Ex Parte Foo et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jun 24, 2009

10890791 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 24, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte CHEK-PENG FOO, HUAHN-FERN YEH, and PAUL LEO
SUMNER
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Appeal 2009-001451
Application 10/890,791
Technology Center 3600
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Decided: 1 June 24, 2009
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Before LINDA E. HORNER, STEVEN D.A. McCARTHY, and
STEFAN STAICOVICI Administrative Patent Judges.

STAICOVICI, Administrative Patent Judge

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, begins to run from the decided date
shown on this page of the decision. The time period does not run from the
Mail Date (paper delivery) or Notification Date (electronic delivery).

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Application 10/890,791

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Chek-Peng Foo et al. (Appellants) appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from
the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-16. We have jurisdiction over
this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2002).

THE INVENTION
The Appellants’ invention is drawn towards a method and apparatus
for controlling a vehicle’s occupant restraining device 14 (airbag), including
a crash sensor assembly 30 having crash acceleration sensors 32, 34, and 36,
forwardly located crush zone sensors 40, 42, and side crash acceleration
sensors 46, 48. Specification 1, ll. 10-11; Specification 7, ll. 9-21; 8, ll. 8-
10; 9, ll. 4-5 and 11-12; and fig. 1.
Claim 1 is representative of the claimed invention and reads as
follows:
1. An apparatus for controlling a vehicle actuatable
occupant restraining system comprising:

a discrimination crash sensor for sensing a vehicle crash
condition and providing a discrimination crash signal
indicative thereof;

a first crush zone sensor located at a first vehicle crush
zone location for providing a first crush zone signal
indicative of crash acceleration sensed by said first crush
zone sensor;

a second crush zone sensor located at a second vehicle
crush zone location for providing a second crush zone
signal indicative of crash acceleration sensed by said
second crush zone sensor;

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crush zone safing determining means monitoring said
first crush zone sensor and said second crush zone sensor
for providing a crush zone safing signal in response to
one of said first and said second crush zone sensors
signals exceeding a threshold and the other of said first
and said second crush zone sensors signals being faulty;
and

a controller monitoring the discrimination crash signal
and said crush zone safing signal for controlling an
actuatable restraining device in response thereto.

THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Gray US 5,620,202 Apr. 15, 1997
de Mersseman US 5,779,264 Jul. 14, 1998
Sakakida US 6,428,040 B2 Aug. 6, 2002
Ugusa US 6,728,604 B2 Apr. 27, 2004

The following rejections are before us for review:
The Examiner rejected claims 1-3, 5, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as anticipated by Gray.
The Examiner rejected claims 4, 6, and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gray and de Mersseman.
The Examiner rejected claims 8 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gray and Sakakida.
The Examiner rejected claims 9 and 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gray, Sakakida, and Ugusa.
The Examiner rejected claims 11-14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gray, Sakakida, and de Mersseman.
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THE ISSUE
Have the Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in interpreting the
limitation of a “crush zone location” as “an area that is compacted upon
impact”?

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We REVERSE.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The following enumerated findings of facts (FF) are supported by at
least a preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d
1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for
proceedings before the Office).
1. Gray teaches a supplemental inflatable restraint (SIR) system
including frontal air bags 10, a frontal accelerometer 12 for
sensing frontal impacts, a central controller having a
microprocessor 16, side sensors 18 each having a side
accelerometer 28 for sensing side impacts, and side air bags 20.
Gray, col. 3, ll. 30-36 and 55-56 and fig. 1.
2. In a frontal SIR system an accelerometer is used to sense the
vehicle deceleration, and a microprocessor evaluates the
accelerometer output to determine whether a bag mounted on
the steering wheel (driver’s side) or the dashboard (passenger
side) should be inflated. Gray, col. 1, ll. 19-23.
3. Similarly, in a side SIR system a side accelerometer on each
side of the vehicle responds to a side impact and a controller
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determines whether the air bag should be deployed. Gray, col.
1, ll. 30-33.
4. An important difference between the frontal and the side SIR
systems is the required response time. In a frontal SIR, because
of the distance between the front of the vehicle and the
passenger compartment, the response time can be significant.
However, in a side SIR, because impact occurs closer to the
passenger compartment, the response time is much shorter.
Gray, col. 1, ll. 34-40.
5. Based on FF 2-4, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the
art would have readily appreciated that the frontal
accelerometer 12 and the side accelerometers 28 of Gray have
different technical characteristics and need to meet different
technical requirements, because a side impact is different than a
frontal impact.
6. Those skilled in the art at the time of the invention understood a
“vehicle crush zone” to “include that portion of the front of the
vehicle which has crushed up to the time that [a] sensor
triggering is required” (U.S. Patent No. 5,326,133 to Breed et
al., issued Jul. 5, 1984, col. 1, ll. 64-67) (emphasis added). In
other words, the “crush zone of a vehicle” is the area “forward
of passenger compartment 12” (U.S. Patent No. 5,194,755 to
Rhee et al., issued Mar. 16, 1993, col. 2, ll. 55-60 and fig. 1).
See also, U.S. Patent 4,995,639 to Breed, issued Feb. 26, 1991,
col. 4, ll. 48-49 and fig. 1.

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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Claim Construction
When construing claim terminology in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification, reading claim language in
light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in
the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
We must be careful not to read a particular embodiment appearing in
the written description into the claim if the claim language is broader than
the embodiment. See Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d
870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The challenge is to interpret claims in view of the
specification without unnecessarily importing limitations from the
specification into the claims. See E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343
F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Anticipation
"A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference." Verdegaal Bros, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628,
631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Obviousness
It is elementary that to support an obviousness rejection all words in a
claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against
the prior art. In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970).

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OPINION
Each of independent claims 1, 8, 15, and 16 requires a first crush zone
sensor or a step of monitoring crash acceleration at a “first vehicle crush
zone location” and a second crush zone sensor or a step of monitoring crash
acceleration at a “second vehicle crush zone location.” The Examiner finds
that Gray teaches first and second crush zone accelerometers 28 located in
vehicle crush zones. Ans. 3 and 6. In other words, as far as we understand,
the Examiner takes the position that the side areas of the vehicle 12 of Gray,
which incorporate the side accelerometers 28, constitute a “first vehicle
crush zone location” and a “second vehicle crush zone location,” as required
by the Appellants’ claimed invention.
The Appellants argue that:
[T]he term “crush zone” is a term of art known to
those skilled in the automotive arts. The term
“crush zone” characterizes an area of a vehicle
designed to collapse during a vehicle collision in
an effort to absorb some of the impact from the
collision without impacting the driver space. On
the other hand, the side accelerometers 28
disclosed in Gray are mounted on the side of a
vehicle. Vehicle sides are not crush zones.
Rather, vehicle sides are reinforced to prevent
intrusion into the driver space.
App. Br. 10-11.
Pointing to the Specification, the Appellants further argue that:
[I]t would be clear to one skilled in the art that the
first and second crush zone sensors are located in
areas of the vehicle designed to collapse during an
impact, e.g. a front portion of the vehicle (See
Spec., Page 8, Line 19-Page 9, Line 3, and FIG. 3).
Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
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Specifically, the Specification states that the crush
zone sensors are preferably mounted at or near the
radiator location of the vehicle (See Spec. Page 8,
Lines 21-23).
Reply Br. 2 (emphasis added).

In response, the Examiner takes the position that:
A person having ordinary skill in the art would
interpret a crush zone to mean an area that is
compacted upon impact. This is exactly what
would happen upon the occurrence of a collision of
the vehicle with another object, especially if that
collision is on the side.
Ans. 7 (emphasis added).
At the outset, we note that the Examiner has not cited to any authority
to show the definition of the disputed term, namely, “crush zone.”
Similarly, the Appellants have not cited to any authority to show that the
disputed term is a term of art. Nonetheless, although we agree with the
Examiner that claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the Specification (Ans. 6), we note that the broadest
reasonable interpretation of the claims must also be consistent with the
interpretation that those skilled in the art would reach. In re Cortright, 165
F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
In this case, Gray teaches a frontal accelerometer 12 and side
accelerometers 28. FF 1. Further, Gray teaches that an important difference
between a frontal sensor and a side sensor of an SIR system is that the
response time of the side sensor is significantly shorter than that of the front
sensor because a side impact occurs much closer to the passenger
compartment than does a frontal impact. FF 2-4. Hence, we find that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have readily appreciated that
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although in both a front and a side impact, the areas are “compacted upon
impact,” a frontal impact area is different than a side impact area.
Moreover, the same person of ordinary skill in the art would have readily
appreciated that the frontal accelerometer 12 and the side accelerometers 28
of Gray have different technical characteristics and need to meet different
technical requirements, because a side impact is different than a frontal
impact. FF 5.
However, as noted above, the Examiner interprets a “crush zone” to
mean an “area that is compacted upon impact.” We conclude the
Examiner’s interpretation to be unreasonably broad. According to the
Examiner, a side impact is no different than a frontal impact because in
either situation an area is “compacted upon impact.” As such, in contrast to
the explicit teachings of Gray, according to the Examiner there is no
difference between a front sensor and a side sensor in an SIR system. We
find such an interpretation of the teachings of Gray to be factually incorrect.
Furthermore, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood a “vehicle crush zone” to “include that portion of the front of the
vehicle which has crushed up to the time that [a] sensor triggering is
required,” namely, an area “forward of [a] passenger compartment.” FF 6.
Emphasis added.
In conclusion, the Examiner has improperly interpreted the limitations
of a “first vehicle crush zone location” and a “second vehicle crush zone
location” to simply mean “an area that is compacted upon impact.” A
person of ordinary skill in the art, in light of the Specification, would have
readily interpreted the limitations of “first vehicle crush zone location” and a
“second vehicle crush zone location” to mean areas “forward of [a]
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passenger compartment” (FF 6), namely, portions located in front of the
vehicle, and not any vehicle area that is compacted upon impact, as
suggested by the Examiner.
Inasmsuch as we found that Gray does not teach a first crush zone
sensor or a step of monitoring crash acceleration at a “first vehicle crush
zone location” and a second crush zone sensor or a step of monitoring crash
acceleration at a “second vehicle crush zone location,” as required by each
of independent claims 1, 8, 15, and 16, Gray does not teach all the elements
of independent claims 1, 8, 15, and 16. Accordingly, the rejection of claim
1, and claims 2, 3, 5, and 15 depending from claim 1, under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Gray, cannot be sustained.
The Examiner relied on de Mersseman to teach filters and analog-to-
digital converters (Ans. 4), Sakakida to teach providing a crush zone safing
signal in response to one of said first and second crush zone sensor signals
exceeding a second threshold (Ans. 4), and Ugusa to teach determining a
moving average value of the first crush zone signal and the second crush
zone signal (Ans. 5). As such, with respect to claims 4, 6, 7-14, and 16, the
Examiner did not rely on the teachings of de Mersseman, Sakakida, and
Ugusa to make up for the deficiencies in Gray as discussed above. Hence
the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 4, 6, and 7 over Gray and
de Mersseman; of claims 8 and 16 over Gray and Sakakida; of claims 9 and
10 over Gray, Sakakida, and Ugasa; and of claims 11-14 over Gray,
Sakakida, and de Mersseman are also reversed.

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CONCLUSION
The Appellants have shown that the Examiner erred in interpreting the
limitation of a “crush zone location” as “an area that is compacted upon
impact.”

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-16 is reversed.

REVERSED

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