Ex Parte Giampaolo et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 13, 2014

11112421 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/112,421 04/22/2005 Dominic Giampaolo 04860.P3727X 7731
45217 7590 03/14/2014
APPLE INC./BSTZ
BLAKELY SOKOLOFF TAYLOR & ZAFMAN LLP
1279 OAKMEAD PARKWAY
SUNNYVALE, CA 94085-4040
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, KIM T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2163
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/14/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DOMINIC GIAMPAOLO and YAN ARROUYE
__________

Appeal 2011-011720
Application 11/112,421
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before Before HUBERT C. LORIN, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and
NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges.

LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Dominic Giampaolo, et al. (Appellants) seek our review under
35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1-3, 5-9, 11-15, 17-33, 58-
60, 62-66, 68-72, 74, and 75. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)
(2002).

Appeal 2011-011720
Application 11/112,421

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SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.1

THE INVENTION
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A method comprising:
receiving a search query and a command indicating to perform
a search from a first user;
performing a search in response to the command from the first
user, based on the search query, wherein the search comprises
accessing at least one of metadata and content of files to determine
which files match the search query, wherein the accessing occurs
without a permissions check to determine if the first user can access
the files and wherein performing the search generates search results
comprising identifiers of a first file and a second file;
determining a set of permissions of the first user, the set of
permissions defining, at least a right to access the first file, wherein
the set of permissions does not include a right to access the second
file;
displaying, by a data processing system, the first file without
displaying content of the second file, wherein the type of information
in metadata for files of a first type differs from the type of information
in metadata for files of a second type.

1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Br.,”
filed Feb. 14, 2011) and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Apr. 27,
2011).
Appeal 2011-011720
Application 11/112,421

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THE REJECTION
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Kahn

US 7,185,192 B1 Feb. 27, 2007
The following rejection is before us for review:
1. Claims 1-3, 5-9, 11-15, 17-33, 58-60, 62-66, 68-72, 74, and 75 are
rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as being anticipated by Kahn.

ISSUE
Did the Examiner err in finding that Kahn expressly describes the
claimed subject matter?

FINDINGS OF FACT
We rely on the Examiner’s factual findings stated in the Answer.
Additional findings of fact may appear in the Analysis below.

ANALYSIS
Claims 1-3, 5-9, 11-15, 17, and 18
This group of claims is discussed at Br. 13-15. We take claim 1 as
representative of the group.
There are two arguments challenging the rejection.
The first argument (see the paragraph bridging pp. 14-15 of the Brief)
is that Kahn does not describe “performing a search ... comprises accessing
at least one of metadata and content of files ... wherein the accessing occurs
without a permissions check” (claim 1). “According to Kahn, if a user
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Application 11/112,421

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requested every resource in a system in order to locate a desired resource
(i.e., a "search"), each request would require an access control decision
before the user could make a determination if the requested resource was the
desired resource (i.e., a "permissions check").” Br. 14.
The argument is unpersuasive because Kahn describes a wide range of
security settings, including the absence of rules requiring a permission
check. “[T]he access control system of the invention allow[s] a security
administrator to more generally express a security policy as a set of rules
which can be applied system wide.” Kahn, col. 5, ll. 34-37. As the
Examiner points out (Ans. 26-27), Kahn gives an example where “... if the
requestor is in the staff department, then disregard all rules (or rule
operations) that relate to granting permissions to payroll data” (col. 5, ll. 28-
30).
The second argument (see p. 15 of the Brief) is that Kahn describes a
resource access request which, according to the Appellants, is not a “search”
as that term is used in the claim.
The claim calls for “receiving a search query and a command
indicating to perform a search from a first user [and] performing a search in
response to the command from the first user, based on the search query”
(claim 1 (emphasis added)). In the context of the subject matter being
claimed, the term “search” is a computer function. No express definition for
the term “search” is given in the Specification. However, it is used
consistent with its ordinary usage in computer parlance; that is, it is used to
mean to use a computer to locate something. See e.g., Specification [0003]:
“Both the Finder program and the Windows Explorer program include a find
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Application 11/112,421

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command which allows a user to search for files by various criteria ... .”
Accordingly, the broadest reasonable interpretation for the claim term
“search” is the act of locating something via a computer.
Turning now to Kahn, it describes processing an “access request” or a
“query” (col. 30, ll. 10-16, discussing element 301). The Examiner points to
Fig. 3 where an “Access Request(s) to Resource(s)” (associated with
element 301) is also described. According to the Appellants, “[t]he
Examiner has equated Kahn's resource request with performing a search as
claimed.” Br. 14.
But it is not Kahn’s “Access Request” per se that the Examiner is
equating to the “search” as claimed. Notwithstanding that the Examiner has
stated: “the examiner thinks that they are equivalent” (Ans. 26), the
Examiner means to point to the filter operations that form a part of the
Access Request. The rejection did so via citing column 10, lines 17-66.
Ans. 4. In response to the Appellants’ argument, the Examiner further
elaborated (with respect to the rejection of claim 19):
Kahn discloses (on Figs. 3, 5, 7 and column 4 lines 25-40) upon
receipt of an access request requesting a type of access by a
requestor to a resource, the system of the invention processes
one or more filter operations that relate to one or more
portions of information in the access request (e.g., that relate
to the requestor submitting the access request, and/or to a type
of access requested, and/or to the resource to which access is
requested) to determine which rules from the master set of rules
might apply to an access control decision (or a query request)
based on the access request. Once the filter operations are
complete, a selected set of rules is produced that define rule
operations that when processed will grant certain access to
certain requestors to the requested resource ....
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Ans. 27-28 (generally repeated at Ans. 29). Accordingly, the question is
whether the Examiner erred in determining that Kahn expressly describes
the claimed subject matter based on finding that the “search” as claimed
reads on Kahn’s filtering operations, not the “Access Request” per se.
Kahn describes the filtering operations thusly:
Access request can specify, for example, an identity of a
requestor, a type of access requested, and a resource to which
this requester requests the access. The system can process this
access request against one or more rules selected from a master
set of rules which define an access control policy. Instead of
processing the access request against the entire set of rules, the
system can preferably first select certain rules which might
apply to a determination of an access control decision by using
filter operations. Filter operations might, for example, select all
rules that apply to the resource to which access is requested, or
might select only those rules from the master set of rules that
apply to a specific role identity of the requestor (e.g., rules that
apply to a database administrator), or to a type of access
requested (e.g., rules that apply to a configure access request).
The system then applies the access request against the selected
set of rules (i.e., a subset of the master set of rules, determined
based on the filter operations) that define rule operations to
determine an access control decision.
Col. 10, ll. 29-47. The filtering operations that Kahn describes appear to be
directed to locating something; specifically, rules. Given that the broadest
reasonable interpretation for the claim term “search” is the act of locating
something via a computer (see above), the “search” as claimed would appear
to cover Kahn’s filtering operations.

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Accordingly, the Appellants’ second argument is unpersuasive as to
error in the rejection because (a) it does not fully address the Examiner’s
position and (b) the claimed “search” as reasonably broadly construed
covers Kahn’s disclosed filtering operations on which the Examiner relied to
make the anticipation determination.
For the foregoing reasons, we are unpersuaded that the Examiner
erred in finding that Kahn expressly describes the claimed subject matter.

Claims 19-33
This group of claims is argued at Br. 15-16 but the argument does no
more than repeat what is claimed, ending with the sentence: “Thus, Kahn
fails to anticipate claim 19 for similar reasons to those stated above with
respect to claim 1.” As we have found those reasons unpersuasive as to
error in the rejection of claim 1, we find the same as directed to the rejection
of these claims.

Claims 58-60, 62-66, 68-72, 74, and 75
This group of claims is argued at Br. 16-17 but the argument does no
more than repeat what is claimed, ending with the sentence: “Thus, claim 58
is not anticipated by Kahn for similar reasons to those stated above with
respect to claim 1.” As we have found those reasons unpersuasive as to
error in the rejection of claim 1, we find the same as directed to the rejection
of these claims.
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Application 11/112,421

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DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-3, 5-9, 11-15, 17-33,
58-60, 62-66, 68-72, 74, and 75 is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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