Ex Parte Garg et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 27, 2017

13518193 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 27, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/518,193 06/21/2012 Sharad K. Garg 01.P33120US 9337
119829 7590 09/29/2017
Green, Howard, & Mughal LLP
5 Centerpointe Dr.
Suite 400
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
EXAMINER
TAYLOR, JOSHUA D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2426
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/29/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @ ghmip .com
inteldocs_docketing @ cpaglobal. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SHARAD K. GARG, ATUL N. HATALKAR,
ALOK K. MATHUR, and JOHN W. CARROLL
Appeal 2017-005340
Application 13/518,193
Technology Center 2400
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ALLEN R. MacDONALD, and
JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges.
SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—2, 5—6, 14—16, 19, 22, 30—31, 34—35, and 46-47,
which are all the claims pending in this application.2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Intel Corporation.
(App. Br. 1).
2 Claims 3—4, 7—13, 17—18, 20—21, 23—29, 32—33, and 36-45 were cancelled
previously.
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Application 13/518,193
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to methods and systems that present data
to a viewer, where the data is specific to the viewer, and is stored locally
(Spec. 117). Exemplary claim 1 under appeal reads as follows:
1. A method, comprising:
storing supplemental content locally in a local device
wherein the supplemental content is specific to a context of
current programming;
loading the current programming into a first media
pipeline of the local device;
receiving at the local device a loading trigger that prompts
loading of the supplemental content from local storage of the
local device into a second media pipeline of the local device,
wherein the first and second media pipelines are separate parallel
media pipelines of a multi-stream transport processing unit and
multi-stream media decoder of the local device that allow
parallel processing and queuing of two separate media streams,
where either a first media stream of the first pipeline or a second
media stream of the second pipeline can be selected for
presenting to a viewer;
after the second media pipeline is loaded with the
supplemental content, waiting for a slot to occur in a presentation
to the viewer of the current programming of the first media
pipeline; and
upon occurrence of the slot, switching the presentation
from the first media pipeline to the second media pipeline at the
local device such that the supplemental content is presented to
the viewer.
REFERENCES and REJECTIONS
Claims 1—2, 5—6, 14—16, 19, 22, 30-31, and 34—35 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Lawrence-Apfelbaum et al.
(US 2009/0210899 Al; published Aug. 20, 2009) (“Lawrence-Apfelbaum”)
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and Hendricks et al. (US 6,463,585 Bl; issued Oct. 8, 2002) (“Hendricks”)
(see Final Act. 2—9).
Claims 1—2, 5—6, 14—16, 19, 22, 30—31, and 34—35 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Lawrence-Apfelbaum,
Hendricks and Monson et al. (US 2003/0023973 Al; published Jan. 30,
2003) (“Monson”) (see Final Act. 10-18).
Claims 46-47 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Lawrence-Apfelbaum, Hendricks and Chevallier et al.
(US 2004/0047596 Al; published Mar. 11, 2004) (“Chevallier”) (see Final
Act. 18-19).
Claims 46-47 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Lawrence-Apfelbaum, Hendricks, Monson and Chevallier (see Final
Act. 19-20).
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Claim Construction
A claim under examination is given its broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the underlying specification. See In re
American Acad, of Science Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
In the absence of an express definition of a claim term in the specification or
a clear disclaimer of scope, the claim term is interpreted as broadly as the
ordinary usage of the term by one of ordinary skill in the art would permit.
See In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); see also In re Morris, YU F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations
contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim
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limitations that are not a part of the claim. See SuperGuide Corp. v.
DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Obviousness
The Supreme Court has rejected the rigid requirement of
demonstrating a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the references to
combine known elements to show obviousness. See KSR Int 7 Co., v.
Teleflex Co., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). Instead, a rejection based on
obviousness only needs to be supported by “some articulated reasoning with
some rational underpinning” to combine known elements in the manner
required by the claim. Id. at 418. Indeed, the Supreme Court made clear
that when considering obviousness, “the analysis need not seek out precise
teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for
a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments (Appeal Brief and Reply Brief) that the Examiner has erred. We
are unpersuaded by Appellants’ contentions and concur with the findings
and conclusions reached by the Examiner as explained below.
Independent Claims 1 and 30
Appellants contend the cited references fail to teach or suggest
“loading the current programming into a first media pipeline of the local
device,” and “receiving at the local device a loading trigger that prompts
loading of the supplemental content from local storage of the local device
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into a second media pipeline of the local device, wherein the first and second
media pipelines are separate parallel media pipelines of a multi-stream
transport processing unit and multi-stream media decoder of the local device
that allow parallel processing and queuing of two separate media streams,”
as recited in independent claim 1, and similarly recited in independent claim
30 (see App. Br. 7). More specifically, Appellants argue the combination of
Lawrence-Apfelbaum and Hendricks, and the alternate combination of
Lawrence-Apfelbaum, Hendricks, and Monson, both fail to describe any
separation of current programming and supplemental content between two
media pipelines of a local device having the hardware specified that allow
parallel processing and queuing of two separate media streams (see App.
Br. 7—8; see also Reply Br. 2-4).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ contention. We agree with the
Examiner that Lawrence-Apfelbaum teaches loading current programming
into a local device and loading supplemental content from a local storage of
the local device into the local device (see Final Act. 10—11). More
specifically, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Lawrence-
Apfelbaum teaches receiving a broadcast or recorded program (i.e., the
claimed “current programming”) into a first channel and further receiving
advertising content (i.e., the claimed “supplemental content”) from a local
storage location, where the advertising content is pre-positioned at the
storage location, or alternatively transmitted at any time after the start of the
program, but before a designated point of insertion (see id. (citing Lawrence-
Apfelbaum || 205, 206, and 209)).
We further agree with the Examiner that Hendricks teaches loading
current programming into a first media pipeline of a local device, and
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receiving at the local device a loading trigger that prompts loading of
supplement content from a local storage of the local device into a second
media pipeline of the local device, where the first and second media
pipelines are separate parallel media pipelines of a multi-stream transport
processing unit and multi-stream media decoder of the local device (see
Final Act. 12). More specifically, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Hendricks teaches a multiple channel architecture that includes a program
channel (i.e., the claimed “first media pipeline”) that carries a main program
(i.e., the claimed “current programming”) and a number of feeder channels
(i.e., the claimed “second media pipeline”) to carry alternate programming
(i.e., the claimed “supplemental content”), where a television terminal
switches itself to the appropriate feeder channels based on a switching plan
that identifies scheduled advertisement spots contained within determined
breaks in the main programming (i.e., the claimed “loading trigger”), where
a digital program signal is stored in a random access memory in the
television terminal for later conversion and display (i.e., the claimed
“[prompting the] loading of the supplemental content from local storage”),
and where the hardware required to accommodate such channel switching
capabilities include, inter alia, a microprocessor (i.e., the claimed “multi­
stream transport processing unit”) and a decompressor (i.e., the claimed
“multi-stream media decoder”) (see id. (citing Hendricks 4:35—53; 5:29—67;
9:65—10:26); see also Hendricks 73:13—35; Fig. 35).
We also agree with the Examiner that Monson teaches first and second
media pipelines that allow parallel processing and queueing of two separate
media streams (see Final Act. 13). More specifically, we agree with the
Examiner’s finding that Monson teaches a media player that streams a pre-
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roll advertisement (i.e., the claimed “first media pipeline”) and replacement
advertisements (i.e., the claimed “second media pipeline”), where the media
player executes code that pre-fetches the replacement advertisements in
parallel to the playing of the pre-roll advertisement and the broadcast audio
and audiovisual stream (i.e., the claimed “parallel processing and queueing
of two media streams”) (see id. at 13 (citing Monson | 85)). Thus, we agree
with the Examiner that the disputed limitations of claims 1 and 30 are taught
or suggested by the cited references.
Contrary to Appellants’ contention, the Examiner’s interpretation of
the claimed “first and second media pipelines” as reading on either
Hendricks’ program channel and feeder channel or Monson’s pre-roll
advertisement and replacement advertisements is reasonable in light of
Appellants’ specification (see Ans. 4—5). Neither the appealed claims, nor
Appellants’ Specification, provides a definition for a “media pipeline” that
distinguishes the claimed “first and second media pipelines” from either
Hendricks’ program channel and feeder channel or Monson’s pre-roll
advertisement and replacement advertisements.
Appellants further contend the cited references fail to teach or suggest
“after the second media pipeline is loaded . . . waiting for a slot to occur,” as
recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 30 (see App. Br. 7). More
specifically, Appellants argue the combination of Lawrence-Apfelbaum and
Hendricks, and the alternate combination of Lawrence-Apfelbaum,
Hendricks, and Monson, both fail to disclose waiting for a slot to occur after
a second media pipeline is loaded with the supplemental content (see App.
Br. 8—9; see also Reply Br. 4).
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This contention is not persuasive. As described above, the Examiner
properly finds that Lawrence-Apfelbaum teaches receiving advertising
content from a local storage location, where the advertising content is pre­
positioned at the storage location, or alternatively transmitted at any time
after the start of the program, but before a designated point of insertion (see
Final Act. 11 (citing Lawrence-Apfelbaum 11205, 206, 209)). We agree with
the Examiner that this feature of Lawrence-Apfelbaum teaches or suggests
waiting for a slot to occur in a presentation to a viewer of current
programming, because the system loads the advertising content at a time
before a designated point of insertion and waits for the designated point of
insertion to display the advertising content.
Appellants also contend the rationale alleged in support of the
rejection of claims 1 and 30 is not sufficient to support the rejection (see
App. Br. 10). More specifically, Appellants assert the rationale amounts to a
bald assertion that the modification of Lawrence-Apfelbaum based on
Hendricks (or alternatively based on Hendricks and Monson) renders
obvious the presently claimed subject matter and would “produce
predictable and desirable results” (see Appeal Br. 10 (citing Final Act. 5,
12—13); see also Reply Br. 5).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ contention. We agree with the
Examiner that the applied references teach or suggest the disputed
limitations to one of ordinary skill in the art, because the skilled artisan is “a
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” and this is a case in which
the skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents
together like pieces of a puzzle.” See KSR, 550 U.S. at 420, 421. We
specifically find that the Examiner has articulated (see Final Act. 12—13; see
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also Ans. 11—13) how the claimed features are met by the reference
teachings with some rational underpinning to combine the teachings of
Lawrence-Apfelbaum with Hendricks and Monson. See KSR, 550 U.S. at
418. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 30 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lawrence-Apfelbaum,
Hendricks and Monson. In light of our discussion above, which is
dispositive of the issues in this rejection, we do not reach the alternate
rejection of claims 1 and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Lawrence-Apfelbaum and Hendricks.
Independent claim 14
Appellants contend the cited references fail to teach or suggest “the
multi-stream transport processing unit to receive, in parallel, current
programming from the media source and the supplemental content from the
local storage unit,” and “a multi-stream media decoder in communication
with the multi-stream transport processing unit, the multi-stream media
decoder to receive, in parallel, the current programming and the
supplemental content via first and second parallel media pipelines,
respectively, of the multi-stream transport processing unit, and to process, in
parallel, the current programming and the supplemental content,” as recited
in independent claim 14 (see App. Br. 9). More specifically, Appellants
argue Lawrence-Apfelbaum and Hendricks fail to describe “any separation
of current programming and supplement content between two media
pipelines of a local device having the hardware” as specified in the
aforementioned limitations that allows processing and queuing of two
separate media streams (see App. Br. 9—10; see also Reply Br. 5—6).
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We are not persuaded by Appellants’ contention. Although the
limitations of claim 14 are slightly different from the limitations of claims 1
and 30, our previous discussion of the cited references with respect to claims
1 and 30 also applies to claim 14. More specifically, we agree with the
Examiner’s finding that Hendricks teaches a microprocessor (i.e., the
claimed “multi-stream transport processing unit”) that receives a main
program (i.e., the claimed “current programming”) and alternate
programming (i.e., the claimed “supplemental content”), and further teaches
a decompressor (i.e., the claimed “multi-stream media decoder”) that
receives the main program and the alternate program via a program channel
and a number of feeder channels (i.e., the claimed “first and second parallel
media pipelines) and processes the main program and the alternate program
(see Final Act. 16 (citing Hendricks 4:35—53; 5:29-67; 9:65—10:26); see also
Hendricks 73:13—35). We further agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Monson teaches a media player (i.e., the claimed “multi-stream media
decoder”) that processes a pre-roll advertisement (i.e., the claimed “current
programming”) and replacement advertisements (i.e., the claimed
“supplemental content”) in parallel (see Final Act. 17 citing Monson | 85).
Thus, we agree with the Examiner’s position that the limitations of claim 14
are taught or suggested by the cited references.
Appellants also contend the rationale alleged in support of the
rejection of claim 14 is not sufficient to support the rejection (see App.
Br. 10). More specifically, Appellants contend the rationale amounts to an
abstract assertion that does not address the noted differences between the
claimed subject matter and the cited references in any meaningful manner
(see App. Br. 10-11 (citing Final Act. 8); see also Reply Br. 5).
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This contention is not persuasive. The Examiner’s rationale as to why
one of ordinary skill in the art would modify the disclosure of Lawrence-
Apfelbaum using the teachings of Hendricks and Monson is sufficient
because the limitations of claim 14 are taught or suggested by the cited
references (see Final Act. 16—17; see also Ans. 11—13). Therefore, we
sustain the rejection of claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lawrence-Apfelbaum, Hendricks, and Monson. In light
of our discussion above, which is dispositive of the issues in this rejection,
we do not reach the alternate rejection of claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Lawrence-Apfelbaum and Hendricks.
Remaining Claims
No separate arguments are presented for the remaining dependent
claims (see App. Br. 11). We therefore sustain their rejections under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lawrence-Apfelbaum,
Hendricks, and Monson for the reasons stated with respect to independent
claims 1, 14, and 30.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—2, 5—6, 14—16,
19, 22, 30-31, 34—35, and 46-A7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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