Ex Parte Gee et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 28, 2018

14628940 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 28, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/628,940 02/23/2015
46442 7590 10/02/2018
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C./Ford
400 W. MAPLE RD.
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Tom Scott Gee
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83503018;67186-161
PUSl
1757
EXAMINER
HUYNH,LUATT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3661
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/02/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TOM SCOTT GEE,
MAZEN HAMMOUD, and KEVIN LA YDEN 1
Appeal 2017-011640
Application 14/628,940
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN C. KERINS, EDWARD A. BROWN, and
ANNETTE R. REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
decision to reject claims 1-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l) as anticipated by
Tonegawa (US 2013/0096734 Al, issued Apr. 18, 2013). We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We REVERSE.
1 Ford Global Technologies, LLC ("Appellant") is indicated as the real party
in interest and is also the Applicant pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.46. Appeal
Brief 1 (hereinafter "Appeal Br.") (filed Feb. 15, 2017).
Appeal2017-011640
Application 14/628,940
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter "relates to conditioning an electrified
vehicle using grid power, which can reduce the battery power required
during a drive cycle and thus extend an electric driving range for the
electrified vehicle." Spec. ,r I2, Fig. 1. Claims 1, 14, and 18 are
independent.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter and recites:
1. A method, comprising:
conditioning an electrified vehicle to maintain a target
conditioning level using power from a grid source, the
conditioning either lasting from a conclusion of a first drive cycle
to the beginning of a second drive cycle that is subsequent the
first drive cycle, or lasting from a conclusion of a first drive cycle
for set time.
ANALYSIS
The Examiner finds that Tonegawa discloses a method comprising all
the claimed limitations. Final Act. 4. 3 More particularly, the Examiner
finds that Tonegawa discloses "preliminarily activat[ing] the air conditioner
36 of the motor vehicle 12 before a driver enters the motor vehicle 12." Id.
( citing Tonegawa ,r 27). The Examiner takes the position that
"from a conclusion of a drive cycle" [has been interpreted] not to
be immediately after the drive cycle is ended. The
[S]pecification offers no further definition of the phrase "from a
conclusion of a drive cycle" other than what is in the claim. The
Examiner notes, however, that paragraph 50 of Appellant's
[S Jpecification notes that "[when] all of the power from the grid
source 22 is required to charge the battery 14 overconditioning,
2 Specification (hereinafter "Spec.") (dated February 23, 2015).
3 Final Office Action (hereinafter "Final Act.") (dated Sept. 8, 2016).
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Application 14/628,940
and even conditioning, may not be an option" ( emphasis added).
Also, Appellant's [F]igure 2 illustrates that conditioning (box
128) does not occur until the condition "Is full amount of grid
power being utilized" is met (box 116). It is the [E]xaminer's
position that paragraph 50 and [F]igure 2 as noted above
demonstrate that the interpretation of the phrase "from a
conclusion of a first drive cycle" is not an exact point in time
even in [Appellant's] invention, but can vary depending on
charge conditions (box 116) and other conditioning factors (box
128).
Ans. 7-8. 4
Appellant contends that
Tonegawa activates preliminary air conditioning for a vehicle
before a driver enters the motor vehicle, but Tonegawa does not
disclose that the preliminary air conditioning is active ''from a
conclusion of a drive cycle."
In Tonegawa, a vehicle 12 is parked outside a home 14
with the preliminary air conditioning in an inactive state. When
the vehicle 12 is parked outside the home 14, a drive cycle for
the vehicle 12 has ended. After some time has passed without
preliminary air conditioning, the preliminary air conditioning is
activated in response to a trigger event. If the preliminary air
conditioning were active from a conclusion of a drive cycle,
the preliminary air conditioning would not require
activation.
Appeal Br. 3 (underlining added). Appellant further contends that "[t]here is
no teaching whatsoever of the vehicle 12 in Tonegawa ending a drive cycle,
but maintaining its air conditioning." Id. at 4.
Appellant has the better position. Although the Specification does not
define the phrase "from a conclusion of a drive cycle," paragraph 40 of the
Specification describes that:
4 Examiner's Answer (hereinafter "Ans.") (dated June 22, 2017).
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Application 14/628,940
In the prior art, vehicles have been preconditioned when
connected to grid power source. Such vehicles start to be
preconditioned in response to a go-time. A user may, for
example, program the vehicle to begin preconditioning at a go-
time, such as 6:00 am every morning. The prior art vehicles,
however, do not maintain a target conditioning level from the end
of a drive cycle to the start of a subsequent drive cycle or a set
time.
Spec. ,r 40 ( emphasis added); see also Reply Br. 2. 5
Paragraph 41 of the Specification further describes that, "[i]n contrast
to the prior art, in the example vehicle 10, the conditioning to maintain a
target conditioning level lasts from the conclusion of an initial drive cycle
until the start of a subsequent drive cycle or until a set time." Id. ,I 41
( emphasis added). The term "from" is defined as "used as a function word
to indicate a starting point of a physical movement or a starting point in
measuring or reckoning or in a statement of limits [ such as] ... cost from $5
to $1 O" ( emphases added). 6 As such, we construe the phrase "from a
conclusion of a drive cycle" to mean "starting at a conclusion of the first
drive cycle." Further, the term "subsequent" is defined as "following in
time, order, or place."7 Accordingly, the phrase "from a conclusion of a first
drive cycle to the beginning of a second drive cycle that is subsequent the
first drive cycle" requires that the second drive cycle be consecutive from
the first drive cycle.
5 Reply Brief (hereinafter "Reply Br.") (filed July 19, 2017).
6 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/from
(last visited Sept. 11, 2018).
7MERRIAM-WEBSTER,https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/subsequent (last visited Sept. 11, 2018).
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Application 14/628,940
Paragraph 27 of Tonegawa states:
A preliminary air conditioning system 10 according to the
embodiment of the present invention supplies electric power
from a building, such as a house 14, to a motor vehicle 12, such
as a hybrid vehicle or electric vehicle, to charge the vehicle
battery 34 mounted in the motor vehicle 12 and executes controls
to preliminarily activate the air conditioner 36 of the motor
vehicle 12 before a driver enters the motor vehicle 12.
Tonegawa ,r 27 (bolding removed).
Paragraph 27 of Tonegawa does not disclose conditioning to maintain
a target conditioning level, with the conditioning lasting from a conclusion
of a first drive cycle to a second drive cycle in which the second drive cycle
is consecutive to the first drive cycle. Claim 1 further recites, in the
alternative, the conditioning "lasting from a conclusion of a first drive cycle
for set time." Appeal Br. 9, Claims App. Paragraph 27 ofTonegawa further
does not disclose conditioning to maintain a target conditioning level, with
the conditioning "lasting from a conclusion of a first drive cycle for set
time," or, in other words, conditioning lasting from a conclusion of the first
drive cycle to another time point. As Tonegawa does not explicitly disclose
that the preliminary air conditioning lasts from a conclusion of a first drive
cycle to a second drive cycle in which the second drive cycle is consecutive
to the first drive cycle, or that the preliminary air conditioning lasts from a
conclusion of the first drive cycle to another time point, the Examiner fails
to establish that Tonegawa discloses all the claimed limitations. Further, the
Examiner fails to provide sufficient evidence or technical reasoning to
establish that (1) the preliminary air conditioning of Tonegawa necessarily
lasts from a conclusion of a first drive cycle to a second drive cycle in which
the second drive cycle is consecutive to the first drive cycle; or that (2) the
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Application 14/628,940
preliminary air conditioning of Tonegawa necessarily lasts from a
conclusion of the first drive cycle to another time point.
For these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim
1, as well as independent claims 14 and 18, which recite similar limitations,
and dependent claims 2-13, 15-17, and 19 as anticipated by Tonegawa.
DECISION
We REVERSE the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-19.
REVERSED
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