot be combined, i.e.,
Ellis teaches periodically downloading schedule guide information including
offers to purchase content to cable subscribers, whereas Yamamichi teaches
bundling electronic content and certain rights to purchase an electronic
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movie ticket; and, as such, (2) a cable subscriber as disclosed by Ellis would
have no reason to purchase an electronic ticket for content already available
via the cable subscription. Id. at 10-11.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. First, and contrary
to Appellants’ arguments, Ellis is not limited to delivery of products ordered
using the program guide by way of shipping (physical shipment) alone;
rather, Ellis teaches that different categories of products and services (i.e.,
movies, news programs, sports, pay-per-view, etc.) may also be ordered, via
a distribution channel such as a telephone line, cable, fiber, or wireless
transmission as the return path for placing user orders. See Ellis ¶¶ 225-231;
and FIG. 9. Consequently, Appellants’ arguments predicated upon Ellis’
physical shipment of products ordered are misplaced. Reply Br. 2-8.
Second, Yamamichi is only relied upon by the Examiner for
disclosing the general concept of user access to movie-related information
(e.g., movie trailers, behind-the-scenes featurettes) before scheduled movie
release. Ans. 5 (citing Yamamichi ¶¶ 929-834). Consequently, any
reference to the environment of Yamamichi as, ie.g., an electronic ticket
system, is also misplaced. As correctly found by the Examiner,
[t]he way the teaching of Yamamichi is used to modify
Ellis does not require that a consumer purchase a movie ticket;
rather, the purchasing of the ticket is the event in the
Yamamichi reference that triggers providing additional content
to a consumer, whereas such a trigger in the Ellis reference
already exists in the form of a consumer selecting a program in
the electronic programming guide. Therefore, it is not
necessary (nor, as Applicant points out, expected or useful) to
import the movie ticket purchase into Ellis, but rather to import
the teaching that consumers may be provided with access to
additional content related to a movie before the release of the
movie, once said consumer has shown interest in said movie.
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Ans. 27 (emphasis added).
Third, we recognize that the Examiner must articulate some
“reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion
of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However,
such a reason to combine teachings from the prior art “may be found in
explicit or implicit teachings within the references themselves, from the
ordinary knowledge of those skilled in the art, or from the nature of the
problem to be solved.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d
1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)). “Under the correct [obviousness] analysis, any need or problem
known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the
patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner
claimed.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). In the
instant appeal, the Examiner finds “both Ellis and Yamamichi disclose using
knowledge of a consumer’s viewing habits (whether they be viewing
programming at home on a television or at a movie theater) in order to offer
and provide additional content, related to said programming, to said
consumer.” Ans. 25. The Examiner has also articulated a rationale
supporting the obviousness conclusion, i.e., “to allow for the promotional
techniques of Yamamichi to be used, i.e., gaining access to such content
before the release of a movie or a program.” Id. 5, 26. Appellants have not
demonstrated the Examiner’s rationale is erroneous or why a person of
ordinary skill in the art would not have reached the conclusions reached by
the Examiner. See DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v.
C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he proper
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question is whether the ordinary artisan possesses knowledge and skills
rendering him capable of combining the prior art references.”).
Consequently, we are not persuaded that the Examiner failed to articulate a
rationale for combining Ellis and Yamamichi.
For the reasons set forth above, we find no reversible error in the
Examiner’s position and, as such, sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of Appellants’ independent claims 1 and 29 based on Ellis and
Yamamichi.
With respect to dependent claims 2, 4, 8, and 34, Appellants present
no separate patentability arguments. For the same reasons discussed, we
also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 2, 4, 8, and 34.
When the patentability of dependent claims is not argued separately, the
claims stand or fall with the claims from which they depend. In re King, 801
F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 991 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
With respect to dependent claim 36, the Examiner further finds
Geshwind discloses the use of a spoiler regarding a broadcast program that
can be offered to a viewer. Ans. 21 (citing Geshwind, col. 7, ll. 23-50).
Nevertheless, Appellants argue that Geshwind teaches away from making a
spoiler accessible prior to the broadcast because the “spoiler” of Geshwind is
not shown to those viewing as a preview in order to cause them to decide
whether to view the entire program. App. Br. 17. However, we disagree. A
spoiler is simply another form of Yamamichi’s movie-related information,
and could be made available to a viewer before the scheduled movie release
along with other examples such as a movie trailer or a behind-the-scenes
featurette, as described by Yamamichi. See Yamamichi ¶¶ 929-834. As
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such, the Examiner need not rely on Geshwind to support the conclusion of
obviousness. For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejections of claim 36.

§ 103(a) Rejection of Claims 5, 6, 25, 26, 28, 31, and 32 over Ellis,
Yamamichi, and Robinson.

With respect to independent claim 25, the Examiner finds Ellis and
Yamamichi disclose a similar method, having all of the limitations except
for using an Internet website to store recorded content so as to be accessible,
via a web link. Ans. 8-9 (citing Ellis ¶¶ 95, 216-221, 225; FIG. 9, FIG. 43A-
E, and FIG. 44; and Yamamichi ¶¶ 929-834). The Examiner further finds
Robinson discloses using an Internet website including a web page and web
links. Id. at 9 (citing Robinson ¶ 43, FIG. 1). Based on these findings, the
Examiner concludes “it would have been obvious . . . to modify Ellis and
Yamamichi to allow for the page displayed on the network client to
comprise an Internet website . . . more robust options in terms of user
interaction . . . to facilitate the user’s purchasing of content.” Id. Appellants
do not dispute the Examiner’s findings regarding Robinson; nor do
Appellants challenge the Examiner’s rationale for incorporating Robinson
into Ellis and Yamamichi. Instead, Appellants simply reiterate the same
arguments presented against the Examiner’s combination of Ellis and
Yamamichi relative to Appellants’ independent claims 1 and 29. App. Br.
14-16; Reply Br. 9-13. We disagree with Appellants for the same reasons
discussed in connection with claims 1 and 29. We adopt as our own the
Examiner’s findings and explanations regarding Ellis, Yamamichi, and
Robinson. Ans. 31-36.
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For the reasons set forth above, we find no reversible error in the
Examiner’s position and, as such, sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of Appellants’ independent claim 25 based on Ellis, Yamamichi,
and Robinson.
With respect to dependent claims 5, 6, 26, 28, 31, and 32, Appellants
present no separate patentability arguments. For the same reasons discussed,
we also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 5, 6, 26, 28,
31, and 32.
With respect to dependent claim 39, the Examiner further finds
Geshwind discloses the use of a spoiler regarding a broadcast program that
can be offered to a viewer. Ans. 23 (citing Geshwind, col. 7, ll. 23-50).
Appellants also argue Geshwind teaches away from making a spoiler
accessible prior to the broadcast because the “spoiler” of Geshwind is not
shown to those viewing as a preview in order to decide whether to view the
entire program. App. Br. 17. Again, we disagree. As previously discussed,
a spoiler is simply another form of Yamamichi’s movie-related information,
and could be made available to a viewer before the scheduled movie release
along with other examples such as a movie trailer or a behind-the-scenes
featurette, as described by Yamamichi. See Yamamichi ¶¶ 929-834. As
such, the Examiner needs not rely on Geshwind to support the conclusion of
obviousness. For these reasons, we also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claim 39.

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§ 103(a) Rejection of Claims 11-13 over Rogers, Robinson, Dewa, and
Kanemitsu.

Independent claim 11 differs from Appellants’ claims 1 and 25 in that
recorded content is recited as “a music recording selected from the group
consisting of an entire song and a portion of the song that is included in an
episode of a broadcast program comprised of multiple episodes” and a
“database” is required to include “information related to the music
recording, the information comprising a name of the song, a name of an
artist that performs the song, a name of the episode of the broadcast program
that includes the song, and at least one songlist for the episode.”
The Examiner finds Rogers discloses a method for providing access to
items related to a broadcast program (as opposed to music) including
obtaining items related to an episode of a broadcast program and providing
searchable access, via an online subscription distribution channel to those
items related to the episode of a broadcast program, and a database that
includes information related to the items related to said episode of a
broadcast program. Ans. 12-13 (citing Rogers ¶¶ 20-22, 26, 57-60, 72-84,
96-99, 137; FIGS. 1-2, 6, 8, and 12-24). The Examiner relies upon:
(1) Robinson for disclosing that those items related to an episode of a
broadcast program indicate a music recording (Id. at 13; see Robinson ¶ 40);
(2) Dewa for providing searchable access to recorded episodes of
programing (Ans. 13; see Dewa ¶ 161, FIG. 20); and (3) Kanemitsu for
disclosing searching programs for songs before the programs are broadcast.
Ans. 13 (citing Kanemitsu col. 7, l. 30 - col. 8, l. 3; col. 12, l. 48 - col. 13,
l. 51; FIGS. 12-18). Based on these findings, the Examiner concludes “it
would have been obvious . . . to modify the above teachings to allow for a
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database to be searched ahead of a broadcast for songs by various metrics,
such as artist name. This would have produced predictable and desirable
results, in that users would be able to more easily search for music in
programs which they enjoy, and would further generate revenue for at least
the artists whose music was purchased and the program from which it was
found to be purchased.” Id. at 13-14.
Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s findings regarding Rogers,
Robinson, and Dewa; nor do Appellants challenge the Examiner’s rationale
for combining Rogers, Robinson, Dewa, and Kanemitsu. Instead,
Appellants argue Kanemitsu teaches a musical program and not songs from
an audio-video episode, and does not disclose “providing searchable access
. . . to the music recording, to recorded episodes of the broadcast program
and a database prior to a scheduled earliest broadcast date of the broadcast
program” and a database that includes “at least one songlist for the episode,”
as recited in Appellants’ independent claim 11. App. Br. 18-19; Reply Br.
14-15.
Again, we are not persuaded. As correctly found by the Examiner,
Kanemitsu teaches searching for programs which contain a certain song,
including a song list. Ans. 38 (citing Kanemitsu FIG. 12).
For the reasons set forth above, we find no reversible error in the
Examiner’s position and, as such, sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of Appellants’ independent claim 11 based on Rogers, Robinson,
Dewa, and Kanemitsu.
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CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude that the Examiner has not erred
in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4-9, 11-15, 25-29, and 31-39 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a). Because we have affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 11-
13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Rogers, Robinson,
Dewa, and Kanemitsu, we need not reach the Examiner’s rejection of claims
11-12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kanemitsu and
Dewa.

DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 2, 4-9, 11-15,
25-29, and 31-39.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

bar