Ex Parte GleichaufDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesSep 16, 201010061901 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 16, 2010) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/061,901 02/01/2002 Paul Gleichauf 50325-0606 8863 29989 7590 09/17/2010 HICKMAN PALERMO TRUONG & BECKER, LLP 2055 GATEWAY PLACE SUITE 550 SAN JOSE, CA 95110 EXAMINER HENNING, MATTHEW T ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2431 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/17/2010 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES _____________ Ex parte PAUL GLEICHAUF _____________ Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 Technology Center 2400 ______________ Before JOHN C. MARTIN, JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, and CARL W. WHITEHEAD, JR., Administrative Patent Judges. MARTIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE” (paper delivery mode) or the “NOTIFICATION DATE” (electronic delivery mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision. Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4-6, 15, 17, 18, 20-22, and 27, which are all of the pending claims.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. A. Appellant’s invention Appellant’s invention is a method and system for storage and transmission of data by applying a one-time pad. Specification [0001].3 The Specification, in the “Background of Invention” section, explains that in a typical network system, such as a Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) or a Wide Area Network (WAN), multiple users have access to and communicate over a shared communication network, that many computer applications require transmission of confidential or sensitive data over these shared networks, and that “such applications must regard the networks as public unless great care is taken to protect them” (id. at [0003]). A one-time pad (OTP) is a non-repeating random string of characters, symbols, or letters that cannot be broken given infinite time and resources 2 Claims 7, 23, and 26 were canceled by an amendment that accompanied the initially filed Appeal Brief, filed on May 6, 2008, and was approved for entry by the Examiner (Answer 2, para. 4). 3 Citations herein to Appellant’s Specification are to the Application as filed rather than to corresponding Patent Application Publication 2003/0149869 A1. Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 3 (id. at [0013]-[0014]). Each letter on the pad is used only once to encrypt one corresponding plaintext character (id. at [0014]). There is one copy of the pad at the transmitter and one at the receiver and, after use, the pad is never re-used (id.). While an important advantage of the one-time-pad is that there is no key to crack, the difficulty has always been in sharing the pad (id. at [0018]). Appellant’s Figure 1, which illustrates the invention, is reproduced below. Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating a system for securely transmitting and storing data by applying an OTP (id. at [0031]). “Network 110 is non-secure, and may comprise one or more local area networks, wide area networks, metropolitan area networks, storage networks, internetworks, or a combination of the foregoing” (id. at [0038]). Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 4 Sending host 100 has plaintext data 102 and OTP data 104 that are to be communicatively coupled to an encryption engine 106, which has a ciphertext output 106A and a keystream output 106B (id. at [0039]). First data path 108A carries ciphertext from output 106A of sending host 100, and second data path 108B carries an OTP keystream from output 106B of the sending host (id. at [0040]). Decryption engine 126 receives ciphertext from data path 108A and the OTP keystream from data path 108B and performs an XOR operation to obtain plaintext data 124 (id. at [0041]). As the ciphertext is decrypted, the keystream is concurrently replaced in the storage with the resulting plaintext (id. at [0065]), thereby achieving savings in storage (id. at [0022]). The security of the system lies in the truly random nature of the keystream and the use of “physically separate routing paths” for the keystream and ciphertext (id.). These paths are also referred to as “physically separate communication channels” (id. at [0023]). One of the questions before us is whether the Application as filed discloses routing the keystream and ciphertext through a “public” network. Appellant’s Figure 5 reproduced below. Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 5 Figure 5 is a flow diagram illustrating a method of separately routing the keystream and the ciphertext (id. at [0057]). In block 502, separation of the first and second physically separate routed paths between a sending host and receiving host “preferably involves separation at a physical network layer one [sic], and does not merely involve establishing a virtual tunnel, for example” (id.). Such physical layer separation can be accomplished, for example, using multi-protocol label switching (MPLS) or by source routing under version 6 of Internet Protocol (IPv6) (id.). In an MPLS network, incoming packets are assigned a “label” by a label edge router (LER) (id. at Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 6 [0058]). Packets are forwarded along a label switched path (LSP), where each label switch router (LSR) makes forwarding decisions based solely on the contents of the label (id.). Thus, the keystream and data stream can be transmitted across physically separate network paths by labeling the keystream with one MPLS label and labeling the data stream with a second MPLS label, as indicated by block 508A and block 510 (id. at [0060]). B. The claims The independent claims before us are claims 1, 15, 17, and 27, of which claim 1 reads as follows: 1. A method for securely storing data by applying a one- time pad, the method comprising the computer implemented steps of: receiving a first data stream comprising a keystream of truly randomly generated characters; receiving a second data stream comprising ciphertext, wherein the first and second data streams are received on two routed communication channels, wherein the ciphertext comprises a source text that is encrypted by applying the keystream to the source text using an exclusive-OR operation, wherein the two routed communication channels are physically separate from one another; establishing both of the two routed communication channels through a public packet switched internetwork; decrypting the ciphertext using the keystream, resulting in creating and storing decrypted data that is equivalent to the source text; wherein the keystream is received and stored in advance of receiving the ciphertext, and wherein the stored keystream is Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 7 replaced in the same storage location with the decrypted data as the ciphertext is decrypted. Claims App. (Br. 244) (emphasis added). C. The references The Examiner’s rejections are based on the following references: Douceur US 6,021,203 Feb. 1, 2000 Shah US 2002/0035556 A1 Mar. 21, 2002 Golasky US 2003/0074599 A1 Apr. 17, 2003 Pierce US 6,680,783 B1 Jan. 20, 2004 Elliott US 7,068,790 B1 Jun. 27, 2006 E. Rosen et al., Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture, Request for Comments: 3031, Network Working Group (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter Rosen]. DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specification, Information Sciences Institute (Sept. 1981) [hereinafter DARPA]. D. The rejections 1. All of the claims on appeal stand rejected under the 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, written description requirement. Final Action 6. 2. Claims 1, 2, 15, 17, 18, and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Douceur in view of Elliott and Pierce. Id. at 7. 4 References herein to the Appeal Brief are to the corrected Appeal Brief filed September 5, 2008. Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 8 3. Claims 4 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Douceur in view of Elliott, Pierce, Golasky, and Shah. Id. at 15-16. 4. Claims 5 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Douceur in view of Elliott, Pierce, and Rosen. Id. at 17. 5. Claims 6 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Douceur in view of Elliott, Pierce, and DARPA. Id. at 18. ANALYSIS OF THE § 112 REJECTION The Examiner finds that the Application as filed fails to describe routing the keystream and the ciphertext through respective communications channels in a public internetwork. Final Action 2. “Adequate written description means that, in the specification, the applicant must ‘convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the [claimed] invention.’” Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (brackets in original)). For the following reasons, Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s position. The arguments for support made in the Brief were previously presented at pages 10-14 of the September 25, 2007, “Reply to Office Action” and addressed as follows in the Final Action. In response to the argument that the MPLS techniques discussed in paragraph [0022] of the Specification for creating physically separate keystream and ciphertext Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 9 channels would have been understood to be commonly used in public packet switched internetworks, the Examiner stated that “MPLS does not require a public internetwork, and there is no suggestion in this paragraph, or any other that the channels should be limited to being established through a public internetwork.” Final Action 2. In response to Appellant’s reliance on the discussion of using VPNs (virtual private networks) in paragraphs [0057] and [0059], the Examiner similarly stated that “VPN’s do not require a public internetwork.” Id. at 2-3. Appellant also relies on the description of network 101 (Fig. 1) in paragraphs [0038], [0039], and [0049] as a “non- secure” network that can include, among other things, WAN and/or MAN technologies, which Appellant (according to the Examiner) alleges are public networks. Id. at 3. The Examiner responded by stating that “[a]lthough the examiner does not necessarily agree with that allegation, the examiner points out that the argument is irrelevant, as neither this paragraph, nor any other, discloses that both channels are established through the WAN and/or MAN technologies.” Id. Regarding Appellant’s reliance on the discussion of the Internet in paragraphs [0077]-[0078], the Examiner agrees that the Internet is a public network but found that these paragraphs describe “how one could obtain the invention, and not how the invention operates” and thus do not provide support for the two physically separate channels being established through the Internet. Id. Finally, in response to Appellant’s reliance on the description in paragraph [0061] of using the “IP-STRICT-ROUTE OPTION” of IPv6 to create the separate paths, the Examiner stated that “IP- Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 10 STRICT-ROUTE-OPTION can be used in private networks, and therefore does not require, nor suggest that the channels are through a public internetwork.” Id. at 3-4. The Brief, at pages 10-13, repeats the above arguments without specifically addressing any of the Examiner’s above-noted criticisms of those arguments, criticisms that are repeated at pages 16-18 of the Answer. Instead, Appellant argues that the “Examiner’s arguments are unreasonably formalistic and literal, and are unsupported by well-established case law” and points out that “[t]he written description requirement of Section 112 does not demand that the specification exactly reproduce the claim language.” (Br. 13.) The Examiner responded by expressing agreement with this principle and stating that “this feature should have been disclosed, not necessarily word for word but at least in some way shape or form, by the specification.” (Answer 18-19.) Appellant also argued that “[p]ractitioners receiving applicant’s disclosure would recognize, at least from the above-referenced paragraphs, that one useful context of the claims is packet-switched networking and that a packet-switched internetwork can be used for communicating ciphertext and keystream.” (Br. 14.) The Examiner responded that “supporting both channels being routed through packet switched networks does not inherently support them being routed through a public packet switched internetwork.” (Answer 19.) In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that the artisan would have recognized that the network through which the keystream and ciphertext can Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 11 be routed can be public or non-public. (See, e.g., Reply Br. 2-3 (“[S]imply because on occasion a packet switched internetwork can be a non-public internetwork, a skilled artisan would not necessarily understand Appellant’s disclosure to provide only a non-public internetwork. Either alternative is fairly covered by the disclosure as a whole.” (emphasis added)).) This and similar other new arguments in the Reply Brief are entitled to no consideration because they were not necessitated by a new point in the Answer and thus should have been made in the opening Brief. See Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1473-74 (BPAI 2010) (“informative”5) (absent a showing of good cause, the Board is not required to address an argument newly presented in the Reply Brief that could have been presented in the principal Brief on Appeal). Because Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us that the Examiner erred in finding that the application as filed fails to disclose routing the keystream and ciphertext through a “public packet switched internetwork,” as required by each of the independent claims (viz., claims 1, 15, 17, and 27), we will sustain the rejection of those claims and dependent claims 2, 4-6, 18, and 20-22. 5 Designated as an “Informative Opinion” at the following Board website: http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/index.jsp. Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 12 THE 103(a) REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1, 2, 15, 17, 18, AND 27 (DOUCEUR, ELLIOTT, AND PIERCE) Douceur’s invention is a coercion-resistant one-time-pad (OTP) cryptosystem. Douceur, title. Douceur’s system provides coercion resistance by facilitating the use of decoy messages that can be revealed when duress is exerted on a party to reveal an encryption key (col. 3, ll. 6-9). Figure 1 of Douceur, which depicts a prior-art system, is reproduced below. Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating the operation of a prior art OTP cryptosystem (col. 1, ll. 28-30). The random bits of the key 14 are transmitted over a “secure channel 16,” which is presumed to be secure against eavesdroppers, to a receiver 12 (col. 1, ll. 36-38). The sender 10 encrypts the message by exclusive ORing (XORing) the random bits of the Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 13 key 14 with the message to produce cyphertext and then transmits the cyphertext 18 over a “publicly accessible channel 20” from the sender 10 to the receiver 12 (col. 1, ll. 39-43). The receiver 12, having already received the random bits of key 14, uses it to decipher the cyphertext (col. 1, ll. 44- 46). The sender destroys the pad after encrypting the message, and the receiver destroys the pad after decrypting the message (col. 1, ll. 21-23). The Examiner bases the rejection on Figure 4, which depicts Douceur’s invention and is reproduced below. Figure 4 is a block diagram that provides an overview of the operation of Douceur’s system (col. 3, ll. 16-18). Communications between the sender 42 and the receiver 44 occur in two stages, which may occur roughly contemporaneously (col. 3, ll. 23-26). In a first stage, n OTP keys 46 for decrypting OTP-encrypted messages are transmitted over a secure channel 48 from the sender to the receiver (col. 3, ll. 26-29). The second stage of Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 14 transmissions includes the transmission of n cyphertexts 50 including low security messages over a publicly accessible channel 52 to the receiver 44 (col. 3, ll. 29-32). The Examiner (Final Action 7) finds that column 3, line 61, to column 4, line 5, describes routing the keystream and the cyphertext through a public network. Appellant does not deny that the cited references disclose or suggest routing the keystream and cyphertext through a public packet switched internetwork. The Examiner, comparing claim 1 to Figure 4, finds that Douceur fails to disclose (1) that the two communication channels are “physically separate” from one another, (2) that the two communication channels are established through a “public packet switched internetwork,” (3) that the keystream is stored prior to receiving the ciphertext, and (4) that the stored keystream is replaced in the same storage location with the decrypted data as the ciphertext is decrypted. Final Action 8. Because Appellant’s arguments regarding claim 1 and the other independent claims are limited to the obviousness of differences (1) and (4), the following analysis addresses only those two differences. A. Difference (1) – the “physically separate” channels limitation A review of the prosecution history reveals the basis for the Examiner’s finding that Douceur fails to describe the two communication channels as “physically separate” from one another. In a September 22, 2005, Office Action, claim 1 (as well as other claims), which at that time Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 15 recited “two physically separate routed communication channels,”6 was rejected for anticipation by Douceur. The Examiner stated that [f]or argument[’]s sake, if we interpret the limitation to mean that the communication channels were “physically separate”, Douceur still meets this limitation. This can clearly be seen in Fig. 4 where the “Secure Channel” and the “Publicly Accessible Channel” are shown to be physically separate. As such, the examiner does not find the argument persuasive. The examiner suggests the following claim language “wherein the two routed communication channels are physically separate from one another” in order to limit the claim to two channels that are separate physically from each other. (September 22, 2005, Office Action at 2-3.) We understand this passage to be suggesting how to amend the claim language to require that the communication channels be physically separate, the interpretation argued by Appellant, while also finding that the claim language thus amended would read on Douceur. Appellant responded by amending claim 1 and the other independent claims in the manner suggested by the Examiner and stating that “[t]he claims feature the ‘wherein’ clause suggested by the Office Action. Applicant understands the claim language was suggested to distinguish over Douceur.” February 28, 2006, “Supp. Reply to Office Action” at 9. For the reasons given above, Appellant’s conclusion that the Examiner suggested the new claim language as a way to distinguish over Douceur appears to be incorrect. However, as explained below, the Examiner subsequently had a 6 July 21, 2005, “Reply to Office Action” at 2. Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 16 change of heart and agreed with Appellant’s following explanation of why the amended claim language does not read on Douceur: Douceur FIG. 4 does not anticipate routing on physically separate paths, as claimed. Douceur FIG. 4 represents secure channel 48 and publicly accessible channel 52 with separate lines, but no part of Douceur teaches that the channels 48, 52 should be routed on physically separate paths. A secure channel and a publicly accessible channel can be physically routed on the same path using, for example, GRE encapsulation, IPSec encapsulation, or other techniques to maintain one of the channels as secure even though the channels are on the same path. The channels of Douceur might be physically routed on the same physical path or channel because network nodes make identical path selection decisions for each of the Douceur channels at the time of establishing them. Nothing in Douceur would suggest, to a skilled artisan, that channels 48, 52 should be physically separately routed, as described and claimed by Applicants. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added). The Examiner, apparently persuaded by this reasoning, found in the next Office Action that “Douceur fail[s] to disclose that the two channels were physically separate from one another” and relied on Kurihara U.S. Patent 6,928,420 for a teaching of using a private line for the decryption key and commercial line for the encrypted data (the claims at that time did not require that both channels be through a “public” network). May 19, 2006, Office Action at 5. In the rejections under review in this appeal, the Examiner relies on Elliott rather than Kurihara for such a teaching. Elliott discloses systems and methods for distributing encryption keys in quantum cryptographic networks (Elliott, col. 1, ll. 16-19), which, as explained below, are optical networks. Quantum cryptographic techniques Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 17 have been conventionally applied to distribute keys from a single photon source to a single photon detector, either through fiber optic strands or through the air (col. 1, ll. 42-45). Conventional quantum cryptographic techniques require a direct connection to anyone with whom one wishes to exchange keying material (col. 1, ll. 50-52). Therefore, according to Elliott, there exists a need for systems and methods which can provide “any to any” connectivity while eliminating the need for a direct connection between parties distributing quantum key material, and which can sustain key distribution even with link failure and/or when eavesdropping exists on the link (col. 1, l. 65 – col. 2, l. 3). Elliott’s Figure 1 is reproduced below. Figure 1 illustrates an exemplary network 100 in which systems and methods distribute encryption keys via quantum cryptographic mechanisms Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 18 consistent with Elliott’s invention (col. 3, ll. 60-63). Network 100 can include QKD (quantum key distribution7) endpoints 105a and 105b connected via sub-network 110 and QKD sub-network 115 (col. 3, ll. 63- 65). Sub-network 110 can include one or more networks of any type, including a local area network (LAN), MAN, WAN, Internet, or Intranet (col. 4, ll. 3-6). Elliott explains that “QKD endpoints 105a and 105b may each include a host or a server” and that endpoints 105a and 105b which include servers can connect to LANs 120 or 125, which can further connect with hosts 130a-130c and 135a-135c, respectively (col. 3, l. 65 – col. 4, l. 28). Figure 2 is reproduced below. 7 Elliott, col. 2, ll. 9-10. 8 In the quotations herein from the references, bolding of the reference numerals is omitted. Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 19 Figure 2 illustrates an exemplary diagram of QKD sub-network 115, which can include one or more QKD switches 205a-205m interconnected via one or more links that may carry light throughout the electromagnetic spectrum (col. 4, ll. 23-27). The Examiner characterizes Elliott as teach[ing] that encrypted traffic can be transmitted over one network including LAN’s, WAN’s, Internet, and Intranet, while the encryption key is transmitted over an optical Quantum Key Distribution network in order to detect eavesdropping of the keys and to be able to route around the eavesdropping (See Elliott Col. 3 Line 60 – Col. 4 Line 20). Final Action 8. Appellant countered that “the Office Action does not argue, and Elliott does not disclose, two channels that must be physically separate from one another” (emphasis altered) and also that “[i]ndeed, Elliott states at Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 20 column 3, lines 63-65 that sub-network 100 and sub-network 115 form part of one network 100.” (Br. 16.) We agree with the Examiner (Answer 20- 22) that although Elliott does not characterize sub-networks 100 and 115 as physically separate from each other, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that to be the case for several reasons. First, these sub-networks are depicted in Figure 1 as non-overlapping. Second, sub- network 110 is described as including one or more networks of any type, including a LAN, MAN, WAN, Internet, or Intranet, whereas QKD sub- network 115 is described as an optical network including one or more QKD switches. Third, Elliott’s description of sub-networks 110 and 115 as parts of a single network 100 does not imply that the sub-networks are not physically separate from each other. Appellant’s argument that “there is no reason that the QKD switches of sub-network 115 cannot participate in sub-network 110 and communicate encrypted traffic” (Br. 16) is unpersuasive. Even assuming for the sake of argument that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized that QKD sub-network 115 can be used to carry the encrypted traffic as well as the key data, the artisan would have understood Elliott to be disclosing that the encrypted traffic and the key data can be carried by separate sub-networks 110 and 115, respectively. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “[n]either reference [of Douceur and Elliott] describes or suggests applicant’s fundamental recognition that maximum security is achieved by requiring physically separate routed paths” (id. (emphasis omitted).) It is not necessary to the rejection for Elliott to characterize sub-networks 110 and Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 21 115, which are clearly physically separate from each other, as providing “maximum” security. Appellant’s observation that “Elliott does not state that sub-network 110 and sub-network 115 cannot physically overlap each other” (Reply Br. 4 (emphasis added)), while correct, is unpersuasive because an artisan would have understood that sub-networks 110 and 115 do not (or at least, need not) overlap. Appellant’s argument that “[s]ince Elliot [sic] does not say that encrypted traffic and keys must be on different physical channels, Elliott cannot anticipate the claims” (id. (emphasis added)) is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, as explained above, an artisan would have understood Elliott to be disclosing physically separate sub-networks. Second, because the rejection is based on obviousness, it is sufficient for the use of physically separate channels to have been rendered obvious by Elliott and Douceur. The Examiner concluded that it would have been obvious to employ the teachings of Elliott in Douceur’s OTP cryptosystem by “sending the one- time pad over a switched quantum optical network and sending the encrypted data over a separate network such as the Internet” in order to provide a secure means for transmitting the OTP key and to be able to detect if the key has been eavesdropped. Final Action 9. Appellant argues that “[Douceur’s] decoy mechanism teaches away from Applicant’s technique, which does not require a decoy approach because of the additional security introduced by guaranteeing use of physically separately routed channels.” (Br. 15 (emphasis omitted).) The Examiner responded that Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 22 [s]imply because Douceur teaches a way of securing the keystream against interception, [that] does not teach against combination with another teaching for securing the keystream. Rather, as would be readily apparent to the ordinary person skilled in the art, combining multiple protection schemes to a data transmission, will, generally, increase the security of the transmission, and therefore would be desirable. (Answer 20.) The Reply Brief does not contain a response to the Examiner’s position, let alone demonstrate either (1) that Douceur discourages the use of physically separate channels or (2) that the use of such channels would render Douceur inoperative. As explained in In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007): “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see KSR [Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007)] (explaining that when the prior art teaches away from a combination, that combination is more likely to be nonobvious). Additionally, a reference may teach away from a use when that use would render the result inoperable. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s reliance on Douceur and Elliott for a suggestion of routing Douceur’s keystream data and cyphertext over physically separate channels. Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 23 B. Difference (4) – replacing the stored keystream with the decrypted data as the ciphertext is decrypted Having found that Douceur fails to disclose replacing the stored keystream in the same storage location at the receiver with the decrypted data as the ciphertext is decrypted, the Examiner relies on Pierce to cure this deficiency. Final Action 8. Pierce discloses a method for printing a postage indicium and, more particularly, a method for printing an IBIP (Information-Based Indicia Program9) indicium using a personal computer. Pierce, col. 1, ll. 20-24. Figure 3 of Pierce is reproduced below. Figure 3 is an envelope printed with a sample IBIP indicium (col. 3, ll. 57-58). 9 Pierce, col. 1, l. 26. Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 24 In an IBIP system, a host PC includes application software that requests postage from the PSD (postage security device), creates an indicium when postage is returned with other information from the PSD, and then requests the printer to print the indicium (col. 2, ll. 58-62). It has been found that conventional safeguards in such application software, which are intended to prevent multiple copies of an indicium, can be circumvented and that multiple copies of an indicium can be printed (col. 2, ll. 63-66). In accordance with Pierce’s invention, the data associated with a valid indicium is destroyed as soon as a single printable image has been rendered (col. 3, ll. 17-19). This is accomplished by overwriting the printable image data in the PC memory with “other information” (col. 3, ll. 33-35, 43-45). The Examiner, in addition to finding that Douceur discloses destroying the OTP after it has been used (Douceur, col. 1, ll. 21-23), relies on Pierce for a teaching of destroying Douceur’s OTP by writing over it with “other information.” Final Action 9. The Examiner further reasoned that “because the decrypted message contained the same number of bits as the one time pad to be overwritten, the decrypted message would be new data containing the proper number of bits, available immediately upon decryption of the message, and therefore a ‘perfect candidate’ for the job” (id. at 9-10). Appellant has responded with several arguments. The first argument is that “Pierce comes from an entirely different field of endeavor (printing postage labels) and is not analogous art. A skilled artisan in the networking field would have had no reason to consult Pierce . . . .” (Br. 16.) This argument is unpersuasive because “[a] reference is reasonably pertinent if, Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 25 even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992). We agree with the Examiner that Douceur and Pierce are analogous art because “both prior art references are within the same technological art, computing, data storage, and data transmission, as the instant application,” and because “both Douceur and Pierce, as well as the instant application, deal with the storage of secure data.” (Answer 22.) Appellant also argues that Pierce’s “‘overwriting the printable image with other information’ . . . is not the same as replacing keystream with data usable in the system, such as decrypted data.” (Br. 17.) This argument is unpersuasive because Pierce’s “other information” is presumably useful information. Furthermore, we agree with the Examiner that because the decrypted message has the same number of bits as the OTP, it would have been obvious to replace the OTP with the decrypted message. Finally, Appellant argues that [i]n Pierce, a data object is deleted from memory “once a printable graphic image has been created”—that is, after the printable graphic image has been created. In sharp contrast, in the claimed approach [the] keystream is replaced with decrypted data as the ciphertext is decrypted—at the same time. (Id.) This argument is unpersuasive because the Examiner does not rely on Pierce for the timing of when to replace the OTP with the decrypted data. Instead, as noted above, the Examiner reasoned that the decrypted message Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 26 is “available immediately upon decryption of the message, and therefore a ‘perfect candidate’ for the job [of overwriting the OTP].” Final Action 9-10. We understand this statement to mean that it would have been obvious to perform this overwriting operation as soon as the message has been decrypted. This position of the Examiner is not contrary to Pierce. Pierce discloses overwriting of the stored printable image data as soon as that data has been used for its intended purpose of printing an IBIP indicium. The Examiner’s position is that it would have been obvious to overwrite Douceur’s OTP with the decrypted text as soon as the OTP has served its purpose of being used to decrypt the cyphertext. Appellant therefore has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious in Douceur as modified in view of Elliott to replace the stored keystream data with the decrypted data as the ciphertext is decrypted. C. Conclusion regarding the obviousness rejection of claims 1, 2, 15, 17, 18, and 27 For the foregoing reasons, we will sustain the rejection of claim 1 for obviousness over Douceur, Elliott, and Pierce, the rejection on this ground of the other independent claims (viz., claims 15, 17, and 27), as to which Appellant treats as standing or falling with claim 1 (Br. 19), and the rejection on this ground of dependent claims 2 and 18, which are not separately argued. In re Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 27 THE § 103(a) REJECTIONS OF THE DEPENDENT CLAIMS A. Claims 4 and 20 Claim 4 reads as follow: 4. A method as recited in Claim 1, further comprising the steps of receiving and storing the keystream in a first storage device of a storage area network (SAN) shared storage infrastructure at a receiver and receiving and storing the ciphertext in a second storage device of the SAN shared storage infrastructure at the receiver that is physically separate from the first storage device. The Examiner relies on Golasky as teaching that SANs provide increased storage capacity and more rapid access to data (citing paragraph [0003]) and on Shah as teaching that in an encryption/decryption system, storing the keys in a separate server than the encrypted data provides added protection from illicit access to the protected content (citing paragraph [0071]). Final Action 16. Appellant’s argument that the rejection is based on an excessive number of references (five) (Br. 20) is unpersuasive. As pointed out by the Examiner (Answer 23-24), reliance on a large number of references in a rejection does not, without more, weigh against the obviousness of the claimed invention. In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Appellant argues that “Shah paragraph 71 merely states that encryption keys can be stored physically separate from a database server hosting encrypted data. Shah does not suggest that a receiver of data, as claimed, should store a received ciphertext and keystream in separate locations.” (Br. 20.) We agree with the Examiner that “[w]hile the preferred Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 28 embodiment of Shah does pertain to a host, the teachings of Shah regarding the separate storage of encryption keys from encrypted data does neither pertain solely to storage of data on a host nor suggest this to be the case.” (Answer 24.) Furthermore, to the extent that Appellant is arguing that Shah fails to disclose receiving transmitted keystream and ciphertext, that argument is unpersuasive because the Examiner relies on Douceur and Elliott for such a teaching. Appellant next argues that nothing in Shah can reasonably suggest Applicant’s claimed use of first and second storage devices in a shared storage infrastructure at the receiver. It is well known in the art that SAN architectures provide logical separation but that a shared storage architecture often involves storing data on the same physical machines or in the same physical infrastructure. Shah teaches away from such an approach by requiring physical separation. Because Shah describes physical separation, a skilled artisan would have no reason to combine Shah with Golasky or to contemplate storing keys and ciphertext in a shared storage infrastructure. (Br. 20-21.) This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the assertion that is well known in the art that shared storage in SAN architectures “often” involves storing data on the same physical machines or in the same physical infrastructure is not supported by any evidence. See Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 595 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments of counsel cannot take the place of evidence lacking in the record.”). Second, the assertion itself concedes that it was known that SAN architectures can provide storage on physically separate devices. Third, as Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 29 pointed out by Examiner (Answer 24), Golasky explains in paragraph [0021] that storage device 14 can be “one or a collection of” hard disks, RAID devices, optical or magnetic medium, or any other suitable type of non- volatile storage. For these reasons, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a skilled artisan would have had no reason to combine Shah with Golasky or to contemplate storing keys and ciphertext in a shared storage infrastructure. Finally, Appellant argues: The Office Action also fails to establish any reason to combine Golasky and Shah with Douceur. At most, Douceur inherently provides for storing the OTP and ciphertext in logically separate files or memory locations, but not physically separate devices. Douceur, in fact, discloses no storage devices at all. A skilled artisan knowing of Douceur would have no reason to consider the storage approach of claim 4, or to consider Golasky or Shah. (Br. 21.) This argument is unpersuasive because Douceur’s failure to disclose storage devices does not amount to a teaching away from using storage devices. We agree with the Examiner that a person having ordinary skill in the art, when implementing the system of Douceur, would have looked to Shah and Golasky for teachings that can be used for the storage of keys and ciphertext. For the foregoing reasons, we will sustain the rejection of claims 4 and 20. Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 30 B. Claims 5 and 21 Dependent claims 5 and 21 stand rejected for obviousness over Douceur, Elliott, Pierce, and Rosen. Regarding these claims, Appellant argues that the references fails to disclose two routed communication channels that are physically separate from one another (Br. 21) and that Rosen fails to remedy the alleged failure of the other references to disclose or suggest replacing the stored keystream with the decrypted data as the ciphertext is decrypted (id. at 22). As explained above in the discussion of claim 1, the other references are not deficient in these respects. The rejection of claims 5 and 21 is therefore sustained. C. Claims 6 and 22 Dependent claims 6 and 22 stand rejected or obviousness over Douceur, Elliott, Pierce, and DARPA. Regarding these claims, Appellant argues that DARPA fails to remedy the alleged failure of the other references to disclose or suggest replacing the stored keystream with the decrypted data as the ciphertext is decrypted (id.). As explained above in the discussion of claim 1, the other references are not deficient in this respect. The rejection of claims 6 and 22 is therefore sustained. DECISION The rejection of claims 1, 2, 4-6, 15, 17, 18, 20-22, and 27, which are all of the claims on appeal, for failure to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is sustained. Also, the Appeal 2009-006345 Application 10/061,901 31 rejections of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over the prior art are sustained. The Examiner’s decision that these claims are unpatentable to Appellant is therefore affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(v) (2010). AFFIRMED babc HICKMAN PALERMO TRUONG & BECKER, LLP 2055 GATEWAY PLACE SUITE 550 SAN JOSE, CA 95110 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation