Ex Parte GadelRabDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 29, 201612340120 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 29, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/340, 120 12/19/2008 29153 7590 03/02/2016 ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC. C/O Faegre Baker Daniels LLP 311 S. WACKER DRIVE Suite 4300 CHICAGO, IL 60606 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Serag M. GadelRab UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 00100.07.0144 8461 EXAMINER TSAI, SHENG JEN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2136 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/02/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): amddocketinternal@faegrebd.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SERAG M. GADELRAB Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 Technology Center 2100 Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ERIC S. FRii~Hl\1, and JEFFREY A. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judges. DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 STATEMENT OF CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-14 and 16-32, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. The claims are directed to a method and apparatus for reallocating memory content. Claims 1, 12, 13, 30, and 32, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for reallocating memory content comprising: copying data from a source memory region to a pending data queue; writing the data from the pending data queue to a destination memory region; executing a first \'l1rite request to a source memory region; duplicating the first write request to produce a duplicated write request; and executing a second write request to copy content that is the subject of the duplicated write request from the source memory region to the destination memory region. 12. A method for reallocating memory content compnsmg: executing programming that is operating using external memory; transferring operation of the programming from an external memory to an internal memory of a chip; prior to reducing power of the external memory, producing an internal translation look aside buffer (TLB) by storing a subset 2 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 or a modified subset of information in an entire translation look aside buffer (TLB) located in the external source memory that contains physical addresses, to the internal TLB; and reducing power of the external memory. 13. The method of claim 12 wherein producing the internal translation look aside buffer (TLB) prior to reducing power to the external memory comprises storing the subset or modified subset of physical addresses as at least one of: a hardware search tree or a hash table. 30. The method of claim 1, further including allowing data from the source memory region to expire from the pending data queue while the data from the source memory region is stored in the destination memory region. 32. The device of claim 23, wherein the operation transferred from the external memory to the internal memory is an operation previously operating on the external memory. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Reams Hsin et al. ("Hsin") Kopec et al. ("Kopec") Cheung et al. ("Cheung") US 6,438,660B1 US 2005/025177 6 Al US 2007 /0174584 Al US RE39,963 E 3 Aug.20,2002 Nov. 10, 2005 July 26, 2007 Dec. 25, 2007 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 Watanabe US 2008/0320260 Al Dec. 25, 2008 Applicant's Admission of Prior Art, Background of the invention section of the instant application (Spec. i-fi-f l-8)(hereinafter, "AAP A"). REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: Claims 12, 13, 30, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Claims 1and29-31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Watanabe. Claims 12, 13, 23, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over AAP A in view of Kopec. Claims 12, 13, 23, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kopec in vie\'l/ of Cheung. Claims 2--4 and 9-11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Watanabe in view of Kopec and Cheung. Claims 5-8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Watanabe in view of Kopec and Cheung, and further in view of Reams. Claims 14, 16-22, and 24--26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kopec in view of Cheung, and further in view of Reams. Claims 27 and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Watanabe in view of Hsin. 4 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 ANALYSIS Dependent claim 19 Appellant contends that the Examiner rejected the unamended claim language in the final rejection rather than the amended claim language. (App. Br. 19). The Examiner finds the evidence relied on to teach the limitations of the parent claims 14 and 18 also teaches the limitations of dependent claim 19. (Ans. 3-5). Appellant contends that the rejection was not properly presented in the Final Office Action. (Reply Br. 3). We note that Appellant's complaint regarding the late presentation of the rejection is a petitionable matter rather than an appealable matter. Appellant contends that "[t]he rejection of claim 19 provides no motivation for combining the teachings cited against claim 19 with the teachings of Kopec and Cheung." (Reply Br. 4). 1 Appellant does not identify any error in the combination as proffered by the Examiner with regards to the base combination. Nor does Appellant identify why the proffered motivation statement for the underlying claims would be inappropriate for dependent claim 19. (Reply Br. 3-5). Therefore, the rejection is properly before us, and we address it below. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph "[C]ompliance with the 'written description' requirement of§ 112 is a question of fact .... " Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 1 We note that the Reply Brief does not include pagination. We refer to the Reply Brief starting with the cover page "Response Brief' as page 1 and the "Table of Contents" as page 2. We further note that Appellant refers to both the Reply Brief and the Examiner's Answer as the "Response Brief." 5 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing in re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Utter v. Hiraga, 845 F.2d 993, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). A written "description must 'clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.'" Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en bane) (quoting Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563). "In other words, the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date." Id. (citing Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563). In order to satisfy the written description requirement, "the [original] specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed." Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. "[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date." Id. (citations omitted). One shows possession "by such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc. that fully set forth the claimed invention." Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We disagree with Appellant's general contentions that the claims are supported by an adequate written description to evidence possession at the time of the filing. (App. Br. 19-21; Reply Br. 5-8). We find Appellant's contentions to be based upon speculation and conjecture regarding what one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood at the time of the invention. Appellant has provided no factual evidence and identified no 6 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 express disclosures in the originally filed Specification to support Appellant's proffered argument. With respect to claim 30, Appellant's general contention regarding a hardware circular buffer does not evidence clear written description support for the method limitation regarding "allowing data from the source memory region to expire from the pending data queue." (App. Br. 20). The Examiner maintains that the term "expired" means "to end or terminate," which is not the same as Appellant asserts. (Ans. 5-9). Appellant has provided no factual evidence regarding the claim term "expire" and identified no express disclosures in the originally filed Specification to support Appellant's proffered argument. With respect to claims 32, 12, and 13, Appellant's general contention regarding the background of the Specification in paragraph 27 does not clearly evidence possession at the time of filing. (App. Br. 20-21 ). As a result, we find Appellant's arguments have not shown error in the Examiner's finding of a lack of written description support for dependent claim 32 and claims 13 and 32 not separately argued. 35 U.S.C. § 102 Claims 1 and 29-31 "In the patentability context, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretations. Moreover, limitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification." In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Any special meaning assigned to a term 7 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 "must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention." Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("A patentee may act as its own lexicographer and assign to a term a unique definition that is different from its ordinary and customary meaning; however, a patentee must clearly express that intent in the written description."). Absent an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the words take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art. Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). With respect to independent claim 1 and dependent claims 29-31, Appellant contends that "Watanabe is directed to a memory backup and mirroring system. Rather than switching operation locations, Watanabe is just a mirroring system where the original location of data stays in use and remains powered up." (App. Br. 21 ). Appellant further contends: The Office Action has shown parsing and executing a write request. There is no showing of duplicating a write request. There is certainly no showing of duplicating a write request where "every aspect of 'the duplicated write request,' including the write data, the source where the write data originates, and the recipient of the write data, [is] exactly the same as that of the original write request." (App. Br. 21). The Examiner generally maintains that the backup or mirroring of data as disclosed in the Watanabe reference is sufficient to re-create the data 8 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 and that the "Switching operation locations" is not relevant to the language of independent claim 1. (Ans. 10-16). Appellant distinguishes the write requests of the Watanabe reference from the claimed "duplicated write requests," recited in independent claim 1. (App. Br. 21-22; Reply Br. 8). We agree with Appellant's line of reasoning that the mirrored write requests described in Watanabe are not "duplicated write requests" because they refer to the backup locations and not the original locations. Consequently, we cannot sustain the anticipation rejection of independent claim 1 and dependent claims 29-31. 35 U.S.C. § 103 AAP A and Kopec Claims 12, 13, 23, and 32 With respect to independent claims 12 and 23, and dependent claims 13 and 32, Appellant argues the claims together and does not set forth separate arguments for patentability. As a result, we select independent claim 12 as the representative claim for the group and will address Appellant's arguments thereto. With respect to representative independent claim 12, Appellant contends that both AAP A and the Kopec reference do not teach or suggest the claimed "transferring operation of the programming from an external memory to an internal memory of a chip." (App. Br. 23-25). The Examiner maintains that "[t]hus, AAPA teaches both known software and known hardware approaches for moving applications/operations from an external memory to an internal memory." (Ans. 17). We note that paragraphs 4 and 5 of the AAP A disclose moving 9 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 an application, but "the application is stopped so there is an interruption of service for the user which is unacceptable." (Spec. i-f 5). While the AAPA discloses some drawbacks/trade-offs, Appellant's argument does not persuasively rebut the Examiner's conclusion it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to perform the prior art transfer of operation and using the TLB as taught and suggested by the Kopec reference. (App. Br. 23-25). Appellant argues that the Kopec reference fails to show transfer of ongoing operations, but it is the AAP A which the Examiner has relied upon to teach and suggest the transfer of operation. (Ans. 16-17). The Examiner addresses each of Appellant's arguments regarding the combination of the AAP A and the Kopec reference. (Ans. 16-21 ). Appellant contends that the Kopec reference is "akin to having a manufacturing space" as an analogy. (Reply Br. 8-9). We find Appellant's analogy to be unpersuasive to show error in the rejection as set forth by the Examiner. Consequently, we find Appellant's arguments do not show error in the Examiner's conclusion of obviousness of representative independent claim 12 and independent claim 23 and dependent claims 13 and 32 grouped therewith. Kopec and Cheung Claims 23, 12, 13, and 32 With respect to independent claims 12 and 23, and dependent claims 13 and 32, Appellant argues the claims together and does not set forth separate arguments for patentability. (App. Br. 26.) As a result, we select independent claim 23 as the representative claim. 10 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 Appellant relies upon the arguments advanced with respect to independent claim 12 above with regards to the combination of AAPA and the Kopec reference. (App. Br. 26). Specifically, Appellants contend "Kopec clearly fails to show transfer of ongoing operations. Relative to art that is using system memory, Kopec represents different placement of where that operation is occurring, but Kopec does not show a system actively moving an operation occurring on an external memory to an internal memory." (App. Br. 25). Appellants further contend regarding the translation look aside buffer (TLB) of the Kopec reference: (Id.). [T]he disclosed operations are internal, and external data is pulled in as necessary to allow continued internal operation. Again, the Office Action has cited no transfer of an active operation. The fact that data was stored externally does not require or make inherent that operations were external. Paragraph [0021] of Kopec makes clear that the operation is not moved. The Examiner maintains that the TLB reload operation of the Kopec reference teaches the transfer of the TLB function from the external memory to the internal memory. (Ans. 17-18). We disagree with the Examiner and find that two separate TLB functions are available and the data is reloaded for the internal operation rather than the claimed "transfer operation from the external memory to the internal memory." In the Answer, the Examiner has not responded to this separate and distinct rejection over this different combination of references. (Ans. 21). As a result, we cannot sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 12, 13, 23, and 32 based upon the Kopec and Cheung references. Watanabe, Kopec, Cheung, and Reams 11 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 Claims 2-11, 14, 16-22, and 24--28 With respect to claims 2--4 and 9-11, Appellant relies upon the arguments advanced with respect to claim 1. (App. Br. 27). The Examiner relies upon the rejection as set forth with respect to independent claim 1 and does not identify how the additional references remedy the noted deficiency above. (Ans. 22-23). As a result, we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 2--4 and 9-11 based upon obviousness. With respect to claims 5-8, Appellant relies upon the arguments advanced with respect to claim 1. (App. Br. 28). The Examiner relies upon the rejection as set forth with respect to independent claim 1 and does not identify how the additional references remedy the noted deficiency above. (Ans. 22-24). As a result, we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 5-8 based upon obviousness. With respect to claims 24--26, 14, and 16-22, the Examiner relies upon the prior art rejection of independent claim 23 based upon the combination of the Kopec and Cheung references. (Ans. 25; Final Act. 25- 28). Appellant relies upon the arguments advanced above with respect to independent claim 23 over the combination of the Kopec and Cheung references. (App. Br. 28-29). We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not adequately addressed independent claim 23. As a result, the Examiner has not addressed claims 24--26, 14, and 16-22 to evidence the obviousness thereof, and we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 24--26, 14, and 16-22. Watanabe and Hsin 12 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 With respect to claims 27 and 28, Appellant relies upon the arguments advanced with respect to independent claim 1. (App. Br. 29). The Examiner maintains the rejection as set forth with respect to independent claim 1 addressed above with respect to anticipation, but relies upon the Hsin reference regarding a computer readable medium and an integrated circuit design system. (Final Act. 28-29; Ans. 25). Because Appellant has not identified how the combination of references remedies the deficiency noted above with respect to independent claim 1, we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 27 and 28. CONCLUSIONS The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 12, 13, 30, and 32 based upon a lack of written description support. The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 and 29-31 as anticipated by Watanabe. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 12, 13, 23, and 32 based upon obviousness over the combination of AAP A and Kopec. The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 12, 13, 23, and 32 based upon obviousness over the combination of Kopec and Cheung; claims 2--4 and 9- 11 over the combination of Watanabe, Kopec, and Cheung; claims 5-8 over the combination of Watanabe, Kopec, Cheung, and Reams; claims 14, 16- 22, and 24--26 over the combination of Kopec, Cheung, and Reams; and claims 27 and 28 over the combination of Watanabe and Hsin. 13 Appeal2014-000084 Application 12/340, 120 DECISION For the above reasons, the Examiner's rejection of claims 12, 13, 30, and 32 based on a lack of written description support is sustained. The Examiner's rejection of claims 12, 13, 23, and 32 based upon obviousness over AAP A and Kopec is sustained. We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claims 1 and 29-31 as anticipated by Watanabe and the Examiner's various rejections of claims 2- 14, 16-28, and 32 over the various combinations of Watanabe, Kopec, Cheung, Reams, and/ or Hsin. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 14 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation