Ex Parte Foster

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 27, 2014

11554865 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte CHUCK FOSTER
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Appeal 2011-012432
Application 11/554,865
Technology Center 3600
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Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, ANTON W. FETTING, and
MICHAEL W. KIM, Administrative Patent Judges.

CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2011-012432
Application 11/554,865

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a final rejection of
claims 21, 22, 26, 29, 32, 42, 43, 45-49, 51-56, and 58-721. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

Exemplary Claim
Exemplary claim 60 reads as follows:
60. A method, comprising:
receiving an electronic order at a computer system,
wherein the electronic order specifies a good to be purchased
from a merchant on behalf of an entity by a customer associated
with the entity;
the computer system accessing privilege information
associated with the customer, wherein the privilege information
is indicative of a purchasing policy for the entity and includes a
first predefined restriction specifying a first type of good that
includes the good specified by the electronic order, wherein the
first predefined restriction includes information usable to
determine a point in time before which the customer is not
authorized to purchase the good specified by the electronic
order, and wherein the first predefined restriction does not
apply to goods other than the first type; and
based at least in part on the privilege information and the
good specified in the electronic order, the computer system
rejecting the electronic order.

1 Claims 1-4, 8, 9, 11, 25, 28, 31, and 34-39 also stand pending and rejected,
however, their rejection is not appealed. App. Br. 4. Appellant further
appeals the rejection of claim 44 (Id. at 4, 18, 24), however, Appellant does
not list claim 44 as pending (Id. at 4), and does not list claim 44 in the
Claims Appendix (Id. at 27). Moreover, the Examiner does not list claim 44
as pending or rejected (Ans. 3; Fin. Rej. 1-2 (mailed Jul. 1, 2010). On these
facts, we treat Appellant’s inclusion of claim 44 as an inadvertent,
typographical error.
Appeal 2011-012432
Application 11/554,865

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Rejections on Appeal
Claims 60, 62, 65, and 69 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Barnes (US 5,970,475; iss. Oct. 19, 1999).
Claims 1-3, 8, 11, 25, 28, 31, 37, and 38 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over King (US 2003/0212629 A1; pub. Nov. 13, 2003).
Claims 64 and 68 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated
by or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Barnes.
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over King and Barnes.
Claims 9 and 36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over King and Obrecht (US 7,630,919 B1; iss. Dec. 8, 2009).
Claims 34 and 35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over King.
Claim 39 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over King and Thomas (US 2002/0116318 A1; pub. Aug. 22, 2002).
Claims 21, 22, 26, 29, 32, 42, 43, 47-49, 51, 52, and 54-56 are
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Barnes and
Straumann (US 2003/0151493 A1; pub. Aug. 14, 2003).
Claims 45, 46, and 53 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Barnes, Straumann, and Barron (US 2004/0210531 A1;
pub. Oct. 21, 2004).
Claim 58 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Barnes, Straumann, and King.
Claim 59 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Barnes, Straumann, and Obrecht.
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Claims 61, 67, and 71 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Barnes and Official Notice.
Claim 63 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Barnes and King.
Claim 70 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Barnes and Obrecht.
Claims 66 and 72 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Barnes and Malik (US 2006/0218006 A1; pub. Sep. 28,
2006).
Appellant’s Contention
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 60
because the Examiner relies on two separate portions of the Barnes reference
to teach “privilege information.” Specifically Appellant argues:
the Examiner has shown two aspects of Barnes’s system:
• (A) That users have an “authorization level” that may “define
. . . the nature of the goods that the user can order and/or the
spending limit that each user has for purchasing.” See id. at col.
8, lines 36-47. And,
• (B) That Barnes’s servers use keys for secured
communication, and these keys may have a “date and time from
which [the] key is to be valid.” See, e.g., id. at col. 13, lines 30-
36 and id. at col. 16, lines 10-18.
(App. Br. 15).
Appellant also states:
in relying on these different features of Barnes as teaching the
“privilege information” of claim 60, the Examiner is in error.
(Reply Br. 4).

Appeal 2011-012432
Application 11/554,865

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Issue on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 60 as being obvious because
the cited references fail to suggest the argued limitations?

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner has erred.
As to Appellant’s above contention, we agree.
Claim 60 recites that the system assesses privilege information
associated with the customer that includes restrictions specifying the first
type of good and information usable to determine a point in time before
which the customer is not authorized to purchase the good specified. Barnes
discloses an authorization level for users that defines the nature of the goods
that the user can order and/or the spending limit that each user has for
purchasing. See col. 8, ll. 36-47. However, this portion of Barnes is not
related to a point in time before which the user is not authorized to purchase
goods.
Barnes also discloses that servers use keys for secured
communication, and these keys may have a “date and time from which [the]
key is to be valid.” See, e.g., id. at col. 13, ll. 30-36 and id. at col. 16, ll. 10-
18. (App. Br. 16). However, this disclosure is related to time and date
restrictions on communication between servers, not restrictions on when a
customer can purchase a good.
Therefore, we agree with the Appellant that Barnes does not disclose
privilege information that includes information usable to determine a point
in time before which the customer is not authorized to purchase the good
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Application 11/554,865

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specified, and certainly does not disclose rejecting an electronic order based
on the privilege information.
In view of the foregoing, we will not sustain the rejection of claim 60
and claims and claims 62, 65, and 69 dependent thereon as being anticipated
by Barnes.
We will likewise not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claims 21, 22, 26, 29, 32, 42, 43, 47-49, 51, 52, and 54-56 as being
unpatentable over Barnes in view of Straumann, because the Examiner relies
on Barnes for teaching privilege information that includes time restrictions
on purchases by the customer wherein a customer is authorized to purchase
goods during a first time period and a second time period. As we discussed
above, Barnes does not disclose time restrictions of the purchases by
customers.
As the Appellant has not appealed the remaining rejections, these
rejections are summarily affirmed, and the Examiner is authorized to cancel
those claims from the application. See Ex Parte Ghuman, 88 USPQ2d 1478,
1480 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) (“A withdrawal of the appeal as to some of
the claims on appeal operates as an authorization to cancel those claims from
the application . . . and the appeal continues as to the remaining claims”); see
also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1215.03 (8th ed.,
Rev. 9, Aug. 2012).

Appeal 2011-012432
Application 11/554,865

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DECISION
We reverse the following rejection of claims 60, 62, 65, and 69 as
being anticipated by Barnes and the rejection of claims 21, 22, 26, 29, 32,
42, 43, 47-49, 51, 52, and 54-56 as obvious in view of Barnes, further in
view of Straumann.
We affirm the remaining rejections.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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