Ex Parte Giunta et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

May 2, 2012

10910863 (B.P.A.I. May. 2, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________________

Ex parte SALVATORE JOHN GIUNTA
and WILLIAM EVAN THOMAS JR.
____________________

Appeal 2010-003349
Application 10/910,863
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, JEFFREY S. SMITH, and
KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, Administrative Patent Judges.

STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
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Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) (2002) from a final
rejection of claims 21-25, 27-30, and 32-42. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Introduction
According to Appellants, the invention relates to a wireless fencing
system. The system comprises a tetherless leash, a programming fixture,
and a terminal. The tetherless leash, attached to an animal and monitored,
establishes a "virtual" (i.e., barrier-free) perimeter based on geo-coordinates.
The tetherless leash also monitors the position and movement of an animal
relative to the perimeter, and delivers warnings, corrections, and praise to
the animal in accordance with its programming. See Spec., Abstract.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Exemplary Claim
Claim 21 is an exemplary claim and is reproduced below:
21. A method comprising:

determining if a monitored animal has breached a perimeter,
wherein the perimeter is defined based on geo-coordinates;

following a pre-breach protocol when the monitored animal
has not breached the perimeter; and

following a post-breach protocol when the monitored animal
has breached the perimeter, wherein the post-breach protocol
comprises delivering a stimulus to the monitored animal as a
function of the monitored animal’s vector of movement relative to
the perimeter.

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Prior Art
Hollis US 6,487,992 B1 Dec. 3, 2002

Rejections
(1) Claims 21, 27-29, and 32-42 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Hollis.
(2) Claims 30 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hollis.

ISSUE 1
35 U.S.C. § 102(e): claims 21, 38, and 41
Appellants argue their invention is not anticipated by Hollis because
Hollis does not deliver stimulus after a monitored animal crosses the
perimeter or as a function of the animal’s vector of movement relative to the
perimeter (App. Br. 14; Reply Br. 3-4).

Issue 1: Has the Examiner erred in finding Hollis discloses “the post-
breach protocol comprises delivering a stimulus to the monitored animal as a
function of the monitored animal's vector of movement relative to the
perimeter” as recited in claim 21?

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
contentions that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’
conclusions. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the
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Examiner (Ans. 3-4, 6-8, and 13-16). However, we highlight and address
specific findings and arguments regarding claim 21 for emphasis as follows.
With respect to Appellants’ argument that Hollis does not disclose
providing a stimulus as a function of vector of movement, we emphasize that
Hollis indeed describes in several places monitoring the animal’s vector of
movement – specifically, monitoring vertical and horizontal orientation and
dynamic movement (col. 5, ll. 24-26), dynamic acceleration (col. 6, ll. 61-
62), movement outside the containment area or toward the containment
fence (col. 8, ll. 13-18 and col. 10, ll. 23-27); speed and direction (col. 10, ll.
35-38) and distance and vector or angle of travel or motion (col. 10, ll. 43-
60). Therefore, Hollis discloses the monitored animal’s vector of movement
relative to the perimeter.
We also agree with the Examiner’s finding that Hollis discloses
providing a stimulus as a function of the animal’s vector of movement
relative to the perimeter (Ans. 4). Specifically, Hollis describes using a
stimulus or an audio signal which we find is also a stimulus (an incentive, a
stimulant, something that rouses or incites to activity). See also, Abstract
(“stimuli includ[es] sound and/or electric shock”) and col. 11, ll. 15-16
(“stimulators delivering stimuli other than sound or electric shock may be
used”).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument based on Hollis’ use
of a term. We interpret the claim giving the claim its broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the Specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d
1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Therefore, we find Hollis discloses “wherein the post-breach protocol
comprises delivering a stimulus to the monitored animal as a function of the
monitored animal's vector of movement relative to the perimeter” as recited
in claim 21 and commensurately recited in claims 38 and 41.
Further with respect to independent claim 38, we agree with the
Examiner that Hollis discloses “wherein the pre-breach protocol comprises
estimating a likelihood that the monitored animal will breach the perimeter”
(Ans. 13-14). We further emphasize that Hollis describes a first training
stimulus and then a main stimulus are provided as the animal moves in the
direction of the fence – i.e., an estimated likelihood that the animal will
breach the perimeter increases as the animal moves closer (col. 7, l. 66 – col.
8, l. 5).
It follows that the Examiner has shown Hollis describes “wherein the
pre-breach protocol comprises estimating a likelihood that the monitored
animal will breach the perimeter” as recited in claim 38
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding
Hollis discloses the invention as recited in independent claim 21and
commensurately recited independent claims 38 and 41.

Claims 27-29
We agree with the Examiner’s findings and reasonings (Ans. 4) and
adopt them as our own. Accordingly, the Examiner did not err in finding
Hollis discloses the invention as recited in claims 27-29.

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Claim 32
Appellants argue Hollis does not disclose a park zone mode of
operation as Hollis does not define two regions that are remote from each
other (App. Br. 15-16). Claim 32 recites entering a mode of operation that
allows the set-up of a second perimeter. The Examiner asserts that since
Hollis describes setting the boundary using GPS, a second perimeter could
be set up by programming GPS coordinates (Ans. 9-10).
Appellants have not presented any persuasive argument or evidence to
show error in the Examiner’s findings. Accordingly, we are not persuaded
the Examiner erred in finding Hollis discloses the invention as recited in
claim 32.

Claims 33-37, 39, 40, and 42
We agree with the Examiner’s findings and reasonings (Ans. 5-7, 10-
13, and 15-17) and adopt them as our own. For the reasons and findings
previously set forth above and because the Examiner has presented detailed
findings that Appellants have not rebutted with any persuasive evidence or
argument, we are not persuaded of Examiner error.
Accordingly, the Examiner did not err in finding Hollis discloses the
invention as recited in claims 33-37, 39, 40, and 42.
Therefore, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 21, 27-29, and
32-42 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) for anticipation by Hollis.

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ISSUE 2
35 U.S.C. § 103 (a): claim 30
Appellants argue Hollis teaches once a monitored animal crosses the
perimeter, stimulus is disabled (App. Br. 23). Thus, according to
Appellants, it would not be obvious to take any action if the animal remains
motionless for a pre-determined period of time (id.).
Issue 2: Has the Examiner erred in finding Hollis would have taught
or suggested “delivering a warning to the monitored animal when the
monitored animal remains motionless for a pre-determined period of time”
as recited in claim 30?
ANALYSIS
We agree with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions and adopt
them as our own (Ans. 7-8 and 17).

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 21, 27-29, and 32-42 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Hollis is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being obvious over Hollis is affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010).

AFFIRMED

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