Ex Parte Gagner et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 24, 2014

12741643 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 24, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MARK B. GAGNER, JACEK A. GRABIEC,
MICHAEL J. IRBY II, SCOTT H. SCHULHOF, and
TRACEY L. WRIGHT
____________________

Appeal 2012-010391
Application 12/741,643
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before: JENNIFER D. BAHR, STEFAN STAICOVICI, and
LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAHR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mark B. Gagner et al. (Appellants) appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from
the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–17 and 19–26. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter.
1. One or more machine-readable storage media having
instructions stored thereon, which when executed by a set of
one or more processors causes the set of one or more processors
to perform operations comprising:
initiating a wagering game session, associated with a
wagering game player account, for presentation of primary
wagering game content via a wagering game machine;
comparing a plurality of secondary wagering game
content, presentable during the wagering game session, to one
or more user preferences indicated in a profile for the wagering
game player account;
selecting one of the plurality of secondary wagering
game content based on the comparing of the plurality of the
secondary wagering game content to the one or more user
preferences;
determining a scheduled event that relates to the one of
the plurality of secondary wagering game content;
presenting a notification message of the scheduled event,
on the wagering game machine, during the wagering game
session; and
indicating, on the notification message, one or more
wagering opportunities for the scheduled event via the
secondary wagering game content.

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
non-statutory subject matter.1
Claims 24–26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as
failing to comply with the enablement requirement.
Claims 1–11, 14–17, and 19–26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being anticipated by LeMay (US 2007/0243925 A1, published
Oct. 18, 2007).
Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over LeMay and Chin (US 2006/0218029 A1, published Sept.
28, 2006).
Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over LeMay and Roemer (US 2006/0019743 A1, published
Jan. 26, 2006).

OPINION
Non-statutory Subject Matter Rejection
In contesting this rejection, Appellants group claims 1–8 together.
Appeal Br. 1112. Thus, we select claim 1 to decide the appeal of this
rejection as to the entire group. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011).

1 The Answer and Final Rejection (mailed Sept. 2, 2001) both indicate that
the “rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. [§] 101 from the previous
office action is hereby maintained,” but set forth a rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 of only claims 1–8. Answer 4, 5; Final Rej. 2, 3. In the Office Action
(mailed Mar. 3, 2011) immediately prior to the Final Rejection, the
Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 from
the Office Action mailed October 29, 2010.
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Claim 1 is directed to “machine-readable storage media.” Appeal Br.
29, Claims App. Appellants argue that they have amended their
Specification “to distinguish between machine readable ‘storage’ media and
machine readable ‘signal’ media.” Appeal Br. 12; see Amendment filed
June 3, 2011 (amending paragraphs 66, 84, 100, and 101). The Examiner
finds that the terminology “machine-readable storage media” covers
machine-readable transitory signal media, and that, even with the
amendments to the Specification alluded to by Appellants, Appellants’
Specification does not exclude these transmission types from the scope of
“machine-readable storage media.” Answer 4.
Paragraph 66 of the Specification, as amended, discloses that the
wagering game network components can include hardware and machine-
readable storage media including instructions for performing operations, and
that “[m]achine-readable storage media includes any mechanism that
provides (i.e., stores) information in a form readable by a machine.”
Paragraph 66 also discloses that “[f]or example, tangible machine-readable
storage media includes read only memory (ROM), random access memory
(RAM), magnetic disk storage media, optical storage media, flash memory
machines, etc.” and that “[m]achine-readable signal media includes any
media suitable for transmitting software over a network.”
Paragraph 84 of the Specification, as amended, alludes to certain
embodiments in which operations are “performed by executing instructions
residing on machine-readable storage media (e.g., software)” and other
embodiments in which operations are “performed by hardware and/or other
logic (e.g., firmware).” Paragraph 100, as amended, adds that any
component of the wagering game device “can include hardware, firmware,
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and/or machine-readable storage media including instructions for performing
the operations described herein.”
Paragraph 101, as amended (with emphasis added), reads:
The described embodiments may be provided as a
computer program product, or software, that may include a
machine-readable storage medium having stored thereon
instructions, which may be used to program a computer system
(or other electronic device(s)) to perform a process according to
embodiments of the invention(s), whether presently described
or not, because every conceivable variation is not enumerated
herein. A machine readable storage medium includes any
mechanism for storing information in a form readable by a
machine (e.g., a computer). The machine-readable storage
medium may include, but is not limited to, magnetic storage
medium (e.g., floppy diskette); optical storage medium (e.g.,
CD-ROM); magneto-optical storage medium; read only
memory (ROM); random access memory (RAM); erasable
programmable memory (e.g., EPROM and EEPROM); flash
memory; or other types of medium suitable for storing
electronic instructions. In addition, some embodiments may
include machine readable signal media, which may be
embodied in an electrical, optical, acoustical or other form of
propagated signal (e.g., carrier waves, infrared signals, digital
signals, etc.), or wireline, wireless, or other communications
medium.
Thus, Appellants’ Specification defines machine-readable storage
media as including any mechanism that provides or stores information in a
form readable by a machine. Accordingly, the Examiner correctly
determined that “machine-readable storage media” covers a propagated
signal, because there are propagated signals that provide or store information
that is machine-readable. Although the Specification describes machine-
readable signal media as including any media suitable for transmitting
software over a network, and labels propagated signals as “communications
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medi[a],” Appellants’ Specification does not explicitly exclude such signal
or communications media from the scope of “machine-readable storage
media.” Rather, paragraph 101 of the Specification appears to identify the
propagated signals (signal or communications media) as embodiments or
forms of machine-readable storage media, in addition to the various other
enumerated forms of machine-readable storage media, such as ROM, RAM,
EPROM, EEPROM, and magnetic, optical, and magneto-optical media.
Paragraph 66 discusses tangible machine-readable storage media and
machine-readable signal media, but does not explicitly indicate that
machine-readable signal media are excluded from tangible machine-readable
storage media, much less from machine-readable storage media generally.
Thus, claim 1 covers subject matter that is not patent-eligible under
35 U.S.C. § 101. See Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 1862 (PTAB
2013) (precedential) (holding recited machine-readable storage medium
ineligible under § 101 because it encompassed transitory media); see also
David J. Kappos, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media,
1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010) (“The broadest reasonable
interpretation of a claim drawn to a computer readable medium . . . typically
covers forms of . . . transitory propagating signals”); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d
1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that “transitory embodiments are not
directed to statutory subject matter”).2

2 As noted in Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, “[a]
claim drawn to such a computer readable medium that covers both
transitory and non-transitory embodiments may be amended to narrow the
claim to cover only statutory embodiments to avoid a rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 by adding the limitation ‘non-transitory’ to the claim.” See
Answer 5.
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Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to non-statutory subject matter.

Enablement Rejection
The Examiner rejects claims 24–26 as failing to comply with the
enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, because “there
is no mention within the specification of a means for carrying out the
claimed functions [of the means-plus-function limitations of claims 24–26
enumerated by the Examiner].” Answer 6–7 (citing Aristocrat Techs. Austl.
Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 133132 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
However, the Examiner’s reliance on Aristocrat to support an enablement
rejection is misplaced. Aristocrat addressed the issue of whether the patent
at issue disclosed structure that is used to perform the function set forth in
the mean-plus-function limitations of the claims so as to limit the scope of
the claims to the particular structure disclosed, together with equivalents
(i.e., “sufficient disclosure of structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶6”), to satisfy
the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1336, 1338. Sufficiency of disclosure of structure
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, serves a very different purpose from
the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Id. at 1336.
“Enablement of a device requires only the disclosure of sufficient
information so that a person of ordinary skill in the art could make and use
the device.” Id.
When rejecting a claim for lack of enablement, the PTO bears the
initial burden of setting forth a reasonable explanation as to why the scope of
the claim is not adequately enabled by the description provided in the
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specification. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 156162 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The
dispositive issue is whether the applicant’s disclosure, considering the level
of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the application for patent, would
have enabled a person of such skill to make and use the applicant’s invention
without undue experimentation. In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232
(CCPA 1982). Factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure
would require undue experimentation include:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of
working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state
of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth
of the claims.
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
These factors are illustrative; what is relevant to an enablement
determination depends upon the facts of the particular case. See
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
In the case before us, the Examiner asserts that Appellants’
Specification fails to provide a description of the structure or algorithm for
carrying out the claimed functions, but does not articulate any findings or
analysis, such as by consideration of any of the Wands factors, to show that
a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been unable to make and use
the claimed invention in the absence of such description in the Specification.
Accordingly, the Examiner has not met the initial burden of setting forth a
reasonable explanation as to why the scope of claims 24–26 is not
adequately enabled by the description provided in the Specification. Thus,
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we do not sustain the rejection of claims 24–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement.

Anticipation based on LeMay
Claims 9–11 and 14
The issue presented in the appeal of the rejection of claim 9 is whether
LeMay discloses a system with a client configured to present “secondary
content superimposed over a portion of the primary content to a degree of
superimposition in accordance with the comparative importance of the
secondary content,” as called for in claim 9. Appeal Br. 15–16; id. at 31–32,
Claims App. (emphasis added). The Examiner points to LeMay’s Figures
5A, 5B, and paragraphs 325, 95, 330, and 319 as disclosing this feature.
Answer 15, 27–28.
More specifically, LeMay discloses that the gaming machine is
operable to provide display portions “as ‘pop-up’ windows that overlap or
overlay one or more other display portions” and “may include logic that
prevents a pop-up window from blocking an important gaming component
on the display . . . or from blocking important game information on the
display.” LeMay, ¶ 95. LeMay also discloses that the externally controlled
interface (ECI) may use “a portion of the display via a sliding window
transition, via a swapping of windows transition, via an overlay of windows
transition, via a scaling of windows transition, via one or more hidden
windows or via any suitable transition.” Id. ¶ 325. Additionally, LeMay
discloses that players may provide, or gaming establishments may collect,
preference information regarding a player’s interests and gaming activities,
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and that advertising for a show may be presented to a player based on
information known about the player. Id. ¶¶ 330, 319.
The Examiner finds that “[t]he degree of superimposition in LeMay is
binary. An ECI that is determined to be relevant and important to a player is
presented, whereas an ECI that is neither relevant nor important is not
presented to a player.” Answer 27–28. According to the Examiner, “[a]s a
whole, LeMay discloses a system in which ECI’s provide players with
information that is relevant to them and does not cover more important
information beneath.” Id. at 28. The Examiner explains that
Appellants’ [S]pecification fails to use the word
“degree.” Appellants’ [S]pecification does, however, discuss[]
secondary content that is superimposed over primary content in
a minimally intrusive manner (e.g., near the bottom of the
primary content, partially transparent in relation to the primary
content, etc.). (Specification [0039]). Transparency is
commonly described in computer programs as a scale from 0
percent to 100 percent transparent. An object with 0 percent
transparency is not transparent at all, whereas an object with
100 percent transparency is invisible. Without further limiting
the term “degree of superimposition[,”] examiner believes a
binary degree of superimposition to meet the requirements of
the claim language.
Answer 28–29.
Appellants argue that “LeMay does not teach a scale of differing
degrees of superimposition, only either superimposing or not
superimposing.” Reply Br. 8.3 This argument does not demonstrate error in
the Examiner’s position, because claim 9 does not require a scale of
differing degrees of superimposition. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348

3 Appellants’ Reply Brief does not include pagination. Our page references
for the Reply Brief correspond to the order of the pages of the document.
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(CCPA 1982) (limitations not appearing in the claims cannot be relied upon
for patentability).
As the Examiner found, LeMay discloses displaying secondary (ECI)
content as an overlay or overlap of the primary display, so long as the
secondary content does not block “an important gaming component” or
“important game information.” LeMay, ¶ 95. Stated differently, LeMay
values all secondary content as less important than “an important gaming
component” or “important game information.” LeMay discloses
determining the comparative importance of the secondary content in relation
to the primary content and, having determined that the gaming content to be
overlaid by the secondary content is not “an important gaming component”
or “important game information.” (i.e., is not more important than the
secondary content), presenting the secondary content overlapped or overlaid
(i.e., superimposed) over a portion of the primary content to a degree of
superimposition in accordance with the determination that the primary
content is not more important than the secondary content (i.e., in accordance
with the comparative importance of the secondary content). Thus, LeMay
discloses a system with a client configured to present “secondary content
superimposed over a portion of the primary content to a degree of
superimposition in accordance with the comparative importance of the
secondary content,” as called for in claim 9.
Moreover, as explained more fully below in our discussion of claim
15, LeMay discloses using a “priority system” to marshal limited
presentation resources, and presenting via a sliding or overlay of windows
transition, or other suitable transition, the ECI content superimposed over at
least a portion of the game interface content to a degree of superimposition
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in accordance with the degree of priority (i.e., importance) of the ECI
content in relation to the game interface content. LeMay, Figs. 5A, 5B; ¶¶
44, 325.
For the above reasons, Appellants do not apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 9 as anticipated by LeMay. Thus, we sustain
the rejection of claim 9 and its dependent claims 10, 11, and 14, for which
Appellants do not present any separate arguments for patentability. Appeal
Br. 16.
Claims 15–17, 19, and 20
Appellants argue that LeMay does not disclose a method as called for
in claim 15 comprising a step of “determining that the second presentation
priority, for the second content, is greater than the first presentation priority
for the first content by a degree of priority” or a step of “presenting the first
content superimposed over at least a portion of the second content to a
degree of superimposition in accordance with the degree of priority.”
Appeal Br. 17; id. at 33–34, Claims App. The Examiner relies on LeMay’s
paragraph 44 as disclosing use of presentation priority considerations in
making determinations regarding presentation of secondary (ECI) content.
Answer 17.
Paragraph 44 of LeMay points out that presentation resources for ECI
processes, such as available real estate on the display device without
interfering with the primary game, are limited, and discloses basing access to
such resources “on a priority system configured to maximize an optimal
gaming experience for each player.” By way of example, LeMay discloses
allotting a portion of the real estate of display 34, the entirety of which was
previously occupied by game interface 503, to ECI content 502, and
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transitioning the ECI onto the display “via a sliding window transition, via a
swapping of windows transition, via an overlay of windows transition, via a
scaling of windows transition, via one or more hidden windows or via any
suitable transition.” LeMay, ¶ 325. LeMay’s priority system clearly
determines that game interface 503 has a higher presentation priority relative
to ECI content 502, as illustrated by the relatively smaller proportion of
entire display 34 allotted to ECI content 502. Id. Figs. 5A, 5B. LeMay then
presents ECI content 502 via, for example, an overlay of windows transition,
i.e., by superimposition over at least a portion of primary game interface 503
during the transition. Thus, LeMay discloses presenting the ECI content
superimposed over at least a portion of the game interface content to a
degree of superimposition in accordance with the degree of priority.
For the above reasons, Appellants do not apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 15 as anticipated by LeMay. Thus, we sustain
the rejection of claim 15 and its dependent claims 16, 17, 19, and 20, for
which Appellants do not present any separate arguments for patentability.
See Appeal Br. 18.
Claims 1, 2, and 4–8
Appellants argue that Lemay does not disclose “comparing a plurality
of secondary wagering game content . . . to one or more user preferences
indicated in a profile for the wagering game player account” and “selecting
one of the plurality of secondary wagering game content based on the
comparing of the plurality of the secondary wagering game content to the
one or more user preferences,” as called for in claim 1. Appeal Br. 18–19;
id. at 29, Claims App. The Examiner relies on LeMay’s Figures 9A–9D and
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paragraphs 233, 237, 262, 330, 247, 257, and 362 as disclosing these steps.
Answer 8–9, 30.
We agree with the Examiner that LeMay discloses the steps in
question. In particular, as discussed above, LeMay discloses collecting
player’s preferences and information regarding a player’s interests and
gaming activities, and providing content targeted toward a group of players
with similar interests. LeMay, ¶ 319. For example, LeMay discloses
presenting tournament information to players who have shown an interest in
tournaments in the past. Id.; ¶ 262. LeMay also discloses presenting one or
more enhanced functions or features of the gaming machine to the player.
Id. ¶ 247. LeMay additionally discloses presenting advertising and attract
features personalized to an individual player’s preferences, based upon
information known about the player. Id. ¶ 330. In other words, LeMay
discloses selecting content targeted to a particular player (such as advertising
or tournament information) based on whether the content matches player
preferences indicated in the information collected for that player, which
collected information constitutes a player profile, and presenting the selected
content to the player.
For the above reasons, Appellants do not apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as anticipated by LeMay. Accordingly, we
sustain the rejection of claim 1 and its dependent claims 2 and 4–8, for
which Appellants do not present any separate arguments for patentability.
Appeal Br. 21.
Claim 3
Appellants argue that LeMay does not disclose presenting a
notification message “near the primary wagering game content with a degree
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of proximity that correlates with the closeness of the current time to the
scheduled time of occurrence for the scheduled event,” as called for in claim
3. Appeal Br. 21–22; id. at 30, Claims App. The Examiner relies on
LeMay’s paragraph 330 as disclosing this feature. Answer 11, 32.
Specifically, the Examiner finds that LeMay’s paragraph 330 “describes
advertising for a show providing show times and seat availability” and
asserts that “[c]learly this information is provided at a time before the show
which would give the player an opportunity to purchase tickets for the
upcoming show.” Id. at 32. The Examiner construes the claim term
“proximity to be a temporal proximity.” Id. According to the Examiner, “a
show that is close in time may be advertised rather than a show that is a
month away.” Id. For example, the Examiner points to LeMay’s illustration
of advertisement for events occurring at the Casino Players Club on March
21, 22, and 23, and presumes that the date this screen was presented to the
player is near March 21. Id.; see LeMay, Fig. 5B.
The Examiner’s position is untenable because (1) it is premised on an
unreasonable claim construction and (2) it is premised on presumptions of
facts not disclosed by LeMay. Applying the Examiner’s temporal proximity
construction, the last step of claim 3 would be read: presenting the
notification message near the primary wagering game content with a degree
of temporal proximity to the current time (or perhaps to the scheduled time
of occurrence of the event) that correlates with the closeness of the current
time to the scheduled time of occurrence for the scheduled event. Such a
step would make no sense. We construe the terms “near” and “proximity” in
the last step of claim 3 in terms of spatial location, and note that this
construction is consistent with the discussion of “proximity” in paragraphs
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11 and 88 of Appellants’ Specification. Moreover, the Examiner does not
point to any disclosure in LeMay to support the Examiner’s presumption that
the date on which the screen illustrated in Figure 5B was presented to the
player is near March 21, rather than a month or more earlier than the
indicated event dates, and instead relies on speculation. See Answer 32
(speculating that “[t]he logic in the gaming machine that evaluates the
importance of information presumably ranked the importance of events on
March 21, 22, and 23, higher than events scheduled for April 21, 22, and 23
or even March 24”).
For the above reasons, the Examiner fails to establish a sound factual
basis that LeMay anticipates the subject matter of claim 3. We do not
sustain the rejection of claim 3 as anticipated by LeMay.
Claims 21–23
Independent claim 21 recites a secondary content unit configured to,
in pertinent part,
determine a degree of closeness of the scheduled time of
occurrence to a system time associated with the wagering game
session; and
present the object in relation to wagering game content
with a degree of proximity that correlates with the degree of
closeness of the scheduled time of occurrence to the system
time.
Appeal Br. 36, Claims App.
The positions of Appellants and the Examiner are substantially the
same as for claim 3. Appeal Br. 23–24; Answer 33. Thus, for essentially
the same reasons discussed above in regard to claim 3, we do not sustain the
rejection of claim 21 and its dependent claims 22 and 23 as anticipated by
LeMay.
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Claims 24–26
Appellants argue that LeMay does not disclose “means for comparing
a first description of the non-gaming, user preference to second descriptions
associated with scheduled events that can be wagered upon” and “means for
selecting one of the scheduled events that relates to the non-gaming, user
preference based on the comparing of the first description to the second
descriptions,” as called for in claim 24. Appeal Br. 24–25; id. at 37, Claims
App. According to Appellants, similar arguments asserted against the
rejection of claim 1 apply to claim 24. Id. at 25. For the reasons discussed
above with regard to claim 1, these arguments do not apprise us of error in
the rejection of claim 24 as anticipated by LeMay.
We sustain the rejection of claim 24 and its dependent claims 25 and
26, for which Appellants do not present any separate arguments for
patentability. Id.

Obviousness based on LeMay and Chin
Claim 12
Appellants argue that LeMay and Chin fail to disclose a presentation
coordinator configured to “present a notification message . . . in proximity to
outcome displaying wagering game play elements, wherein the proximity is
relative to the urgency of the timing of the upcoming event,” as called for in
claim 12. Appeal Br. 27; id. at 32, Claims App. The Examiner’s position in
addressing this limitation is substantially the same as that of the Examiner in
addressing the similar “proximity” limitation in claims 3 and 21–23. The
Examiner’s application of Chin does not overcome the deficiency in the
Examiner’s position, as discussed above. Thus, for the reasons set forth
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above, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 12 as unpatentable over
LeMay and Chin.

Obviousness based on LeMay and Roemer
Claim 13
Appellants argue that Roemer does not cure the purported deficiencies
of LeMay vis-à-vis claim 9, from which claim 13 depends. Appeal Br. 26.
Having determined that Appellants’ arguments asserted for claim 9 fail to
demonstrate a deficiency in LeMay vis-à-vis claim 9, we likewise are not
apprised of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13. Accordingly, we
sustain the rejection of claim 13 as unpatentable over LeMay and Roemer.

DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–8 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.
We REVERSE the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 24–26 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement
requirement.
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–11, 14–
17, 19, 20, and 24–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by
LeMay.
We REVERSE the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 3 and 21–23
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by LeMay.
We REVERSE the Examiner’s decision rejecting claim 12 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over LeMay and Chin.
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We AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision rejecting claim 13 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over LeMay and Roemer.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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