Ex Parte Fisk et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 18, 201713198373 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/198,373 08/04/2011 Frank C. FISK END920110078US1 7673 46583 7590 04/20/2017 Roberts Mlntknwski Safran Pole Rr PalHernn P P EXAMINER Intellectual Property Department P.O. Box 10064 MAPA, MICHAEL Y MCLEAN, VA 22102-8064 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2645 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/20/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@rmsc2.com lgallaugher@rmsc2.com dbeltran @ rmsc2. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte FRANK C. FISK, SRI RAMANATHAN, MATTHEW A. TERRY, and MATTHEW B. TREVATHAN Appeal 2016-006778 Application 13/198,373 Technology Center 2600 Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, AMBER L. HAGY, and PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges. WINSOR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of claims 1—8, 10-17, and 19—29, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 9 and 18 are cancelled. Final Act. 2. We affirm. 1 The real party in interest identified by Appellants is International Business Machines Corporation. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2016-006778 Application 13/198,373 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ disclosed invention “relates to mobile devices, and more particularly, to . . . preventing and/or limiting use of mobile devices.” Spec. 11. Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows: 1. A method, comprising: receiving, by a mobile device, a message from a transmitter indicating that the mobile device is in a certain location within one of a plurality of short range fields, wherein the message includes both location attribute information and a state of events currently occurring at the certain location, and the location attribute information describes attributes associated with the one of the plurality of short range fields; forwarding the message, by the mobile device, including both the location attribute information and the state of events, to a security manager located on a network; receiving, by the mobile device, a user-configured security policy selected and sent by the security manager based on the location attribute information and the state of events; changing a present user-configured security policy on the mobile device to the received user-configured security policy on the mobile device; and at least one of disabling and enabling, by the mobile device, one or more functions of the mobile device based on the received user-configured security policy set for the attributes associated with the one of the plurality of short range fields, wherein the received user-configured security policy includes one or more functionalities for the at least one of disabling and enabling the one or more function of the mobile device, and wherein the state of events currently occurring includes a velocity of a vehicle and an indication of whether an emergency has been currently detected at the certain location. 2 Appeal 2016-006778 Application 13/198,373 The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims: Claims 1—6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 22, 23, 26, and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 35 U.S.C. 103(a)2 as being unpatentable over Tadayon et al. (hereinafter “Tadayon”) and Tibbitts et al. (hereinafter “Tibbitts”). See Final Act. 7-25. Claims 7, 11, 15—17, 19, 24, and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tadayon, Tibbitts, Rao, and Nakamura et al. (hereinafter “Nakamura”). See Final Act. 25—48. Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tadayon, Tibbitts, and Stem et al. (hereinafter “Stem”). See Final Act. 48-49. Claims 20 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tadayon, Tibbitts, and Rao. See Final Act. 49—56. Claims 28 and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tadayon, Tibbitts, and Kelly et al. (hereinafter “Kelly”). See Final Act. 56—59. Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Briefs (“App. Br.” filed Dec. 29, 2015; “Reply Br.” filed June 21, 2016) and the Specification (“Spec.” filed Aug. 4, 2011) for the positions of Appellants 2 All rejections are under the provisions of 35 U.S.C. in effect prior to the effective date of the Feahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, i.e., “pre- AIA.” See Final Act. 6. Stem et al. Rao Nakamura et al. Kelly et al. Tadayon et al. Tibbitts et al. US 2003/0008662 Al US 2004/0210752 Al US 2010/0017411 Al US 2010/0233959 Al US 2011/0105097 Al US 2012/0244883 Al Jan. 9, 2003 Oct. 21,2004 Jan. 21,2010 Sept. 16,2010 May 5, 2011 Sept. 27, 2012 3 Appeal 2016-006778 Application 13/198,373 and the Final Office Action (“Final Act.” mailed Aug. 6, 2015) and Answer (“Ans.” mailed Apr. 21, 2016) for the reasoning, findings, and conclusions of the Examiner. Only those arguments actually made by Appellants have been considered in this decision. Arguments that Appellants did not make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2015). ISSUES Based on Appellants’ arguments, we discuss the appeal by reference to claims 1, 28, and 29. The issues presented by Appellants’ arguments are as follows: Does the Examiner err in finding the combination of Tadayon and Tibbitts teaches or suggests “[a] message .. . including ... the state of events [currently occurring], . . . wherein the state of events currently occurring includes a velocity of a vehicle and an indication of whether an emergency has been currently detected at the certain location,” as recited in claim 1? Does the Examiner err in finding the combination of Tadayon, Tibbitts, and Kelly teaches or suggests “the emergency being currently detected at the current location comprises a vehicle accident being currently detected at the current location,” and “the vehicle accident being currently detected at the current location comprises detecting that a vehicle air bag has been deployed at the current location,” as recited in claims 28 and 29 respectively? 4 Appeal 2016-006778 Application 13/198,373 ANALYSIS We have reviewed Appellants’ arguments and contentions (App. Br. 8—38; Reply Br. 3—19) in light of the Examiner’s findings (Final Act. 7—11, 57—59) and explanations (Ans. 2—14) regarding claims 1, 28, and 29. We agree with the Examiner’s findings and explanations and, except as set forth below, we adopt them as our own. The following discussion, findings, and conclusions are for emphasis. Claim 1 Appellants’ position is as follows: Tadayon does not disclose that “the state of events currently occurring includes a velocity of a vehicle and an indication of whether an emergency has been currently detected at the certain location”. In fact, Tadayon only appears to disclose an emergency message being received at a location in a car. Therefore, Tadayon does not disclose an indication that an emergency has been currently detected at the certain location. Tadayon only discloses a general emergency message without disclosing any specific information regarding whether an emergency has been currently detected at the certain location. App. Br. 11 (discussing Tadayon H 92, 109, 179, 192). Appellants further contend Tibbitts does not cure the deficiencies of Tadayon. App. Br. 11—12. We are not persuaded of error. It is not disputed that Tadayon teaches communicating vehicle status to a remote entity/server (i.e., “security manager” (claim 1)), that in turn communicates with a mobile device to modify a feature on the mobile device or to take other action. See Tadayon 191. Tadayon further teaches that information sent to and processed by the security manager may include location information from a GPS system. See id. 1135. Tadayon also teaches that any condition can be applied to the logic to the security manager “as long as there is a sensor or device to detect 5 Appeal 2016-006778 Application 13/198,373 that condition.” Id. 1143. Tibbitts and Tadayon both teach that signals for control of a mobile device may be obtained by direct connection to vehicle sensor systems (Tibbitts 1106; Tadayon 192). One of ordinary skill in the art considering Tibbitts and Tadayon would have known that one of the vehicle sensor signals typically found in a vehicle is from an “air bag deployed]” sensor (see, e.g., Kelly 18—193), which is at least indicative of an accident — an emergency condition (accord Spec. 1 33). Tadayon teaches that “[ejmergency condition rules may override all others, in terms of police calling or 911-calls, or any forward calls, showing the Context or Content flag (as a header information) as being the emergency type.” Tadayon 1192. Tadayon’s teaching regarding emergency conditions is explained in more detail as follows: In one embodiment, upon occurrence of other events (e.g., an emergency event indicated by a signal/input to the mobile device), the disabled or limited feature of the mobile device is restored. In one embodiment, when user dials an emergency number or the mobile device enters an emergency mode, the disabled or limited feature of the mobile device is restored. Id. ^ 41 (emphasis added). One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that, in order for a remote entity/server implementing the logic (id. 191) to provide the signal/input to the mobile device, the remote entity/server necessarily receives information indicative of an emergency situation, such as from a sensor in the vehicle (see id. H 92, 143; Tibbitts 1106). 3 We refer here to Kelly to explain what the person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from the teachings of Tadayon and Tibbitts. 6 Appeal 2016-006778 Application 13/198,373 “[T]he test [for obviousness] is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Therefore, “one cannot show non obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on combinations of references.” Id. at 426. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that Tadayon, when combined with Tibbitts, teaches, or at least suggests “[a] message . . . including ... the state of events [currently occurring], . . . wherein the state of events currently occurring includes a velocity of a vehicle and an indication of whether an emergency has been currently detected at the certain location,” as recited in claim 1. Turning to Appellants’ contention that the Examiner improperly imports limitations from the Specification into the claims {see, e.g., Reply Br. 4 (citing MPEP § 2103) we see nothing in the Examiner’s findings and conclusions that indicate the Examiner has imported un-recited limitations from the Specification. Furthermore, in view of our findings and conclusions discussed supra, we find unpersuasive Appellants’ contention that “Tadayon does not relate to the Appellants’] claimed invention because Tadayon is directed toward automatically restricting the texting ability of a mobile device, which is different from providing an indication of whether an emergency has been currently detected at the certain location” (Reply Br. 3). Indeed, Appellants’ Specification states that Appellants’ invention relates to “preventing and/or limiting use of mobile devices” (Spec. 11) such as texting (see id. 12). Appellants do not persuade us of error in the rejection of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1. Appellants argue the 7 Appeal 2016-006778 Application 13/198,373 patentability of independent claims 15 (App. Br. 16—20), 20 (App. Br. 26— 30), 22 (App. Br. 12—14), and 24 (App. Br. 20-25) utilizing substantially the same arguments as presented for claim 1 (see App. Br. 8—12) and additionally arguing that neither Rao nor Nakamura cures the alleged deficiencies of Tadayon and Tibbitts (App. Br. 20, 24, 30). We find these arguments unpersuasive for the reasons discussed supra for claim 1 and sustain the rejections of claims 15, 20, 22, and 24. Appellants do not separately argue with particularity the patentability of claims 1—8, 10-14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, and 25—27, which variously depend, directly or indirectly, from claims 1, 15, 20, 22, and 25. See generally App. Br. 8—38. Therefore, for the same reasons as discussed for the independent claims, we sustain the rejections of claims 1—8, 10-14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, and 25—27. Claims 28 and 29 Appellants contend as follows: “. . . Kelly only appears to disclose vehicle faults and vehicle air bag deployment codes, and limiting functionality based on an evaluation of movement parameter and/or vehicle diagnostic information. Therefore, Kelly does not disclose the emergency comprising a vehicle accident being currently detected at the current location.” App. Br. 34 (discussing claim 28) (emphasis omitted). Appellants further contend “Kelly does not disclose the emergency comprising detecting that a vehicle air bag has been deployed at the current location.” App. Br. 38 (discussing claim 29). We are not persuaded of error. As pointed out by the Examiner, the rejection is based on the combination of Tadayon, Tibbitts, and Kelly. See Ans. 11—12 (citing Keller, 642 F.2d at 425—26; In re Merck Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). One of ordinary skill in the art would 8 Appeal 2016-006778 Application 13/198,373 have understood air bag deployment to be indicative of the occurrence of an accident. The Examiner explains, and we agree, that Kelly discloses that the functionality of the mobile device can be modified based on a number of parameters including speed and air bag deployment codes (i.e. claimed vehicle accident) and since the combination of Tadayon in view of Tibbits [sic] discloses a server receiving information corresponding to an emergency message together with the velocity and location information within the vehicle, then one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the emergency message could be directed towards a vehicle accident indicated by] the air bag deployment codes. Ans. 13. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Tadayon, Tibbitts, and Kelly teaches or suggests “the emergency being currently detected at the current location comprises a vehicle accident being currently detected at the current location,” and “the vehicle accident being currently detected at the current location comprises detecting that a vehicle air bag has been deployed at the current location,” as recited in claims 28 and 29 respectively. Appellants do not persuade us of error in the rejection of claims 28 and 29; we, therefore, sustain the rejection of claims 28 and 29. DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1—8, 10—17, and 19—29 is affirmed. 9 Appeal 2016-006778 Application 13/198,373 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation