Ex Parte GONZALES et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 7, 2018

14034941 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 7, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/034,941 09/24/2013 Philip Michael GONZALES 83382239;67186-033
PUS1
5620
46442 7590 02/09/2018
TART SON OASKFY Rr OT DS P C /FnrH EXAMINER
400 W. MAPLE RD.
SUITE 350
MUSLEH, MOHAMAD A
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2837
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/09/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket @ cgolaw. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PHILIP MICHAEL GONZALES and
RAY C. SICIAK
Appeal 2017-005571
Application 14/034,9411
Technology Center 2800
Before TERRY J. OWENS, CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN, and
SHELDON M. McGEE, Administrative Patent Judges.
McGEE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134, Appellant appeals from the Examiner’s
rejections adverse to the patentability of claims 1—13, 15, and 21—25.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6.
We affirm-in-part.
1 Appellant is the Applicant, Ford Global Technologies, LLC, which is also
identified as the real party in interest. App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2017-005571
Application 14/034,941
SUBJECT MATTER
The appealed subject matter is related to an integrated contactor and
service disconnect assembly used to interrupt high voltage current in electric
vehicles. Spec. Tflf 1—2.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. An integrated contactor/service disconnect assembly,
comprising:
a stationary contact;
a movable contact selectively movable relative to said stationary
contact; and
a service disconnect unit configured to block said movable
contact from contacting said stationary contact.
App. Br. 9.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence of
unpatentability:
Faffart US 5,099,385 March 24, 1992
Hauke2 WO 94/28567 December 8, 1994
(as translated)
Kodama US 2013/0335174 A1 December 19, 2013
2 The Examiner refers to this reference as “Reinhard.”
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Application 14/034,941
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1—10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as
anticipated by Faffart (Final Act. 2—3);
II. Claims 11—13, 15, 24, and 25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Hauke (Final Act. 4); and
III. Claims 21—23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Hauke in view of Kodama (Final Act. 5—6).
OPINION
We address the claims separately to the extent they are so argued by
Appellant. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Rejection I
Claim 1
The Examiner finds that Faffart anticipates the recited assembly.
Final Act. 2. Appellant argues Faffart fails to disclose a “structure that
blocks contact between the fixed [and movable] contacts.” App. Br. 3.
This argument is not persuasive, however, because the claim does not
require a structure to physically block the movable and stationary contacts
from touching. Rather, the claim recites that the service disconnect unit is
“configured to block said movable contact from contacting said stationary
contact.” In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (“[A]ppellanf s
arguments fail from the outset because . . . they are not based on limitations
appearing in the claims.”).
“[DJuring examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” In re Hyatt, 211
F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In this case, we agree with the Examiner
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Application 14/034,941
(Ans. 6) that the term “block” is not limited to require some physical
structure. While the Specification discloses embodiments allowing for such
physical structure to prevent the contacts from touching (e.g., Fig. 3, prong
84), the Specification is not limited to that embodiment. See Spec. 147
(explaining that the “exemplary configurations are not intended to limit the
scope of this disclosure”), and id. 1 62 (“[t]he foregoing description shall be
interpreted as illustrative and not in any limiting sense.”).
Here, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that Faffarf s mechanical
locking device 41 is configured to block, i.e., prevent, the contacts from
touching as required by claim 1. Final Act. 2. Faffart explains that the
mechanical locking device 41 “act[s] on the armatures [] of the
electromagnets ... to guarantee that one of the two contact maker systems is
open when the other is closed.” Faffart 3:41 44. Thus, the Examiner is
correct (Ans. 6—7) that the recited limitation is satisfied by Faffarf s locking
device 41 by ensuring that one of the contact maker systems is open.
Because Appellant has not identified error in the Examiner’s
anticipation rejection of claim 1, we sustain it as well as the rejection of
dependent claims 2—6 and 8—10 not separately argued. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Claim 7
Claim 7 ultimately depends from claim 1, and additionally requires a
service button, and a prong extending from said button, wherein the prong is
movable to a position between the stationary and movable contacts. App.
Br. 9.
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Application 14/034,941
Appellant argues that “Faffart fails to teach any structure, let alone a
prong, that is moved to a position between the” contacts. App. Br. 5. We
agree with Appellant.
The Examiner maps Faffart’s control knob 132 to the recited service
button, and shaft 131 to the recited prong. Final Act. 3. See Faffart, Fig. 3.
The Examiner relies on the “dotted line between elements 6 and 7” of Fig. 1
to satisfy the prong’s movement between the contacts. Id. However, the
Examiner has not shown, nor do we discern, how Faffart’s shaft 131 as
illustrated in Figure 3 is movable to a position between the stationary (48,
49) and movable (55, 56) contacts. We emphasize that the dotted line
between armatures 6 and 7 upon which the Examiner relies (Final Act. 3)
appears in Figure 1, i.e., a general diagram of the contactor, and not Figure 3
which is the schematic sectional view showing shaft 131. Faffart 2:45—52.
We also observe that the Examiner changes the mapping in the
Answer by referring to element 133 as the prong and an annotated portion
“B” of Figure 3. Ans. 8. We agree with Appellant (Reply Br. 4) that this
alternative disclosure of Faffart fails to evince the recited limitation because
annotated portion “B” highlights element 57, not element 133.
Therefore, the anticipation rejection of claim 7 is reversed.
Rejection II
Independent claims 11 and 24 are rejected as anticipated by Hauke,
and are separately argued by Appellant. Final Act. 4; App. Br. 5—6.
Claim 11
Regarding claim 11, Appellant argues that Hauke fails to teach the
recited “energy storage device.” App. Br. 5—6. This argument fails to
persuade us of reversible error because Appellant does not challenge the
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Application 14/034,941
Examiner’s finding (Ans. 10) regarding Hauke’s disclosure of a coil meeting
the “energy storage device” limitation. See Reply Br. 4.
We furthermore disagree with Appellant’s argument regarding the
lack of integration between Hauke’s contactor and the service disconnect
unit. App. Br. 5. Rather, we share the Examiner’s view (Ans. 10—11) that
these elements are indeed integrated. Hauke expressly states that Figures 2a
and 2b are detailed drawings of “the fast mechanical switch 20 shown in
Fig[ure] 1.” Hauke 2:18 (as translated). Contactor 21 and prong 23 (Figs.
2a, 2b) are each contained within switch 20 (Fig. 1), and are, thus,
“integrated” according to the broadest reasonable interpretation of this term
consistent with the Specification. Spec. 145. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1372.
We therefore sustain the anticipation rejection of claim 11, as well as
dependent claims 12, 13 and 15 not separately argued.
Claim 24
Appellant challenges the Examiner’s finding (Final Act. 4) that Hauke
discloses the recited “service button.” App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 4. We agree
with Appellant.
The Examiner maps the service button to Hauke’s aluminum disk 24,
but neither the machine translation of Hauke nor the Examiner discuss the
purpose for such disk. The Specification, however, is replete with
references to the recited “service button” and its purpose. Spec. H 9, 16, 20,
50-52, 56, and 57. For example, the Specification notes that the button 82 is
actuated in a certain direction, e.g., by pressing, to move prong 84 to a
position that is between the movable contact 66 and the stationary contact
64. Spec. 151, Fig. 3. Furthermore, button 82 may be pressed by a service
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Application 14/034,941
technician in an “attempt to position the prong 84 between the” contacts.
Spec. 50, 56.
Hauke’s aluminum disk 24 appears to be contained within switch 20.
Figs. 1, 2a, 2b; Hauke 2:18—21 (as translated, explaining how components
21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 are part of mechanical switch 20, and are shown in
greater detail in Figures 2a and 2b.) On this record, it is not clear how
internal component 24 of switch 20 may be “pressed” by a service
technician, and thus function as a service button to move prong 23 between
the contacts 21.
The Examiner’s attempt to shift the burden to Appellant to show why
aluminum disk 24 cannot be the recited “service button” (Ans. 11) is legally
impermissible, for it is the examiner who “bears the initial burden ... of
presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Therefore, we do not sustain the anticipation rejection of claim 24, or
its dependent claim 25.
Rejection III
Appellant contests the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims
21—23 as improper because the Examiner fails to provide any support for the
obviousness conclusion. App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 4—5.
We agree with Appellant. “[Rejections on obviousness grounds
cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be
some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418 (2007) {quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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Here, the Examiner provides no such reasoning. Final Act. 6.
Furthermore, in the Answer, the Examiner fails to even respond to
Appellant’s arguments set forth in the Appeal Brief regarding the conclusory
nature of the rejection.
Under these circumstances, we are constrained to reverse the
obviousness rejection of claims 21—23.
DECISION / ORDER
The Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1—6, 8—13, and 15 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 7 and 21—25 is
reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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